F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 24 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GORDON E. STROPE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 02-3336
(District of Kansas)
DAVID R. McKUNE, Warden,
(D.C. No. 01-CV-3164-DES)
Lansing Correctional Facility; CARLA
J. STOVALL, Attorney General of
Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On April 30, 2001, pro se petitioner, Gordon E. Strope, filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court.
The district court denied the petition and Strope now seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing
that no appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition
unless the petitioner first obtains a COA). Strope is not entitled to a COA unless
he can make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. §
2253(c)(2). Strope can make this showing by demonstrating that the issues raised
are debatable among jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or that
the questions presented deserve further proceedings. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529
U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
Strope raised five claims in his § 2254 petition: (1) he was denied due
process when the state trial judge denied his request for a continuance of his
trial; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial; (3) the sentence he
received was calculated based on erroneous information; (4) he was denied a fair
trial because the state trial judge was biased against him; and (5) his trial counsel
was constitutionally ineffective.
The district court concluded that Strope’s claim that he received an
erroneous sentence is procedurally barred because it was not presented to the
Kansas Court of Appeals. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1
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(1991). As to Strope’s other claims, the district court concluded that the state
court’s adjudication of those claims did not result “in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or result “in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Williams
v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405-13 (2000). We have conducted a “preliminary,
though not definitive, consideration” of the legal framework applicable to each of
Strope’s claims. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003). From
our examination, we conclude that Strope has failed to “demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, Strope has not
made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and is not
entitled to a COA on this issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This court denies Strope’s
request for a COA for substantially those reasons set forth in the district court’s
order dated August 26, 2002, and dismisses this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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