F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 10 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ALI SHERKAT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-3406
(D. Kan.)
JOHNSON COUNTY DISTRICT (D.Ct. No. 02-CV-2487-KHV)
COURT,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Mr. Ali Sherkat, acting pro se 1, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Mr. Sherkat, acting pro se, brought an action against the Johnson County,
Kansas, District Court alleging a violation of his equal protection and due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed the Johnson County District
Court found him guilty of abuse without proof, took away his parenting rights,
and jeopardized his right to appeal by failing to record the hearing. Mr. Sherkat
requested the United States district court dismiss and/or reverse the orders of the
Johnson County District Court and sought an award of damages, including five
million dollars in punitive damages. Acting sua sponte, the district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 2 Mr. Sherkat now appeals that ruling, and has filed
two emergency motions regarding his appeal.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘bars a party losing in state court from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d
1
We liberally construe his pro se pleadings. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
2
The doctrine’s name is derived from the two United States Supreme Court
cases from which it arose: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163,
1169 (10th Cir. 1998)). This doctrine “not only prohibit[s] direct review of state
judgments by lower federal courts, but it also prohibit[s] those federal courts from
issuing any declaratory relief that is inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment.” Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. U.S.
West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1106 (2000). Here, Mr. Sherkat essentially seeks a dismissal and/or reversal
of the state court proceedings, and the constitutional claims raised and relief
sought are inextricably intertwined with the substance and procedure of the state
court judgment. This is precisely the type of meddling in state court affairs the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Sherkat’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Further, Mr. Sherkat’s two emergency motions are denied as moot.
Entered by the Court:
TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
United States Circuit Judge
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