F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 13 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROXANA PEREDA-ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 97-9508
(Petition for Review)
IMMIGRATION & (No. A73 373 021)
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) finding her deportable and denying her request for
asylum or withholding of deportation. 1 A stay of deportation was earlier granted
pending the outcome of this petition for review. Our jurisdiction over this matter
arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), 2 and we affirm.
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States on
May 30, 1992, as a visitor. In August of 1994, she was taken into custody by the
INS and charged with deportability. Petitioner denied deportability, and
subsequently filed an application for asylum. Following a hearing that concluded
on April 18, 1995, the immigration judge (IJ) issued an oral decision finding
petitioner deportable and ineligible for asylum. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) summarily affirmed that decision for the reasons given by the IJ.
1
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, alters the availability, scope, and
nature of judicial review in INS cases. Because petitioner’s deportation
proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, IIRIRA’s permanent “new rules”
do not apply to this case. See id. § 309(c)(1). However, because the order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals was filed more than thirty days after IIRIRA’s
September 30, 1997 date of enactment, IIRIRA’s “transitional rules” apply. See
id. § 309(c)(4); Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1997). None of the
transitional rules bar petitioner from seeking judicial review of the INS’s final
order in this case.
2
Section 1105a was repealed by § 306(b) of IIRIRA. However, that repeal is
not effective in cases such as this one where the transitional rules are in effect.
See IIRIRA § 309(c).
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Where, as here, the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision.
See Panrit v. INS, 19 F.3d 544, 546 (10th Cir. 1994).
A. Deportability
The IJ found petitioner deportable on the grounds that she was excludable
at the time of entry because she did not possess a valid immigrant visa and
because she procured her entry with fraudulent documents. In so concluding, he
relied on the testimony of an INS special investigator who interviewed petitioner
after she was taken into custody. The investigator testified that, when he asked
petitioner how she entered the United States, she told him that she bought
someone else’s passport for $2000 through an unknown agency in Lima, Peru and
that her picture was “photo substituted.” R. at 72. His testimony conformed to
information on a form I-213 (“Record of Deportable Alien”), see id. at 214, which
he prepared following the interview. The IJ discredited petitioner’s testimony
that the passport was her own, and that the $2000 payment to an agency in Lima
was made on her behalf by relatives for her tickets and a visa.
“The government in deportation proceedings must establish its allegations
by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.’” Solis-Muela v. INS, 13 F.3d
372, 375 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)).
We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings to
determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. See id.
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In her petition for review, petitioner challenges the quality of the evidence
underlying the IJ’s finding of deportability. First, she questions the reliability of
the information contained in the I-213 due to the circumstances under which the
form was completed. 3 The IJ based his finding, however, not on the I-213 itself,
but on the investigator’s testimony, simply noting that the I-213 conformed to his
testimony. Furthermore, the record does not support the statement in petitioner’s
brief that, in testifying, the investigator “relied largely upon the written
statements” on the form. Petitioner’s Br. at 12. Upon inquiry, the investigator
specifically testified that he had an independent recollection of the interview and,
in particular, of petitioner’s admission as to the photo-substituted passport. See
R. at 77-78 (“It’s not often that I hear somebody tell me that, you know, they had
a photo-substituted passport. Something like that usually sticks in the mind pretty
well.”). Petitioner does directly challenge the reliability of the agent’s testimony
as well, claiming that it was “subject to minor inconsistencies.” Petitioner’s Br.
3
Petitioner’s brief suggests that the circumstances give rise to the specter of
possible difficulties in communication and possible errors in transcription. In
particular, she notes (1) that the investigator admitted he was not fluent in
Spanish and she is not fluent in English, and (2) that the investigator generated
the official I-213 on a computer following the interview on the basis of an I-213
he completed by hand (in what the investigator characterized as “pretty bad”
handwriting, id. at 74) during the interview.
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at 12. However, her single example cannot even be fairly characterized as an
inconsistency.
Petitioner also challenges the IJ’s decision to accept the investigator’s
testimony while discrediting her own. She argues that the IJ’s rationale for
questioning her veracity is against the weight of the evidence, suggesting in her
brief that his only basis for doing so was her proficiency in English at the time of
the hearing. We do not agree with this exegesis of the IJ’s credibility
determination. While the IJ does appear to rely on petitioner’s apparent
proficiency in English to support his conclusion that a misunderstanding during
the interview was unlikely, he also found it “difficult to believe that the
[investigator] would simply pull this out of the air.” R. at 49. This conclusion is
supported by the record. See id. at 73 (investigator’s testimony that “[i]t doesn’t
do [him] any good to falsify a form like this.”). Furthermore, the IJ specifically
found that “[t]he [investigator] appeared to be credible and businesslike in his
report and in his testimony.” “[B]ecause the immigration judge is in the best
position to evaluate an alien’s testimony, his or her credibility determinations are
to be given much weight.” Dulane v. INS, 46 F.3d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (further quotation
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omitted)). We see no reason on this record not to accept the IJ’s credibility
determination. 4
Finally, petitioner argues that the evidence relied upon by the IJ is hearsay
and, as such, should not be regarded as sufficient to establish deportability.
Assuming, without deciding, that petitioner correctly characterizes the evidence
as hearsay, we note that “evidentiary rules are not strictly applied at immigration
hearings.” Bauge v. INS, 7 F.3d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993). “The test for
admissibility of evidence in a deportation hearing is whether the evidence is
probative and whether its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien
of due process of law.” Id. (quotation omitted). We conclude that the evidence in
question here was probative and its introduction was not fundamentally unfair.
Therefore, the IJ did not err in relying on it.
B. Asylum
To be eligible for asylum, petitioner must first establish that she is a
refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). See Rezai v. INS, 62 F.3d 1286, 1289
4
Petitioner argues that the judge did not have to conclude that only one of
the parties was credible, but instead could have reconciled the testimony “[b]y
accepting the proposition that a simple misunderstanding occurred at the initial
interview or that a drafting error had crept into the computer-generated version of
the form when the agent transferred his notes.” Appellant’s Br. at 13-14. While
it may be true that the testimony could have been reconciled, it is not relevant to
our review.
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(10th Cir. 1995). To do that, she “must prove either past ‘persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702,
706 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). “Fear of persecution is
well-founded if it is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. The
objective component requires [petitioner] to show a ‘reasonable possibility of
actually suffering . . . persecution if [she] were to return’ to the country of
persecution.” Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations
and quotation omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is a
refugee. See Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 647 (10th Cir. 1995); see
also Rezai, 62 F.3d at 1289 (alien “must present specific, credible evidence to
support his claim that he has been persecuted or will be persecuted if deported”).
The basis of petitioner’s asylum claim is her alleged fear of persecution by
the Shining Path. In support of her application, petitioner testified that she and
others in her family were longtime members of the Partido Aprista Peroano, a
political party known for its opposition to the Shining Path. She said that for
nearly seven years, she attended a university in Lima that was affiliated with the
Partido Aprista, where she was active in the party and in the Affiliated Center of
Visitation, a group that spoke out against the Shining Path and encouraged other
students to join the Partido Aprista. She testified that her group was threatened
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by the Shining Path, and she recalled the Shining Path taping dynamite to the
doors to prevent people from attending the group’s lectures and meetings.
Petitioner further testified that, following her graduation, she taught school in her
home village outside of Lima, where she continued to speak out in opposition to
the Shining Path. Petitioner said that at the beginning of April in 1992, she
received a threat from the Shining Path at her home, a note which said “[i]f you
continue talking and if you continue teaching, you will be killed.” R. at 96.
Petitioner testified that she reported the threat to police and subsequently went
into hiding for twenty-two days before coming to the United States.
The IJ concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear
of persecution. He found that petitioner failed to show a fear of persecution that
was nationwide, reasoning that
[petitioner’s] fear of persecution was in a small village which was
rather primitive and which was in a remote location where
government forces did not have much influence. The Shining Path
did have influence. If the respondent were to change her teaching
career and live in Lima or another city where there was military
presence and a stronger police presence, it is quite unlikely that she
would have to suffer such threats.
R. at 54. The IJ also noted that there were “some problems in the credibility of
the case,” citing petitioner’s failure to file for asylum until after she was arrested
by immigration officers more than two years after her arrival in the United States,
and a letter from the school where petitioner was employed which indicates that
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petitioner worked right up until she left the country. Finally, the IJ noted that
petitioner did not give any corroborating evidence of her political affiliation and
she had not shown that the Peruvian government is unwilling or unable to protect
her in other areas of the country.
The IJ’s finding that petitioner is not eligible for asylum “must be upheld if
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)
(quotation omitted). Reversal is appropriate only if the evidence presented is
“such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear
of persecution existed.” Id. at 481 & n.1.
Petitioner argues that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s “implied
conclusion” that she failed to establish past persecution. 5 Petitioner’s claim of
past persecution is based on her testimony that at the beginning of April 1992, she
received a death threat at her home from the Shining Path, which drove her into
hiding for twenty-two days before she fled to the United States for safety. As
indicated above, the IJ questioned petitioner’s credibility in this case because the
record indicates that she taught right up until she left for the United States, and
that she sought asylum only after she was arrested and faced possible deportation.
5
Petitioner does not argue in her brief that the absence of an explicit finding
as to past persecution constitutes error, and thus we do not consider that argument
in this appeal.
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He also noted that the exhibit which, according to petitioner, corroborates her
testimony, 6 was neither authenticated by the American Consul nor by any other
agency. Mindful that it is not our responsibility to weigh the evidence or evaluate
the credibility of witnesses, see Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 707, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s rejection of petitioner’s claim of past
persecution.
Petitioner also challenges the IJ’s conclusion that she could live in Lima or
another metropolitan area free of persecution by the Shining Path. She maintains
that “[t]he overwhelming weight of evidence establishes that although the Shining
Path may be strongest in rural areas, it continues to perform terrorist acts within
the capital of Lima and other metropolitan areas.” Petitioner’s Br. at 11. While
petitioner is correct that the record includes newspaper accounts of terrorist
activity in Lima, the reported activity involves detonating bombs in public places
and near government and military facilities. See R. at 162 (embassies, police
stations, electric power stations), 171 (banks, police and military facilities), 180
(power pylons, recently privatized telephone companies, banks, electricity
6
We note that the document, which is purportedly a copy of the police report
filed by petitioner following the threat, does not directly corroborate petitioner’s
testimony. It speaks not of a single threat received by petitioner in April of 1992,
but instead indicates that sometime in 1992, petitioner complained that she was
“continually receiving anonymous calls as well as letters” from the Shining Path.
R. at 123.
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repeater station, government telecommunications training center); see also id. at
189 (where State Department’s 1995 country conditions profile of Peru indicates
that “[i]n the countryside, the guerrillas have killed members of self-defense
forces, community leaders, and political party members, while in urban areas, they
often use car bombs and other explosive devices in their campaign of terror.”)
Although regrettable, these kinds of activities cannot establish eligibility for
asylum. See Figeroa v. United States, INS, 886 F.2d 76, 80 (4th Cir. 1989)
(eligibility for asylum requires evidence that “the alien’s predicament is
appreciably different from the dangers faced by the alien’s fellow citizens”
(quotations omitted)).
Our review of the record in this case reveals substantial evidence to
support the IJ’s conclusion that any danger to petitioner is geographically limited.
See generally Cuadras v. United States, INS, 910 F.2d 567, 571 n.2 (9th Cir.
1990) (evidence that danger is geographically localized and could be avoided is
relevant to the question of the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution).
Most compelling is the evidence from petitioner herself. She testified at the
hearing that she was active in her opposition to the Shining Path while at the
university in Lima for nearly seven years and yet was never personally threatened.
See R. at 90, 91-92, 109. She admitted that “[s]ince they caught the leader of the
Shining Path, things are controlled . . . in the downtown.” Id. at 97. In her
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application for asylum, petitioner focuses on the risk of persecution she faces in
her home village because it is a “Shining Path stronghold,” and she and members
of her family “‘stand-out’” there as opponents to the Shining Path. Id. at 195.
She alleges that “[i]f I returned to Peru, especially if I returned to my home
village and district, I would be remembered as an opponent of the Shining Path.”
Id. Deportation would not require petitioner to return to her home village,
however, and she has not demonstrated that she faces a risk of persecution in
other areas of Peru. Furthermore, the State Department, in its 1995 country
conditions profile of Peru, recognizes relocation within Peru as a viable option.
See id. at 191 (stating that “internal relocation” is available to many Peruvian
asylum applicants because there is “no evidence that a nationwide guerrilla
information network for tracking perceived opponents exists”). On this record,
we cannot conclude that “a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the
requisite fear of persecution existed.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481.
Our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination
that petitioner did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution is fatal to
petitioner’s claim for withholding of deportation, as well. See Casteneda v. INS,
23 F.3d 1576, 1578 (10th Cir. 1994).
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The petition for review is DENIED, and the BIA’s summary dismissal is
AFFIRMED. The stay of deportation heretofore entered by this court is
VACATED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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