F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 6 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WILLIAM HENRY BYRD, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 02-6316
CORNELL CORRECTIONS, INC., D.C. No. CIV-02-52-W
GREAT PLAINS CORRECTIONAL (W.D. Oklahoma)
FACILITY, CITY OF HINTON,
OKLAHOMA,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
William Henry Byrd, III, a prisoner convicted of rape by an Oklahoma state
court and currently serving a sentence in a private prison, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants Great Plains Correctional
Facility, Cornell Corrections, Inc., and the City of Hinton in his pro se civil rights
action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the district court’s grant of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
summary judgment to the defendants for substantially the same reasons set forth
in the district court’s order and the magistrate’s report and recommendation. 1
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Byrd was convicted of rape in Tulsa County District Court in 1995.
Under a contract between the Oklahoma Department of Corrections and Cornell
Corrections, Inc., Mr. Byrd is now incarcerated at the Great Plains Correctional
Facility, a private prison operated by Cornell Corrections and located in Hinton,
Oklahoma. In his pro se complaint, Mr. Byrd alleged that he was: (1) incorrectly
placed in medium security status and, (2) placed in punitive segregation for no
apparent reason and thus received excessive punishment for a disciplinary
violation. 2
He named as defendants the Great Plains Correctional Facility, Cornell
Corrections, Inc., and the City of Hinton, Oklahoma, where the facility is located.
1
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). The case is
therefore submitted without oral argument.
2
The magistrate judge observed that Mr. Byrd’s complaint was “brief and
vaguely worded.” Rec. doc. 18, at 1 (Report and Recommendation, filed Aug. 13,
2002). However, after considering Mr. Byrd’s response to the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge construed the complaint to
raise these two claims. On appeal, Mr. Byrd does not challenge this
characterization of his claims, and we therefore read the complaint in the same
manner.
-2-
Adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned
that prison officials had broad discretion to place inmates in the appropriate
security classification and that, as to his claim regarding his placement in
disciplinary segregation, Mr. Byrd did not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in remaining in the general prison population. As to the City of Hinton,
the court observed that Mr. Byrd had failed to offer any evidence of a causal
connection between a municipal policy and the alleged constitutional deprivations.
Moreover, the court noted, the city does not own or operate the Great Plains
Correctional Facility.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standard as did the district court. Amro v. Boeing Co. , 232 F.3d 790,
796 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the evidence and draw any
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment,
but that party must identify sufficient evidence that would require submission of
the case to the jury. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52
-3-
(1986). Although courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally, pro se plaintiffs
may not rely on conclusory allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Applying these
standards, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment
to the defendants.
As to Mr. Byrd’s challenge to his security classification, we note that
“[c]hanging an inmate’s prison classification ordinarily does not deprive him of
liberty, because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison.”
Templeman v. Gunter , 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Meachum v.
Fano , 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that
“regulations promulgated by prison officials should be upheld by courts unless the
regulations are shown to be unreasonable or an exaggerated response to
administrative and security concerns.” Beerheide v. Suthers , 286 F.3d 1179, 1184
(10th Cir. 2002). Here, the defendant prison officials have explained the basis for
Mr. Byrd’s classification. Rec. doc. 12, Affidavit and Ex. 4. (Special Report, filed
June 10, 2002) (explaining Department of Corrections’ guidelines for determining
security status, which consider the severity of the offense of conviction and the
inmate’s prior criminal record). Thus, Mr. Byrd’s constitutional challenge to his
security classification lacks merit.
-4-
As to his placement in disciplinary segregation, the district court properly
noted that an inmate generally does not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in remaining free from placement in disciplinary segregation unless that
placement constituted an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995). Applying that standard, the Supreme Court has held that a placement
in disciplinary segregation for thirty days did not impose an atypical and
significant hardship. Id. at 486. Here, Mr. Byrd pleaded guilty to committing
battery while in prison and received thirty days’ confinement in disciplinary
segregation and a $50 fine. He has presented no evidence indicating that the
conditions to which he was subjected during this thirty day period constituted an
atypical and significant hardship,” id. at 484, in relation to ordinary prison life.
Cf. Penrod v. Zavaras , 94 F.3d 1399, 1407 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming the grant
of summary judgment to defendant prison officials on claim arising out of inmate’s
placement in administrative segregation for ten-month period on the grounds that
“[t]he administrative segregation regime plaintiff was subjected to as a result of
legitimate security concerns did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison”). In light of Sandin ,
these facts are insufficient to support Mr. Byrd’s challenge to his placement in
disciplinary segregation.
-5-
Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City of
Hinton. There is no evidence that the city had any role in operating the Great
Plains Correctional Facility and thus no causal link between the city and the
alleged constitutional violations. See Hollingsworth v. Hill , 110 F.3d 733, 742
(10th Cir. 1997) (explaining the elements necessary to support a § 1983 action
against a municipality).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the defendants.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
-6-