F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
AUG 23 2002
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RUBEN R. HERRERA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 98-2060
TIM LEMASTER, Warden,
New Mexico State Penitentiary;
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents - Appellees,
ON REHEARING EN BANC
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-97-542-JP)
Peter Schoenburg of Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenburg &
Frye, LLP, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Petitioner-Appellant.
Patricia Gandert, Assistant Attorney General (Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney
General, with her on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondents-
Appellees.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY,
BRISCOE, LUCERO, MURPHY, HARTZ, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Ruben Robert Herrera, a state prisoner, brought a petition for habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his constitutional rights were violated
by the admission at trial of illegally obtained evidence. The district court denied
relief, holding that the state court’s determination of harmless error was entitled
to a presumption of correctness and, alternatively, that the error was harmless
under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). A panel of this court
concluded the district court erred in presuming correct the state court’s harmless
error analysis and in reaching its own harmless error determination without
reviewing the entire state court record. See Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176
(10th Cir. 2000). We directed the district court on remand to assess whether the
constitutional error was harmless under Brecht after an independent review of the
state court record. Mr. Herrera sought en banc review, arguing that the Brecht
harmless error standard does not apply to a habeas action governed by AEDPA 1
when, as here, the state court did not perform its harmless error analysis under
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
We granted rehearing en banc and directed the parties to address the
following question:
After AEDPA, when a state court decides a constitutional issue
1
Mr. Herrera’s federal habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the
effective date of AEDPA, and is therefore governed by its provisions. See Lindh
v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
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contrary to Supreme Court authority, or unreasonably applies
Supreme Court authority, should the habeas court on collateral
review apply the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), to assess the constitutional violation, or should it
apply the standard set out in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993).
Herrera v. Lemaster, No. 98-2060 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2002) (order granting
rehearing en banc). Upon en banc consideration, we hold that the standard set out
in Brecht is the appropriate one to use in these circumstances.
I
Mr. Herrera was convicted in New Mexico state court of first degree
murder and aggravated assault with a firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison
for the murder, eighteen months for the aggravated assault, and one year for the
firearm enhancement. On direct appeal, Mr. Herrera argued that his residence
was searched and evidence found there was seized under an invalid warrant, and
that the admission of the seized evidence at his trial therefore violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment. Although the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the warrant was constitutionally deficient, it concluded the admission of the
illegally seized items was harmless error under State v. Moore, 612 P.2d 1314,
1315 (N.M. 1980). See State v. Herrera, 694 P.2d 510, 513-15 (N.M. 1985).
Mr. Herrera subsequently filed this petition for federal habeas relief,
arguing the state supreme court erred in holding that the admission of the illegally
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seized evidence was harmless. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge,
who issued proposed findings and conclusions recommending that relief be
denied. In so doing, the magistrate conducted no hearings, ordered no briefs,
proceeded without access to the trial record, and issued his proposed disposition
without prior notice to the parties. In reaching his decision, the magistrate gave a
presumption of correctness to the state court’s harmless error determination, and
alternatively concluded the error was harmless under the standard set out in
Brecht.
Mr. Herrera filed objections to the report, contending the state court’s
harmless error determination was entitled to no deference because that court had
not performed its analysis under the standard mandated by the Supreme Court in
Chapman. 2 Mr. Herrera further argued that because application of the Brecht
standard of review is predicated upon a state court evaluation of harmlessness
under Chapman, when the state court failed to apply the correct Chapman
analysis, as here, the federal habeas court should assess harmlessness under
Chapman rather than Brecht. The state filed no response, and the district court
adopted the magistrate’s recommendation that the petition be dismissed with
2
The state has never argued that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
harmless error analysis satisfied the standards of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967), and in fact has conceded from the start that it is not consistent with
Chapman. As a consequence, we need not independently assess the constitutional
propriety of the harmless error standard applied by the state court.
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prejudice. Mr. Herrera appealed.
We granted Mr. Herrera a certificate of appealability on his claims that the
admission of the unlawfully seized evidence was not harmless error and that the
district court erred in denying habeas relief without reviewing the state court
record. On appeal, Mr. Herrera argued that Brecht is no longer good law after
AEDPA, and that even if Brecht survives it does not apply when the state court
has not performed a harmless error analysis under Chapman. In so doing, Mr.
Herrera contended that the state court’s failure to apply Chapman was contrary to
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, and that the
harmless error issue is therefore a legal question governed by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), 3 to which the presumption of correctness does not apply.
The panel opinion agreed with Mr. Herrera in part. It held that under
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), a state court decision is contrary to
clearly established federal law within the meaning of section 2254(d)(1) if the
state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the
3
AEDPA provides in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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Supreme Court’s cases. See Herrera, 225 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Williams, 529
U.S. at 405). The panel further agreed that the state court’s failure to assess the
harmlessness of the Fourth Amendment violation under Chapman was contrary to
clearly established federal law under section 2254(d)(1). 4 It also pointed out that
the presumption of correctness provided in AEDPA by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) 5
applies only to state court fact findings, and that the harmless error inquiry is a
mixed question of law and fact to which the presumption does not apply.
Accordingly, it held that the district court erred in presuming correct the state
court’s harmless error determination. Although the panel also agreed with Mr.
Herrera that the district court erred in concluding alternatively that the admission
of the illegally seized evidence was harmless without reviewing the entire state
court record, it did not accept the argument that a federal habeas court undertakes
a harmless error review in these circumstances under the Chapman standard. The
4
The panel asked the parties for additional briefing on whether it was
barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), from addressing Mr. Herrera’s
Fourth Amendment claim. Under Stone, a state prisoner may only raise a Fourth
Amendment claim on federal habeas if he has not received a full and fair hearing
on the issue in state court. The panel was persuaded that Mr. Herrera was denied
a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim by the state
court’s failure to assess the harmlessness of the constitutional violation under the
Chapman standard.
5
AEDPA provides in pertinent part that “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
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panel remanded with directions that the district court make a harmless error
determination under Brecht upon review of the entire state court record.
Mr. Herrera petitioned for rehearing en banc, renewing his arguments that
federal habeas courts should assess the harmlessness of a constitutional error
under Chapman rather than Brecht when the state courts fail to do so, and that the
justification for the Brecht standard has disappeared upon the enactment of
AEDPA. We granted rehearing en banc to address these issues. 6
6
In Brecht itself, the state court found a constitutional violation but
concluded that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. See
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 625-26. In the instant case, the state court found
constitutional error and undertook a harmless error analysis under a standard the
state concedes was improper. In other cases, a state court may find no
constitutional violation but do so in a decision that is contrary to clearly
established federal law or involves an unreasonable application of it. In the latter
two circumstances, the habeas petitioner has not received a harmless error review
under Chapman in state court. Mr. Herrera concedes that if Brecht is still viable
after AEDPA, it applies to the first situation, that is, where the state court has
performed a Chapman harmless error analysis. Accordingly, we address on
rehearing whether Brecht is still applicable after AEDPA and, if so, whether a
federal court on habeas review should assess harmlessness under Chapman or
Brecht when the state court has failed to apply Chapman.
The circuits do not speak with one voice on either issue. See Hernandez v.
Johnson, 248 F.3d 344, 379 (5th Cir. 2001) (Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting)
(discussing division in circuits as to whether Brecht survives AEDPA); Denny v.
Gudmanson, 252 F.3d 896, 905 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement and reaffirming prior holdings
that Brecht applies after AEDPA); and see Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426,
1430 (8th Cir. 1993) (Chapman applies rather than Brecht when state court did
not conduct its own harmless error analysis on direct appeal); Hassine v.
Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 950-53 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting circuit split and
applying Brecht); see also Sanna, 265 F.3d at 14 n.6 (noting circuit controversy
(continued...)
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II
A.
Before we turn to the en banc question, we address briefly the state’s
argument that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case because the
illegally seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon
was decided after the trial in this case and while Mr. Herrera’s direct appeal was
pending. The state filed a supplemental brief with the New Mexico Supreme
Court arguing that the case did not require consideration of the good faith
exception set out in Leon but that it could provide an alternative ground for
sustaining Mr. Herrera’s convictions. See rec. vol. I, doc. 7, exh. H. The court
concluded it need not discuss the issue in view of its determination that the
admission of the illegally seized evidence was harmless. See Herrera, 694 P.2d
at 514 n.1.
The state did not specifically raise the applicability of Leon in federal
district court, either by asserting the issue in its answer or by way of objection to
the magistrate’s report and recommendation. The state did urge the applicability
6
(...continued)
over whether Brecht applies when state court did not perform harmless error
analysis under Chapman and applying Brecht because state court applied standard
essentially equivalent to Chapman).
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of Leon to the panel on appeal as part of its contention that the district court did
not err in applying Brecht. In so doing, the state made the barebones argument
that the affidavit was sufficient to allow the issuing magistrate to conclude the
residence to be scrutinized was Mr. Herrera’s residence.
When an issue has not been properly raised below, we generally do not
address it on appeal. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1270-
71 (10th Cir. 2000). Although some courts have considered the applicability of
the Leon exception to be a mixed question of fact and law that can be addressed
for the first time on appeal, see United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1034
(5th Cir. 1985) (citing cases); United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261, 1265-66
(8th Cir. 1984), we conclude that such consideration is not appropriate here.
For the first time in its brief to the en banc court, the state contended the
affidavit was facially sufficient on the basis of evidence presented at the state
court suppression hearing. We will not consider new assertions presented for the
first time on rehearing en banc, particularly those based on factual allegations.
Accordingly, we decline the state’s invitation to address the applicability of Leon.
B.
In addressing the continued viability and applicability of Brecht after the
enactment of AEDPA, we look first to the text of the decision itself and compare
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the concerns underlying its holding with the purposes Congress intended to
further by enacting AEDPA. In Brecht, the Court held that the harmless error
standard set out in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, under which a conviction must be
set aside unless the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
does not apply to federal habeas review of state court convictions. Instead, the
Court adopted the harmless error standard set out in Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946), under which relief is granted when the constitutional
error had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. The
Court supported its conclusion that a less stringent harmless error standard should
apply on collateral review by looking first “to the considerations underlying our
habeas jurisprudence,” pointing to the primacy of the principal that “collateral
review is different from direct review.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633. The Court set
out four concerns that are furthered by applying different standards on habeas
than would be applied on direct review.
The reason most frequently advanced in our cases for
distinguishing between direct and collateral review is the State’s
interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review
within the state court system. We have also spoken of comity and
federalism. The States possess primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the
initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal
intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States’
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to
honor constitutional rights. Finally, we have recognized that [l]iberal
allowance of the writ . . . degrades the prominence of the trial itself,
and at the same time encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their
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claims on collateral review.
Id. at 635 (citations and quotations omitted). After assessing the impact of the
Chapman and Kotteakos standards on these interests, the Court concluded that the
latter standard is “better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review
and more likely to promote the considerations underlying our recent habeas
cases.” Id. at 638.
We note that while the Brecht standard is less stringent than that in
Chapman, it is still “appropriately demanding.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 641 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens, whose concurring opinion made the fifth vote for
the majority in Brecht, wrote separately to emphasize this point. Justice Stevens
stressed that the standard adopted in Brecht “places the burden on prosecutors to
explain why those errors were harmless; [7] requires a habeas court to review the
entire record de novo in determining whether the error influenced the jury’s
deliberations; and leaves considerable latitude for the exercise of judgment by
federal courts.” Id. at 640-41. As Justice Stevens observed, while the Brecht
standard is less stringent than that in Chapman, “[g]iven the critical importance of
the faculty of judgment in administering either standard, however, that difference
7
As the Supreme Court subsequently explained in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513
U.S. 432 (1995), Justice Stevens’ view of the Brecht standard as adopting “the
Kotteakos standard in its entirety”commanded a majority of the Court, id. at 439
(emphasis added).
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is less significant than it might seem . . . .” Id. at 643.
The standard in Brecht must also be construed and applied in light of the
Court’s subsequent decision in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995). There
the Court held that when a federal habeas judge finds a constitutional error in a
state court trial but the record is evenly balanced such that the judge is in grave
doubt about whether the error is harmless, “the uncertain judge should treat the
error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict (i.e., as if it had a
‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’).”
Id. at 435.
The Court rested its legal conclusion on three considerations. Id. at 437.
First, the Court observed that both Chapman and Kotteakos apply the rule, id. at
437-40, and that it properly takes into account the stakes involved in a habeas
proceeding, in which a person’s custody, not mere civil liability, is at issue, id. at
440. Second, the Court concluded that its rule is consistent with the purposes
underlying habeas relief. Id. at 442. After balancing the interests in protecting
against unconstitutional convictions and in assuring fundamentally fair trials
against the interests in the finality of state court judgments and state-federal
comity, the Court concluded that “[o]n balance, we must doubt that the law of
habeas corpus would hold many people in prison ‘in violation of the
Constitution,’ for fear that otherwise a smaller number, not so held may
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eventually go free.” Id. at 443. Finally the Court pointed out the administrative
virtues of its rule, noting that it “is consistent with the way that courts have long
treated important trial errors.” Id. After weighing the above considerations, the
Court held that “in cases of grave doubt as to harmlessness the petitioner must
win.” Id. at 437.
The concerns that prompted the Court in Brecht to adopt a less stringent
standard for harmless error assessment on collateral review are the same ones that
led Congress to pass AEDPA. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554-55
(1998) (citing Brecht as example of habeas corpus jurisprudence consistent with
objects of AEDPA). “AEDPA’s purpose [was] to further the principles of comity,
finality, and federalism. There is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance
these doctrines.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). In enacting
AEDPA “Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas,
and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law.”
Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 404. Accordingly, applying Brecht to cases governed by
AEDPA would not run counter to the Act’s purpose.
On rehearing en banc, Mr. Herrera argues that after AEDPA, he is entitled
to habeas relief without regard to whether the standard in Brecht is met when, as
here, the state court decision was contrary to clearly established law. In essence
he argues that the prerequisites for federal habeas relief set out in section 2254(d)
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replace the Brecht inquiry, contending the Court’s justifications in Brecht for
using a less demanding harmless error standard have disappeared with the
enactment of AEDPA. In Mr. Herrera’s view, if a state court fails to apply
Chapman on direct review, the decision is contrary to Supreme Court authority
under section 2254(d)(1) and the federal habeas court must therefore apply the
proper Chapman standard. If, on the other hand, the state court properly applies
Chapman, the federal habeas court assesses only whether the state court’s
application was unreasonable under section 2254(d)(2). He thus urges that the
Brecht inquiry should have no application in either scenario.
We are not persuaded Congress intended to alter the Supreme Court’s pre-
existing federal habeas jurisprudence on harmless error analysis. As we have
discussed, Congress’ purpose in enacting AEDPA is entirely congruent with the
rationale set out by the Court in Brecht for adopting a less demanding harmless
error standard on collateral review. Congress intended that AEDPA raise the bar
with respect to availability of federal habeas relief, an intent that does not permit
us to construe AEDPA to frustrate that intent by broadening the availability of
habeas relief. Moreover, we “generally assume Congress knows the law and
legislates in light of federal court precedent.” Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190
F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486
U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988). We therefore assume Congress was aware of and acted
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in light of the harmless error standard set out in Brecht when it enacted AEDPA.
Mr. Herrera contends that applying the Brecht standard on habeas review
would reduce the constitutional protection provided by established Supreme Court
precedent and defeat the remedial purpose of habeas relief. The Court, however,
has decided otherwise. As discussed above, although the Court narrowed the
availability of habeas relief in Brecht, in O’Neal the Court ameliorated the effect
of Brecht by ruling that when a habeas court is in grave doubt as to the
harmlessness of a constitutional error, the petitioner is entitled to relief. O’Neal,
513 U.S. at 435. In so doing, the Court balanced comity, finality, and deference
to state court criminal proceedings against the need to protect the fundamental
fairness of criminal trials and avoid grievous wrongs. We are not at liberty to
reweigh the balance struck by the Court in establishing the Brecht/O’Neal
standard.
We also are not persuaded by Mr. Herrera’s argument that because the state
court in Brecht had assessed harmlessness under the proper Chapman analysis,
Brecht is only applicable in those circumstances and does not govern habeas
petitions where the state did not apply Chapman. The broad language and the
analysis employed by both the plurality and by Justice Stevens in his concurrence
imply that the standard set out was intended to govern all federal habeas review
of state court decisions. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (Rehnquist, J., writing for
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the Court) (“The Kotteakos harmless-error standard is better tailored to the nature
and purpose of collateral review than the Chapman standard, and application of a
less onerous harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the considerations
underlying our habeas jurisprudence.”); id. at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The
Kotteakos standard that will now apply on collateral review is less stringent than
the [Chapman] standard applied on direct review.”).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has subsequently clearly indicated that a
federal habeas court is to apply the Brecht standard to a habeas petition governed
by AEDPA even when the state court has not assessed a constitutional error for
harmlessness under Chapman. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). In
Penry, a petitioner convicted of capital murder in state court asserted that
evidence was admitted at trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The state court on direct review disagreed and
concluded that no constitutional violation had taken place. The petitioner then
brought a proceeding for federal habeas relief, alleging the state court decision
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law. Although
the Supreme Court concluded otherwise, the Court alternatively indicated:
Even if our precedent were to establish squarely that the
prosecution’s use of the Peebles report violated Penry’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that error would
justify overturning Penry’s sentence only if Penry could establish that
the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.”
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Id. at 795 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637).
In Penry no harmless error analysis took place in state court because that
court determined that no constitutional error had occurred. Id. at 789-91. Here,
likewise, no proper harmless error analysis took place in state court because that
court did not apply the Chapman standard mandated by the Supreme Court in
conducting its harmless error review. In both instances, however, the result was
the same: the petitioner never received a harmless error analysis under the proper
standard in state court. The Supreme Court in Penry nonetheless stated that the
appropriate standard by which to gauge harmlessness on collateral review was
that supplied by Brecht. Id. at 795. Even though no party in Penry asserted that
Brecht was an inappropriate standard, we are not inclined to disregard this clear
signal from the Court that Brecht applies to an AEDPA case even when no proper
harmless error assessment occurred in state court.
In sum, we conclude that in cases governed by AEDPA, the habeas court is
to apply the harmless error standard set out in Brecht when a state court decides a
constitutional issue contrary to controlling Supreme Court authority or
unreasonably applies that authority. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s
judgment and remand with directions to assess the harmlessness of the Fourth
Amendment violation under the Brecht standard in light of the entire state court
record. In all other respects the panel opinion is reinstated.
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REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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