United States v. Gorman

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 3 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 01-4249

TROY ALLEN GORMAN, also
known as Tracy Gorman,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:00-CR-299-G)

Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant.

Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,
(Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City,
Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before MURPHY, ANDERSON and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
 Troy Allen Gorman was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Mr. Gorman

argues: (1) the district court abused its discretion by (a) admitting evidence

pertaining to a bag of marijuana alleged to be in his possession at the time of his

arrest and (b) admitting into evidence a box of ammunition where no officer

specifically testified to finding it in his truck; (2) the evidence was insufficient to

sustain the jury’s verdict; and (3) the district court erred when it increased his

sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines because of a prior

dangerous weapons violation to which he had pled guilty under a negotiated “plea

in abeyance.” We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 2, 1999, Mr. Gorman pled guilty in state district court to

attempting to provide a weapon to a person in custody—a third degree felony. The

court agreed to stay the consequences of the guilty plea on condition of twenty-

four months of good behavior. Less than eight months later, in the early hours of

April 23, 2000, police officers investigated Mr. Gorman’s truck, which was broken

down and parked in a church parking lot, serving as a home for Mr. Gorman and

his cousin Mr. Beckstead. Upon approaching the truck, officers smelled the odor

of raw marijuana.

Mr. Gorman, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, was asked to exit the

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truck. Upon exiting, he threw the blanket that had been covering him on Mr.

Beckstead. To ensure his safety, an officer removed the blanket so he could see

Mr. Beckstead’s hands and then noticed a hunting knife on the truck seat touching

Mr. Beckstead’s hand. Officers frisked Mr. Gorman and Mr. Beckstead for

weapons and detained them.

Because of the smell of marijuana, an officer called for a narcotics sniffing

canine. While conducting a preliminary sweep of the truck to protect the dog from

sharp objects, an officer found a firearm secreted in a compartment on the driver’s

side of the dashboard underneath the steering column. The butt of the gun

protruded from the dashboard compartment and was visible from the driver’s side

of the vehicle. The firearm, a 9mm semi-automatic handgun, contained a loaded

magazine.

The dog was then placed in the truck and indicated odors from the

floorboard of the passenger area and part of the seat cover on the driver’s side of

the vehicle. The officers found a large bag of marijuana behind the floorboard,

which Mr. Beckstead later admitted was his. While searching the seat cover on the

driver’s side of the vehicle, officers found a second 9mm handgun magazine—

unloaded and nonfunctional. Also, one of the officers noticed a small bag of

marijuana had fallen to the ground during the search of the driver’s seat cover.

A box of 9mm ammunition was also booked into evidence. No officer could

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remember who found the ammunition or where it was located in the truck.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Small Bag of Marijuana

The small bag of marijuana was identified as a government exhibit but not

offered into evidence; testimony relating to it was allowed. Mr. Gorman argues

the admitted testimony was not relevant to firearm possession, was unfairly

prejudicial, and should have been excluded under F ED . R. E VID . 404(b). Further,

he contends the government did not give proper notice of its intent to use that

evidence, as Rule 404(b) requires. We review for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Morris, 287 F.3d 985, 989-90 (10th Cir. 2002).

Rule 404(b) forbids the use of other bad acts to prove the character of the

defendant and to show the defendant acted in conformity with his character.

“Other bad acts” means acts that are not part of the events giving rise to the

present charges. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1372 n.5 (10th Cir.

1989). But acts intrinsic to or intertwined with the charged acts are not Rule

404(b) acts. See id.

The smell of raw marijuana emanating from the truck cab prompted the

officers to call for a narcotics canine. Ultimately, preparing for and conducting

the canine search led to the discovery of the marijuana and other evidence, viz. the

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loaded firearm, unloaded magazine clip, and box of ammunition.

During the trial Mr. Beckstead admitted ownership of the large bag of

marijuana, and several officers testified about both the small and large bags. No

testimony named Mr. Gorman as the owner of the small bag and the jury was

instructed that he was being tried only for illegal possession of a firearm. 1 The

testimony relating to the marijuana—both the large and small bag—was

intertwined with the discovery of the firearm and therefore necessary to understand

the flow of events and put police conduct in context. It was not Rule 404(b)

evidence, and before introduction it was subjected to Rule 403 evaluation.

Mr. Gorman argued these same issues during the hearing on his motion in

limine. The district court found “. . . the probative value of that [the marijuana]

and the connected aspect of it as the very impetus and reason for the search

outweighs any prejudicial effect that might be asserted under Rule 403.” Rather

than an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s considered approach in weighing

1
Jury instruction No. 16 states:

During the trial you have heard testimony related to other forms of
contraband seized from within the vehicle and in connection with the
other occupant of the vehicle. This information is related primarily
to provide you with the full background and context of the actions of
the police officers in the course of contacting and arresting Mr.
Gorman and Timothy Beckstead. The defendant is not charged with
any offense related to any other contraband. You are not to speculate
as to whether the defendant was involved in any uncharged criminal
conduct.

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probative value against unfair prejudice is the hallmark of a proper exercise of

discretion.

Mr. Gorman also argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding

he had fair notice that the government planned to use the marijuana evidence at

trial. Even if it was Rule 404(b) evidence, Rule 404(b) requires only that the

government provide a defendant with “reasonable notice” prior to trial. Mr.

Gorman may not have had formal written notice, but he had verbal notice of the

government’s intention to present the marijuana evidence at trial. That notice was

evident from his admission at a hearing and made manifest in his motion in limine,

filed more than a week before trial, seeking to exclude “his alleged possession of

controlled substances,” among other bad acts. We agree with the district court that

the notice given was sufficient under the circumstances.

B. The Box of Ammunition

Mr. Gorman contends the district court erred in admitting the box of

ammunition because it lacked proper foundation and authentication. Specifically,

he argues the chain of custody was broken when no one could remember who

found the box of ammunition or where it was located in the truck. We do not

disturb a trial court’s evidentiary ruling unless we are “firmly convinced that the

district court ‘made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of

permissible choice in the circumstances.’” United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d

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1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th

Cir. 1994)).

Testimony is sufficient to establish foundation for evidence that is “readily

identifiable and relatively resistant to change.” United States v. Cardenas, 864

F.2d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). The partially filled

box of 9mm ammunition clearly meets this test. One officer testified that all

evidence taken from inside the truck was placed on the hood of the truck and the

box of ammunition was among those items. He said he took the evidence from the

truck hood and transported it to the police station. Another officer testified to

receiving, securing and accounting for the evidence, including the box of

ammunition. Although these officers could not identify who found the box of

ammunition, their testimony was sufficient foundation when placed in context and

considered in light of all factual circumstances. In any event “deficiencies in the

chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. . . .”

United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1531). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in

admitting such evidence.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Claims of insufficiency of the evidence prompt de novo review. United

States v. Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002). “Evidence is sufficient to

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support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . . We resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the

Government.” Id. at 921-22.

In a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant

thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or

affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144

(10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999). The parties stipulated to parts

one and three, requiring the government to prove only that Mr. Gorman knowingly

possessed the firearm.

The government may satisfy the element of knowing possession of a firearm

by showing constructive possession: where a defendant “knowingly hold[s] the

power to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.” Van Tieu, 279 F.3d at

922 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th

Cir. 2001)). Knowledge and control can be inferred where a defendant has

exclusive possession of the premises, but where a defendant jointly occupies the

premises the government must “show some connection or nexus between the

defendant and the firearm or other contraband.” Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1145.

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 Mr. Gorman did not have exclusive possession of his truck because Mr.

Beckstead was present when the gun was found and both men were living out of

the truck. However, sufficient nexus between Mr. Gorman and the firearm was

established by testimony describing the location of the gun on the driver’s side of

the vehicle and demonstrating it was visible and retrievable from the driver’s seat,

where Mr. Gorman was sitting immediately prior to the search. Additionally, the

second unloaded 9mm magazine was found in the driver’s seat cover. Finally,

evidence established Mr. Gorman was an auto mechanic by profession, who owned

and worked on the truck. One could reasonably conclude he would know its

special details and convenient hiding places. Based on these facts a reasonable

jury could find Mr. Gorman had knowledge of and dominion or control over the

firearm.

D. Utah’s Plea in Abeyance

Mr. Gorman contends the district court erred in adding two points to his

criminal history category for a plea in abeyance. 2 U NITED S TATES S ENTENCING

Utah’s plea in abeyance statute provides: “‘Plea in abeyance’ means an
2

order by a court . . . accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions. . . .”
U TAH C ODE A NN . § 77-2a-1 (2002).

[T]he court may, upon finding that the defendant has successfully
completed the terms of the agreement: (a) reduce the degree of the offense
and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence for a lower degree of
offense; or (b) allow withdrawal of defendant’s plea and order the dismissal

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G UIDELINES § 4A1.1(d)(2001) (hereinafter “USSG”) allows the addition of two

points to the defendant’s offense level “if the defendant committed the instant

offense while under any criminal justice sentence.” A “criminal justice sentence”

is a sentence countable under USSG § 4A1.2, including a “prior sentence” and a

“diversionary disposition,” “having a custodial or supervisory component,

although active supervision is not required.” USSG § 4A1.1(d), cmt. n.4. A prior

sentence is “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt,” and is

counted to enhance the sentencing level even if the imposition of sentence was

completely suspended or stayed, or the sentence was not yet determined and

entered. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1), (a)(3) and (a)(4). A diversionary disposition based on

a finding or admission of guilt is also counted as a prior sentence and used to

enhance the sentencing level “even if a conviction is not formally entered.” Id. §

4A1.2(f).

One point is added to a defendant’s criminal history category for a “prior

sentence” or a “diversionary disposition,” Id. §§ 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(a)(f), but two

points are added for a “criminal justice sentence.” Id. § 4A1.1(d). The difference

of the case. . . . If . . . information comes to the attention of the
prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any
condition of the agreement, the court . . . may terminate the agreement and
enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for
the offense to which the original plea was entered.

Id. §§ 77-2a-3(2), (5); 77-2a-4(a)(2001).

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is whether, because of his prior conviction, the defendant was subject to a

“supervisory component” when he committed the instant crime. Had Mr. Gorman

been found with a firearm even after successfully completing the conditions

imposed as a result of his plea in abeyance, it would have still counted as a prior

sentence, adding one point to his criminal history category under USSG

§ 4A1.1(c). But because he had not complied with the court’s order during its

term, and was therefore subject to the consequences of violation, he was subject to

a two point addition under USSG § 4A1.1(d) if the plea in abeyance satisfied the

“supervisory component” of a criminal justice sentence.

Where objections to sentencing are asserted, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error but consider de novo its legal interpretations of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393,

1398 (10th Cir. 1997). Whether Utah’s plea in abeyance has the necessary

“supervisory component” to make it a “criminal justice sentence” is a legal

interpretation.

Mr. Gorman’s plea in abeyance was both an adjudication of guilt and a

conviction. Utah law defines a conviction as “(a) judgment of guilt; (b) plea of

guilty; or (c) plea of no contest.” U TAH C ODE A NN . § 77-38a-102(1) (202). A

plea in abeyance is conditioned upon a defendant pleading guilty or no contest. Id.

§ 77-38a-102(8). Thus, upon entry of a guilty plea and its acceptance, a defendant

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is convicted under Utah law, but the full consequences of conviction are not

visited upon a defendant who completes the conditions associated with the plea in

abeyance.

It is less clear whether sentence was imposed within the meaning of the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, but we note that some Utah statutes consider

a plea in abeyance as a criminal disposition. U TAH C ODE A NN . § 77-36-1.1 (the

penalty for domestic violence can be enhanced if the perpetrator has a prior

domestic abuse conviction; “[f]or purposes of this section, a plea in abeyance is

considered a conviction”); id. § 61-2c-301(2) (convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo

contendere, and pleas in abeyance are considered criminal dispositions for persons

engaged in the business of residential mortgage loans).

We have never considered whether Utah’s plea in abeyance constitutes a

criminal justice sentence for purposes of USSG § 4A1.1(d), but we have

determined two distinct deferred judgment statutes to be criminal justice

sentences. Oklahoma’s deferred judgment, which imposes a formal probation, is a

criminal justice sentence. United States v. Vela, 992 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1993).

Likewise, we determined Colorado’s deferred sentence, 3 which “may place the

3
Colorado’s deferred judgment, in force at the time of Norman, has been
repealed and renumbered. No substantive changes, however, were made to the
statute, which states in part:

[T]he defendant is obligated to adhere to such stipulation. The
conditions imposed in the stipulation shall be similar in all respects

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defendant under the supervision of the probation department,” results in a criminal

justice sentence even when there was no formal supervision, because the deferred

sentence imposed “probation-like” components. Norman, 129 F.3d at 1401 n.13,

1402 (emphasis added).

Mr. Gorman argues Colorado’s deferred sentence, and thus Utah’s plea in

abeyance, are not probationary in nature and should not be considered criminal

justice sentences. He relies on United States v. Kipp, 10 F.3d 1463 (9th Cir.

1993), but in so doing seems to ignore a salient fact. We distinguished Kipp in

Norman, specifically stating Kipp was distinct because no conditions were

imposed on the defendant in conjunction with his deferred sentence. Norman, 129

F.3d at 1402 n.15.

Utah’s plea in abeyance is similar to Colorado’s deferred judgment. Under

both, after the defendant enters a guilty plea the court may refrain from entering

the judgment and sentence and instead impose specific conditions to which the

defendant must adhere. U TAH C ODE A NN . § 77-2a-1 (2002); C OLO . R EV . S TAT . §

to conditions permitted as part of probation . . . . Upon full
compliance with such conditions by the defendant, the plea of guilty
previously entered shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the
judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed
with prejudice . . . . [U]pon a breach by the defendant of any
condition regulating the conduct of the defendant, the court shall
enter judgment and impose sentence upon such guilty plea.

C OLO . R EV . S TAT . 16-7-403(2), repealed by C OLO . R EV . S TAT . § 18-1.3-102(2)
(2002).

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18-1.3-102 (2002). In Utah, the specific conditions can be “any other conditions

which could have been imposed as conditions of probation,” and the Department

of Corrections may be required “to assist in the administration of the plea

agreement as if the defendant were on probation of the court,” U TAH C ODE A NN .

§§ 77-2a-3(5)(e), 77-2a-3(4)(2002). In Colorado, the conditions are to be “similar

in all respects to conditions permitted as part of probation.” C OLO . R EV . S TAT . §

18-1.3-102(2)(2002).

In both states, if the defendant complies with all conditions, the guilty plea

can be withdrawn and the case dismissed; if the defendant does not comply, the

court can terminate the deferral, enter judgment and impose sentence on the

original guilty plea. Id.; U TAH C ODE A NN . §§ 77-2a-3, 77-2a-4(2002). Utah’s plea

in abeyance, like Colorado’s deferred sentence, includes probation-like

components.

Mr. Gorman pled guilty to a third degree felony offense, attempting to

provide a weapon to a person in custody, under a court approved agreement

allowing the plea to be held in abeyance. The matter was to be held in abeyance

for 24 months—beginning September 2, 1999—during which time Mr. Gorman

was required by court order to maintain good behavior, refrain from violating the

law, and pay a fee of $300. Although there was no active supervision of Mr.

Gorman, the court retained the power to terminate the agreement, fine and

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incarcerate him if he violated the law or failed to abide by the other conditions of

the court’s order. Several sister circuits have held the court’s termination power

to be a sufficient supervisory component to establish a criminal justice sentence.

The Eighth Circuit determined Illinois’s conditional discharge sentence,

which is a “conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision,” is

the “functional equivalent” of unsupervised probation, and is a criminal justice

sentence for purposes of USSG § 4A1.1(d). United States v. Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183,

1187 n.4, 1188 (8th Cir. 1994).

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held Kentucky’s conditionally discharged

sentence to be a criminal justice sentence pursuant to § 4A1.1(d) where

“probationary supervision is inappropriate,” but where the court imposes

conditions, the noncompliance of which could result in a revocation of the

conditionally discharged sentence. United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 721-22

(6th Cir. 1995).

The Second Circuit concluded New York’s conditional discharge sentence

could be counted as a criminal justice sentence because the necessary supervisory

component was present in that the court “retained the power to revoke the

conditional discharge sentence,” despite a lack of probationary supervision.

United States v. Labella-Szuba, 92 F.3d 136, 138 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.

1047 (1996).

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 Although distinct in name, Utah’s plea in abeyance is similar to both

deferred sentences and conditional discharge sentences. If the court finds that its

order, entered upon the plea in abeyance agreement, was violated by a defendant,

it can enter judgment and impose sentence upon the previously accepted guilty

plea. As evidenced in Norman and in sister circuits, this simple supervisory

component is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a criminal justice sentence

and thus add two points to a defendant’s criminal history category in accordance

with USSG § 4A1.1(d). See generally, Norman, 129 F.3d 1393.

Our reasoning is in harmony with the United States Sentencing Guidelines’

expressed purpose of increasing sentences for repeat offenders. USSG Ch.4, Pt.

A, intro. comment. In keeping with that purpose, “defendants who receive the

benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes should not be

treated with further leniency.” Id. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.9. While not itself an end,

lenity can be a means to an end; it offers opportunity and expresses hope. But it

defies reason, as well as the text and purpose of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, to continue to hope when hope has become forlorn. See Callanan v.

United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961). “General deterrence of criminal conduct

dictates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will

aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.” USSG Ch.4, pt.A, intro.

comment.

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 The district court’s two-level enhancement of Mr. Gorman’s criminal history

category was appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary

rulings, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and it was

appropriate to add two points to Mr. Gorman’s criminal history category for his

plea in abeyance.

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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