F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 13 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID W. LANDRY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NANCY SMITH, Director, United
States Department of Agriculture, No. 02-7075
National Appeals Division; GLEN D.C. No. 01-CV-711-S
MILLER, JR., Hearing Officer, (E. D. Oklahoma)
United States Department of
Agriculture, National Appeals
Division; ERNEST M. RENFROW,
County Supervisor, Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA)/Rural
Economic and Community
Development (RECD),
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore ordered submitted
without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The
court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an
order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R.
36.3.
Plaintiff David Wayne Landry was denied a loan from the Farm Service
Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) because the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) characterized his site as a
wetland, ineligible for the requested loans. A hearing officer reviewed and
affirmed the wetland characterization. The Director of the National Appeals
Division (NAD) of the USDA (the “Director”) upheld the hearing officer’s
decision.
Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma challenging the NRCS’s wetland determination and the
Director’s subsequent approval. See Landry v. Cooper, No. 97-596-S (E.D. Okla.
May 4, 1998) (“Landry I”). The district court found that “the NRCS’s wetland
determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not otherwise
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the agency’s discretion.” Id. at 5. It also
found, “[T]he NRCS’s determination that no exemption applies . . . is . . .
supported by the record.” Id. at 6. As a result, both the NRCS determination and
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the Director’s decision were upheld. This court affirmed. Landry v. Cooper, No.
98-7077 (10th Cir. Mar. 15, 1999).
Plaintiff brought a second action challenging the Secretary of the USDA’s
failure to implement a decision of the National Appeals Staff. Plaintiff asserted
that the decision, if implemented, would have allowed the USDA to issue him a
loan. See Landry v. Glickman, No. 99-165-S (E.D. Okla. July 7, 1999) (“Landry
II”). The district court found the suit barred because, in accordance with Landry
I, the property was a wetland and the Secretary was prohibited from making loans
to disturb wetlands. Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed as untimely. Landry v.
Glickman, No. 99-7130 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 2000).
In October 2000 Plaintiff filed a third action asking the court to find that he
was entitled to a wetland exception that would have allowed him to secure a
USDA loan. See Landry v. Glickman, No. CIV-00-546-S (E.D. Okla. May 29,
2001) (“Landry III”). The district court dismissed the case on the basis of res
judicata. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Landry v. Veneman, No. 01-7121 (10th
Cir. May 30, 2002).
Plaintiff then filed the current action, Landry v. Smith, No. CIV-01-711-S
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 11, 2002) (“Landry IV”), challenging the manner in which his
loan application was processed and the Director’s approval of the hearing
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officer’s determination. Again, the district court dismissed the case on the basis
of res judicata.
On appeal Plaintiff claims that the district court erred when it (1) granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss without first requiring an answer to be served, and
(2) exercised subject matter jurisdiction despite Plaintiff’s alleged failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. In his reply brief he also argues that res
judicata does not apply because each action challenged the conduct of a separate
agency. He contends that Defendants’ answer brief “is another attempt to re-
litigate it’s [sic] affirmative defense of res judicata against [Plaintiff’s] previously
[sic] claims, thereby continuing to burden and abuse the judicial process by filing
frivolous affirmative defenses . . . .” Aplt. Reply Br. at 1.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). County of Santa Fe v. Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 311 F.3d
1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 2002). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
I. The Pre-Answer Motion
Rule 12(a) gives a federal governmental defendant 60 days in which to
answer a plaintiff’s complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(3)(A)-(3)(B). In this case
the governmental defendants never answered Plaintiff’s complaint. Instead, they
moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district
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court granted their motion. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants defaulted when they
failed to answer his complaint within the 60-day period.
The 12(b)(6) defense may be raised in a pre-answer motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b). “Unless a different time is fixed by court order, the service of a [12(b)(6)]
motion . . . alters the[] period[] of time [for filing an answer].” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(4). “[I]f the court denies the motion . . . , the [answer must] be served
within 10 days after notice of the court’s action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). If
the court grants the motion, as it did here, the plaintiff’s action is dismissed, and
an answer is no longer necessary. Thus, Defendants did not default.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff claims that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
that therefore the court in this action, as well as the courts in the three previous
actions, lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff failed to raise this
issue in the district court, we consider it only to the extent that it implicates
jurisdiction in this case. See Sac and Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063
(10th Cir. 1995). Whether the courts in Landry I, Landry II, and Landry III had
subject matter jurisdiction, while potentially relevant to the application of the
doctrine of res judicata, has no bearing on jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly,
we do not address whether jurisdiction was present in Plaintiff’s earlier actions.
We are concerned solely with the district court’s jurisdiction in Landry IV.
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The district court’s power to review the Director’s decision derived from 7
U.S.C. § 6999, which reads, “A final determination of the [National Appeals]
Division shall be reviewable and enforceable by any United States district court
of competent jurisdiction in accordance with chapter 7 of Title 5.” Under this
statute the district court had subject matter jurisdiction if the Director’s decision
was “final.” The Supreme Court has explained the finality requirement as
follows:
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for
agency action to be final: First, the action must mark
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
process—it must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be
one by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). The NAD decision at issue here explicitly states, “This
concludes the administrative appeal of this case.” ROA at 15. Moreover, it
appears to dispose of Plaintiff’s claims fully. Plaintiff does not explain in what
way the NAD decision was not final or how he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. We therefore conclude that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s claim.
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III. Res Judicata
Because he did not raise the issue until his reply brief, we need not address
Plaintiff’s argument that the elements of res judicata have not been established.
Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000). In any event, the issue was
thoroughly and correctly addressed in the district court’s orders in Landry III and
Landry IV.
We AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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