United States v. Kennedy

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 20 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-1421

WILLIAM R. KENNEDY, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 97-B-816)

Sean Connelly (Thomas L. Strickland, United States Attorney; Stacey L. Ross,
Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Assistant United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Craig L. Parshall (James Rouse, Englewood, Colorado; Daniel T. Smith, Denver,
Colorado, with him on the briefs), Fredericksburg, Virginia, for Defendant-
Appellant.

Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
 Petitioner William R. Kennedy, Jr. appeals from the district court’s denial

of an evidentiary hearing and other relief regarding Mr. Kennedy’s petition to

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging

prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. We exercise

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and deny Mr. Kennedy’s request

for a certificate of appealability and dismiss his appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 2, 1992, Mr. Kennedy was charged in two separate indictments by

a federal grand jury. United States v. Kennedy, 29 F. Supp.2d 662, 665 (D. Colo.

1998). In one of the indictments, the grand jury charged Mr. Kennedy committed

mail and wire fraud, racketeering and money laundering, from 1984 through 1988.

The grand jury found Mr. Kennedy, acting as the president of Western Monetary

Consultants, Inc. (Western), was involved in “a massive Ponzi scheme to defraud

numerous precious metals investors.” United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465,

1468 (10th Cir. 1995). The other indictment charged Mr. Kennedy with crimes

arising from his failure to report funds received from Kuwaiti officials. Kennedy,

29 F. Supp.2d at 665-66. These funds were to be used to support efforts to end

the occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi army. Id. at 666. Only the indictment

charging Mr. Kennedy with crimes arising from his involvement in the precious

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metals scheme led to the convictions at issue in this appeal.

In Mr. Kennedy’s trial for his involvement in Western’s operations, the

prosecution argued Mr. Kennedy intended to defraud his customers when, rather

than purchasing the precious metals the customers ordered, he (1) lost their

money by speculating in the future’s market; (2) used it to fund conservative

causes and organizations; and (3) spent it on operating expenses, executive

compensation and generating new sales. Mr. Kennedy’s theory of defense was

that he was unable to fill precious metals orders because he had mismanaged the

company. After a seven week trial, the jury found Mr. Kennedy guilty of one

count of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963; nine counts

of aiding and abetting mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1341; and

seven counts of aiding and abetting money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) & (2). Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1469; Kennedy, 29 F. Supp.2d at

666. The court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. This court affirmed Mr.

Kennedy’s conviction on direct appeal, but indicated Mr. Kennedy could pursue

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a collateral proceeding. Kennedy,

64 F.3d at 1474-75, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995).

Mr. Kennedy subsequently filed the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition at issue

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alleging various claims including ineffective assistance of counsel and claims

relating to prosecutorial misconduct. The district court determined all of the

claims Mr. Kennedy asserted were procedurally barred except his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel and the prosecutorial misconduct claims relating

to the prosecution’s alleged intrusion into Mr. Kennedy’s relationship with his

attorney. As to these remaining claims, the district court denied Mr. Kennedy’s

request for an evidentiary hearing concluding “the petition, files, and record of

this case conclusively demonstrate that he is not entitled to § 2255 relief,” and

denied his habeas petition. Kennedy, 29 F. Supp.2d at 686. Mr. Kennedy

subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of

appealability. After oral argument in the present appeal, Mr. Kennedy filed a

motion with this court requesting leave to supplement the record on appeal to

include an affidavit which was not before the district court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal

We first address Mr. Kennedy’s request to supplement the record before

this court. The evidence Mr. Kennedy wishes to include in the record on appeal

consists of an affidavit from Keith Danley. In 1989 and 1990, Mr. Danley was a

paralegal and law clerk at the law firm of Brown, Arvanitis & McDonnell (Brown

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& McDonnell), a firm that represented Mr. Kennedy. After taking the bar exam,

Mr. Danley left Brown & Donnell and became an employee of Mr. Kennedy in

October 1990. In his motion to supplement the record, Mr. Kennedy alleges Mr.

Danley acted as his attorney in connection with both civil and the potential

criminal matters arising from Mr. Kennedy’s actions as president of Western. He

asserts the prosecution intentionally invaded that relationship to gather

information used against Mr. Kennedy in the criminal prosecution at issue in this

case and in formulating its trial strategy. Mr. Kennedy asserts Mr. Danley’s

affidavit supports these allegations. However, the evidence which Mr. Kennedy

seeks to introduce was not a part of the record before the district court.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) authorizes the modification of

the record only to the extent it is necessary to “truly disclose[] what occurred in

the district court.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). This court will not consider material

outside the record before the district court. See In re Capital Cities, 913 F.2d 89,

96 (3d Cir. 1990). In Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982), we stated Rule 10(e) “allows a party to

supplement the record on appeal” but “does not grant a license to build a new

record.” Id. (citing cases). Because the affidavit was not before the district

court, Rule 10(e) does not countenance supplementing the record in this instance.

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See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1993); United States

v. Walker, 601 F.2d 1051, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 1979).

Nevertheless, Mr. Kennedy argues this court should exercise its “inherent

equitable authority” to enlarge the record on appeal. Mr. Kennedy points to our

decision in Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., as authority for this argument. In Allen, we

concluded the district court did not err by denying the appellant’s request to add

to the record portions of a deposition which were not before the district court

when it ruled on the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Allen, 8 F.3d at

1474. In making this determination, we quoted from Jones v. Jackson Nat’l Life

Ins. Co., 819 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1993). Id. While denying a

motion to supplement the record on appeal because the proposed evidence was not

before the court at the time its final decision was made, the Jones court noted the

court of appeals may have “an ‘inherent equitable power’ to supplement the

record exceeding the power provided in Rule 10(e),” but concluded any such

power is not to be exercised by the district court. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 1387

(citations omitted). Although in Allen we included the above statement from

Jones, we did not address the issue of whether this court may, and under what

circumstances should, allow the augmentation of the record on appeal to include

evidence not before the district court. See Allen, 8 F.3d at 1474-1476. Rather,

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we simply determined supplementation was not appropriate under the

circumstances. See id. Even so, Mr. Kennedy urges us to adopt the reasoning of

other courts of appeals concerning the “inherent equitable power” of the court of

appeals to supplement the record on appeal.

In support of his argument, Mr. Kennedy urges us to follow the reasoning

of the Eleventh Circuit in Ross v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1986), where

the court recognized its “inherent equitable authority” to supplement the record on

appeal to include material not before the district court. Id. at 1474-75. The Ross

court set forth the following non-exclusive list of factors it would consider when

deciding to supplement the record on appeal: 1) whether “acceptance of the

proffered material into the record would establish beyond any doubt the proper

resolution of the pending issue;” 2) whether remand for the district court to

consider the additional material would be contrary to the interests of justice and a

waste of judicial resources; and 3) whether supplementation is warranted in light

of the “unique powers that federal appellate judges have in the context of habeas

corpus actions.” Id. at 1475. The Ross court determined the movant had not

established the first factor, and had not established the threshold issue of whether

his failure to present the information before the district court was the result of

excusable neglect. Id. at 1476. However, the Ross court concluded based on the

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facts of that case, the interests of justice demanded remand to the district court to

determine whether to allow Mr. Ross to supplement the record and if so, to

determine whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted. Id. at 1477-79. 1

We are not persuaded by Mr. Kennedy’s argument. Although Ross is not

controlling precedent in this circuit, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that,

1
In Ross, the movant (Mr. Ross) requested leave to supplement the record
on appeal after the Eleventh Circuit had issued its opinion affirming the district
court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Ross’ request for habeas relief and
after the parties had filed their briefs on his motion for an en banc hearing. Id. at
1470, 1476, 1477. Mr. Ross claimed the jury was illegally composed – not
representative of the community – and that his right to a fair trial was therefore
compromised. Id. at 1469-70. In his motion to supplement the record on appeal,
Mr. Ross presented an affidavit by a statistician showing the racial and sexual
composition of the county where he was tried and comparing it to the jury lists for
the years immediately preceding and following the year Mr. Ross was tried. Id. at
1467, 1472-73. The affidavit showed a significant discrepancy between the
gender and racial composition of the population and the composition of the jury
lists. Id. at 1473 & n.10. In considering whether to allow Mr. Ross to
supplement the record on appeal, the court noted this was not the type of case
where it would normally allow supplementation of the record on appeal, but listed
the three factors set forth above it would consider when deciding whether to
exercise its authority to allow supplementation of the record on appeal. Id. at
1475. The court went on to explain this was not an exclusive list of the factors to
be considered, and indicated this issue is most appropriately determined on a
case-by-case basis. Id. The court finally concluded, although Mr. Ross had failed
to establish the proffered material “would establish beyond doubt he is entitled to
a full evidentiary hearing,” or the failure to present the evidence before the
district court was not the result of inexcusable neglect, the interests of justice
would best be served by remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
to determined the threshold question of whether his failure to present the evidence
was due to inexcusable neglect. Id. at 1476-77.

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under some circumstances, we have an inherent equitable power to supplement the

record on appeal. However, we conclude the present case is not one which

would come under that rare exception to Rule 10(e), and is distinguishable from

Ross.

The Ross court determined the interests of justice would best be served by

remanding to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the

threshold question of whether Mr. Ross’s failure to present the evidence before

the district court was the result of inexcusable neglect. Id. at 1476-77. The court

reached this conclusion because it was concerned the “apparent negligence on the

part of Ross’ attorneys may have been due to their reliance on misrepresentations

by the state official who had legal custody of the records.” Id. at 1477. The court

also expressed its concern that the state officials refused to produce the other

records and they were apparently inconsistent in disclosing jury lists to different

attorneys in different cases. Id. Finally, because it was reviewing a capital

murder case, and due to the extremely serious nature of the constitutional error

asserted and the fact the proffered evidence would “have a definite impact on

[Mr. Ross’] ability to prove the illegal composition of his grand and traverse

juries,” the court decided to invoke its inherent authority and remanded to the

district court for a hearing to resolve the threshold issue of inexcusable neglect.

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Id. at 1477.

In the present case, however, there is no indication the government was

lying to Mr. Kennedy’s attorney concerning the location of records or was

refusing to produce information. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude Mr.

Danley’s affidavit makes a stronger case for Mr. Kennedy’s arguments concerning

invasion of the attorney-client relationship, we could not conclude it “would

establish beyond any doubt the proper resolution of the pending issue[s].” See id.

at 1475. As discussed below, the main issue before us is whether Mr. Kennedy

has made a sufficient showing of prejudice from the alleged intrusions to warrant

an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Danley’s affidavit does not remove our doubt

concerning the existence of prejudice resulting from the alleged intrusions. 2

Consequently, we conclude the circumstances in the present case do not lead us to

believe the interests of justice would best be served by exercising our inherent

equitable power to allow Mr. Kennedy to supplement the record on appeal or by

remanding the issue to the district court. For all the reasons stated above, we

deny Mr. Kennedy’s request to supplement the record on appeal to include Mr.

2
In his affidavit, Mr. Danley accuses AUSA Peters of lying about the
content of the government’s interviews with Mr. Danley. However, we do not
find these accusations sufficient to justify exercising our inherent authority to
supplement the record on appeal to include this affidavit.

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Danley’s affidavit.

B. Certificate of Appealability and Standard of Review

We next address the standard of review governing Mr. Kennedy’s request

for a certificate of appealability. 3 Because Mr. Kennedy’s request for a certificate

of appealability was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214 (April 24, 1996), his right to appeal is governed by the AEDPA. See Slack

v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (2000); Tillman v. Cook, 215

F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability and proceed to

3
The district court did not rule on Mr. Kennedy’s request for a certificate
of appealability within thirty days after Mr. Kennedy filed his notice of appeal.
Under our Emergency General Order of October 1, 1996, we deem the district
court’s failure to issue a certificate of appealability within thirty days after filing
the notice of appeal as a denial of the certificate. See United States v. Riddick,
104 F.3d 1239, 1241 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, United
States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). We note the district court
ultimately granted Mr. Kennedy a certificate of appealability, but for reasons not
evident in the record before us, that certificate did not issue until two months
after Mr. Kennedy filed his notice of appeal. Given the untimeliness of the
district court’s ruling, we construe this appeal as Mr. Kennedy’s request to this
court for a certificate of appealability. Cf. id. (where the petitioner made no
request for a certificate of appealability, we construed his appeal as a request for
a certificate of appealability).

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the merits of Mr. Kennedy’s appeal, he must make a “substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In addressing the

requirements of obtaining a certificate of appealability under § 2253(c), the

Supreme Court recently stated the petitioner must show a substantial denial of a

constitutional right by demonstrating “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,

for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.’” Slack,___ U.S. at ___, 120 S. Ct. at 1603-04 (quoting Barefoot

v. Estelle, 463 U.S., 880, 893 and n.4 (1983)) (further quotation marks omitted).

See also Tillman, 215 F.3d at 1120. A review of the record establishes Mr.

Kennedy failed to make the requisite showing for a certificate of appealability.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Kennedy’s request for a certificate of

appealability and dismiss his appeal.

Keeping in mind the standard of review governing a request for a certificate

of appealability, we note our standard of review over the district court’s

determination of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is clearly established. “[W]e review

the district court’s legal rulings on a § 2255 motion de novo and its findings of

fact for clear error.” United States v. Pearce, 146 F.3d 771, 774 (10th Cir. 1998);

accord United States v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1997). Under 28

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U.S.C. § 2255, the district court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing

“[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the

prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 113, 119 (10th

Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For the following reasons, we

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Kennedy’s

request for an evidentiary hearing.

C. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Mr. Kennedy argues the district court erred by failing to grant him an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether his right to effective counsel as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution was compromised by the

government’s alleged invasion into his attorney-client relationship. Specifically,

he contends the government used Mr. Danley as a source of information in its

criminal prosecution of Mr. Kennedy in the case at issue.

Mr. Danley worked at Brown & McDonnell from June 1989 to October

1990. He then began to work for Mr. Kennedy and received his license to

practice law in May 1991. Both parties admit there is a factual dispute

concerning whether Mr. Danley acted in the capacity of an attorney for Mr.

Kennedy after he began to work for Mr. Kennedy exclusively. However, Mr.

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Danley had left Mr. Kennedy’s employ by June 27, 1991. As mentioned above,

the indictment was filed July 2, 1992. Mr. Kennedy admits some of the

information he asserts Mr. Danley gave the prosecution was turned over before

the indictment was issued. Government intrusions into pre-indictment attorney-

client relationships do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. See United States v.

Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Kingston, 971 F.2d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, Mr. Kennedy is not entitled

to an evidentiary hearing to explore alleged intrusions that occurred before July 2,

1992.

Mr. Kennedy further contends, however, the prosecution invaded his

attorney-client privilege by interviewing Mr. Danley after Mr. Kennedy was

indicted. However, these interviews occurred after Mr. Danley had left Mr.

Kennedy’s employ. Consequently, there could have been no invasion of Mr.

Kennedy’s attorney-client relationship with Mr. Danley resulting from these

interviews. See United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1985)

(where defendant’s former attorney divulged confidential information to the

Internal Revenue Service during its pre-indictment investigation of the defendant,

the court concluded the Sixth Amendment was not implicated, although the

former attorney may have breached his ethical obligation of confidentiality).

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Thus, we conclude the cases Mr. Kennedy cites in support of his Sixth

Amendment argument are inapplicable. 4

D. Fifth Amendment Due Process Violation

In support of his request for an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Kennedy contends

the government’s alleged intrusion into his attorney-client relationship with Mr.

Danley so infected the entire investigation and trial that his Fifth Amendment

right to due process was violated and he has suffered irreparable harm. While a

claim of a Sixth Amendment violation based on intrusion of attorney-client

privilege is limited to government action which interferes with legal

representation after the initiation of criminal proceedings, we acknowledge a

defendant may claim his or her rights under the Due Process Clause have been

violated by prosecutorial misconduct occurring prior to indictment.

4
We also conclude Mr. Kennedy is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his Sixth Amendment claim because Mr. Kennedy has failed to show the
prosecution obtained any material privileged information concerning the case at
issue during the post-indictment meetings with Mr. Danley. The meeting Mr.
Kennedy emphasizes most occurred in 1993, after the indictment. According to
Mr. Danley’s testimony in the Kuwait case, the purpose of this meeting was for
Mr. Danley to locate ten pages of notes he had taken while working for Mr.
Kennedy. Mr. Danley searched though ten file boxes, but was unable to locate
these notes. Likewise, there is nothing in the record to indicate any of the
subsequent meetings Mr. Danley had with members of the prosecution team
yielded any privileged information concerning the Western case.

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 Misconduct by law enforcement officials in collecting incriminating

evidence may rise to the level of a due process violation when the misconduct is

outrageous enough to shock the conscience of the court. Rochin v. California,

342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (where police obtained evidence against the

defendant by pumping his stomach, the Court determined the officers’ actions

offended the Due Process Clause). See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.

423, 431-32 (1973) (where the government supplied the defendant with materials

to commit the crime and the defendant claimed governmental misconduct in

violation of the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated there could be a situation

where “the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process

principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes

to obtain a conviction,” but concluded the case before it was “not of that breed.”).

Other courts have concluded governmental misconduct in the form of a pre-

indictment invasion of a defendant’s attorney-client relationship may, under some

circumstances, amount to a deprivation of the defendant’s right to due process.

See United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 562-63, 566 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding

defendants’ due process rights were violated when their attorney represented them

during grand jury proceedings, and then participated in their prosecution after

indictments were issued in the same matter), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986);

United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1521-23 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

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(concluding pre-indictment intrusion into the attorney-client relationship was so

pervasive and prejudicial as to warrant dismissal of the indictment where the

defendant’s attorney participated in the investigation of his client and the

government knowingly assisted the attorney in violating the attorney-client

privilege and hid the violation from the court). But see Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1076,

1078-80 (holding defendants’ former attorney breached his ethical duties to his

former clients by divulging confidential information to the IRS during its pre-

indictment investigation of the defendants, but concluding no prejudice to the

defendants resulted justifying the dismissal of the indictment and the government

engaged in no misconduct by interviewing the defendants’ former attorney).

In United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.

1047 (1996), the court applied due process principles to a pre-indictment intrusion

into the defendant’s relationship with his attorney. Id. at 1066. In Voigt, the

defendant contended the government had used his attorney as an undercover agent

to gather privileged information as part of the government’s investigation. Id. at

1061, 1064. The Voigt court held:

in order to raise a colorable claim of outrageousness pertaining to
alleged governmental intrusion into the attorney-client relationship,
the defendant’s submissions must demonstrate an issue of fact as to
each of the three following elements: (1) the government’s objective
awareness of an ongoing, personal attorney-client relationship
between its informant and the defendant; (2) deliberate intrusion into

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 that relationship; and (3) actual and substantial prejudice.

Id. at 1067. We consider the Third Circuit’s test as set forth in Voigt to be a

reasonable method of evaluating Fifth Amendment claims based on allegations of

an invasion of the attorney-client relationship. We therefore adopt it as our own.

In the present case, the district court made no findings concerning the first

two elements of the Voigt test. Rather, it concluded Mr. Kennedy had failed to

show sufficient prejudice flowing from the alleged intrusions to warrant a new

trial, the dismissal of the indictment, or an evidentiary hearing. In making this

determination, the district court only discussed the evidence actually introduced at

trial and the fact that Mr. Danley never testified at trial. 5 However, Mr.

5
The district court relied upon our opinion in Shillinger, 70 F.3d at 1142-
43, and the Supreme Court case of United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-
65 (1980), in determining Mr. Kennedy was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on these claims. The court pointed out the only evidence introduced at trial which
was derived from the alleged intrusion was the check used in the government’s
attempt to refresh Mr. Korpi’s memory and thereby impeach his testimony. The
court implicitly concluded any prejudice resulting from the use of this check was
slight, not reaching the level of outrageousness necessary to sustain a claim for a
violation of due process based on prosecutorial misconduct, because it was never
admitted into evidence. The court also pointed out Mr. Danley never testified at
trial, and concluded because any other information allegedly gathered by the
government from Mr. Danley was not introduced at trial, Mr. Kennedy had failed
to show he was entitled to relief based on his claims of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations flowing from the alleged invasion of his attorney-client
relationship. Although we agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion, we
note the present case is distinguishable from Shillinger in that Mr. Kennedy is
presenting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct flowing from invasion of his

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Kennedy’s Fifth Amendment claim focuses on the government’s method of

investigating its case against him. The district court should have considered not

only the evidence admitted in this case, but also any information the government

allegedly received from Mr. Danley during its investigation. See Marshank, 777

F. Supp. at 1521-23. Nevertheless, after examining all of the information Mr.

Kennedy alleges the government discovered in violation of his attorney-client

relationship, we conclude Mr. Kennedy has not made the requisite showing of

prejudice to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 6 Under the Voigt test set forth above,

relationship with his attorney during the investigative stage of the prosecution.
Shillinger dealt with a Sixth Amendment claim, and seemingly limited the remedy
of a new trial or the dismissal of an indictment only where “the evidence has been
wrongfully admitted.” Shillinger, 70 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Morrison, 449 U.S. at
365) (quotation marks omitted). However, the Morrison Court did not impose
such a limitation on claims brought under the Fifth Amendment. Morrison
involved a Sixth Amendment claim of pre-indictment intrusion in to the attorney-
client relationship. 449 U.S. at 363. The Morrison Court distinguished cases
alleging Fifth Amendment violations and pointed out in that case “[t]here [was]
no claim [] of continuing prejudice which, because it could not be remedied by a
new trial of suppression of evidence, called for more drastic treatment. Id. at
365-66 and n.2.

6
Mr. Kennedy asserts his claims were supported in the record by: 1) a
confidential attorney-client letter from his counsel which later surfaced in the
prosecutor’s files; 2) a photocopy of the check used to discredit Mr. Korpi; 3) the
so-called “speculation” letter from Mr. Danley to Mr. Kennedy urging him to
“stop speculating”; 4) information concerning potential prosecution and defense
witnesses; 5) information that the prosecution had seized Western documents
considered most important to Mr. Kennedy’s defense team; 6) information
concerning Mr. Kennedy’s plans to repay Western’s creditors; 7) information
concerning a privately published novel about Mr. Kennedy which he alleges
provided the prosecution with a “road map” for its case. Rather than expanding

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the party asserting a Fifth Amendment violation must make a showing of all three

elements. Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1067. Mr. Kennedy has not shown how the

government’s use of the allegedly privileged information “infected the trial to

such an extent that it resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Fox v. Ward, 200

F.3d 1286, 1299 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637, 645 (1974)). Nor has he shown the prosecution’s actions in interviewing Mr.

Danley and gathering evidence from him during its investigation were sufficiently

outrageous to support granting a new trial or dismissing the indictment. See

Morrison, 449 U.S. at 365-67 and n.3. Consequently, we conclude the district

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Mr. Kennedy an evidentiary

hearing.

this opinion to include an in-depth analysis of every piece of information Mr.
Kennedy asserts the prosecution obtained through Mr. Danley, we assure the
parties we have examined the record and conclude Mr. Kennedy has shown no
prejudice resulting from the alleged intrusions into his relationship with Mr.
Danley. Although the government may have a duty to rebut an assertion it
obtained information in violation of the attorney-client privilege, see Lin Lyn
Trading, Ltd., 149 F. 3d at 1116, the burden remains on the petitioner in a § 2255
proceeding to show a deprivation of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
In light of all of the evidence offered against him in the seven week trial, Mr.
Kennedy has not convinced us he was in any way prejudiced by the discovery of
the allegedly privileged information. Thus, we need not address his argument
concerning the government’s failure to come forward with an explanation for how
it received the information Mr. Kennedy claims came from his attorney.

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 E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Mr. Kennedy contends the district court erred by failing to grant

him an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr.

Kennedy asserts:

The question of whether attorney Lane should have moved to
suppress all [Western]-related information divulged by [Mr.] Danley
following its brief disclosure in Plaintiff’s Hearing Exhibit Ten
warrants a full evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s effectiveness in
conducting an adequate investigation, or the reasonableness of his
reliance on the prosecutor’s assurances that Mr. Danley had nothing
to do with the [Western] case.

(Footnotes and citations omitted.)

“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of

law and fact which we review de novo.” Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1273

(10th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to obtain habeas

relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish both that

his attorney’s representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced by that

deficiency.” James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 555 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “An ineffective assistance

claim may be resolved on either performance or prejudice grounds alone.” Fox,

200 F.3d at 1295. In order to show prejudice, the petitioner must show “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

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the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. “There is a strong presumption that counsel provided effective

assistance, and a section 2255 defendant has the burden of proof to overcome that

presumption.” United States v. Williams, 948 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Kan. 1996),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1033 (1997). In the present case, the district court

determined Mr. Kennedy failed to show his counsel’s assistance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s

performance. We agree.

As explained above, Mr. Kennedy has failed to show how his defense was

prejudiced by the government’s alleged possession of the information obtained

through Mr. Danley. Thus, any failure on the part of his counsel to investigate

further into the source of that evidence was harmless. Furthermore, Mr. Danley

never testified, and the only evidence presented at trial which was obtained

through him was the “Korpi” check. As explained above, this check was never

entered into evidence. The prosecutor used it to refresh Mr. Korpi’s memory in

an attempt to impeach his testimony. We conclude this episode had little

possibility of affecting the outcome of the trial. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy has

failed to make the requisite showing he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s

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failure to request suppression of all the evidence obtained through Mr. Danley.

Thus, the district court did not err by determining Mr. Kennedy was not entitled

to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

We therefore AFFIRM the order of the district court denying Mr. Kennedy

an evidentiary hearing and deny Mr. Kennedy a certificate of appealability.

Appeal DISMISSED.

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