F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 30 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ZELMA STALION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7122
(D.C. No. 97-CV-222-S)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Zelma Stalion appeals from an order of the district court affirming
the Commissioner’s determination that she is not entitled to benefits. We affirm.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record and
to determine whether he applied the correct legal standards. See Castellano v.
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted). In the course of
our review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for
that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799,
800 (10th Cir. 1991).
Ms. Stalion alleged disability since April 1985 1
due to pain in her right hip,
lower back, ankle, and elbows and lack of grip in her left hand . The
administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Ms. Stalion was not disabled at
step four of the five-step sequential process, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d
748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), as she could perform her past relevant work.
On appeal, Ms. Stalion alleges her past work as a provider does not qualify
as past relevant work because provider work is generally not performed at the
1
Ms. Stalion met the earnings requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 1990. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. Therefore, Ms. Stalion
must establish her disability prior to that date to qualify for Title II benefits.
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substantial gainful level unless the individual works several jobs. Ms. Stalion
contends that the ALJ should have made his determination at step five where, due
to her advanced age, the regulations provide that she cannot work unless she has
transferable skills, which she does not. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d).
In determining whether a claimant’s past work experience qualifies as past
relevant work, the ALJ must consider whether the work (1) was performed within
the last fifteen years, (2) lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it, and
(3) was substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565(a). Earnings in
excess of $300 per month for the years before 1990 establish that a claimant has
engaged in substantial gainful activity. See id. § 404.1574(b)(2)(vi). Part-time
work can be considered substantial gainful activity. See id. § 404.1572(a).
Ms. Stalion agrees that she performed her work as a provider within the last
fifteen years and that she held the job long enough to learn it. However, she
contends she had to work two jobs in order to meet the minimum earnings
necessary to meet the substantial gainful activity prong. The record shows that
Ms. Stalion had one job, that of provider. However, she saw two clients during
the week. Even if she were correct as to her supposition that two jobs cannot be
combined to meet the minimum earnings requirements, Ms. Stalion had one job.
Ms. Stalion further proposes that Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at
*1, requires that any work be performed eight hours a day, five days a week to be
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considered past relevant work. She contends she worked only three hours a day,
seven days a week. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p addresses the agency’s assessment of
whether an individual retains the ability to do work-related activities in a work
setting on a sustained basis and does not address the number of hours a claimant
must work to meet the substantial gainful activity level. 2
That determination is
made by consideration of the amounts earned.
Ms. Stalion states her earnings of $300.00 a month were “presumptively not
considered substantial,” citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(2). See Br. at 15.
Ms. Stalion misreads the regulation.
Ms. Stalion further contends that the agency’s own reviewer found that she
had not performed her job at the substantial gainful activity level. While this is
true, we note that the reviewer was referring to the time period of December 1991
to May 1993, after Ms. Stalion claimed she was disabled. The ALJ considered
Ms. Stalion’s earnings prior to her alleged date of disability. Her earnings record
shows that in 1982, Ms. Stalion made over $500.00 per month, and in 1981 and
1984 she made over $300.00 per month. See App. Vol. II at 139. Thus,
Ms. Stalion has satisfied the regulatory standards having performed her job as
provider at the level of substantial gainful activity.
2
Even if the ruling applied, the agency specifically states that working eight
hours a day, five days a week “is not always required.” Id. at n. 2, 7.
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We agree that the ALJ correctly determined that Ms. Stalion performed her
job as a provider at the level of substantial gainful activity. Further, based on her
current activities, she retains the residual functional capacity to perform the duties
of that job as she actually performed it. Therefore, we conclude the ALJ correctly
determined that Ms. Stalion is not disabled.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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