F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 7 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 99-4245
MICHAEL BRAD MAGLEBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D. Ct. No. 98-CR-565)
Bel-Ami J. de Montreux, Montreux Freres, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, appearing
for Defendant-Appellant.
Lisa J. Stark, Attorney (Jessica Dunsay Silver and Louis E. Peraertz, Attorneys,
on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
Washington, DC, appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Chief Judge.
Defendant Michael Brad Magleby was convicted of four counts of an
indictment stemming from the burning of a cross on the property of an interracial
family. On appeal, Mr. Magleby argues that the evidence of his guilt regarding
three of these four counts was insufficient to support his conviction. He also
argues that the district court submitted two erroneous instructions to the jury.
Finally, he argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence which he
argues was highly prejudicial and of little or no probative value. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Background
On the evening of September 6, 1996, the defendant, Michael Brad
Magleby, hosted a barbecue at his home. His friends Andy Whitlock, Steve
Meguerditchian, Justin Merriam, Mr. Merriam’s date Liz Cannon, and fifteen-
year-old L.M. were in attendance. During the course of the barbecue, Mr.
Magleby and his guests drank heavily. In addition to drinking that evening, Mr.
Magleby took prescription pain pills. On this occasion, as on other occasions,
Mr. Magleby joined his friends in expressing prejudicial views of African-
Americans. They told racist jokes, used racial slurs, and listened to racist CDs.
The group accessed internet sites with racist jokes and other internet hate sites on
Mr. Magleby’s computer.
At some point during the evening, Mr. Magleby began talking about some
Tongans, alleged gang members, who lived in his neighborhood. He later
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testified that he did not like having the Tongans in his neighborhood. L.M. also
testified that the Tongans had previously assaulted Mr. Magleby. During the
course of this conversation, Mr. Magleby and L.M. began talking about burning a
cross at the Tongans’ house. Mr. Merriam taunted Mr. Magleby, telling him that
he did not dare burn a cross there. Mr. Merriam told Mr. Magleby that if he were
really going to do it, he should stop talking about it and just do it.
At about 1:00 AM, after several hours of drinking, Mr. Magleby and L.M.
gathered wood from Mr. Magleby’s garage to build a cross. In his kitchen, Mr.
Magleby used a power drill to drill holes in the wood and fastened the pieces of
wood together with screws. He then applied black spray-paint to make the cross
more flammable. After the cross was ready, Mr. Magleby and L.M. carried it to
Mr. Magleby’s jeep and drove off with Mr. Magleby behind the wheel. They
stopped at a gas station to fill a beer bottle with gasoline which they planned to
pour over the cross to ensure that it would burn. They then set out for the
Tongans’ house.
When they arrived at the Tongans’ house at about 2:30 AM, Mr. Magleby
got out of his jeep and started taking the cross out. Before he took the cross out
of the jeep, L.M. noticed several men outside. Because there were men outside
the house, Mr. Magleby decided that “it wouldn’t be too wise” to burn the cross at
that house. Tr. at 800. He got back in the jeep.
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At that point, Mr. Magleby told L.M. that they still had to the burn the
cross because their friends would ridicule them if they did not. The parties
dispute what happened next. Mr. Magleby argues that L.M. told him that he knew
where a “crackhead” lived and that they could burn the cross at his house. The
government argues that L.M. told him that he knew where a black man lived and
that they could burn the cross there. The parties agree that Mr. Magleby knew
nothing about the Henrys prior to that moment. Mr. Magleby and L.M. then drove
to the house where Ron and Robyn Henry and their eleven-year-old son lived.
The Henrys are an interracial family: Ron is African-American and Robyn is
white.
When Mr. Magleby and L.M. arrived at the Henrys’ home, Mr. Magleby
took the cross out of the jeep, placed it in the Henrys’ yard, poured gasoline on it,
and then ignited it. The two immediately returned to Mr. Magleby’s house.
After returning to Mr. Magleby’s house, Mr. Magleby was excited and
bragged to his friends about what he had done. Mr. Merriam became angry when
he learned where Mr. Magleby and L.M. had burned the cross because the Henrys
lived in his neighborhood and his father knew them. Mr. Magleby argues that it
was at this point that he first discovered that Ron Henry was African-American.
Mr. Magleby was arrested and indicted on charges stemming from burning
the cross at the Henrys’ home. On December 10, 1999, Mr. Magleby was
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convicted by a jury of conspiracy against rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241,
violation of civil rights and aiding and abetting in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
3631(a), using fire or an explosive in the commission of a felony in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), and tampering with a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(3).
II. Discussion
Mr. Magleby argues that the district court submitted two erroneous
instructions to the jury. He also argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), and 42 U.S.C. §
3631(a). Finally, he argues that the district court erred in admitting several pieces
of evidence which, he argues, were highly prejudicial and of little or no probative
value.
A. Sufficiency of the Jury Instructions
Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred in submitting two
instructions to the jury. Because Mr. Magleby did not object to either instruction
at trial, we review these instructions for plain error. United States v. Fabiano,
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169 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 1999). 1 In reviewing jury instructions for
error, we review the instructions “as a whole to determine whether the jury may
have been misled, upholding the judgment in absence of substantial doubt that the
jury was fairly guided.” Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Jury Instruction No. 30
Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred in submitting Jury
Instruction No. 30 to the jury because it misstates the relevant legal standard of
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a). “To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a), the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with
the specific intent to injure, intimidate or interfere with the victim[s] because of
[their] race and because of the victim[s’] occupation of [their] home.” United
States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Mr. Magleby concedes that Jury Instruction No. 27 correctly states the third
element of a § 3631(a) violation: “[t]he defendant engaged in conduct described
1
Mr. Magleby did not object to either Jury Instruction No. 30 or Jury
Instruction No. 22. He asserts, however, that proposing an alternative to Jury
Instruction No. 30 should be considered an objection to that instruction. This
court has previously held, however, that proposing an alternate jury instruction is
not an objection that “put the district court clearly on notice as to the asserted
inadequacy of the jury instruction.” Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1303 (10th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore review both jury instructions for
plain error.
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because of the race or color of one or both Ron Henry or Robyn Henry and
because one or both Ron Henry and Robyn Henry were attempting to occupy their
home free from racial discrimination.” (emphasis added). This instruction
further specifies that the government must prove each element “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” He argues, however, that Jury Instruction No. 30 permits
conviction if a defendant is motivated by race alone. To support this argument,
he points to the following passage:
The Government may satisfy its burden of proof by proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that one or more of the victims’ race was one of the
reasons that the defendant acted. It does not matter that the
defendant may have had more than one motive in performing the act
as long as the defendant’s race was one of his motives.
In other words, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did the act charged . . . because of the race of the victim,
the Government has satisfied its burden . . . .
We find Mr. Magleby’s argument unpersuasive. In the first paragraph of
Jury Instruction No. 30, the district court instructed the jury regarding the third
element of the § 3631(a) charge:
[I]f you find that an act by the defendant was for the purpose of
intimidating or interfering with Robyn Henry because she was
associating with an African-American or with Ron Henry because he
is African-American and because either was occupying a dwelling,
then this element of the offense would be proven.
(emphasis added). Additionally, the sentence preceding the passage quoted by
Mr. Magleby helps clarify that the following language refers only to the race
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prong of § 3631(a). Taking the instruction in its entirety, it is sufficiently clear
that Jury Instruction No. 30 states that two factors must be satisfied, and that the
language cited by Mr. Magleby simply instructs the jury as to what it can consider
with respect to one of these two factors. We conclude, therefore, that Jury
Instruction No. 30 accurately describes the legal standard of § 3631(a).
Furthermore, when combined with Jury Instruction No. 27 and looking at the jury
instructions as a whole, it is clear that the jury was properly instructed that they
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henry’s both
because of race and because they occupied a dwelling in order to convict him
under § 3631(a). We find, therefore, that Jury Instruction No. 30 is not erroneous
and did not mislead the jury.
2. Jury Instruction No. 22
Mr. Magleby also argues that the district court erred in submitting Jury
Instruction No. 22 to the jury, instructing the jury that they may consider, among
other factors, 2 “the reaction of the victims and other witnesses to the cross
burning in determining the defendant’s intent” under 18 U.S.C. § 241.
2
This instruction also permitted the jury to consider as evidence of Mr.
Magleby’s intent “all the evidence in this case and the entire context in which the
cross was burned,” “the defendant’s actions before, during and after the cross-
burning,” and “the location at which the cross was burned and its nearness to the
intended victims.”
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Section 241 prohibits any person or persons from conspiring “to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” In determining the existence of a threat in other contexts, this circuit has
adopted an objective test, focusing on whether a reasonable person would find
that a threat existed. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir.
1999). To determine whether this objective test is satisfied, this court has stated
that a trier of fact may look to the reaction of the recipient of the alleged threat.
United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court has also looked to the reaction of the recipients in determining whether a
threat exists. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Additionally,
other circuits that have adopted a similar reasonable foreseeability test have held
that evidence of the recipient’s response to the alleged threat is relevant to
whether a threat was made. E.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1500
(1st Cir. 1997) (“[E]vidence of the effect of the threat upon its listener is relevant
to what a reasonable person in the position of the speaker should have
foreseen.”); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.
1990) (“Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual
context, including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners.”).
Furthermore, other circuits that have adopted a “reasonable recipient test” have
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also held that evidence of a recipient’s response is relevant to whether a true
threat exists. E.g., United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In
making this determination, proof of the effect of the alleged threat upon the
addressee is highly relevant.”); United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 890-91
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding evidence of the reactions of recipients of an alleged
threat relevant to whether a “reasonable recipient” would believe that a threat
exists).
In the particular context of cross-burnings, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
have held that evidence of victims’ reactions to a cross-burning is relevant to a
defendant’s intent under 18 U.S.C. § 241. United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d
777, 782-83 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that victim reaction evidence is relevant
under the reasonable foreseeability test); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821,
827-28 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that victim reaction evidence is relevant under the
reasonable recipient test). We agree with these circuits and hold that victims’
reactions to a cross-burning may be considered by a trier of fact as relevant
evidence of a defendant’s intent under § 241. Consequently, we find that the
district court did not err in issuing Jury Instruction No. 22.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for
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judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), and 42 U.S.C. §
3631(a). We review de novo both the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial
of the motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222,
1228 (10th Cir. 2000).
In reviewing his sufficiency of the evidence claims, we must ask “only
whether taking the evidence – both direct and circumstantial, together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom – in the light most favorable to the
government, a reasonable jury could find [Defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Magleby’s hurdle in persuading this court
to overturn the jury verdict is high. We will only overturn a jury verdict if “no
reasonable juror could have reached the disputed verdict.” United States v.
Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, “the evidence necessary to support a verdict need not
conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all
possibilities except guilt.” Wood, 207 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In a sufficiency challenge, we review the record as a whole and consider
the collective inferences reasonably drawn therefrom. United States v. Jenkins,
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175 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999). Where conflicting evidence exists, we do
not question the jury’s conclusions regarding the credibility of witnesses or the
relative weight of evidence. Springfield, 196 F.3d at 1184. “[W]hen a record
allows for conflicting findings, we must presume that the trier of fact resolved
any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution.” Wingfield v. Massie, 122 F.3d
1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 1997) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)
“To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a), the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent
to injure, intimidate or interfere with the victim[s] because of [their] race and
because of the victim[s’] occupation of [their] home.” Whitney, 229 F.3d at 1303
(internal quotation marks omitted). 3 Mr. Magleby argues that the district court
improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government
3
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) imposes criminal penalties upon anyone who
“whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with (a) any person because of his race, color,
religion, sex, handicap . . . , familial status . . . , or national origin
and because he is or has been selling, purchasing, renting, financing,
occupying, or contracting or negotiating for the sale, purchase,
rental, financing or occupation of any dwelling.”
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presented insufficient evidence to prove either that he targeted the Henrys
because of their race or that he acted because the Henrys occupied their home.
In making its determination regarding a defendant’s intent, “a jury is
permitted to draw inferences of subjective intent from a defendant’s objective
acts.” Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333. The government may also prove intent
through circumstantial evidence and surrounding circumstances. E.g., United
States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1997) (“‘[B]ecause intent involves
the defendant’s state of mind, and is difficult to prove directly, it is usually
proven by circumstantial evidence.’” (quoting Kathleen Flavin & Kathleen
Corrigan, Eleventh Survey of White Collar Crime: Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud, 33
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 861, 869 (1996))); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562,
566 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Direct evidence of a defendant’s intent is seldom
available. Intent can be proven, however, from surrounding circumstances.”);
United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1257 & n.15 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding
jury instruction permitting jury to infer intent from circumstantial evidence).
“Thus, even when a defendant, as here, denies having the requisite intent, a jury
may disbelieve the defendant if [his] words and acts in the light of all the
circumstances make [his] explanation seem improbable.” Wingfield, 122 F.3d at
1333 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the record in its entirety together with the reasonable inferences to
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be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the government, as we must, we
find that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henrys because of their race. The
jury heard evidence that Mr. Magleby knew that burning crosses were symbols of
racial hatred. Mr. Magleby admitted during cross-examination that he understood
the “racial hatred nature” of a burning cross when used by the Ku Klux Klan. He
also admitted that he understood that a burning cross, like a swastika, was a
universal symbol of racial hatred. He admitted that he knew that the general
public saw a burning cross as a symbol of racial hatred. Mr. Magleby’s friends
and associates testified that, prior to the cross-burning, Mr. Magleby had watched
the movie Mississippi Burning – a movie that includes scenes of crosses being
burned as symbols of hatred toward African-Americans.
Although Mr. Magleby testified that he could not remember whether L.M.
had told him that the Henrys are an interracial family, claiming that he could
remember being told only that the home was occupied by a “crackhead,” he also
testified that he first learned that Mr. Henry is African-American after returning
to his house following the cross-burning. Likewise, L.M. testified that he first
learned that Mr. Henry is African-American subsequent to the cross-burning.
Evidence was presented at trial, however, that L.M. had signed a statement in
which he told police that he had told Mr. Magleby that Mr. Henry is black prior to
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the cross-burning. 4 Furthermore, Andy Whitlock testified that, after the cross-
burning, both Mr. Magleby and L.M. appeared to know that Mr. Henry is African-
American. Liz Cannon testified that, after Mr. Magleby and L.M. returned from
burning the cross in the Henrys’ yard, she “clearly recall[ed] them indicating the
family was black” and that they discussed with their friends at the party that Mr.
Henry is African-American. Tr. at 474-75. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Magleby’s
assertion that he felt remorse after learning that Mr. Henry is African-American,
Ms. Cannon testified that Mr. Magleby appeared excited by what he had done and
bragged about it. We do not question the jury’s conclusions regarding the
credibility of Mr. Magleby and L.M. and must presume that the jury resolved
these conflicts in favor of the prosecution. See Springfield, 196 F.3d at 1184;
Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333.
The jury also heard Mr. Henry’s unrebutted testimony that he is the only
African-American on his block. This evidence, combined with Mr. Magleby’s
4
The government argues that L.M.’s signed statement that he told Mr.
Magleby that Mr. Henry is African-American should be considered as evidence
that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henrys because of race. That statement, however,
was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach L.M.’s testimony
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 613. The district court properly instructed the jury that
the statement was admitted only to impeach L.M.’s credibility, not for the truth of
the statement itself. Because the statement was not admitted for its truth, the jury
could not properly consider it as evidence of Mr. Magleby’s intent. Our review is
limited to whether the jury reasonably could have found that Mr. Magleby
targeted the Henrys because of race. We therefore do not consider this statement
as evidence of Mr. Magleby’s intent.
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and L.M.’s testimony that they targeted a specific residence, was sufficient to
permit the jury to reasonably infer that it was highly unlikely that Mr. Magleby
burned a cross at a home occupied by an African-American merely by
coincidence.
Viewing this evidence – combined with the background of racial slurs,
racist jokes, racist music, and racist internet sites – in the light most favorable to
the government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henrys because of their race.
Mr. Magleby also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
targeted the Henrys because they occupied their home. We disagree. Mr.
Magleby’s own testimony regarding his understanding of the meaning of a
burning cross, combined with his testimony that he intentionally burned the cross
in the Henrys’ yard, provides sufficient evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby also targeted the
Henrys because they occupied their home. We therefore find that the district
court properly denied Mr. Magleby’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this
count.
2. Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1)
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) makes illegal the use of fire to commit a felony. At
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trial, Mr. Magleby did not deny igniting a cross in the Henrys’ yard.
Consequently, if the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 241, it is also sufficient to sustain his § 844(h)(1) conviction.
Section 241 is violated “[i]f two or more persons conspire to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Section 241 requires that a “specific intent to interfere with the Federal
right . . . be proved.” United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). Mr.
Magleby does not argue that the Henrys do not have a federally protected right to
occupy their home. Rather, Mr. Magleby contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to “oppress,
threaten, or intimidate” the Henrys in their enjoyment of that right. We disagree.
The record contains substantial evidence of Mr. Magleby’s intent. Mr.
Magleby testified that he decided to burn a cross to “rile people up.” Tr. at 921.
He acknowledged that he knew the public found cross-burning highly
objectionable. He anticipated that the cross-burning would receive the attention
of the news media. He admitted that he understood the message of racial hatred
conveyed by a burning cross. Mr. Magleby further admitted that he intended to
burn and did burn the cross in the Henrys’ yard. Given this evidence of Mr.
Magleby’s understanding of the meaning of a burning cross to the general public
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and the placement of the burning cross in the Henrys’ yard, we conclude that the
jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Magleby intended to oppress, threaten, and
intimidate the Henrys in the free exercise of their federal right to occupy property.
Furthermore, the district court properly instructed the jury that they could
consider the Henrys’ reactions when deciding whether Mr. Magleby’s actions
were intended to be a threat. Robyn Henry testified that the cross-burning
“terrified” her. Id. at 652. She testified that she discussed with her husband
moving from their neighborhood. She testified that she was “scared, confused,
anxious, [and] didn’t sleep well at night.” Id. at 652. She stopped sitting on their
porch because she feared for her safety. The Henrys’ eleven-year-old son
testified that he was scared because he “didn’t know if they were still going to try
to hurt [him].” Id. at 659. He testified that he started carrying a baseball bat with
him when he would walk in his neighborhood. He also testified that he started
sleeping with this baseball bat under his bed at night “[i]n case somebody came in
[his] house.” Id. at 653. Ron Henry testified that the significance of the cross-
burning to him was “move, leave, you’re not welcome here, . . . you were in
trouble somewhere and they wanted you to leave, leave the community.” Id. at
680. He testified that he was “afraid for [himself] as well as the members of [his]
family.” Id. at 681. He also testified that he made several modifications to his
home to improve security and protect his family. The jury was shown
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photographs of these modifications. From this evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer that a reasonable person would foresee a burning cross in
another’s yard being interpreted in a like manner.
Having viewed the above evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, we find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby intended to oppress, threaten,
and intimidate the Henrys in the free exercise of their federal right to occupy
property. We therefore find that the district court properly denied Mr. Magleby’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts.
C. Evidentiary Challenges
Finally, Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred in admitting
several pieces of evidence. We review the district court’s rulings on the
admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, if an objection is timely made, and
otherwise for plain error. United States v. Mills, 194 F.3d 1108, 1113 (10th Cir.
1999).
Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will not overturn the district
court’s decision unless we are firmly convinced that the district court “made a
clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994). In
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applying this standard, “we defer to the trial court’s judgment because of its first-
hand ability to view the witness or evidence and assess credibility and probative
value.” Id.
Under the plain error standard, Mr. Magleby must show “(1) an ‘error,’ (2)
that is ‘plain,’ which means ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ under current law, and (3) that
‘affect[s] substantial rights.’” United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1303
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).
Once these requirements are met, this court may “exercise discretion to correct
the error if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.’” Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1303 (quoting United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
In all of Mr. Magleby’s evidentiary challenges, he argues that the district
court admitted the evidence in violation of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Rule 403 permits the district court to exclude evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.” The district court has “broad
discretion to determine whether prejudice inherent in otherwise relevant evidence
outweighs its probative value.” United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312, 1319
(10th Cir. 2000). Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is
detrimental to a party’s case. United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1082
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(10th Cir. 1991). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has “‘an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily an emotional one.’” Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 538 (10th Cir.
2000) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note).
1. The Henrys’ Reactions
Mr. Magleby argues that the evidence of what he characterizes as “the
Henrys’ extended and delayed reactions” is irrelevant and highly prejudicial
because it did not pertain to their reaction at the time of the incident. He also
argues that the district court erred in admitting photographs of security measures
taken by Mr. Henry. Additionally he argues that the district court erred in
admitting a baseball bat and testimony that the Henrys’ eleven-year-old son slept
with it for protection following the cross-burning. Mr. Magleby objected only to
the admission of the photographs and the baseball bat itself, so we review the
admission of this evidence for abuse of discretion and the remainder for plain
error. Mills, 194 F.3d at 1113.
As we discussed above, evidence of the victims’ reactions to a cross-
burning is probative of the defendant’s intent under 18 U.S.C. § 241. The
Henrys’ reactions contained in the record begin immediately with their discovery
of the burning cross in their yard and continue through the following days.
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Because the threat communicated by the burning cross did not disappear once the
cross was extinguished, the Henrys’ reactions in the days following the cross-
burning are relevant to their ongoing perception of that threat. We therefore find
no plain error in the admission of the testimony regarding the Henrys’ reactions.
The reactions of the Henrys include the security measures taken by Mr.
Henry. The government offered eight photographs as illustrative aids to Mr.
Henry’s testimony regarding the security measures he had taken. Furthermore,
the photographs are not cumulative. “Evidence is cumulative if repetitive, and if
the small increment of probability it adds may not warrant the time spent in
introducing it.” United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citations and internal quotations marks omitted). The district court reviewed the
photographs and determined that each photograph shows a different security
measure taken by Mr. Henry following the cross-burning. Because they aided the
jury in understanding Mr. Henry’s relevant testimony and are not cumulative, we
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
photographs into evidence.
The Henrys’ biracial son was also a victim of the cross-burning. He lived
at the home with his parents. His reactions, like those of his parents, are
probative of Mr. Magleby’s intent. His testimony that he carried and slept with a
baseball bat for protection is certainly relevant to his reaction to the cross-
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burning. We find no plain error in the admission of this testimony. Furthermore,
the baseball bat itself is illustrative of that testimony. We find, therefore, that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the baseball bat into
evidence.
2. The Testimony of Dr. Gerlach
Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Larry
Gerlach to testify as an expert on hate groups and the Ku Klux Klan. Mr.
Magleby did not object to this testimony at trial, so we review for plain error.
Mills, 194 F.3d at 1113.
At trial, Dr. Gerlach testified that he is a history professor who specializes
in the history of hate groups in America, particularly the Ku Klux Klan. He
testified that he had authored a book on the history of the Klan in Utah. He
testified briefly regarding the history of the Klan in both the United States and
Utah, the symbols it used, and the groups it targeted. Finally, he testified
regarding the symbol of a burning cross as used by the Klan.
The admission of this testimony raises concerns similar to those faced by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994). In
J.H.H., a “skinhead” expert was permitted to testify in a cross-burning trial even
though there was no evidence in the record that the defendant was a skinhead. Id.
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at 829. The Eighth Circuit expressed concern that the testimony implied that the
defendant was, in fact, a skinhead and that it came close to permitting the
factfinder to conclude that the defendant was guilty by association. Id.
We share these concerns and find the admission of this testimony troubling
in a number of respects. First, the record contains no evidence that Mr. Magleby
was a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Indeed, the record is completely devoid of
any evidence indicating or suggesting that Mr. Magleby was a member or
sympathizer of the Ku Klux Klan or any other hate group. At most, the evidence
shows that Mr. Magleby harbored similar prejudicial attitudes toward African-
Americans. This does not provide a sufficient foundation for Dr. Gerlach’s
testimony. Second, even if the government’s testimony did establish an adequate
foundation for Dr. Gerlach’s testimony, the admission of his testimony, like the
testimony in J.H.H., “comes dangerously close” to inviting the jury to find Mr.
Magleby guilty by association. Id.
Notwithstanding its concerns regarding the expert testimony, the Eighth
Circuit held that any error in its admission was harmless due to the ample
evidence of the defendants’ guilt. Id. at 829-30. In J.H.H., however, the Eighth
Circuit reviewed the admission of evidence in a bench trial. Id. at 829.
Consequently, the court reasoned that the prejudicial impact of inflammatory
evidence was lessened. Id. In contrast, Mr. Magleby’s trial was before a jury,
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and the prejudicial impact of inflammatory evidence may therefore be heightened.
See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 60, at 262-63 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999). Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the admission of Dr. Gerlach’s
testimony was either an “error” or “plain” under our plain error analysis because
we too find that any error was harmless. “A non-constitutional error, such as a
decision whether to admit or exclude evidence, is considered harmless ‘unless a
substantial right of [a] party is affected.’” United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d
1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)). We have held that an
error affects a substantial right when it has a “‘substantial influence’ on the
outcome or leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it had such effect.” United
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). We review “the record as
a whole de novo to evaluate whether the error is harmless, examining the context,
timing and use of the erroneously admitted evidence at trial and how it compares
to properly admitted evidence.” United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237
(10th Cir. 1999). The burden of persuasion is on the defendant to show that the
error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at
734 (1993).
We find that Dr. Gerlach’s testimony did not affect the outcome of Mr.
Magleby’s trial. As discussed above, the record contains substantial evidence to
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support Mr. Magleby’s convictions. Moreover, Dr. Gerlach’s testimony regarding
the history of the Ku Klux Klan in America and in Utah was brief and was the
only evidence regarding the Ku Klux Klan presented at trial. In addition, Dr.
Gerlach’s testimony regarding the symbolism of a burning cross was rendered
harmless by Mr. Magleby’s own admission on cross-examination that he
understood the “racial hatred nature” of a cross burned by the Klan. Tr. at 980.
Mr. Magleby also admitted that he understood that a burning cross, like a
swastika, is a universal symbol of hatred.
Given the amount of evidence supporting Mr. Magleby’s convictions, we
are confident that the jury would have reached the same result even without Dr.
Gerlach’s testimony. We find, therefore, that any error in admitting Dr. Gerlach’s
testimony was harmless.
3. The Testimony Regarding James McBride
During the presentation of its case, the government introduced testimony
regarding James McBride and his views. Because Mr. Magleby objected to the
admission of this evidence at trial, we review for abuse of discretion. Mills, 194
F.3d at 1113.
Mr. McBride is allegedly a racist and member of a hate group. Mr.
Magleby testified that he had only met Mr. McBride once and that he did not
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know him and was not friends with him. One of Mr. Magleby’s friends testified
that they had conversations about Mr. McBride in Mr. Magleby’s presence, but
that they had not spoken to Mr. Magleby directly about Mr. McBride or his views
[3:495-98]. Another of Mr. Magleby’s friends testified that he had once taken
Mr. McBride to a party at Mr. Magleby’s where Mr. McBride “could have” given
racist CDs, racist literature, and information regarding a hate group to Mr.
Magleby, but that he did not know if Mr. McBride had in fact provided Mr.
Magleby with such materials. Tr. at 316-17. Mr. Magleby argues that the district
court erred in admitting this evidence because it was irrelevant and highly
prejudicial. The government argues that this evidence was relevant because it
was probative of Mr. Magleby’s racial animus.
Because this testimony raises concerns similar to those raised by Dr.
Gerlach’s testimony, we find its admission troubling. There is no evidence in the
record that Mr. Magleby even discussed Mr. McBride’s views with him or anyone
else, let alone that he shared them. There is also no evidence that Mr. Magleby
belonged to or sympathized with the “Church of the Creator,” the hate group to
which Mr. McBride allegedly belonged. Moreover, there was no evidence that
Mr. McBride attended Mr. Magleby’s party on the night that Mr. Magleby burned
the cross. It is difficult to see how the admitted testimony regarding Mr. McBride
had any relevance to Mr. Magleby’s intent on the evening he burned the cross.
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Furthermore, Mr. McBride’s testimony also comes dangerously close to inviting
the jury to find Mr. Magleby guilty by association.
Notwithstanding our doubts regarding the relevance of this testimony, we
need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting it
because we find that it was harmless error. The admission of the testimony
regarding Mr. McBride did not affect any of Mr. Magleby’s substantial rights
because we conclude it did not affect the outcome of the trial. See Rivera, 900
F.2d at 1469. As discussed in detail above, the record contains extensive
evidence of Mr. Magleby’s attitudes toward African-Americans. We are
confident that the jury would have found that Mr. Magleby acted with racial
animus even without the testimony regarding James McBride.
4. Song Lyrics
Mr. Magleby also argues that the district court erred in admitting song
lyrics from racist CDs. He argues that there was no foundation for the song lyrics
read during Mr. Magleby’s testimony and that their probative value, if any, is
substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Because Mr. Magleby
objected at trial to their admission, we review for abuse of discretion. Mills, 194
F.3d at 1113.
During its cross-examination of Mr. Magleby, the government was
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permitted to read into evidence the lyrics from a song entitled “When the Boat
Comes In” by the band Screwdriver. The message of the passage read into
evidence is that the nation has been taken over by African-Americans, that it
should be taken back, and that African-Americans should leave the country. The
chorus to this song is “Nigger, nigger, get on that boat. Nigger, nigger, row.
Nigger, nigger, get out of here. Nigger, nigger go, go, go.” Tr. at 959.
We first address Mr. Magleby’s argument that there was no foundation for
the admission of the song lyrics. Mr. Magleby’s friend Andy Whitlock testified
that he heard Mr. Magleby play a CD by Screwdriver on a number of occasions.
He testified that the message of one of Screwdriver’s songs played by Mr.
Magleby was “[j]ust get out, leave the country” and that it contained the word
“nigger.” Id. 394-95. Another of Mr. Magleby’s friends, Justin Merriam,
testified that, on the night of the cross-burning, Mr. Magleby was playing a CD by
Screwdriver with lyrics “nigger get on your boat, nigger go.” Id. at 331. Liz
Cannon, who accompanied Mr. Merriam to Mr. Magleby’s party on the evening of
the cross-burning, testified that Mr. Magleby played a CD with lyrics like “nigga,
nigga.” Id. at 468. She also testified that Mr. Magleby knew and sang along with
the lyrics to the racist CDs: “[Mr. Magleby] knew the lyrics on the CD’s. . . . as
good as you can know them, he knew the lyrics. He could sing them word-for-
word.” Id. at 468-69. All of this testimony preceded the introduction of the
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Screwdriver lyrics during the cross-examination of Mr. Magleby. We find that
this evidence provided a sufficient foundation to permit the district court to
appropriately exercise its discretion in admitting the lyrics.
We now turn to Mr. Magleby’s argument that the lyrics are irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial. Although the admission of the lyrics to the Screwdriver song
was certainly harmful to Mr. Magleby’s case, we conclude that its probative value
outweighed its prejudicial effect. This evidence is probative both of Mr.
Magleby’s racial animus under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) and of his intent under 18
U.S.C. § 241.
In United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999), we held that
the context in which an alleged threat is made is probative of whether a “true
threat” exists. Id. at 398. In Viefhaus, the defendant was convicted of making
threats against, inter alia, African-Americans, Jews, and federal law enforcement
on an answering machine “hotline.” The defendant asserted as a defense that he
lacked the intent requisite to make a true threat. We upheld the admission of
racially inflammatory items as relevant to the defendant’s intent.
[T]he need to demonstrate the context in which Viefhaus uttered his
remarks rendered much of the evidence of Viefhaus’ racial hostility
intrinsic to the crime charged in the indictment. . . .
....
. . . The only way a jury could properly assess the sincerity of
Viefhaus’ beliefs, as well as the likely effect Viefhaus’ message
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would have on an objective listener, was to examine the
circumstances in which the comments were made.”
Id.
As did the defendant in Viefhaus, Mr. Magleby denies having the requisite
intent under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 241. The lyrics to the
Screwdriver song, as well as the evidence that Mr. Magleby knew the lyrics and
could sing along with them, are probative of his intent under these sections. First,
§ 3631(a) requires that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Magleby targeted the Henrys because of their race. The lyrics and Mr. Magleby’s
familiarity with them are probative of his racial animus in burning the cross.
Second, under § 241, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Magleby had the specific intent to “oppress, threaten or intimidate” the
Henrys in the enjoyment of their federally protected right to occupy property.
Context is important in determining whether a true threat has been made.
Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 397. The necessity of demonstrating the context in which
the cross was burned renders the Screwdriver lyrics and other evidence of
hostility toward the presence of African-Americans in this country intrinsic to a
violation of § 241. And, as in Viefhaus, the only way the jury could properly
determine the message conveyed by Mr. Magleby’s cross-burning and the
foreseeable effect it would have on the Henrys was to examine the circumstances
in which the cross-burning was conceived, planned, and executed. We find that
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the song lyrics into
evidence.
5. Testimony that Mr. Magleby Provided Alcohol and Pornography to
Minors
Finally, Mr. Magleby argues that the district court erred in admitting
testimony that Mr. Magleby provided alcohol and pornography to a minor.
During its cross-examination of Mr. Magleby, the government inquired into
whether he allowed L.M. to look at pornography while at his home and whether
he provided L.M. with alcohol. The government argues that this evidence is
relevant as illustrative of the relationship between Mr. Magleby and his co-
conspirator. The government also argues that this testimony permitted the jury to
assess Mr. Magleby’s credibility. Because Mr. Magleby did not object to this
evidence at trial, we review for plain error. Mills, 194 F.3d at 1113.
Viewing the record as a whole and taking this evidence in context, we
conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict even without the
testimony about Mr. Magleby providing alcohol and pornography to minors. The
cross-examination on this subject was brief. Additionally, Mr. Magleby denied
that he gave L.M. alcohol or permitted him to look at pornography. There was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find Mr. Magleby guilty beyond a reasonable
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doubt. We find, therefore, that the admission of this testimony was not plain
error.
III. Conclusion
We find that neither challenged jury instruction constituted plain error. We
also find that the government presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby violated 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a),
18 U.S.C. § 241, and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). Furthermore, we find that the district
court did not commit reversible error in admitting any of the evidence challenged
by Mr. Magleby.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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