F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 31 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES R. GRIFFITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5076
(D.C. No. 96-CV-446-EA)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (N.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , BARRETT , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant James R. Griffith appeals the district court’s order 1 affirming the
Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for social security disability
benefits. He alleges disability since August 1, 1989 due to back pain, diabetes,
and foot pain and numbness. The parties agree that Mr. Griffith’s insured status
expired on September 30, 1994, so he must establish his disability prior to that
date. See Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1996). Following an
administrative hearing before an administrative law judge, the Commissioner
determined at step five of the five-step analysis, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d
748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing five steps), that Mr. Griffith could
perform a full range of sedentary work and, therefore, he was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. On appeal, Mr. Griffith contends that (1)
the ALJ did not evaluate properly his claims of disabling pain, (2) the ALJ
improperly based his decision on a lack of medical evidence that Mr. Griffith was
required to elevate his feet while sitting, (3) the ALJ failed to shift the burden to
the Commissioner at step five, and (4) the ALJ considered medical reports written
before Mr. Griffith’s back surgery to discount his claims of disabling pain
following the surgery.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were
1
The parties proceeded before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997).
Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d 373, 375
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(further quotation omitted)). We may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute
our judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Casias v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Griffith complains that the ALJ improperly discounted his claim that he
must elevate his feet while sitting. He relies on a November 4, 1993 report by
Dr. Denton. See Appellant’s App. vol. II, at 162. Later reports by Dr. Malavolti,
the treating podiatrist, however, do not indicate that Mr. Griffith must elevate his
feet, only that he not do a job requiring him to stand for prolonged periods. See
id. at 255-56. Mr. Griffith argues that the ALJ relied on a lack of evidence to
reject his claim that he must elevate his feet based on the fact that Dr. Malavolti
did not impose such a requirement. The treating podiatrist’s failure to restrict
Mr. Griffith’s ability to sit is not a lack of evidence; rather, it indicates that the
podiatrist imposed no limitations other than those specifically described. Based
on our review of the record, we determine that the ALJ complied with the
requirements of Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995), to consider
the proper factors and adequately explain the reasons for discounting
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Mr. Griffith’s claims that he must elevate his feet and alternate sitting and
standing every forty-five minutes due to back and foot pain. See Appellant’s
App. vol. II, at 21-22.
Mr. Griffith also argues that the ALJ erred in finding him capable of
performing a full range of sedentary work and in failing to recognize that at step
five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that a claimant can
perform other jobs that exist in sufficient numbers in the national economy. See
Daniels v. Apfel , 154 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 1998). The ALJ clearly shifted
the burden to the Commissioner. See Appellant’s App. vol. II, at 23.
Mr. Griffith asserts that the ALJ relied on medical evidence from before his
back surgery to discount his claim of disabling pain after the surgery. He
maintains that only the back surgeon’s opinions following his September 1994
surgery are relevant. Those opinions, however, indicate that Mr. Griffith’s back
pain subsided following the surgery, see Appellant’s App. vol. II, at 179, and the
ALJ considered those opinions, see id. at 21. The ALJ did not commit reversible
error. The record contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
determination that Mr. Griffith was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act prior to the expiration of his insured status.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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