L&T Fabrication & Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor

                                                                         F I L E D
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Tenth Circuit
                                    PUBLISH
                                                                          NOV 29 1999
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                      PATRICK FISHER
                                                                               Clerk
                          FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT



 L & T FABRICATION &
 CONSTRUCTION, INC.

       Petitioner,

 v.                                                     No. 99-9523

 THE SECRETARY OF LABOR;
 FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND
 HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION,

       Respondent.


                PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
      FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
                      (Petition No. EAJ 99-1)



                                     ORDER



Before ANDERSON, EBEL and MURPHY, Circuit Judges


      This is a direct appeal from an order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

denying the petitioner attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice

Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. § 504. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

      The petitioner was cited for a violation of a safety standard under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. The petitioner contested the citation and the

accompanying civil penalty proposal. The ALJ affirmed the citation but reduced the

proposed penalty. Neither the Secretary of Labor nor the petitioner appealed to the

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. After the decision became

final pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1), the petitioner moved under the EAJA for

attorney fees and expenses. The ALJ denied the application, concluding that the

proposed penalty was neither substantially in excess of the of the penalty assessed

nor unreasonable when compared to that decision. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(4). The

petitioner then filed this appeal as well as a petition for review with the

Commission.

      The EAJA provides that:

            [a]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall
            award, to a prevailing party other than the United States,
            fees and other expenses incurred by that party in
            connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative
            officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
            was substantially justified or that special circumstances
            make an award unjust.


5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). The Act goes on to provide that:

            (3) The adjudicative officer of the agency may reduce the
            amount to be awarded, or deny an award, to the extent that
            the party during the course of the proceedings engaged in
            conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the
            final resolution of the matter in controversy. The decision
            of the adjudicative officer of the agency under this section
            shall be made a part of the record containing the final

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             decision of the agency and shall include written findings
             and conclusions and the reason or basis therefor. The
             decision of the agency on the application for fees and
             other expenses shall be the final administrative decision
             under this section.

             (4) If, in an adversary adjudication arising from an agency
             action to enforce a party's compliance with a statutory or
             regulatory requirement, the demand by the agency is
             substantially in excess of the decision of the adjudicative
             officer and is unreasonable when compared with such
             decision, under the facts and circumstances of the case,
             the adjudicative officer shall award to the party the fees
             and other expenses related to defending against the
             excessive demand, unless the party has committed a
             willful violation of law or otherwise acted in bad faith, or
             special circumstances make an award unjust. Fees and
             expenses awarded under this paragraph shall be paid only
             as a consequence of appropriations provided in advance.


5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3) and (4)(emphasis added).

      The petitioner argues that, because under the statutory language found in

subsection (1), that “unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds,” and in

subsection (3), that the “decision of the adjudicative officer shall be made part of

the record containing the final decision of the agency,”, the decision of the ALJ is

the final agency decision and is therefore immediately appealable to this court. This

argument is without merit.

      It is clear from the emphasized language of the statute above that the final

decision is not that of the ALJ , but rather that of the agency.

      The petitioner contends that the legislative history supports its position. We

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disagree. “When the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, that language

is controlling absent rare and exceptional circumstances.”        True Oil Co. v.

Commissioner, 170 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation

omitted). However, even upon review of the legislative history, we conclude that

the history accompanying the 1985 amendments supports our interpretation.

            The legislation allows the agency rather than the
            adjudicative officer to make the final decision on the fee
            award at the agency level.


H.R. Rep. No. 99-120 (I), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 135. The addition

of the last sentence to § 504(a)(3), which is emphasized above,

            explicitly adopts the view that the agency makes the final
            decision in the award of fees in administrative
            proceedings under section 504. This follows the view
            adopted by the Administrative Conference and recognizes
            the fact that decisions in administrative proceedings are
            generally not final until they have been adopted by the
            agency.


Id. at 142. Moreover, “[u]nder the provisions of the bill the government may not

appeal fee decisions by the agency.” Id. at 145.

      The petitioner makes much of the reference to McDonald v. Schweiker, 726

F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1983) and Mass. Union Public Housing Tenants v. Pierce, 755

F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1985) on page 14 of the House Report. However, this reference

sentence was deleted in the supplemental House Report. H.R. Supp. Rep. No. 99-


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120 (II), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 151, 155.

      Our reading of the statute is also supported by case law. In Smith v. NTSB,

992 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1993), the court, citing to § 504(a)(3), held that the

decision of the Board and not the ALJ was the final decision subject to review. The

Sixth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Lion Uniform, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 905

F.2d 120, 123 (6th Cir.) (“While the decision on an application for fees is initially

made by the adjudicative officer, the final administrative decision is that of the

agency.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).

      APPEAL DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.



                                       ENTERED FOR THE COURT

                                       PER CURIAM




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