Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

DEC 31 1998
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

SUSAN SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

DefendantAppellee, No. 97-1120

and

DENVER CLASSROOM
TEACHER’S ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 95-D-738)

Elizabeth Lamb Kearney, Law Offices of Elizabeth Lamb Kearney, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Martin Semple (Patrick B. Mooney and John A. McNamara, with him on the
brief), of Semple & Mooney, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.

Susan Sanchez brought this action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000 et.

seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§621 et

seq., against her former employer, Denver Public Schools (DPS). The District

Court granted DPS’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. At issue in this

appeal are Ms. Sanchez’s allegations that 1) DPS transferred her to a teaching

position at Beach Court elementary school in violation of Title VII and ADEA; 2)

DPS retaliated against her because she filed a discrimination complaint; 3) DPS

failed to place her in a Chapter I van teacher position because of her sex and age,

and in retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint; 4) DPS constructively

discharged her; and 5) the district court erred in denying her motion under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60 (b). 1 We affirm for the reasons set forth below. 2

1
Ms. Sanchez also alleged that the Denver Classroom Teacher’s Association
was liable for breach of contract and breach of duty of fair representation. She
does not appeal the district court’s grant of judgment against her on these claims.

2
The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is appropriate here even though Ms.
Sanchez filed her notice of appeal prematurely. This court first issued an order
requiring Ms. Sanchez to obtain certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or a
final judgment, and later issued a show cause order as to why the appeal should
not be dismissed. We then issued a notice on August 11, 1997, that failure to
respond within ten days could result in dismissal. The next day the district court

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 I.

Ms. Sanchez began her employment with DPS in 1979. Prior thereto, she

had been a nun, a teacher in Catholic schools for twenty-four years, and a

principal for five. In August 1979, she became a teacher at Johnson Elementary,

a position she held until the summer of 1993.

In the spring of 1993, the administration at Johnson realized that the fourth

grade enrollment would be decreasing the following school year and that they

would not be able to retain all three of the fourth grade teachers teaching there.

Because none of the teachers volunteered to transfer, the Personnel

Subcommittee, consisting of three teachers and the principal, interviewed them to

decide who would be transferred. After interviewing all three candidates, the

Personnel Subcommittee decided to transfer Ms. Sanchez and retain two younger,

male teachers. Upset by this decision, Ms. Sanchez filed a complaint with the

teacher’s union, and then with the EEOC.

DPS reassigned Ms. Sanchez to a second grade teacher position at Beach

entered a final judgment dismissing the case in its entirety. On August 19, 1997,
Ms. Sanchez submitted a copy of the final judgment to this court, thereby ripening
her premature appeal. See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich 850 F.2d 641, 644 (10th Cir.
1988) (en banc). We held in Lewis that “when a district court has adjudicated all
remaining outstanding claims before this appellate court acts to dismiss the
appeal, we will consider the appeal on its merits rather than dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.” Id. In the instant case, we had not yet acted to dismiss the appeal.
Appellee’s arguments notwithstanding, we see no reason to depart from Lewis.

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Court Elementary. Ms. Sanchez’s displeasure with the transfer only worsened

after interacting with Beach Court’s principal, Lucia Aandhal. Relations between

the two started off poorly and did not improve throughout Ms. Sanchez’s tenure at

Beach Court. According to Ms. Sanchez, at the beginning of the first faculty

meeting Ms. Aandhal introduced all the new teachers except her, and said

something like, “it is so nice to have some beginning bright, young teachers in the

building.” Aplt. App. at 90-91. At the end of the meeting, and after prompting,

Ms. Aandhal introduced Ms. Sanchez and mentioned that she was transferred

from Johnson, a fact Ms. Sanchez found embarrassing.

Ms. Aandhal allegedly made several other ageist comments during the

school year. In addition, Ms. Aandhal required Ms. Sanchez to bring in a doctor’s

note whenever she took sick leave, even though other teachers were not required

to do so. Later in the year, Ms. Aandhal threatened to put Ms. Sanchez on a plan

for improvement.

In April 1994, Ms. Aandhal called Ms. Sanchez into her office to determine

whether she would be returning to Beach Court the next year. Although evasive

at first, Ms. Sanchez eventually told Ms. Aandhal she was not planning to return.

Despite Ms. Aandhal’s repeated requests, Ms. Sanchez never put her intentions in

writing.

During the spring of 1994, Ms. Sanchez’s health deteriorated due to stress

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and her doctor recommended that she take a leave of absence from Beach Court.

Ms. Sanchez had the administrative choice of either using her sick leave, of which

she had accumulated a great deal, or taking a formal leave of absence. She chose

the former.

In May 1994, DPS engaged in its annual county-wide process of

reassigning teachers within the district. At that time Ms. Sanchez did not ask to

be reassigned. She stated she was under the impression that she would be

transferred automatically because she thought she had a one-year assignment at

Beach Court. Later that summer she requested a transfer, but DPS said it would

be unable to grant her one because the reassignment process had already occurred.

DPS further told her she would be expected to fulfill her assignment at Beach

Court.

According to Ms. Sanchez, in mid-August Estelle Urioste contacted her

about a new opening as a Chapter I van teacher, a position in which a DPS

teacher would drive to parochial schools to assist students with special needs.

They met that day and Ms. Urioste asked Ms. Sanchez about her background,

showed her one of the vans used in the program, and requested a copy of her

driving record. Ms. Sanchez obtained a copy of her driving record for Ms.

Urioste. Later that day, Ms. Urioste called her and told her the position would not

be available until December. About a month later, Ms. Sanchez found out from a

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friend who was a Chapter I van teacher that DPS had filled the position with a

young man, Andy Lurie. Mr. Lurie was a non-tenured, probationary teacher who

had not received his Master’s degree at that time.

Unable to find a position she considered suitable, Ms. Sanchez continued to

take sick leave throughout the fall of 1994. During that time, DPS offered her a

position as an English As a Second Language (EASL) teacher, but Ms. Sanchez

declined because she had previously applied for a similar job and had been told

she was not qualified for it.

As Ms. Sanchez’s sick leave began to run out, she decided to opt for early

retirement. She applied for early retirement in mid-December, effective January

25, 1995. The agreement could not be rescinded less than 30 days before it was

to take effect. On December 30, DPS stated that it would have two openings, and

that Mrs. Sanchez would have been able to take either one, except her early

retirement rendered her ineligible. 3

3
In setting out the facts, we do not consider the affidavits Ms. Sanchez
submitted with the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion she filed after summary judgment
was entered against her. That rule allows for relief from judgment for “(1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; [or] (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . . .” Nowhere does Ms. Sanchez allege she
could not obtain the affidavits prior to the summary judgment hearing; to the
contrary, she admits she had the evidence prior to the hearing but felt it “would be
cumulative and would not materially assist the Court in its determination.” Aplt.
App. at 308. The district court declined to consider these affidavits, and did not
abuse its discretion in doing so. We decline as well to consider the additional

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 II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “examin[ing] the factual

record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party

opposing summary judgment.” Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.

1996) (citations omitted). A grant of summary judgment is appropriate if there is

no genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Id. at 248.

A. Sex and Age Discrimination Claims

The plaintiff in both ADEA and Title VII cases bears the initial burden of

setting forth a prima facie case of discrimination. The elements of each closely

parallel the other. In either case the plaintiff must show: 1) she is a member of

the class protected by the statute; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action;

3) she was qualified for the position at issue; and 4) she was treated less

favorably than others not in the protected class. See Thomas v. Denny’s Inc., 111

F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997) (race); Corneveaux v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Group,

76 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996) (age); Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624,

evidence on appeal.

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630 (10th. Cir. 1995) (age); Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th

Cir. 1994) (sex). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the

action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s

proffered reasons are pretextual. See Jones, 54 F.3d at 630.

In the instant case, Ms. Sanchez alleges two counts of sex and age

discrimination: one based on the transfer to Beach Court and the other on DPS’s

failure to place her in the Chapter I van teacher position. We consider each in

turn.

1. The Beach Court Transfer

Ms. Sanchez argues the district court erred in holding that she did not

establish a prima facie case of discrimination regarding her transfer to Beach

Court. 4 In particular, she disputes the district court’s finding that she suffered no

adverse employment action.

The Tenth Circuit liberally defines the phrase “adverse employment

action.” See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th.

Cir. 1998); Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998). Such

We note that DPS does not base its administrative transfer decisions solely
4

on seniority; instead, it relies on interviews with the Personnel Subcommittee
which is composed of teachers and a principal. Such a system comports with the
requirements of the ADEA. See Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 630 n.6
(10th Cir. 1995).

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actions are not simply limited to monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits.

See Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1996). Instead,

we take “a case-by-case approach,” examining the unique factors relevant to the

situation at hand. Jeffries, 147 F.3d at 1232. Nevertheless, we will not consider

“a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” to be an adverse

employment action. Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136

(7th Cir. 1993); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268

(1998) (conduct is adverse employment action if it “constitutes a significant

change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a

significant change in benefits”); Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d

883, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (principal’s change in assignment was not an adverse

employment action despite her increased commute and belief that the public

perceived the transfer “as a ‘nudge towards retirement’”).

We agree with the district court that Ms. Sanchez’s transfer was not an

adverse employment action. Ms. Sanchez points only to the fact that her commute

increased from between five and seven minutes to between thirty and forty

minutes, and that the other two teachers at Johnson did not volunteer to transfer

schools. Ms. Sanchez admits that her salary and benefits remained the same, that

she continued to teach at the elementary school level, and that the decreasing

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student population at Johnson prompted the transfer. Although she claims the

Beach Court assignment was only for a year, she knew that after that year she

would remain a DPS teacher, and she expected DPS to reassign her. We do not

find any special circumstances unique to this case that show this employment

action was anything beyond a mere inconvenience or alteration of job

responsibilities. Because Ms. Sanchez experienced a purely lateral transfer, we

agree with the district court that despite her personal discomfort she failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

2. The Van Teacher Position

Ms. Sanchez alleges that by failing to place her as a Chapter I van teacher,

DPS discriminated in violation of ADEA and Title VII and unlawfully retaliated

against her. The district court addressed only the retaliation claim and did not

directly discuss the Title VII or ADEA discrimination claims arising out of DPS’s

failure. We need not remand, however, because this claim can be resolved on the

basis of undisputed facts and for substantially the same reasons applicable to Ms.

Sanchez’s Beach Court discrimination claim.

As set out above, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

under either Title VII or ADEA, Ms. Sanchez must establish that the challenged

conduct constituted an adverse employment action. The record is undisputed that

at the time Ms. Sanchez applied for the position as a Chapter I van teacher, she

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was employed with DPS. 5 It is also undisputed that the van position would have

paid the same salary and benefits she was already receiving, and would have

involved substantially similar duties. Thus, the position would have been a purely

lateral transfer for Ms. Sanchez involving at most an insignificant alteration in

job responsibilities. While Ms. Sanchez obviously viewed the change as a

positive one, under the law cited above, and in the unique circumstances of this

case, her failure to receive the position was not an adverse employment action for

the same reasons her transfer to Beach Court was not. 6

B. Retaliation Claims

A plaintiff claiming unlawful retaliation for asserting a Title VII or ADEA

claim also bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. To do so

she must show: 1) she was engaged in opposition to Title VII or ADEA

discrimination; 2) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and 3) a

causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action. See Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1262-63; Jeffries, 147 F.3d at 1231;

5
This case does not involve an employer’s refusal to reassign an employee
to a vacant lateral position in the wake of a reduction in force, which refusal to
transfer could constitute an adverse action. See Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 861 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1989).
6
If a transfer is truly lateral and involves no significant changes in an
employee’s conditions of employment, the fact that the employee views the
transfer either positively or negatively does not of itself render the denial or
receipt of the transfer adverse employment action. See, e.g., Doe v. Dekalb
County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449-50 (11th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).

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Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.3d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988). A

meritorious retaliation claim will stand even if the underlying discrimination

claim fails. See Jeffries, 147 F.3d at1231.

Ms. Sanchez contends DPS unlawfully retaliated against her on two

occasions for filing a discrimination claim. She alleges first that Ms. Aandhal

retaliated against her by subjecting her to a hostile environment, and second that

DPS retaliated against her by failing to place her in the Chapter I van teacher

position. Again, we consider these claims in turn.

1. Retaliation at Beach Court

The district court granted summary judgment on Ms. Sanchez’s Beach

Court retaliation claim, holding that she did not suffer an adverse employment

action because she clearly had a job offer for the following year. We affirm the

district court’s ruling, albeit under a slightly different analysis.

Ms. Sanchez points to several encounters with Ms. Aandhal to support her

contention that she was subjected to retaliatory adverse employment action at

Beach Court. Ms. Aandhal allegedly made several ageist remarks over the course

of the school year, including calling an older substitute teacher “an old fossil” and

welcoming “bright young teachers” at the first staff meeting. In addition, Ms.

Sanchez believed she was the only teacher required to bring a doctor’s note when

she was sick. Ms. Aandhal also threatened to write her up for insubordination

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when Ms. Sanchez walked out of her office in the middle of a meeting to tend to

her class. Finally, Ms. Sanchez asserts that Ms. Aandhal threatened to put her on

a plan for improvement if she returned to Beach Court.

This conduct simply does not rise to the level of a materially adverse

employment action sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case.

Courts considering the issue have held that “‘unsubstantiated oral reprimands’

and ‘unnecessary derogatory comments’” such as those alleged here are not

included within the definition of adverse action absent evidence that they had

some impact on the employee’s employment status. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of

Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,1301 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Sweeney v. West, 149

F.3d 550, 556-57 (7th Cir. 1998).

Retaliatory conduct other than discharge or refusal to rehire is thus
proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the employee’s
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or
adversely affect[s] his [or her] status as an employee.” It follows
that “not everything that makes an employee unhappy” qualifies as
retaliation, for “[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment
actions that ‘an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like
would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’”

Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (alteration in original) (quoting Smart v. Ball State

Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)). Although we appreciate Ms. Sanchez’s

distress over Ms. Aandhal’s alleged disagreeable conduct, that conduct did not

significantly affect her employment status and therefore did not constitute adverse

employment action remediable under Title VII.

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2. Retaliation by Failure of Placement in Van Teacher Position

Ms. Sanchez also asserts that Ms. Urioste unlawfully retaliated against her

by failing to place her in the Chapter I van teacher position. The district court

denied this motion because it found no evidence of a causal connection between

Ms. Sanchez’s protected activity and the conduct she asserts was retaliatory.

We have already determined that Ms. Sanchez’s failure to obtain the

position was not adverse action with respect to her discrimination claim. That

holding is equally applicable here and is sufficient to defeat her retaliation claim

as well. In addition, as the district court noted, Ms. Sanchez did not establish a

causal connection between the filing of her discrimination claim and her

nonplacement in the van teacher position. Ms. Sanchez claims that Anna Marie

Sandoval, an activist involved in DPS and a friend of Ms. Urioste, called her to

ask what her age was after Ms. Sanchez did not get the van teacher position. Ms.

Sandoval showed no sign of knowing about Ms. Sanchez’s discrimination claims,

or of having discussed them with Ms. Urioste. Ms. Urioste testified in her

deposition that she had no knowledge of Ms. Sanchez’s discrimination claim.

Moreover, according to Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Sandoval’s phone call took place after

the decision was already made. Even when all reasonable inferences are drawn in

favor of Ms. Sanchez, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

We thus affirm the dismissal of this retaliation claim.

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 C. Constructive Discharge

Ms. Sanchez also contends the district court erred by granting summary

judgment on her claim that DPS constructively discharged her by forcing her to

accept early retirement rather than finding her a suitable transfer. We agree with

the district court that DPS’s actions do not amount to a constructive discharge.

Constructive discharge occurs when “the employer by its illegal

discriminatory acts has made working conditions so difficult that a reasonable

person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to resign.” Derr v. Gulf

Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986). “Essentially, a plaintiff must show

that she had ‘no other choice but to quit.’” Yearous v. Niobrara County Mem’l

Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Woodward v. City of

Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992)). The conditions of employment

must be objectively intolerable; the “plaintiff’s subjective views of the situation

are irrelevant.” Id.

According to Ms. Sanchez, the hostile work environment at Beach Court, in

conjunction with DPS’s insistence that she return to her placement there and its

failure to find her a suitable alternative transfer, resulted in her constructive

discharge. As we discussed above, however, the work environment at Beach

Court, while unpleasant, was not adverse employment action. Furthermore, it is

undisputed that Ms. Sanchez did not apply for a transfer in May when that process

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occurs for DPS. Later, DPS told her there might be some openings in January, at

the semester break. Instead of taking her position at Beach Court temporarily and

waiting to see if a more suitable position would open up, she chose to take early

retirement. While we have no doubt that Ms. Sanchez found her working

conditions extremely difficult, and that the stress exacerbated her health

problems, we cannot conclude that objectively DPS’s actions left Ms. Sanchez

with no choice but to resign. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of

the constructive discharge claim.

III.

In sum, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of defendants in all respects.

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