F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 12 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 96-2184
v. (Dist. of New Mexico)
(D.C. No. CR-94-721-9-JC)
ELENO OSORIO-SOTO,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS and MURPHY,
Circuit Judges.
Eleno Osorio-Soto, Cipriano Zamudio, and Alfredo Pando were tried jointly
and each convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than
five kilograms of cocaine. Osorio-Soto appeals his conviction claiming that
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(1) the trial court improperly admitted hearsay statements by Zamudio and Pando
through the testimony of former codefendant Jose Megallon and (2) there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
In November 1994, authorities found over 500 pounds of cocaine in a
hidden compartment of a trailer. Subsequent investigation revealed that Jose
Megallon had leased the trailer. In January 1995, Megallon voluntarily went to a
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office after being contacted by police.
He provided federal agents with a statement and agreed to cooperate by allowing
the agents to tape conversations between him and other alleged conspirators.
Megallon pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreed to testify for the
government at the trial of Osorio-Soto, Zamudio, and Pando. Through
Megallon’s testimony, the government introduced and played three conversations
which were taped while Megallon was cooperating with the DEA: a January 26,
1995 conversation between Megallon and Zamudio; a February 14, 1995 phone
conversation between Megallon and Pando; and a February 22, 1995 conversation
between Megallon and Zamudio. Additionally, the jury was provided with
English transcripts of the taped conversations, which were primarily in Spanish.
Zamudio, Pando, and Osorio-Soto did not testify at trial. The only evidence
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linking Osorio-Soto to the conspiracy was the testimony of Megallon and the
taped conversations between Megallon and codefendants Zamudio and Pando.
DISCUSSION
During trial, Osorio-Soto objected to the admission of the three taped
conversations and the transcripts of those conversations on hearsay grounds. The
trial judge ruled that the tapes and transcripts were admissible as coconspirator
statements. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “A
statement is not hearsay if . . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . .
. a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.” A court may admit evidence under this rule only if it determines
“by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the
declarant and the defendant were both members of the conspiracy; and (3) the
statements were made during the course of, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy.”
United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Urena, 27 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994).
Osorio-Soto argues that the taped statements and transcripts were
improperly admitted because the statements were not made during the course of
the conspiracy nor were they in furtherance of the conspiracy. This court reviews
the district court’s findings that particular statements were made during the
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course and in furtherance of a conspiracy for clear error. See United States v.
Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 1995), opinion supplemented on rehearing,
80 F.3d 1466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 265 (1996); Williamson, 53 F.3d
at 1517; Urena, 27 F.3d at 1490. The district court’s decision to admit evidence
under the coconspirator exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Olivo,
69 F.3d at 1066; Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1517.
For the taped conversations and transcripts to be admissible, the
government was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statements were made both “during the course” and “in furtherance of” the
conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see also United States v. Perez, 989
F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (discussing the importance of both
requirements). “A coconspirator statement is made ‘during the course’ of the
conspiracy if it is made before ‘“the objectives of the conspiracy have either
failed or been achieved.”’” Owens, 70 F.3d at 1126 (quoting Perez, 989 F.2d at
1579 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note)); see also
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949) (holding declaration
made after conspiracy’s “objectives either had failed or had been achieved” was
inadmissible because it was not made pursuant to and in furtherance of the
conspiracy). Statements made to conceal criminal conduct after the main
objective of the conspiracy has either failed or been achieved are not admissible
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as coconspirator statements. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 616-18
(1953); Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 443-44; Perez, 989 F.2d at 1579; United States v.
Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 81 (1970) (“It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay
exception that allows evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to
be admitted against his fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made
in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent
period when the conspirators were engaged in nothing more than concealment of
the criminal enterprise.”).
In this case, the cocaine was seized by the government on November 16,
1994. While the indictment alleged a conspiracy from “on or about the 1st day of
August, 1994 to on or about the 28th day of February, 1995,” the government
never alleged the conspiracy involved any drug quantities beyond those seized in
November 1994 nor were any additional drug transactions alleged. Cf. Lutwak,
344 U.S. at 616-17 (holding declaration to conceal crime was outside scope of
conspiracy even though indictment alleged conspiracy to conceal). This case is
therefore distinguishable from those involving continuing drug transactions. The
seizure of the drugs in November 1994 ended the conspiracy because it was no
longer possible for conspirators to achieve their objectives. The taped
conversations, however, did not occur until January and February of 1995, over
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two months after the government had seized the cocaine and successfully
prevented completion of the conspiracy objectives. Under these facts, the district
court’s finding that the taped conversations occurred during the course of the
conspiracy was clearly erroneous. 1 Cf. Silverstein, 737 F.2d at 867 (holding
coconspirator’s declaration, made several weeks after central objective of
conspiracy was attained, inadmissible because it was not made during
conspiracy). Because the conversations did not occur “during the course” of the
conspiracy, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
against Osorio-Soto.
Osorio-Soto’s second contention is that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of conspiracy. Having ruled that the taped conversations and
transcripts were improperly admitted against Osorio-Soto, this court must
1
The government’s reliance on United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500
(10th Cir. 1995), is misplaced. In Williamson, the defendant was involved in a
continuing conspiracy to distribute cocaine from approximately January 1986 to
October 1991, with the exception of a seven-month period from the fall of 1988
to the spring of 1989, in which drug operations ceased because of a related
investigation. See id. at 1507-08. The challenged statements in Williamson were
made in October 1990 and January 1991 and, therefore, “were well within the
time frame of the conspiracy at issue.” Id. at 1520. The important question in
Williamson, therefore, was not whether the statements occurred during the time
frame of the conspiracy but whether they furthered the objectives of the
conspiracy. See id. at 1520-21 (holding that statements which relate to (1) the
identity and roles of coconspirators; (2) avoiding detection by law enforcement
officers; (3) allying the fears and suspicions of individuals; and (4) inducing
future involvement in the conspiracy may all be “in furtherance of” a conspiracy).
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consider whether, in the absence of the taped conversations and transcripts, there
was sufficient evidence to convict Osorio-Soto.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de
novo, United States v. Grimes, 967 F.2d 1468, 1472 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 927 (1992), and ask only whether, taking the evidence--
“both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom”--in the light most favorable to the government, a
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Urena, 27 F.3d at 1489 (quoting United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531
(10th Cir. 1986)); see also Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1514. This court “cannot
sustain a conspiracy conviction if the evidence does no more than create a
suspicion of guilt or amounts to a conviction resulting from piling inference on
top of inference.” United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1991);
accord United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1564 (10th Cir. 1992).
To support a conviction of conspiracy, “the government must prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that two or more persons agreed to violate the law, that the
defendant knew at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it, and that the alleged
coconspirators were interdependent.” Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1516 (internal
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 864-65 (10th
Cir. 1995).
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While the testimony at trial clearly established that Osorio-Soto knew the
other codefendants 2 and was involved in legitimate business transactions with
Megallon, the only evidence the government presented linking Osorio-Soto to the
conspiracy, excluding the inadmissible hearsay, was the testimony of Megallon
regarding a meeting which occurred at a tire shop. Megallon testified that when
he arrived at the tire shop, he met up with Osorio-Soto who told him, “Go over
there, because Shorty [Pando] wants to talk to you.” Megallon testified that when
he went to where Pando and Zamudio were, they started “talking, talking, and
talking about things related to drugs and everything.” He testified that both
Pando and Zamudio asked him to participate in the conspiracy by renting a trailer.
He then stated that Osorio-Soto came over and when Osorio-Soto approached,
Pando said, “No, no, no. There’s no problem. You already know about this.”
Contrary to the government’s assertion, this evidence is insufficient to
show Osorio-Soto was a participant in the conspiracy. Megallon testified that
Pando and Zamudio invited him to join the conspiracy. This conversation
occurred outside Osorio-Soto’s presence.
Read in the light most favorable to the government, the most a jury could
infer from Pando’s statement was that Osorio-Soto had knowledge of the
Megallon testified that Osorio-Soto had a familial association with
2
Zamudio and a business association with Pando.
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conspiracy. The government, however, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt not
only that Osorio-Soto knew the objectives of the conspiracy, but also that he
knowingly and voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy. See Anderson, 981
F.2d at 1564 (“‘[T]he Government was required to show, by clear and
unequivocal evidence, [defendant’s] knowledge that the object of the conspiracy
was the distribution of marijuana, and his agreement to cooperate in achieving
that object.’” (quoting United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added))). “Mere knowledge of illegal activity . . . does not by itself
establish that a person has joined in the grand conspiracy.” United States v.
Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 670 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Riggins, 15
F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that even if defendant knew her mother
and sister were hiding drugs in van, defendant’s presence in the van was
insufficient to establish she “knowingly and voluntarily became part of the
conspiracy”). Likewise, mere association with conspirators is insufficient to
support a conspiracy conviction. See Jones, 44 F.3d at 866. “One does not
become a participant in a conspiracy merely by associating with conspirators
known to be involved in crime. One must agree to participate in order to be
convicted for conspiracy.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Anderson, 981 F.2d at
1564, Evans, 970 F.2d at 669; Horn, 946 F.2d at 741.
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The testimony of Megallon regarding the conversation at the tire shop is
insufficient to establish Osorio-Soto knowingly and voluntarily became a
participant in the conspiracy. Megallon’s testimony, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, at most established that Osorio-Soto had some
knowledge of the conspiracy. Knowledge of the conspiracy and association with
conspirators, however, is insufficient to convict Osorio-Soto.
The government does not cite any other evidence in the record showing
Osorio-Soto agreed to participate in the conspiracy. After de novo review of the
record, we find no other evidence from which a jury could infer that Osorio-Soto
knowingly and voluntarily became a participant in the conspiracy. There was thus
insufficient evidence to convict Osorio-Soto of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 3
3
Having concluded there was insufficient evidence to convict Osorio-Soto
after excluding the inadmissible hearsay, we need not consider his argument that
admission of the taped conversations and transcripts violated his confrontation
rights.
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For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and VACATE the conviction of
Eleno Osorio-Soto and REMAND to the district court for action consistent with
this opinion.
Judge McWilliams dissents.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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