F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 8 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PATRICK E. SKAGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7188
(D.C. No. 97-CV-538-S)
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, (E.D. Okla.)
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK , BARRETT , and McKAY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Patrick E. Skaggs appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying plaintiff’s application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income (SSI) under Title II and Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges that he has been disabled since July 15,
1993, because of problems with his back, neck, feet, shoulders, and hands. The
administrative law judge (ALJ) found that, while plaintiff could not perform his
past relevant work as a convenience store manager or trucking maintenance
supervisor, plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform
the full range of sedentary work and, in particular, three jobs the vocational
expert (VE) testified exist in significant numbers in the national economy. The
Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision and it became the Commissioner’s
final decision. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint in district court. The
district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendations,
affirmed the Commissioner’s denial, and plaintiff’s appeal to this court followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to ascertain whether it is supported
by substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards. See Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.
1997). On review, “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our
judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. ,
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933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Soliz v. Chater , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (further quotations omitted)).
On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
the evidence of plaintiff’s physical impairments and consider the vocational
impact of those impairments at step five; and (2) the ALJ failed to show that
plaintiff could perform a significant number of alternative jobs either through the
use of the “grids” or through the testimony of the vocational expert. We affirm.
Plaintiff was born in 1941, has a tenth grade education (he subsequently
received a General Equivalency Diploma), 1
and, on the date of the ALJ’s decision
on review here, was fifty-five years old. In September 1993, plaintiff applied for
disability and SSI benefits alleging an onset date of July 15, 1993. The
Commissioner denied plaintiff’s application at the administrative level and again
on reconsideration. Plaintiff opted for a de novo hearing before an ALJ which
was held on August 8, 1994. The ALJ issued a decision on October 26, 1994,
denying plaintiff’s claim, finding that the Commissioner had met his burden at
step five of the five-step sequential evaluation process to show that plaintiff was
1
Plaintiff testified that he has a ninth grade education. Plaintiff’s
application materials and the ALJ’s decision, however, state that plaintiff has
a tenth grade education.
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capable of performing occupations that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy despite his impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining five-step
evaluation process in detail). Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court and, on
a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court remanded to the
Commissioner for further medical evaluation. Specifically, the district court
directed the Secretary to “obtain additional medical evidence from a arthritis [sic]
(Rheumatologist) to assist in evaluating whether or not Plaintiff’s arthritic
condition is disabling under the Social Security Act.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II
at 200.
On remand, the Social Security Administration requested another
consultative examination. Accordingly, after his second hearing, plaintiff was
examined by Dr. Raymond J. Dougherty, an internal medicine specialist
(apparently, there was no rheumatologist on the consultative examiners panel in
Oklahoma). As described by the ALJ, Dr. Dougherty reported “some limitation in
range of motion in the back and both hips without muscle spasms,” id. at 180, but
concluded that plaintiff did not have any physical limitations. Although he
ordered a rheumatoid arthritis test, Dr. Dougherty did not discuss the result in his
report. The ALJ, however, stated that plaintiff’s laboratory test results were
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negative for rheumatoid arthritis. 2
In addition, the ALJ described the
radiologist’s report of plaintiff’s X-rays as indicating an old injury to plaintiff’s
back and some degenerative changes to plaintiff’s knees.
The ALJ found that this recent medical evidence was consistent with earlier
medical evidence in the record and, in conjunction with plaintiff’s testimony
describing his daily activities, was also consistent with the conclusion that, while
plaintiff could no longer perform his past relevant work, plaintiff retained the
RFC to perform sedentary work. The ALJ found that the Commissioner met his
burden at step five to show that plaintiff has the RFC to perform other work in the
national economy based on the VE’s testimony that plaintiff has transferrable
skills applicable to skilled and semi-skilled jobs within the sedentary work
category . The VE testified that plaintiff could work as a counter clerk, cashier,
and information clerk and such positions exist in the national economy and within
2
Plaintiff states that the copy of his rheumatoid arthritis test result is
illegible. Indeed, we cannot decipher the copy attached to appellant’s appendix.
The ALJ specifically addressed the test result and reported that the outcome was
negative as did the magistrate judge. Our review of the copy of the test result in
the district court record confirms that plaintiff tested negative for rheumatoid
arthritis.
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Oklahoma in significant numbers. 3
Hence, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
plaintiff was not disabled.
Both of plaintiff’s contentions hinge on whether the ALJ’s credibility
determination of plaintiff’s testimony concerning disabling pain is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. To qualify as disabling, pain must be severe
enough--either by itself or in combination with other impairments--to preclude
any substantially gainful employment. See Brown v. Bowen , 801 F.2d 361,
362-63 (10th Cir. 1986). This court has enumerated the following factors to
consider when analyzing a claimant’s pain evidence:
(1) [W]hether Claimant established a pain producing impairment by
objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether there is a “loose
nexus” between the proven impairment and the Claimant’s subjective
allegations of pain; and (3) if so, whether, considering all the
evidence, both objective and subjective, Claimant’s pain is in fact
disabling.
Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Luna v.
Bowen , 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987)). Objective evidence includes
3
Plaintiff contends the VE erroneously testified plaintiff’s skills can be
transferred to the job of counter clerk. We do not address this argument because,
based on our review of the record, plaintiff did not raise it to the district court
until he filed his objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations. See Marshall v. Chater , 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation are deemed waived.”). Nevertheless, the VE’s testimony on two
other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy is sufficient to
meet the Commissioner’s burden at step five. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b),
416.966(b); Evans v. Chater , 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995).
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physiological and psychological evidence that can be verified by external testing.
See Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1488-89 (10th Cir. 1993). Subjective
evidence comprises statements from the claimant and other witnesses that are
evaluated on the basis of credibility. See id. at 1489.
While plaintiff has shown objective medical evidence of a “pain producing
impairment,” and a loose nexus between the impairment and his pain, the
objective evidence does not establish disabling pain. Accordingly, the ALJ had to
evaluate plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony and the other pertinent evidence
before him. When we review an ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s disabling pain,
we do so with the caveat that “[c]redibility determination are peculiarly the
province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when
supported by substantial evidence.” Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. ,
898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990).
The ALJ prefaced his decision by noting the “lack of medical treatment,
paucity of the findings, and [plaintiff’s] demeanor.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II
at 180. The ALJ then considered plaintiff’s testimony in light of the medical
evidence and plaintiff’s daily activities. We find the ALJ fulfilled his duty to
provide adequate findings to support his credibility determination. See Kepler v.
Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995). The ALJ considered many of the
factors that we have approved for purposes of evaluating pain testimony. See
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Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) (setting out factors
considered in evaluating credibility of pain testimony). The ALJ pointed out that
plaintiff lives alone, performs his own household chores, can drive, mows his
lawn on a riding lawn mower, does not require any assistance with personal
hygiene, and can ride in a car for several hours. In addition, the ALJ found that
the medical evidence was not consistent with the pain described by plaintiff and
the limitations imposed thereby. Specifically, the ALJ rejected plaintiff’s
testimony he has to lie down intermittently during the day and spend most of his
day lying down, noting “[t]he physical examination of claimant showed him to be
well developed and well nourished without any pressure sores or atrophied
muscles.” Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 181. The ALJ rejected plaintiff’s
statement he has to use a cane to walk at least every other day, noting the
“[p]hysical examination showed that claimant has a normal gait; no muscle
spasms; he could heel and toe walk; and he had no instability.” Id. The ALJ also
rejected plaintiff’s testimony of loss of strength and pain in his hands because the
physical examination did not corroborate plaintiff’s claims. See id. We find that
the ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff’s disabling pain testimony is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
Plaintiff also alleges the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence of plaintiff’s
daily living activities and, therefore, erred by finding that plaintiff has the RFC
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to perform the full range of sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)
(describing physical requirements for sedentary work); 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a)
(same). Our review of the record does not support plaintiff’s assertion. The
ALJ’s sedentary RFC finding flows from his assessment of plaintiff’s
impairments as well as from the medical evidence in the record, 4
plaintiff’s
testimony about his daily living activities, and the VE’s testimony. We find this
determination too is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erroneously relied on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the grids) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P,
App. 2, since plaintiff has both exertional and nonexertional impairments.
Plaintiff all but concedes that the issue is irrelevant since a VE testified at
plaintiff’s hearing and the ALJ’s findings reflect that testimony. Moreover,
“the mere presence of a nonexertional impairment does not automatically preclude
reliance on the grids;” rather, reliance on the grids is foreclosed only when the
nonexertional impairment poses an additional limitation on the claimant’s ability
to perform a range of available jobs. Channel v. Heckler , 747 F.2d 577, 582 n.6
(10th Cir. 1984). Here, the ALJ did not identify pain as a nonexertional
4
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Dougherty’s report is
misplaced because he is not a rheumatologist. As discussed, plaintiff tested
negative for rheumatoid arthritis.
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impairment that would limit plaintiff’s ability to perform a range of jobs with the
sedentary level work category.
Last, plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE because it
excluded plaintiff’s subjective testimony of pain and corresponding limitations.
The ALJ’s hypothetical accurately reflects the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s
impairments and limitations and, as we stated above, this assessment is supported
by substantial evidence in the record. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955
(10th Cir. 1996) (stating that, while hypotheticals to VE must precisely reflect
impairments, “they need only reflect impairments and limitations that are borne
out by the evidentiary record”). Accordingly, we find that the ALJ’s conclusion
that plaintiff was not disabled at step five is supported by substantial evidence.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
James E. Barrett
Senior Circuit Judge
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