F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 5 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WYOMING OUTFITTERS
ASSOCIATION, doing business as
Wyoming Outfitters and Guides
Association; JIM ALLEN; TIM
TREFREN; JOHN WINTER;
BOBBI WADE; VINCE VAN
ROEGEN; KIM R. CARRARA;
WALTER LEE JONES; CRAIG
ARTMAN; CRAIG LARSEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. Nos. 00-8066 & 00-8078
(D.C. No. 98-CV-1027-J)
WYOMING GAME AND FISH (D. Wyo.)
COMMISSION; HAL CORBELT;
LEE HENDERSON; TRACY
HUNT; L. GARY LUNDUALL;
J. MICHAEL POWERS; MIKE
HUNZIE; JOHN BAUGHMAN,
Defendants-Appellees,
WYOMING WILDLIFE
FEDERATION,
Intervenor-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
(continued...)
Before HENRY , PORFILIO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs challenge Wyoming’s hunting licensing system under various
provisions of the federal constitution. On July 5, 2000, the district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the state. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A),
plaintiffs had until August 5, 2000 to file a notice of appeal. By the close of
business on August 5, no such notice had been filed.
More than two weeks later, on August 22, 2000, plaintiffs filed a notice
of appeal accompanied by a motion for an extension of time. After a hearing
on the motion, the district court denied the request for an extension, finding
that plaintiffs did not make a showing of “excusable neglect” as required by
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (allowing a district court to extend the time to file a notice
*
(...continued)
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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of appeal, provided the party so moves within thirty days after the notice was due
and shows excusable neglect or good cause). Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. 1
The Supreme Court has directed that in determining what constitutes
excusable neglect, a court must “tak[e] account of all relevant circumstances
surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The Court has pointed to four
factors that are relevant in determining whether to find excusable neglect: 1) the
danger of unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party; 2) the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings; 3) the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant; and 4) whether the
movant acted in good faith. Id.; see City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas
Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994).
We review the district court’s determination of the presence or absence of
excusable neglect based on an abuse of discretion. City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at
1046. “The real question here is not whether we would have found . . . excusable
neglect but rather whether we should second-guess the trial judge’s
1
The notice of appeal stemming from the underlying appeal is docketed as
No. 00-8066. Plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s denial of the motion for
an extension of time is docketed at No. 00-8078. This court consolidated the
appeals for purposes of briefing.
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decision . . . .” Varhol v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1564
(7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (en banc).
Based on the record before us, we find nothing to suggest that the district
court abused its discretion. Renewing the arguments he pressed in his motion for
an extension of time, plaintiffs’ counsel first states that in the month following
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, counsel was in the midst of a
rigorous treatment of physical therapy. The treatment was necessary as a result
of injuries counsel sustained in a 1999 car accident. We have no doubt that the
treatment was painful and time-consuming, but we agree with the district court
that counsel was not so physically or mentally disabled that he was unable to file
the notice of appeal. We note in particular that counsel was apparently able to
perform various duties related to his extensive pro bono practice, yet was unable,
he says, to file a notice of appeal in this case.
Similarly, we reject counsel’s invitation to excuse his untimely notice of
appeal in recognition of his impressive pro bono commitment. While it is no
doubt important for lawyers to engage in public service, we have never intimated
that a deadline, especially one as significant as that contained in Fed. R. App. P.
4(a), can be excused merely because the offending lawyer has a laudable pro
bono practice. Finally, we agree with the district court that the difficulties
related to counsel’s inability to secure competent secretarial service, the upheaval
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caused by his withdrawal from his former law firm, and the communication
problems posed by his clients’ treks into the wilderness do not provide, either
alone or in the aggregate, a basis for a finding of excusable neglect.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying plaintiffs’ request for an extension of time, we lack appellate jurisdiction
to reach the merits of the underlying appeal. We therefore DISMISS appeal No.
00-8066; with respect to appeal No. 00-8078, we AFFIRM the order of the
district court denying plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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