F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 13 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
AMIGOS BRAVOS, a nonprofit
corporation; NEW MEXICO
CITIZENS FOR CLEAN AIR AND
WATER, a nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 97-2327
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1497-JP)
MOLYCORP, INC., (D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and TACHA , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
I.
Defendant Molycorp Inc. operates a molybdenum mine in New Mexico that
discharges pollutants into the Red River. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the
discharge of pollutants from a point source 1
into the navigable waters of the
United States is prohibited unless authorized by a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342. Molycorp
was issued an NPDES permit in 1977 covering discharges from three point
sources. Because NPDES permits are valid only for a prescribed period of time,
Molycorp applied to the Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1992 for renewal of its permit. The EPA
renewed Molycorp’s NPDES permit in September 1993 after adding two more
point sources to those previously regulated under Molycorp’s permit. The
September 1993 permit expired at midnight on October 14, 1998.
1
A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
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Plaintiffs are two non-profit corporations whose members are interested in
protecting New Mexico’s water resources. Plaintiffs brought suit against
defendant under the citizen suit provisions of the CWA, alleging that pollutants
were being leached from waste rock piles at defendant’s mine and discharged into
the Red River through ground water flow, seeps, and springs, and that the
discharge of these pollutants was not authorized by an NPDES permit. See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (authorizing suits by citizens against any person alleged to be in
violation of an effluent limitation or standard or a federal or state order
concerning such limitation or standard). Plaintiffs sought several forms of relief,
including an order declaring that defendant was violating the CWA by failing to
obtain an NPDES permit for these discharges, an order enjoining defendant from
not complying with the CWA, and an order imposing maximum civil penalties
against defendant for violating the CWA.
The district court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction
over plaintiffs’ claims because they should have been brought before the court of
appeals in connection with the renewal of Molycorp’s NPDES permit in 1993.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the court of
appeals for review of the EPA Administrator’s action in issuing or denying any
NPDES permit). We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction de novo. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United
States Dep’t of Army , 111 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1997).
II.
A.
To understand the issues before us, we must first examine the permit
renewal process. An applicant seeking to renew an existing NPDES permit must
submit an application to the EPA Regional Administrator 2
before the existing
permit expires. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(d)(2). Once the application is complete,
the Regional Administrator makes a tentative decision either to issue or to deny a
draft permit. See id. § 124.6(a). If the Regional Director decides to prepare a
draft permit, the EPA will issue the draft permit and an explanatory fact sheet.
See id. §§ 124.6, 124.8, 124.56. The Regional Administrator also must give
public notice that a draft permit has been prepared and must allow at least thirty
days for public comment. See id. § 124.10(a)(1)(ii),(b). During the public
comment period, any interested person may submit comments on the draft permit
and may request a public hearing if no hearing has been scheduled. See id.
§ 124.11. Anyone who believes that any condition of a draft permit is
2
When, as here, the permitting process is administered by the EPA rather
than the state, the Regional Administrator stands as the “Director” referred to in
the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 124.2(a).
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inappropriate must raise all reasonably ascertainable issues and arguments in
support of his position before the end of the comment period. See id. § 124.13.
After the close of the public comment period, the Regional Administrator
makes a final decision either to issue, deny, modify, revoke and reissue, or
terminate a permit. See id. § 124.15. This decision must be based upon the
administrative record, which must be complete by the date the final permit is
issued. See id. § 124.18. The Regional Administrator must consider all public
comments in making his final decision and must issue a response to all significant
comments at the time the final permit decision is issued. See id. §§124.11,
124.17(a)(2).
The procedural regulations governing the public comment period “are
intended to alert the EPA to potential problems with the draft permit and to
ensure it has an opportunity to address those problems before the permit becomes
final.” Adams v. United States EPA , 38 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 1994). In
promulgating the regulations, the EPA “anticipated that most policy and technical
issues would be decided as part of the public comment period, which is the most
open, accessible forum possible and which comes at a stage where the Agency has
the greatest ability to modify a draft permit.” Id.
Within thirty days of the final permit decision, any interested person may
request an evidentiary hearing to reconsider or contest that decision. See
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40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a). The Regional Administrator will then decide whether to
grant a hearing. See id. § 124.75(a). If the Regional Administrator denies a
hearing, an appeal may be taken to the Environmental Appeals Board. See id.
§§ 124.75(b), 124.91. If the Appeals Board denies review, the Regional
Administrator’s previous decision becomes final. See id. §§ 124.60(c)(5),
124.91(f)(1). Once an NPDES permit decision has become final, any interested
person may petition the United States Court of Appeals for review of the
decision. 3
See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
B.
During the period of public comment on Molycorp’s draft permit, the EPA
received numerous comments about Molycorp’s discharge of pollutants into the
Red River via ground water and seeps, and the need to regulate these discharges
under the NPDES permit program. Several commenters requested that the EPA
hold a public hearing on the draft permit. The most comprehensive comment was
submitted by the Land and Water Fund, which specifically argued that seeps
draining from the waste rock piles should be regulated under the NPDES permit
3
Although an issue must be raised during the public comment period to be
preserved for review, the person petitioning for judicial review need not be the
same person who raised the issue during the comment period. See Adams , 38
F.3d at 52 n.7.
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program. The Land and Water Fund also expressed concerns about water draining
from the waste rock piles into the mine’s upper underground workings, which
might then discharge into the Red River without ever reaching the surface.
The EPA issued Molycorp’s final NPDES permit without holding a public
hearing and without including in the permit the discharges at issue here. In its
response to comments, the EPA explained its position as follows:
Response No. 9:
While EPA understands the concern of these commenters for the
possible impact of ground water seepage on the Red River, we do not
agree that these are “point sources” under the NPDES permitting
program. Ground water is regulated by the State through the [New
Mexico Environment Department].
We are familiar with the case law citation [4]
which relates to EPA
authority to require construction and control of surface discharges
(proscribed “point sources” of pollution) in instances where the
operator has not applied the proper control and construction to the
sources. However, the issue of seepage of groundwater which may
have infiltrated through porous soil is a different matter. We
recommend that the commenters continue to pursue this issue through
the [New Mexico Environment Department].
Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 110. None of the commenters sought further
administrative or judicial review of the EPA’s final permit decision.
4
Some of the comments cited Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co. , 620
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980), as support for the contention that seepage from mining
pits and collection ponds is subject to regulation under the NPDES permitting
program.
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C.
The district court examined the issues raised in the permitting process to
decide whether it had jurisdiction over the present action. The court determined
that, “[w]ithout question, the EPA made a decision that Molycorp did not need a
permit for any ground water seepage into the Red River, regardless of whether
Molycorp’s operations polluted the ground water and, eventually, the river.
Because of this determination, the permit that the EPA reissued to Molycorp
contained no regulation of ground water seepage.” Id. at 34. The court also
concluded that, “[a]t its core, plaintiffs’ complaint attacks the EPA’s decision to
reissue Molycorp’s NPDES permit without regulating ground water seepage into
the Red River.” Id. Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs should have been
brought their claims in a petition for review under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), and
could not now litigate their claims in the district court under the citizen suit
provisions.
III.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the 1993 permitting process would not
have provided them a proper basis for seeking judicial review of their claim that
Molycorp is violating the CWA by discharging pollutants from its waste rock
piles without an NPDES permit. Plaintiffs focus primarily on the language of
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33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F), which provides for “[r]eview of the Administrator’s
action . . . in issuing or denying any [NPDES] permit,” and advance several
arguments in support of their theory. 5
First, plaintiffs argue that the EPA could not have taken any “action” on the
waste rock pile discharges during the permit renewal process because the agency
did not follow all the procedures necessary to include these discharges in the final
NPDES permit. The EPA’s failure to include the waste rock pile discharges in
the initial draft permit or accompanying fact sheet did not preclude the agency
from making a decision about the propriety of regulating these discharges,
however. That the regulations provide for public comment and subsequent
modification of the draft permit, if necessary, reflects an expectation that the
initial draft permit and fact sheet may not consider everything that will ultimately
be included in the final permit. See id. §§ 124.14(b), 124.15. Further, if
plaintiffs are correct that the public comments raised “substantial new questions”
that should have prompted the EPA to take further action under 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.14(4)(b), plaintiffs could have challenged the agency’s failure to take such
5
In the district court, plaintiffs argued that it would be unjust to prohibit
them from pursuing the present suit because they did not actually participate in
the public comment process in 1993. The district court rejected this argument,
and plaintiffs’ opening brief does not challenge this aspect of the district court’s
ruling. Therefore, we will deem the issue waived. See State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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action had they sought administrative and judicial review of the final permit
decision. See, e.g. , Webb v. Gorsuch , 699 F.2d 157, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1983)
(reviewing challenges to EPA’s response to comments and its failure to hold
public hearing).
Next, plaintiffs argue that Response No. 9 concerned on ground water
issues other than discharges from the waste rock piles and, therefore, the agency
did not actually consider the discharges at issue here. Our examination of the
public comments and the EPA’s response thereto shows otherwise. Moreover,
because the issue of waste rock pile drainage was raised in the public comments,
plaintiffs could have challenged any failure to adequately address this issue had
they sought review of the final permit decision. See Adams , 38 F.3d at 52
(discussing EPA’s duty to respond to public comments).
Third, plaintiffs argue that the EPA did not take any “action” on the waste
rock pile discharges because Response No. 9 neither issued, denied, nor required
an NPDES permit for these discharges, nor threaten any such action. Plaintiffs
also contend that judicial review of the decision stated in Response No. 9 would
not have been appropriate because “[n]one of the specific clauses enumerated in
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) actually describe EPA’s issuance of responses to
comments.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 24.
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Again, plaintiffs misunderstand the procedural scheme. Once the EPA took
final action by issuing the NPDES permit, the decisions the EPA made about the
issues raised in the public comments became reviewable under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b). See Webb , 699 F.2d at 161-62 (reviewing EPA’s response to
comments); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review
of the final agency action.”); Citizens for Clean Air v. United States EPA , 959
F.2d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing adequacy of EPA’s response to
petitioner’s comments). The cases plaintiffs cite to establish that judicial review
under § 1369(b) would have been premature are inapposite; they involve no final
agency action whatsoever. See, e.g. , Appalachian Energy Group v. EPA , 33 F.3d
319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over petition
seeking review of internal EPA memorandum that did not involve or relate to any
decision to issue or deny a permit).
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Response No. 9 did not correctly state the
EPA’s actual position on ground water discharges that are hydrologically
connected to surface water. The accuracy of the statements in Response No. 9 is
irrelevant to the jurisdictional question at issue here. If the position the EPA
stated in Response No. 9 conflicted with the position it had stated elsewhere,
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plaintiffs could have challenged this discrepancy through administrative and
judicial review of the final permit decision.
IV.
In sum, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs should have pursued
their present claims during the 1993 permit renewal process. Having failed to do
so, plaintiffs may not now use the vehicle of the CWA’s citizen suit provisions to
challenge Molycorp’s discharge of pollutants from its rock waste piles without an
NPDES permit.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico is AFFIRMED. Defendant’s motion to strike Volume II of
Appellants’ Appendix is DENIED as moot.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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