F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 13 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STAN K. BUCK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. Nos. 01-4224 & 01-4261
D.C. No. 2:01-CV-416-ST
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF (D. Utah)
UTAH; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Western Region Office,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Stan K. Buck, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his case.
The district court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Mr. Buck’s claims
against the Industrial Commission of Utah and that Mr. Buck had failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted against the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district
court entered separate orders dismissing each defendant. Mr. Buck filed a notice
of appeal from each order. We consolidated the appeals. Our jurisdiction arises
from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
Background
Mr. Buck sustained an injury while working for a private employer. He
asserts that his employer failed to provide a reasonable duty of care, failed to
accommodate his disability, wrongfully terminated his employment, and retaliated
against him for exercising his rights. As required by Utah workers’ compensation
procedures, he filed a claim with the Industrial Commission. After many months
passed without resolution of his claims, Mr. Buck filed a lawsuit in state court
based on his injury, although he has not made clear the nature of his claims or the
identity of the parties. He alleges his state-court case was compromised by the
Industrial Commission’s delays in processing his claims, which included
transferring them to the EEOC. The EEOC declined Mr. Buck’s requests for a
right-to-sue letter, at first because it had not received the claim from the
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Industrial Commission, and later because it had not had an opportunity to conduct
an investigation. Mr. Buck alleged that this caused additional delay and further
hampered his state-court case.
Mr. Buck then filed this lawsuit in federal court alleging that the Industrial
Commission violated his federal rights to due process and equal protection when
it failed to notify him timely that it had terminated its proceedings and failed to
maintain accurate records and to make them available to him. R. doc. 1, at 2. He
further claimed that the Industrial Commission violated an implied contract to
protect his civil rights in the worker’s compensation and discrimination claims
and that it engaged in unlawful conduct when it gave him false and misleading
directions to take his case to federal court before it would release its records. Id.
Mr. Buck alleged that the EEOC failed to afford him the required
substantial-weight review and it failed to investigate his claims. Id. Mr. Buck’s
former employer is not a party to this action.
In dismissing Mr. Buck’s case, the district court also denied Mr. Buck’s
request to amend his complaint, finding that amendment would be futile.
Mr. Buck appeals.
Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s orders dismissing Mr. Buck’s claims
against the Industrial Commission based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign
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immunity. Joseph A., ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram , 275 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir.
2002). We also review de novo the district court’s ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) that
Mr. Buck failed to state a claim against the EEOC on which relief can be granted.
Ruiz v. McDonnell , 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002). Mr. Buck maintains
he is entitled to damages against the Industrial Commission under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12202 &
12203; and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. For his claims against the EEOC,
Mr. Buck relies on Title VII, the ADA and the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 522a(g)(4), 702, 704 & 706. He has abandoned on appeal his
claim against the EEOC based on § 1983. Because he is representing himself on
appeal, his pleadings will be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972).
Mr. Buck does not contest the district court’s finding that the Industrial
Commission is an arm of the State of Utah. Therefore, we accept this underlying
factual finding. 1
Cf. Hein v. TechAmerica Group, Inc. , 17 F.3d 1278, 1279 (10th
Cir. 1994) (accepting district court’s findings as undisputed because not expressly
appealed). The Eleventh Amendment bars Mr. Buck’s claim under § 1983
1
Our decision to affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Industrial
Commission is an arm of the state is based solely on the fact that Mr. Buck does
not dispute this underlying factual finding. The record provides no basis to
evaluate whether the finding is correct.
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because the State is not a “person” against whom § 1983 claim can be brought.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). It also precludes his
claim under the ADA because the ADA’s attempt to waive sovereign immunity
has been rejected. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett , 531 U.S. 356,
374 (2001) (invalidating waiver of states’ immunity under Title I of ADA);
Thompson v. Colorado , 278 F.3d 1020, 1034 (10th Cir. 2001) (same for Title II of
ADA), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 1960 (2002). As for Mr. Buck’s assertion that
Title VII authorizes his damages claim against the Industrial Commission, this
issue is deemed waived because he failed to argue it in his appellate briefs. See
Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa , 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990).
Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing the complaint against the Industrial
Commission.
We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Buck’s claims against
the EEOC for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “The
circuits which have addressed the issue have uniformly held that no cause of
action against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim.”
Scheerer v. Rose State Coll. , 950 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation
omitted) (collecting cases); accord Smith v. Casellas , 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (collecting cases holding “Congress has not authorized, either expressly or
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impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC’s alleged negligence
or other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge.”).
Mr. Buck asserts that the APA provides a civil remedy against the EEOC.
He relies on 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) & (B). 2
To maintain a suit under that
section, a plaintiff must establish that “the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). “Intentional or willful” is defined
as “action so patently egregious and unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct
should have known it unlawful, or conduct committed without grounds for
believing it to be lawful or action flagrantly disregarding others’ rights under
[§ 552a(g)(4)].” Pippinger v. Rubin , 129 F.3d 519, 530 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted). Alleging gross negligence is insufficient. See Andrews v.
Veterans Admin. , 838 F.2d 418, 425 (10th Cir. 1988). Mr. Buck’s allegations fall
short of the “intentional or willful” standard; therefore, he has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
The other sections of the APA Mr. Buck cites apply to judicial review of
agency action, not to claims for damages against an agency. Consequently, they
do not apply to this case brought against a federal agency. Accordingly,
2
Mr. Buck’s appellate brief cites 5 U.S.C. § 522a, but it is clear that he
relies on § 552a.
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Mr. Buck’s claim against the EEOC for mishandling his charge of discrimination
was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Finally, we consider Mr. Buck’s claim that the district court erred in
denying him leave to amend his complaint to include claims based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics ,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court
correctly determined that Mr. Buck could not state a claim under any of those
authorities.
Mr. Buck failed to allege the requisite racial or class-based animus for a
claim under § 1985. See Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). A
Bivens action alleging that a federal actor violated a plaintiff’s constitutional
right cannot be maintained against a federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S.
471, 485-86 (1994). Mr. Buck’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies on his
FTCA claim precludes filing suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Therefore, it is “patently
obvious” that Mr. Buck cannot prevail on his proposed amendments, “and
allowing him an opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile.” Curley v.
Perry , 246 F.3d 1278, 1281-82 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 274 (2001).
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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