F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 1 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES C. CURRIER, as personal
representative of the Estate of Anthony
Michael Juarez, deceased; DEVONNE
ESPERANZA JUAREZ, as mother and
next friend of Latasha Juarez, a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. No. 99-2287
No. 99-2288
TOM DORAN, SHIRLEY MEDINA,
MELBA GONZALES, REGINA
SENTELL, in their personal capacity,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
KELLY ROBBINS, in her personal
capacity,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-97-477-BB/JHG)
Paula I. Forney, of Legal Bureau-Risk Management, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Appellant Gonzales.
Timothy Flynn-O’Brien, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellants Doran,
Medina and Sentell.
Charles K. Purcell, of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque,
New Mexico, (William S. Dixon of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,
and Michael L. Stout, of Roswell, New Mexico, with him on the briefs) for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before SEYMOUR, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and KANE, * District Judge.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, the representatives of two minor children abused by their father,
brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants violated their
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Defendants Tom Doran, Shirley Medina, and Regina Sentell are
social workers for the Children, Youth and Families Department of the State of
New Mexico (“CYF”), and defendant Melba Gonzales is a supervisor for CYF. 1
*
Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
CYF was formerly known as the Human Services Department of the State
1
of New Mexico.
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Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to
qualified immunity. The district court treated the motions as motions to dismiss.
Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their motions. Jurisdiction to
consider Defendants’ appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Johnson v.
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (“[A] Federal District Court order rejecting a
qualified immunity defense on the ground that the defendant’s actions—if
proved—would have violated clearly established law may be appealed
immediately as a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of the general federal
appellate jurisdiction statute.”). Because Plaintiffs have alleged a clearly
established constitutional claim against Defendants Doran and Gonzales, these
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity; this court therefore affirms the
district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment. Because Plaintiffs
have not alleged a viable constitutional claim against Defendant Sentell, this court
reverses the district court’s denial of her motion for summary judgment. Because
the constitutional violation Plaintiffs state against Medina was not clearly
established at the time of the events underlying this suit, this court reverses the
district court’s denial of Medina’s motion for summary judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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Plaintiffs allege the following facts in their complaint and in their response
to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. On April 30, 1993, Defendant
Medina visited the home of Devonne Juarez (“Juarez”) to investigate a report of
child neglect. Juarez is the natural mother of Latasha and Anthony Juarez, whose
abuse prompted this lawsuit. 2 Medina found Latasha and Anthony, who were both
under four years old, in the care of their five-year-old cousin. Medina discovered
that Juarez had left the state. Medina removed Latasha and Anthony from the
home and delivered the children into the physical custody of CYF.
On May 3, 1993, CYF petitioned the New Mexico Children’s Court
(“Children’s Court”) for an order formally granting legal custody of the children
to CYF. Medina stated in an affidavit supporting the petition that Christopher
Vargas, the father of Latasha and Anthony, had not supported the children and
had allowed them to live in “alarming conditions.” Medina had also been
informed by an associate of Vargas that Vargas worked evenings and would “have
a hard time taking care of the kids.”
During this time Defendant Doran became aware of Vargas’ history of
financial irresponsibility, which included having made only eight child-support
payments in the preceding three years. On May 10, 1993, the Children’s Court
2
Charles C. Currier is suing as personal representative of Anthony’s Estate,
and Juarez represents Latasha, a minor, as mother and next friend.
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held a custody hearing. Doran attended but said nothing about Vargas’ history of
child-support payments. The Children’s Court stated that “no parent, guardian,
custodian or other person is able or willing to provide adequate supervision and
care for the children.” Nevertheless, based on the recommendation of Medina, the
court granted physical custody of the children to Vargas while keeping legal
custody with CYF.
At some point during the following months, Vargas was also awarded legal
custody. Plaintiffs contend this occurred on October 19, 1993, and that Doran,
either through his failure to investigate and report to the Children’s Court or his
affirmative recommendation to the Children’s Court, was responsible for this
decision. Defendants maintain Vargas assumed legal custody on June 23, 1993.
The district court allowed limited discovery on this issue, but found it
unnecessary to resolve the issue in denying Defendants’ motions.
On July 22, 1993, Doran visited Latasha and Anthony at Vargas’ home.
Doran noticed a small bruise on Anthony’s cheek; Vargas’ girlfriend claimed the
bruise was the result of a fall on the playground. On August 3, 1993, Anthony
had another bruise when he arrived at the CYF office for a visit. This bruise was
also attributed to a fall. Doran did not further investigate either bruise.
Juarez returned to New Mexico in August 1993. On August 25 and
September 16, 1993, Juarez asserted to the children’s guardian ad litem that
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Vargas and his fiancee were physically abusing Latasha and Anthony. Defendant
Doran was told about at least one of these allegations but failed to investigate.
On August 31, 1993, during the course of a comprehensive psychological
evaluation conducted at CYF’s request, Juarez alleged that Vargas’ fiancee
punished Latasha and Anthony by dunking them in a bathtub full of water. Doran
learned of these accusations but failed to investigate.
On October 15, 1993, during a visit between Juarez and the children at the
CYF office, two bruises were noticed on Latasha’s back. When Latasha was
asked who gave her the bruises, she replied “Da, Da.” On October 20, 1993, the
guardian ad litem for Latasha and Anthony sent letters to Doran and Gonzales
urging a thorough investigation of the recent observations of bruises on Latasha’s
back. Doran did interview Vargas and his fiancee about the bruises; they
explained that the bruises had been caused by a bunk bed ladder which they had
since thrown away.
On November 17, 1993, bruises were noticed on Anthony’s face while he
was in the CYF office. Vargas’ fiancee claimed the bruises were the result of
Anthony’s fall from a bunk bed. CYF then removed Latasha and Anthony from
Vargas’ home and placed them with relatives. When questioned about the bruises
on Anthony’s cheek, Vargas explained to Doran that he had bitten Anthony on the
cheek while wrestling on the floor, but that he did not think he had bitten
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Anthony “that hard.” Latasha made some remarks indicating that “Ta Ta” had
bitten Anthony to punish him. There were also bite marks on Latasha that Vargas
could not explain. Doran prepared an affidavit for a November 19, 1993 meeting
with Gonzales in which he indicated that the children would be subject to further
abuse if permitted to stay with Vargas. In the meeting, however, Doran failed to
strongly advocate against return of the children to Vargas. Gonzales concluded
the children had to be returned to Vargas, which occurred on November 19, 1993.
On January 10, 1994, a request for an investigation of possible physical
abuse of Anthony was made to Defendant Sentell. Sentell received this request
and referred it to Medina for further action. Medina discovered bruises on
Anthony’s buttocks but concluded the bruises were the result of a fall. During the
visit Latasha told Medina that she was spanked with a belt.
On January 16, 1994, the children’s guardian ad litem filed a report
indicating that “Anthony and Latasha will be subject to further injury in their
current home situation” and recommended monitoring the situation. Despite this
recommendation, Medina and Doran then instructed Juarez to stop making
allegations of abuse because it was traumatizing the children. On March 16,
1994, Doran referred another allegation of abuse to Sentell. Sentell discovered
bruises on both Latasha and Anthony but concluded the injuries were not the
result of abuse.
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On April 16, 1994, Vargas poured boiling water on Anthony, causing
Anthony severe burns over most of his body. When Doran learned of this
incident, he went to Vargas’ home, where he observed many indications of
violence. Doran removed Latasha, who was covered with bruises, from Vargas’
home and took her to the emergency room. Doctors at the emergency room
indicated that Anthony was bruised everywhere he was not burned. Defendants
then sought and gained custody of the children on CYF’s behalf. Anthony died in
an intensive care unit on May 3, 1994.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico, claiming Defendants had violated Latasha and Anthony’s
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the completion of the limited
discovery referred to above, Medina and Doran moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
precluded Plaintiffs’ claims. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Defendant Gonzales
independently moved for summary judgment, raising the same argument.
Gonzales also maintained, however, that even if DeShaney did not foreclose
Plaintiffs’ claims, the law was not clearly established at the time of the underlying
events and thus she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court issued a
memorandum opinion and order stating that DeShaney did not foreclose
Plaintiffs’ claims but concluding the law was not clearly established at the time of
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the events underlying this suit. See Currier v. Doran, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1279-
83 (D.N.M. 1998) Thus, the district court denied Medina and Doran’s motion and
granted Gonzales’ motion. See id. at 1283.
The district court subsequently issued an order withdrawing the portion of
its memorandum opinion dealing with the issue of whether the law was clearly
established during the events underlying the suit, apparently because counsel for
Gonzales had raised the issue in her brief to the court but failed to do so in her
brief to Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Currier v. Doran, No. CIV 97-0477 BB/JHG, slip
op. at 1-2 (D.N.M. Aug. 19, 1999). Doran, Medina, and Sentell then joined
Gonzales in moving for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The district court again held that DeShaney did not preclude Plaintiffs’
claims. See id. at 6-10. The district court also concluded that at the time of the
events underlying the suit it was clearly established Defendants’ alleged conduct
could be the source of a constitutional violation, reversing its prior memorandum
opinion. See id. at 2-6. Thus, the district court denied Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. See id. at 10.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
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Although Defendants’ motions were filed as motions for summary
judgment, the district court treated them as motions to dismiss because discovery
had been limited to the question of when legal custody was given to Vargas.
Thus, all the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint were accepted as true. See
Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991). The district court also
relied on additional facts disclosed in the limited discovery and alleged by
Plaintiffs in their response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
Defendants argue that because matters outside the pleadings were
considered it was error for the district court to apply a motion to dismiss standard
rather than a summary judgment standard. Defendants’ argument, however,
would have left the district court with the option of either referring solely to the
complaint or determining whether the minimal evidence then available warranted
a trial. Plaintiffs could not properly respond to a factual challenge to their
complaint because the district court had allowed discovery only on the limited
question of when legal custody was granted to Vargas. In addition, it would have
been odd to prohibit Plaintiffs from relying on additional facts disclosed during
that discovery. As Plaintiffs correctly note, they could have amended their
complaint to include the new information as factual allegations. Thus, the district
court properly treated Defendants’ motions as motions to dismiss. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(f) (stating that when the nonmovant cannot respond to a summary
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judgment motion the court “may order a continuance to permit . . . discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just” (emphasis added)).
Whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief may be granted is a
question of law this court reviews de novo. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the
Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d. 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). Similarly, whether the law
on which Plaintiffs rely was clearly established at the time of the events
underlying this suit is also a question of law subject to de novo review. See
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1998). All of
Plaintiffs’ allegations are accepted as true. See Williams, 926 F.2d at 997.
B. Heightened Pleading Requirement
Defendants correctly note that this court requires plaintiffs to meet a
heightened pleading requirement once a defendant raises the defense of qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.
1997); Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 667 (10th Cir. 1990). The
heightened pleading standard requires plaintiffs to “do more than assert bare
allegations of a constitutional violation.” Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1293. The
plaintiff’s complaint must include “‘all of the factual allegations necessary to
sustain a conclusion that defendant violated clearly established law.’” Id. (quoting
Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987)). The factual allegations
must be “specific” and “non-conclusory,” and sufficient for a district court to
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determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate the defendant is not entitled to
qualified immunity. Id. The heightened pleading requirement is an exception to
the notice pleading standard in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
“the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Plaintiffs question whether this court’s heightened pleading requirement
survives the recent Supreme Court case of Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct.
1584 (1998). Although we are generally bound by the prior precedent of this
court, there is an exception to this rule when that precedent is superceded by
contrary decisions of the Supreme Court. See United States v. Bell, 154 F.3d
1205, 1209 n.6 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246
(10th Cir. 1998). This court has recognized on several occasions the possibility
that Crawford-El might affect this court’s heightened pleading requirement, but
has yet to resolve that question in a published, precedential opinion. See Ramirez
v. Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Smith v.
Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 00-6046, 2000 WL 1480259, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. Oct.
6, 2000) (unpublished disposition); Watkins v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 98-1063,
1999 WL 594584, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1999) (unpublished disposition). See
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generally Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1897,
1925 & n.187 (suggesting that Crawford-El puts an end to judicially-crafted
heightened pleading requirements in qualified immunity cases). Because
application of the heightened pleading requirement affects the outcome of this
case, this court must consider its continued viability after Crawford-El.
The heightened pleading requirement is premised on “the purpose of the
qualified immunity doctrine itself.” Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1292. More
specifically, this court has linked the heightened pleading requirement to the
Supreme Court case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982):
When the Supreme Court reformulated its qualified immunity test in
Harlow to focus on the “objective reasonableness” of an officer’s
actions as opposed to his or her subjective intent, the Court sought to
shield government officials not only from the “substantial costs” of
subjecting officials to the risks of trial, but also from “[j]udicial
inquiry into subjective motivation,” including “broad-ranging
discovery and the deposing of numerous persons.” The Court held
that such inquiries “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.” In keeping with this important concern for shielding
government officers from burdensome discovery in cases where
subjective intent is at issue, this court and several other circuits have
imposed a more stringent pleading requirement where a qualified
immunity defense is asserted.
Breidenbach, 126 F.3d at 1292 (citations omitted).
In Harlow the Supreme Court reconsidered qualified immunity law as it
existed at the time. Before Harlow a plaintiff could defeat a government
official’s defense of qualified immunity two ways: by demonstrating the official
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knew or should have known her action was unconstitutional (referred to by the
Court as the “objective element” of qualified immunity) or by demonstrating the
official acted with the malicious intent to cause injury (the “intent element” of
qualified immunity 3). See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. In Harlow, however, the
Court decided the intent element of qualified immunity had proved in practice to
be incompatible with the overall goal of qualified immunity, which is to prevent
government officials from being disrupted by a trial of insubstantial claims. See
id. at 815-17. The Court explained that because the question of an official’s
intent to cause harm could not usually be disposed of at summary judgment, many
plaintiffs were proceeding to trial against government officials on insubstantial
claims because the plaintiffs were able to easily create an issue of fact on whether
the government official had the subjective intent to harm them. See id. at 815-18.
The Court eliminated the intent element of qualified immunity, reasoning that
“bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials
either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” Id. at
817-18. 4
3
The Supreme Court in Harlow actually referred to the latter option as the
“subjective element,” but for clarity this opinion will instead refer to this option
as the “intent element.” See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
Intent, however, remains an element of a plaintiff’s affirmative case in
4
some instances. In Harlow, the Court dealt only with the defense of qualified
immunity. Many constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
however, require proof that the government official acted with a prohibited
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Thus, after Harlow, a plaintiff can defeat a defendant’s claim of qualified
immunity only by demonstrating the defendant violated “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Id. at 818. After Harlow, many circuits imposed upon plaintiffs a
heightened pleading requirement, similar to this court’s, once qualified immunity
was raised as a defense. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 452 (9th Cir.
1994); Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1992); Elliott v.
Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1991).
In Crawford-El the Supreme Court examined the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeal’s heightened burden of proof. The D.C. Circuit’s heightened-proof
standard applied when a plaintiff sued a government official, the government
official asserted the defense of qualified immunity, and the plaintiff’s cause of
action depended on proving improper motive of the defendant. See Crawford-El,
118 S. Ct. at 1588-91. The D.C. Circuit’s heightened burden of proof, applicable
at both summary judgment and trial, required plaintiffs to prove by clear and
convincing evidence defendant’s improper motive. See id. at 1590. Justice
Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, expansively framed the issue before
the Court in Crawford-El as follows:
mindset, and Harlow does not alter what plaintiffs’ are required to prove on these
claims. See Crawford-El, 118 S.Ct. at 1592.
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The broad question presented is whether the courts of appeals may
craft special procedural rules for [improper-motive] cases to protect
public servants from the burdens of trial and discovery that may
impair the performance of their official duties. The more specific
question is whether, at least in cases brought by prisoners, the
plaintiff must adduce clear and convincing evidence of improper
motive in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 1587.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s heightened
burden of proof. See id. at 1596. The D.C. Circuit had justified its heightened
burden of proof requirement, like this court justifies its heightened pleading
requirement, on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Harlow. See id. at 1590. The
Court explained, however, that neither the specific holding in Harlow nor its
reasoning justified the D.C. Circuit’s heightened burden of proof. See id. at
1591-96.
The Court carefully distinguished Harlow as a case dealing only with the
defense of qualified immunity: Harlow “did not implicate the elements of the
plaintiff’s initial burden of proving a constitutional violation” nor “address any
question concerning the plaintiff’s affirmative case.” Id. at 1592, 1591. The
Court explained that although the decision in Harlow was motivated by a concern
that public officials be protected from the costs associated with defending against
lawsuits, particularly baseless ones, it did not follow that a defendant’s claim of
qualified immunity could always be resolved before at least some discovery was
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conducted. See id. at 1593-94 & 1594 n.14. In addition, the Court commented
that a heightened proof standard “alters the cause of action itself in a way that
undermines the very purpose of § 1983—to provide a remedy for the violation of
federal rights.” Id. at 1595.
The Court in Crawford-El also observed that neither federal statutory law
nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gave any support to the heightened
burden of proof. See id. at 1595. In language particularly relevant to this court’s
heightened pleading requirement, the Supreme Court stated the following:
In the past we have consistently declined similar invitations to
revise established rules that are separate from the qualified immunity
defense. We refused to change the Federal Rules governing
pleading by requiring the plaintiff to anticipate the immunity defense,
Gomez, 446 U.S., at 639-640, or requiring pleadings of heightened
specificity in cases alleging municipal liability, Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164-169 (1993). We also declined to craft an exception to
settled rules of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and rejected the
argument that the policies behind the immunity defense justify
interlocutory appeals on questions of evidentiary sufficiency.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317- 318 (1995). Our reasons for
those unanimous rulings apply with equal force to the imposition of a
clear and convincing burden of proof in cases alleging
unconstitutional motive.
As we have noted, the Court of Appeals adopted a heightened
proof standard in large part to reduce the availability of discovery in
actions that require proof of motive. To the extent that the court was
concerned with this procedural issue, our cases demonstrate that
questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are
most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the
rulemaking process or the legislative process. See, e.g.,
Leatherman, 507 U.S., at 168-169.
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Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1595 (duplicate citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has recently cited Crawford-El for the proposition that
“[c]ivil rights complaints are not held to a higher standard than complaints in
other civil litigation.” Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998). But
see Elliott, 937 F.2d at 344-45 (explaining, prior to issuance of Crawford-El, the
Seventh Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit,
the very court from which Crawford-El appealed to the Supreme Court, has
recently stated that the Supreme Court “held [in Crawford-El] that plaintiffs
making constitutional claims based on improper motive need not meet any special
heightened pleading standard.” See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 611 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). The First Circuit, however, has concluded that Crawford-El does not
affect its heightened pleading requirement. See Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d
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67, 72-75 (1st Cir. 1998). 5 In upholding their heightened pleading requirement,
the First Circuit relied on the following language from Crawford-El:
In Harlow we noted that a “‘firm application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure’ is fully warranted” and may lead to the
prompt disposition of insubstantial claims. 457 U.S., at 819-820, n.
35 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S., at 508). Though we have rejected the
Court of Appeals’ solution, we are aware of the potential problem
that troubled the court. It is therefore appropriate to add a few
words on some of the existing procedures available to federal trial
judges in handling claims that involve examination of an official’s
state of mind.
When a plaintiff files a complaint against a public official
alleging a claim that requires proof of wrongful motive, the trial
court must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance
of the qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so
that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome
discovery or trial proceedings. The district judge has two primary
options prior to permitting any discovery at all. First, the court may
5
Although various Sixth Circuit cases have touched upon Crawford-El’s
impact on its heightened pleading requirement, it does not appear a firm
resolution has been reached. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (stating, in the resolution of a motion for
summary judgment, that “Crawford-El disallows any type of ‘heightened pleading
standard’ to avoid” analyzing the subjective motivation of the defendant); Kain v.
Nesbitt, 156 F.3d 669, 672 n.4, 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (first distinguishing between
burdens of proof and pleading requirements but later noting that defendants are
not “at the mercy of vague generalized pleadings” because trial courts may
require specific pleading from a plaintiff); Kesterson v. Moritsugu, No. 96-5898,
1998 WL 321008, at *4 (6th Cir. June 3, 1998) (unpublished disposition)
(explaining that plaintiff’s complaint was not held to a heightened pleading
standard); id. at *8-10 (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
applying a heightened pleading standard and arguing the standard is not proper
after Crawford-El); Smith v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, No. 97-3107, 1998 WL
321045, at *2 (6th Cir. June 2, 1998) (unpublished disposition) (applying the
Sixth Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement but noting that the Supreme
Court in Crawford-El approved a trial court’s requirement of specificity).
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order a reply to the defendant’s or a third party’s answer under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the defendant's motion
for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Thus, the court may
insist that the plaintiff “put forward specific, nonconclusory factual
allegations” that establish improper motive causing cognizable injury
in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary
judgment. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (KENNEDY,
J., concurring in judgment). This option exists even if the official
chooses not to plead the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (duplicate citations omitted).
This court respectfully disagrees with the First Circuit in its conclusion that
the above language from Crawford-El saves circuit-imposed heightened pleading
requirements. The passage in reality constitutes a rejection of deviations from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure combined with an instruction to federal trial
judges to exercise their discretion under the Federal Rules to manage cases in a
way that serves both the purposes of qualified immunity and § 1983. See id. at
1596-98. Furthermore, the Court in Crawford-El was careful to distinguish
between the D.C. Circuit’s solution to protect government officials from
insubstantial claims, which it rejected, and the options otherwise available under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for federal trial judges to deal with this
concern. See id.; see also id. at 1587 (defining the broad issue presented in the
case as whether “the courts of appeals may craft special procedural rules” for
cases involving constitutional claims of improper motive against government
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officials (emphasis added)). This court’s analysis is buttressed by the following
language in Crawford-El:
It is the district judges rather than appellate judges like
ourselves who have had the most experience in managing cases in
which an official’s intent is an element. Given the wide variety of
civil rights and “constitutional tort” claims that trial judges confront,
broad discretion in the management of the factfinding process may be
more useful and equitable to all the parties than the categorical rule
imposed by the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 1598. Thus, the circuit courts are admonished in civil rights cases not to
impose management rules which deviate from those express in the statute and
rules of procedure, and the district courts are encouraged to use the provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to manage these cases.
We conclude that this court’s heightened pleading requirement cannot
survive Crawford-El. There is no relevant difference between the D.C. Circuit’s
heightened burden of proof at summary judgment and this court’s heightened
pleading requirement which justifies the continuing viability of the latter after
Crawford-El. See Nance, 147 F.3d at 590 (citing Crawford-El for the proposition
that “civil rights complaints are not held to a higher standard than complaints in
other civil litigation”). Like the D.C. Circuit’s heightened burden of proof, this
court’s heightened pleading requirement was based on Harlow. See Breidenbach,
126 F.3d at 1292. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court made clear in Crawford-
El, neither the holding nor the reasoning of Harlow, a qualified immunity case,
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warranted a change in the requirements of a plaintiff’s affirmative case. See
Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1590-94. Like the D.C. Circuit’s heightened proof
requirement, this court’s heightened pleading requirement finds no support in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and constitutes a deviation from the notice-
pleading standards of Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
(“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally.”). Additionally, the manner in which the Court framed the
“broad” question presented for appeal—“whether the courts of appeals may craft
special procedural rules for [civil rights cases that require proof of improper
motive] to protect public servants from the burdens of trial and
discovery”—suggests that the Court’s ruling is not limited to the D.C. Circuit’s
heightened burden of proof. See Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct. at 1587. Finally, to the
extent the Supreme Court considered whether a court may require a plaintiff to
plead “‘specific, nonconclusory factual allegations’” to survive a prediscovery
motion for dismissal, it concluded this option resides in the discretion of federal
trial judges, not federal circuit courts. Id. at 1596-97 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
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This court reiterates that trial judges retain discretion to order a reply to a
defendant’s answer, grant a defendant’s motion for a more definite statement, or
tightly confine discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(e); Crawford-El, 118 S. Ct.
at 1596-97. The district court in this case, however, thought Plaintiffs had
alleged sufficient facts to be allowed discovery. See Currier v. Doran, No. CIV
97-0477 BB/JHG, slip op. at 7 (D.N.M. Aug. 19, 1999) (“The Court cannot say
Plaintiffs would be unable to recover damages from Doran under any set of facts
alleged in the complaint.”); id. at 8 (“[T]he Court believes Plaintiffs have alleged
sufficient facts to be allowed discovery . . . .”); id. at 9 (“Given the stay of
discovery that has been imposed in this case, it would not be fair to require the
Plaintiffs to assert more facts than they have been able to allege at this point.”).
Therefore, this court will review Defendants’ motions under the customary motion
to dismiss standard: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-
46.
C. Constitutional Violation
Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in the context of
a motion to dismiss, a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has asserted
a violation of federal law. See Ramirez, 222 F.3d at 1241; Dill v. City of Edmond,
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155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1998). In this case Plaintiffs allege that their
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants affirmatively
removed them from the custody of their mother and then placed them in the
custody of their abusive father. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants violated their
Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to protect them while they were in state
custody and by failing to protect them once they were placed in the custody of
their father.
Defendants maintain Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by DeShaney. In
DeShaney the Supreme Court considered the Fourteenth Amendment claims of
Joshua Deshaney, a victim of severe child abuse, against the local department of
social services and the employees thereof. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
Joshua lived with his natural father. In 1982, the Winnebago County Department
of Social Services (“DSS”) first investigated abuse charges against Joshua’s
father. The DSS took no action to remove Joshua at the time. In 1983 Joshua
was admitted to a hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. DSS obtained an
order placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital. DSS, along with
other professionals assembled by the county to assess Joshua’s situation, decided
there was insufficient evidence of child abuse to retain Joshua in the custody of
the court. For the next six months the assigned DSS caseworker was made aware
of several factors indicating that Joshua was being abused, but DSS took no
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action. Joshua was eventually beaten so violently that he fell into a life-
threatening coma. See id. at 192-93.
Joshua claimed DSS and its employees had violated his constitutional rights
by “failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at his father’s
hands of which they knew or should have known.” Id. The Supreme Court
rejected Joshua’s claim. The Court stated that the Due Process Clause “generally
confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government
itself may not deprive the individual.” Id. at 196. The Court, however, went on
to state the following:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. That the
State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the
analysis, for when it returned him to his father’s custody, it placed
him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had
it not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent
guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him
shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua.
Id. at 201.
Relying on the above language in DeShaney, this court has held that “state
officials can be liable for the acts of third parties where those officials ‘created
the danger’ that caused the harm.” Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995)). In
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Armijo, this court delineated the contours of a “danger creation” cause of action.
See 159 F.3d at 1262-63. To make out a proper danger creation claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) the charged state entity and the charged individual
actors created the danger or increased plaintiff’s vulnerability to the danger in
some way; (2) plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically definable
group; (3) defendants’ conduct put plaintiff at substantial risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or known; (5) defendant
acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk; and (6) such conduct, when
viewed in total, is conscience shocking. See id.
Defendants, relying on DeShaney, argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged a
constitutional violation because custody was simply transferred from one natural
parent to another; thus, Defendants claim, they did not create the danger.
DeShaney does not, however, compel this conclusion. In this case, Anthony and
Latasha were removed from their mother and placed with their father. In
DeShaney, Joshua was removed from his father and then returned to his father.
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192. Anthony and Latasha would not have been
exposed to the dangers from their father but for the affirmative acts of the state;
the same cannot be said for Joshua in DeShaney.
The limited caselaw does not support Defendants’ theory that they are
shielded by DeShaney because Anthony and Latasha were placed in the custody of
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their natural father. In Ford v. Johnson, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered the constitutional claims of the
mother of a child who had been beaten to death by his father. See 899 F. Supp.
227, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The child had been in state custody before being
placed with her father by court order after an investigation and recommendation
by local social workers. See id. The court decided that the mother had stated a
constitutional claim by alleging that the social workers failed to investigate the
father and failed to report information to the juvenile court which would have
disqualified the father from gaining custody. See id. at 232. The court stated that
just because “the child is placed with a parent as opposed to a foster parent
should not change the standards by which social agencies and their employees
conduct their investigations.” Id. at 233.
Similarly, in Tazioly v. City of Philadelphia, the same court held that the
“state-created danger theory may apply in cases where a state actor has rendered a
minor more vulnerable to injury at the hands of the minor’s biological parent.”
No. CIV.A. 97-CV-1219, 1998 WL 633747, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1998)
(unpublished disposition). In Tazioly the City Department of Human Services
removed a child from a foster parent and placed him in the custody of his mother.
The court distinguished DeShaney by noting that in DeShaney there was
insufficient evidence of abuse to retain the child in state custody, while defendant
-27-
social workers in the Tazioly case had actual knowledge that the biological
mother was “unfit and dangerous.” Id. at *9.
While language in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in K.H v. Morgan, 914
F.2d 846, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1990), suggests that placing a child with a family
member might insulate the state from constitutional liability, the Seventh Circuit
seems to have since reconsidered its earlier dicta. In a recent case involving a
suit brought against social workers as the result of injuries suffered while a child
was abused at her father’s home, the court stated that “[i]f the [social workers]
knowingly placed [plaintiff] in a position of danger, they would not be shielded
from liability by the decision in DeShaney.” Bank of Ill. v. Over, 65 F.3d 76, 78
(7th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the reasoning used by the Seventh Circuit in
Morgan actually supports constitutional liability when custody is transferred from
one parent to another. The court stated that “[t]he state could have left [plaintiff]
to the tender mercies of her parents without thereby violating her rights under the
Constitution. But having removed her from their custody the state assumed at
least a limited responsibility for her safety.” Morgan, 914 F.2d at 849. Under
this reasoning it would be arbitrary to allow the state to avoid this responsibility
merely by placing the child with another relative. See S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d
960, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“These distinctions . .
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. between foster parents and natural parents [] are arbitrary.”), petition for cert.
filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2000) (No. 00-946).
Thus, neither DeShaney nor other authorities shield the Defendants. When
the state affirmatively acts to remove a child from the custody of one parent and
then places the child with another parent, DeShaney does not foreclose
constitutional liability.
Having established that DeShaney does not foreclose liability, we now
examine each of the Defendants individually to determine if Plaintiffs have
pleaded sufficient facts to state a cause of action under the danger creation theory.
1. Doran
Doran first became involved in the case before the May 10, 1993, custody
hearing granting physical custody to Vargas and legal custody to CYF. At the
hearing Doran failed to alert the Children’s Court to Vargas’ history of financial
irresponsibility. Just a short time later, in late July and early August, Doran
noticed bruises on the children and did not investigate further after being told the
bruises were the result of falls. Three times during the late summer of 1993,
Juarez made allegations that Vargas and his girlfriend were abusing the children,
including the very specific accusation that the children were dunked in a bathtub
full of water as punishment; Doran did not investigate these allegations. On
October 19, 1993, Doran was responsible for the Children’s Court’s decision to
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grant Vargas legal custody, through either his failure to investigate and report to
the court or through his affirmative recommendation. 6
Plaintiffs also make various allegations as to Doran’s involvement after
legal custody was awarded to Vargas. The district court considered these post-
custody allegations in determining that Plaintiffs had met the requirements of
danger creation liability. See Currier v. Doran, No. CIV 97-0477 BB/JHG, slip
op. at 6-7 & n.3 (D.N.M. Aug. 19, 1999). The danger creation theory, however,
focuses on the affirmative actions of the state in placing the plaintiff in harm’s
way. Plaintiffs cannot rely on Defendants’ failure to intervene once custody was
given to Vargas to state a danger creation claim if the Defendants’ affirmative
conduct in placing the child with Vargas does not satisfy the Armijo danger
creation requirements. As the Supreme Court stated in DeShaney, “the State does
not become the permanent guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once
offered him shelter.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. Thus, we will only consider
Doran’s conduct before legal custody was given to Vargas.
6
The parties appear to agree that legal custody, not physical custody, is the
benchmark date by which to analyze Plaintiffs’ claims. There is conflicting
evidence as to when legal custody was granted Vargas; Plaintiffs claim legal
custody was awarded on October 19, 1993, while Defendants argue legal custody
was transferred on June 23, 1993. The district court allowed discovery on this
limited question, but did not decide the issue. See Currier v. Doran, No. CIV 97-
0477 BB/JHG, slip op. at 2 (D.N.M. Aug. 19, 1999). Because we are treating
Defendants’ motions as motions to dismiss, we will assume that legal custody was
given to Vargas on October 19, 1993, as Plaintiffs allege.
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Doran’s conduct meets the danger creation theory of liability spelled out in
Armijo. Doran “created the danger or increased the plaintiff[s’] vulnerability to
the danger” through his failure to investigate the numerous bruises and allegations
of abuse and his responsibility for the court order granting legal custody to
Vargas. 7 Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1263; see also Ford, 899 F. Supp. at 233 (finding a
constitutional claim was stated against defendant social workers who failed to
investigate and report to juvenile court circumstances concerning father given
custody of a child he subsequently beat to death). Latasha and Anthony were
members “of a limited and specifically definable group”: children the state has
removed from their natural parent and taken into state custody. Armijo, 159 F.3d
at 1262 (quotation omitted). By failing to investigate the allegations of child
abuse and by recommending that Vargas assume legal custody, Doran’s conduct
put Anthony and Latasha at obvious risk of serious, immediate, and proximate
harm, a harm that Doran recklessly and consciously disregarded.
7
It is true that the conduct Plaintiffs complain of is partially a failure by
Doran to act on particular allegations of abuse. Doran’s failure to investigate
allegations of abuse while the children were in state legal custody should be
distinguished, however, from a claim that the state failed to rescue the children
once legal custody was given to Vargas. Doran’s failure to investigate allegations
of abuse should be viewed in the general context of the state’s affirmative
conduct in removing the children from their mother and placing the children with
their father.
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It is a somewhat closer question whether Doran’s conduct is “conscience
shocking.” Id. at 1263 (quotation omitted). This court has recognized three basic
principles guiding the evaluation of substantive due process claims that are
particularly relevant to this determination: (1) the general need for restraint; (2)
the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference
to local policy decisions impacting public safety. See Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d
567, 573 (10th Cir. 1995). Armijo involved a decision by school officials to send
home a distraught and potentially suicidal student, when it was known that there
were firearms present at his house and that his parents were not home, despite
school disciplinary policy that prevented out-of-school suspensions when a
student’s parent was not home. Armijo, 159 F.3d at 2156-57. This court
determined that this decision could be “construed as conscience-shocking,
depending on context as determined after a full trial.” Id. at 1264.
The allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint against Doran, if true, are at least
as conscience-shocking as the facts in Armijo. It is important to remember that
Doran’s conduct must be “viewed in total,” and thus the cumulative impression of
Doran’s conduct should be considered. Id. In light of the initial information
Doran had about Vargas’ financial irresponsibility, and in light of the numerous
bruises and allegations of abuse, Doran’s failure to investigate the bruises and
allegations and his subsequent responsibility for the court order granting Vargas
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legal custody could be conscience shocking, depending, of course, on further
context as provided by discovery. See id. Thus, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient
facts to support a danger creation claim against Doran.
2. Sentell
Defendant Sentell’s limited involvement in this matter came only after
Vargas had been awarded both physical and legal custody. On January 10, 1994,
a request for an investigation of possible physical abuse of Anthony was made to
Sentell. Sentell reviewed the file on Doran’s November investigation of abuse
and then referred the request to Medina for further action. On March 16, 1994,
Doran referred another allegation of abuse to Sentell. Sentell discovered bruises
on both Latasha and Anthony but concluded the injuries were not the result of
abuse.
Plaintiffs do not argue that Sentell was personally involved in creating the
danger the children faced. Instead, Plaintiffs argue Sentell was constitutionally
required to rescue the children because she was aware that her fellow co-workers
had created the danger.
This court has stated that “state officials may be liable for injuries caused
by a private actor where those officials created the danger that led to the harm.”
Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237 (emphasis added). In Sutton, this court refused to extend
constitutional liability against one state defendant because he had not
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affirmatively created a dangerous situation, even though another state actor had
created the dangerous situation. See id. at 1239. Plaintiffs distinguish Sutton by
noting that Sentell, unlike the defendant in Sutton, was aware that other state
actors had created the danger and was presented with a clear opportunity to rescue
the children. Although this is perhaps a closer case than Sutton, Sentell
nevertheless had no constitutional duty to rescue the children. The language of
Sutton explaining that only officials who created the danger might have a duty to
rescue, the principle that the “Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to government aid,” and the general need for restraint in
evaluating substantive due process claims all dictate the conclusion that Sentell
had no constitutional duty to rescue. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196; see also Uhlrig,
64 F.3d at 573 (recognizing the need for restraint in evaluating substantive due
process claims). Thus, because Plaintiffs have not alleged a constitutional
violation by Sentell, the district court’s denial of Sentell’s motion is reversed.
3. Medina
Defendant Medina made the initial visit to Juarez’s home, removed the
children from the home, and delivered them into the physical custody of CYF.
Medina conducted an investigation and reported in the custody hearing that
Vargas had not supported the children while they were with Juarez. Medina then
had no involvement in the case until after physical and legal custody was
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transferred to Vargas. On January 10, 1994, Medina investigated an abuse
charge. Medina found bruises on Anthony’s buttocks but concluded the bruises
were the result of a fall. During this visit, Latasha told Medina that she had been
spanked with a belt. Medina’s last involvement in the case came when she
instructed Juarez to stop making allegations of abuse because it was traumatizing
the children.
Medina’s involvement in the initial removal of the children from Juarez
cannot support a danger creation claim. Moreover, the January 10, 1994,
investigation by Medina came after legal and physical custody had been
transferred to Vargas. Because Medina did not create the danger, and because
Medina is not constitutionally required to rescue a plaintiff from danger created
by another state actor, Medina was not constitutionally obligated to rescue the
children during the January 1994 visit.
Plaintiffs argue that Medina can be liable for danger creation because she
instructed Juarez to stop making allegations of abuse. Because of this affirmative
conduct, Plaintiffs reason, Juarez was discouraged from reporting additional signs
of abuse, and the risk to the children was intensified. After an examination of
similar cases in other circuits, this court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged a
constitutional violation by Medina in her instruction to Juarez to stop making
allegations of abuse.
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In Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2nd Cir. 1993), flag-
burning demonstrators alleged that police officers had violated their constitutional
rights when the police officers told “skinheads” that they would not interfere if
the skinheads assaulted the demonstrators. The Second Circuit concluded that a
constitutional violation had been alleged, distinguishing the case from DeShaney.
See id. at 98-99. The court explained that the police officer’s affirmative
conduct had made the demonstrators more vulnerable to assault, even if the police
officers were under no constitutional duty to rescue the demonstrators from an
assault. See id. at 99.
Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1990), involved a claim
that the police chief had directed officers not to respond to a woman’s complaints
that her estranged husband was violating his restraining order. The estranged
husband, a close friend of the police chief, eventually killed his former wife. See
id. The Eighth Circuit distinguished DeShaney and reversed the trial court’s
dismissal of the claim by the wife’s estate against the police chief, noting that the
murder was “the result of an affirmative act by a state actor to interfere with the
protective services which would have otherwise been available in the
community.” Id. at 54; cf. Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir.
1990) (allowing recovery under the Constitution for injury resulting from state
prevention of private rescue attempt).
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While reiterating the basic holding of DeShaney that the government is
under no constitutional obligation to rescue private citizens from harm, these
cases also illustrate that the state can be liable when it affirmatively places
private citizens in harm’s way by removing what would otherwise be safety
valves. This court has also stated that the state creates danger when it cuts off
potential sources of private aid. See Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1263 (quoting from
Johnson v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994)). By
discouraging Juarez from reporting additional indications of abuse, Medina
increased the children’s vulnerability to Vargas’ abuse. While Medina certainly
was not constitutionally required to rescue the children, her comments to Juarez
allegedly discouraged the mother from reporting further evidence of abuse to
either the police or CYF, which might then have acted to rescue the children.
That the potential aid Medina’s conduct tended to foreclose was from a
state source rather than a private source is not constitutionally significant. The
Eighth Circuit stated in Freeman that a state actor cannot “interfere with the
protective services which would have otherwise been available in the
community.” 911 F.2d at 54. This is precisely what Medina did when she
instructed Juarez to stop making allegations of abuse. This court’s language in
Armijo stating that the state can be liable when it cuts off potential sources of
private aid does not preclude today’s decision that a state actor can also be
-37-
constitutionally liable when it cuts off potential sources of state aid. Although
Medina was constitutionally free to ignore the pleas of Juarez and offer no
assistance, her behavior allegedly discouraged Juarez from seeking the help of
other CYF employees or other governmental sources of help such as the police.
Keeping in mind that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,” this court agrees
with the district court that Plaintiffs have properly alleged a danger creation claim
against Medina. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Medina increased the children’s
vulnerability to Vargas, the first requirement of a danger creation cause of action.
Medina’s conduct could have put Anthony and Latasha at obvious risk of serious,
immediate, and proximate harm, a harm that Medina recklessly and consciously
disregarded. Medina’s conduct could be conscience shocking, depending on
further context as provided by discovery. See Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264. Thus,
assuming Plaintiffs will be able to prove that Medina’s conduct was a cause of the
harm to the children, Plaintiffs have alleged a danger creation constitutional claim
against Medina.
4. Gonzales
Plaintiffs allege that Gonzales “knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate
indifference toward and callous disregard for the rights of Latasha and Anthony,
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failed to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline on a continuing basis
Defendants Medina, Doran, and Sentell in their duties so as to refrain from
depriving Latasha and Anthony of their constitutional and statutory rights.” In
the context of a motion to dismiss, this court agrees with the district court that
Plaintiffs have properly alleged that Gonzales, in her role as supervisor, deprived
Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
This court has stated that when “a superior’s failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom his subordinates come
into contact, the inadequacy of training may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability.” Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1240. In addition, as with all substantive due
process claims, the supervisor’s conduct must shock the conscience. See id. at
1241. Plaintiffs claim that Gonzales had knowledge that the alleged
unconstitutional behavior by Doran and Medina was occurring. Having
knowledge that subordinates are depriving young children of their constitutional
rights, Gonzales’ failure to correct this conduct amounts to a deliberate
indifference to the rights of Anthony and Latasha that could be conscience
shocking, depending on context as provided by discovery. Plaintiffs have
therefore alleged a constitutional deprivation by Gonzales in her role as
supervisor. See id. at 1241 (finding supervisor liability when assault was
committed by private actor).
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D. Clearly Established Law
Once defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must
demonstrate to the court that the law on which the plaintiff relies was clearly
established at the time of the defendants’ actions. See Hilliard v. City & County
of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff must prove the
right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood that
his conduct violated the right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the
plaintiff maintains.” Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. It is not necessary, however, for
plaintiffs to find a case with exact corresponding factual circumstances;
defendants are required to make “reasonable applications of the prevailing law to
their own circumstances.” Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th
Cir. 1999). In addition, contrary authority from other circuits does not preclude a
finding that the law in this circuit was clearly established, if the contrary authority
can be distinguished. See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., 195 F.3d
584, 594 (10th Cir. 1999).
1. Doran
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In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that state officials could not be liable
for failing to protect citizens from private violence. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at
197. The Court was careful to note, however, that the state had played no part in
creating the danger or leaving the plaintiff more vulnerable to the danger. See id.
at 200-01. The clear implication of the Court’s language, which was written in
1989, was that a state could be liable when it affirmatively acts to create, or
increases a plaintiffs vulnerability to, danger from private violence. Any doubts
as to the possible inference to be drawn in this circuit from the Court’s language
in DeShaney were dispelled by the Medina case. In Medina, decided in 1992, this
court contrasted the social workers in DeShaney with police officers who
recklessly chased a suspect, noting that the police officers “affirmatively and
directly changed the status quo . . . by pursuing an allegedly unconstitutional
chase. DeShaney is therefore inapplicable.” Medina, 960 F.2d at 1497 n.5.
Other circuit courts also recognized the danger creation theory before Defendants’
conduct in question began. See Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that plaintiffs “may state claims for civil rights violations if
they allege state action that creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of,
a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a danger tha[n] they otherwise
would have been”); Dwares, 985 F.2d at 99 (“[A]n allegation that the officers in
some way had assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim would
-41-
indeed implicate [the victim’s due process rights].”); Gregory v. City of Rogers,
974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
imposes a duty on state actors to protect or care for citizens . . . when the state
affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual
would not otherwise have faced.”); L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir.
1992) (“The ‘danger creation’ basis for a claim . . . involves affirmative conduct
on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.”); McComb v.
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 483 (3rd Cir. 1991) (holding that DeShaney prevented
recovery because local social workers had not created the danger of private
abuse); Freeman, 911 F.2d at 55 (“DeShaney . . . establishes that the increased
danger created in a custodial setting is sufficient to trigger the [Due Process
Clause].”). Based on Deshaney, Medina, and the ample case law from other
circuits, this court concludes that a reasonable state official would have known in
1993 and 1994 that reckless, conscience shocking conduct that altered the status
quo and placed a child at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate
harm was unconstitutional.
Our conclusion is supported by Armijo. In Armijo this court determined
that “danger creation jurisprudence was clearly established as a matter of law” by
late 1994. Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1262. The events prompting this lawsuit began in
late April 1993 and continued until May 1994. As the district court correctly
-42-
noted, the law of danger creation was not so radically altered between the time
Defendants in this case acted and the time the defendants in the Armijo case acted
as to justify a different legal conclusion. 8
Our conclusion that danger creation law was clearly established at the time
of the events underlying this suit is not undermined by the Seventh Circuit’s dicta
in K.H. v. Morgan suggesting that placing a child with a family member might
insulate the state from all constitutional liability. See 914 F.2d at 852-53. Never
before has this court indicated that state employees would be justified in relying
on the isolated dicta of another circuit court to create an exception to a general
theory of liability established by Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court cases, and it
will not do so now. Such a rule would make state employees immune from
constitutional obligations determined to exist by this court or the Supreme Court,
based on the non-binding musings of other circuit courts.
8
Our conclusion is not altered to the extent that some of our pre-1995 cases
can be interpreted to not require “conscience-shocking” behavior. Compare
Medina, 960 F.2d at 1496, with Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574. For one, the “shock the
conscience” standard has been traced by this court to the 1992 Supreme Court
case of Collins v. City of Harker Heights Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). See
Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 573. The law is clearly established when there is a Supreme
Court case on point. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. In addition, the shock the
conscience requirement is an additional hurdle for plaintiffs attempting to prove
liability. Thus, even if Defendants were not aware of the requirement, the
constitutional standard they would then have operated on would have been higher.
They cannot now claim, therefore, that they were unaware their conduct was
illegal because the shock the conscience requirement was not clearly established.
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2. Medina
As the above discussion demonstrates, the danger creation cause of action
was clearly established at the time of the events underlying this suit. The
circumstances surrounding Doran’s involvement with the children resulted in a
relatively straight-forward application of the doctrine. The particular theory of
danger creation on which Plaintiffs have stated a claim against Medina, however,
is substantially less established in the case law. There are no Tenth Circuit cases
in which a government official, by her statements discouraging citizens from
seeking protection from government officials for harm inflicted by other private
citizens, is held to have created danger of private abuse. The closest support for
this particularly application of the danger creation theory comes from two cases
decided by other circuits. See Dwares, 985 F.2d at 94 (decided by the Second
Circuit in 1993); Freeman, 911 F.2d at 52 (decided by the Eighth Circuit in
1990). These two cases, however, involve circumstances which are not
sufficiently analogous to those surrounding Medina’s involvement in this case to
constitute clearly established law. In Dwares, the police officers directly told the
citizens committing the violence that they would not interfere with the citizens’
assault on other private citizens; Medina made no such statement to Vargas or his
fiancee. See Dwares, 985 F.2d at 97. In Freeman, the police chief directed
officers not to respond to a citizen’s complaint; Medina made no such statement
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to her co-workers or to any other government entity which might have responded
to Juarez’s requests for help. See Freeman, 911 F.2d at 53-54.
Plaintiffs can meet their burden to show the law was clearly established by
relying on cases from other circuits, but only if “the clearly established weight of
authority from other courts . . . have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.” Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. This standard has not been met in this
case. A reasonable official in Medina’s position would not have understood that
her conduct created a claim under the danger creation theory. Thus, Medina is
entitled to qualified immunity.
3. Gonzales
This court has long held that a supervisor may be individually liable when
there is “essentially a complete failure to train, or training that is so reckless or
grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.” Meade v. Grubbs,
841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988). While Gonzales’ alleged failure to train
resulted in injury to Plaintiffs by a private actor, it was also clearly established in
1993 and 1994, as the discussion supra demonstrates, that state actors can be
liable for private violence when they create the danger or increase the plaintiff’s
vulnerability to danger.
IV. CONCLUSION
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For the reasons stated above, this court AFFIRMS the district court’s
denial of Doran’s and Gonzales’ motions for summary judgment, and
REVERSES the district court’s denial of Medina’s and Sentell’s motion for
summary judgment.
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