F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 29 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FERNANDO HERRERA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF SANTA FE;
BENJAMIN MONTANO; RAYMOND
SISNEROS; MARCOS LUCERO;
RUDY ESTRADA; LAWRENCE
BARRERAS, individually and in their No. 03-2099
capacity as Wardens, Santa Fe County (D.C. No. CIV-00-766-BB/DJS)
Jail; WILFRED ROMERO, (D. New Mexico)
individually and in his capacity as
Assistant Facility Manager, Santa Fe
County Jail; JAMES COATS;
DANIEL BOLTON; SANTA FE
COUNTY DETENTION CENTER,
and/or Cornell Corrections, Inc.,
RONNIE ARMENTA,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before EBEL, HENRY and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Fernando Herrera, an inmate at the Santa Fe County Detention Center,
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials used
excessive force against him during an altercation on November 10, 1998, in
violation of his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed his claims
without prejudice because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). We AFFIRM.
Herrera’s complaint arises out of an altercation in which he was shot by a
prison guard with a beanbag round, causing injuries that required three days
hospitalization and that ultimately resulted in the loss of a testicle. 1 Herrera does
not contest that the Santa Fe County Detention Center had a grievance procedure
in place at that time, and that he did not make use of that procedure after the
November 1998 shooting. Instead, he argues that the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement did not apply to him at the time of that incident, that other grievances
he filed prior to that incident should suffice to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
1
The parties give conflicting reports of the events giving rise to the
November 1998 shooting. According to Herrera, prison guards acted maliciously
for the purpose of punishing, silencing, and demeaning him. In contrast, prison
officials reported that the altercation took place after Herrera assaulted a prison
guard, took the guard’s keys, released another inmate from his cell, seized metal
window covers to use as weapons, threatened other guards, and refused to obey
orders to return to his cell.
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and that the prison’s grievance procedure was not “available” to him in practice
because he was hospitalized after the shooting and later placed in segregation.
The district court properly rejected each of these arguments. 2
In the PLRA, Congress established that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). 3 In Porter v. Nussle, the Supreme Court clarified that this exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong. 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The district court correctly declined Herrera’s invitation to ignore the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law on the grounds that Nussle was decided
2
Although Herrera was represented by counsel at the district court level, he
brings this appeal pro se. Accordingly, we construe his arguments to this court
liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). We will not,
however, address the arguments Herrera raises for the first time on appeal. See
Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 545 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Issues not
raised in the district court are considered on appeal only under exceptional
circumstances or to prevent manifest injustice.”).
3
This requirement applies to prisoners like Herrera who are confined in
facilities operated by a private entity on a state’s behalf. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) (the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to prisoners “confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility”).
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after the November 1998 shooting incident. When the Supreme Court applies
federal law to the parties before it, that Court’s interpretation of the law is
controlling and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on
direct review. Harper v. Va. Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see also
Beaudry v. Corrections Corp. of America, 331 F.3d 1164, 166-67 (10th Cir. 2003)
(applying a Supreme Court decision interpreting the PLRA that was decided while
the case at bar was pending); Yousef v. Reno 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir.
2001) (same). Accordingly, Herrera was required under the PLRA to exhaust his
administrative remedies before bringing this § 1983 action.
Herrera’s next argument – that he exhausted administrative remedies with
respect to these claims by filing other grievances before the shooting took place –
is meritless. The fact that Herrera complained of abusive treatment in the past
does not excuse his complete failure to take advantage of the prison’s procedures
for redressing any separate claims based on the November 1998 shooting. The
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies in order to allow
prisons to address specific complaints internally and thus obviate the need for
litigation, to filter out some frivolous claims, and to create an administrative
record that would help resolve complaints that are ultimately brought to court.
Nussle, 534 U.S. at 525. These purposes would be frustrated were we to agree
with Herrera that a prisoner who has previously complained of abuse somehow
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has a free ticket to bring similar complaints in the future based on wholly separate
incidents without complying with the prison’s internal grievance process.
Finally, we find nothing in the record to support Herrera’s contention that
no administrative remedy was “available” in this case. Although Herrera alleges
that he was hospitalized for three days and later placed in segregation, he does not
explain how this might have prevented him from filing a grievance. Cf. Yousef,
254 F.3d at 1216 (affirming dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, though the prisoner was segregated in an isolated soundproof cell).
Although he alleges he was “initially denied access” to standardized grievance
forms with respect to his prior complaints, he admits that he eventually received
those forms and that he has been able to file grievances in the past. Furthermore,
to the extent Herrera argues that the prison’s administrative remedy was not
available because it was unlikely to give him effective relief, the Supreme Court
has already rejected his argument. “All ‘available’ remedies must now be
exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be
‘plain, speedy, and effective.’ Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available
in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to
suit.” Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524 (citation omitted).
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The judgment of the district court dismissing Herrera’s claims without
prejudice is hereby AFFIRMED. 4
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
4
The district court did not expressly discuss Herrera’s state law claims.
We assume that the court, having dismissed Herrera’s § 1983 claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) and
therefore dismissed those claims without prejudice. See Erikson v. Pawnee
County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1155 n.6
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