F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 14 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 03-2075
ADALBERTO VENEGAS-
ORNELAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-02-1851 JP)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Stephan P. McCue, Federal Public Defender; Charles A. Harwood, Assistant
Federal Public Defender; and Shari Lynn Allison, Research and Writing
Specialist, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and Norman Cairns, Assistant United
States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before EBEL, HARTZ, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case therefore is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2002, Adalberto Venegas-Ornelas (“Defendant”) was arrested
in New Mexico. Defendant was a Mexican national who had previously been
deported after having been convicted in Colorado of first degree trespass, a
felony. Defendant pled guilty to one count of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The
presentence report (PSR) calculated Defendant’s offense level as 10. The PSR
recommended a base offense level of 8 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), with an
increase of four levels for a prior felony conviction pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D)
and a reduction of two levels for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1.
Defendant’s criminal history category was IV.
The United States objected to the PSR, arguing that Defendant’s prior
felony conviction was an aggravated felony justifying an eight level increase in
his base offense level, instead of the four level increase recommended by the
PSR. The district court agreed with the United States and determined that
Defendant’s base offense level was 13 and his criminal history category was IV,
giving him a guideline sentencing range of 24-30 months. The court sentenced
him to 24 months in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.
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Defendant appeals his sentence on the ground that his prior Colorado
conviction for criminal trespass was not an aggravated felony qualifying him for
an increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). For the following reasons, we
AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the determination that a prior offense is an “aggravated
felony” under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Saenz-Mendoza, 287
F.3d 1011, 1013 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martinez-Villalva, 232
F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 2000).
B. Sentencing Guideline and Statutory Overview
The Sentencing Guideline at issue in this case, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)
(2002), provides for enhancements based on the nature of an illegal alien’s
convictions prior to removal. If an alien was previously convicted of an
“aggravated felony,” he or she is subject to an eight-level enhancement.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). The commentary to this guideline directs the courts to use the
definition of “aggravated felony” given in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). See U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2 cmt. 2. Section 1101(a)(43)(F) provides that one type of aggravated
felony is a “crime of violence (as defined in Section 16 of Title 18, but not
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including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year.” 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(F). 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines “crime of
violence” as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
Because the United States only argues that § 16(b) applies in this case, we
limit our discussion to that subsection. In applying § 16(b), we are to consider
whether a crime, “by its nature,” poses a substantial risk that physical force may
be used in the commission of the offense. United States v. Lucio-Lucio, __ F.3d
__, 2003 WL 22436260, *2 (10th Cir. 2003).
In this determination, “a court must only look to the statutory definition,
not the underlying circumstances of the crime.” United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13
F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993). Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89
(1990) (applying this categorical approach in interpreting the Armed Career
Criminal Act). Although we may not consider the particular facts surrounding the
conviction, if the statute reaches different types of conduct, we may look to the
charging paper and judgment of conviction in order to “determine if the actual
offense the defendant was convicted of qualifies as a crime of violence.” Sareang
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Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000). 1 Cf. United States v. Zamora,
222 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir. 2000) (utilizing same categorical approach in career
offender context, but explaining that “if ambiguity exists under the statute we can
look beyond the statute to certain records of the prior proceeding, such as the
charging documents, the judgment, any plea thereto, and findings by the court”).
“Force,” as used in the definition of a “crime of violence,” is “synonymous
with destructive or violent force.” United States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d
424, 426 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d
18, 20 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Lucio-Lucio, 2003 WL 22436260, at *2
1
This is not inconsistent with McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113, 1117-19
(10th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grds., 529 U.S. 1126 (2000), where we held
that the “Taylor exception” to the categorical approach did not apply to a § 16(b)
analysis. In McCann, we reversed the district court’s analysis of § 16(b) because
it examined the particular facts of the prior conviction when it should have looked
only to the statute. The prior conviction in McCann was for forcible sexual
abuse, a Utah crime that contained no ambiguity regarding the conduct it reached
and that provided the same elements for any conduct prohibited therein.
However, the Colorado statute in the instant case is ambiguous on its face because
it reaches different types of conduct under different sets of elements. Before we
can analyze whether the elements of the statute categorically meet § 16(b), we
must parse its nuances in order to determine which elements apply. In situations
like this, we look to the charging document for the limited purpose of discerning
which portion of the statute to examine on its face. This was not the issue
addressed by the court in McCann. In contrast to McCann, here we are not
looking at the underlying facts of the charged crime; rather we are looking to the
charging documents to determine what part of the statute was charged against
Defendant. We then determine whether that statutory offense constitutes a crime
of violence. We thus believe that McCann poses no conflict to our disposition of
the case at hand.
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(explaining that § 16(b) calls to mind “active violence”) (quotation omitted);
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e found the term
‘physical force’ in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) refers to actual violent force.”).
C. Is a Colorado conviction of first degree criminal trespass of a dwelling
an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)?
Defendant in the instant case was previously convicted of first degree
criminal trespass under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-4-502, which provides:
A person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if
such person knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in the
dwelling of another or if such person enters any motor vehicle
with intent to commit a crime therein. First degree criminal trespass
is a class 5 felony.
Because this statute reaches two different types of conduct by governing both
entry or remaining in an automobile and entry or remaining in a dwelling, we can
look to Defendant’s charging papers to discern which section he was convicted
under. See Sareang Ye, 214 F.3d at 1133. Defendant was charged with unlawful
entry or remaining in a dwelling, and we thus focus on that section of the statute.
The Colorado Court of Appeals has clarified that the “intent to commit a crime
therein” language of the statute “establishes an element of criminal trespass of a
motor vehicle and not an element of criminal trespass of a dwelling.” People v.
Rodriguez, 43 P.3d 641, 643 (Colo. App. 2002). Therefore, the elements of
Defendant’s prior conviction are that he (1) knowingly, (2) unlawfully, (3)
entered or remained (4) in the dwelling of another. Our task in the current appeal
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is to decide whether this offense, from the face of these elements, is an
“aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), or in other words, whether
there is a substantial risk that a defendant will use physical force in committing
the elements of this crime.
The Fifth Circuit has addressed this precise question and has held that
Colorado criminal trespass is indeed an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
United States v. Delgado-Enriquez, 188 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1999). The court
noted that “a substantial risk requires a strong probability that the event, in this
case the application of physical force during the commission of the crime, will
occur.” Id. at 595 (quotations omitted). Because “[e]ntering or remaining in the
dwelling of another creates a substantial risk that physical force will be used
against the residents [or property] in the dwelling,” the court concluded that
criminal trespass is a crime of violence. Id. We find this persuasive and adopt
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in finding that Colorado first degree criminal
trespass is a “crime of violence” and thus an “aggravated felony” under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).
Defendant argues that a later Fifth Circuit case erased the precedential
value of Delgado-Enriquez by changing its approach to “crime of violence”
determinations under the Sentencing Guidelines. In United States v. Chapa-
Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held that convictions for driving
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while intoxicated (DWI) are not “crimes of violence” because although there is a
substantial risk that injury will result, there is not a substantial risk that “the
defendant will intentionally employ force against the person or property of
another in order to effectuate the commission of the offense.” Id. at 927.
Defendant argues that this changes the Delgado-Enriquez court’s analysis by
adding that the use of force must be “intentional” and by focusing on the risk of
force used to carry out the offense itself, rather than the risk of force “resulting”
from the offense. However, Delgado-Enriquez and Chapa-Garza are not
inconsistent.
The Chapa-Garza court was correct in instructing courts not to focus on the
risk that force may result as an effect of the crime’s commission. Chapa-Garza,
243 F.3d at 925, 927. See also Lucio-Lucio, 2003 WL 22436260, at *4
(cautioning against investigating whether the crime “merely involve[s] the
possibility of resulting harm” in applying § 16(b)); see also Jobson v. Ashcroft,
326 F.3d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The risk of serious physical injury concerns
the likely effect of the defendant’s conduct, but the risk in § 16(b) concerns the
defendant’s likely use of violent force as a means to an end.”). Instead, we
examine whether there is a high probability that physical force may be used “in
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the course of committing the offense.” 2 Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379. For
example, a DUI only involves the risk of resulting physical injury, not the risk of
the use of force in the actual commission of drunk driving. See Lucio-Lucio,
2003 WL 22436260, at *3-4. Nothing in Delgado-Enriquez contradicts this
“course of commission” approach, and the court in fact stated that it was utilizing
this test in its § 16(b) analysis. See Delgado-Enriquez, 188 F.3d at 595.
The Chapa-Garza court is also correct that we look at whether the risk of
force involves the risk of intentional, rather than accidental, physical force.
Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d at 927. “For a use of force to be ‘in the course of
committing the offense,’ we think it must be part of the course of action that the
offender commits - and thus it, too, must be actively committed . . . with at least
some degree of intent[.]” Lucio-Lucio,2003 WL 22436260, at *3 (finding DUI
2
This distinction between “risk of resulting physical injury” and “risk of
physical force in the commission of the crime” illustrates the impropriety of
importing analogies from the “career offender” guideline context into the
“aggravated felony” guideline context here. Because the career offender
guideline, § 4B1.2(a)(2), requires that there be a substantial risk of resulting
physical injury, this is significantly different from the §16(b) standard described
above. Therefore, we decline the government’s invitation to analogize to our §
4B1.2 cases. See Lucio-Lucio, 2003 WL 22436260, at * 4 (explaining that §
4B1.2 is “obviously broader than § 16(b)” and stating, “If we were to follow the
Government in concluding that § 16(b) reaches DWI offenses merely because they
involve a significant risk of harm to the person or property of others, we would
collapse the distinction between these two differently-worded definitions”);
Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 610-11 (describing the differences between the two
guideline definitions and explaining that the difference “counsels against
interpreting § 16(b) to be equivalent to section 4B1.2").
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conviction to lack requisite intent in the use of force); see also Jobson, 326 F.3d
at 373 (Ҥ 16(b) contemplates only intentional conduct and refers only to those
offenses in which there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will
intentionally employ physical force.”) (quotations omitted). Delgado-Enriquez
does not contradict this approach as the court did not rely on the risk of accidental
force in a home trespass. In fact, another Fifth Circuit case that post-dated both
Chapa-Garza and Delgado-Enriquez clarified that Delgado-Enriquez held that
criminal trespassing was a crime of violence because it “poses a substantial risk
that force will be used to enter the dwelling and subdue the occupants.”
Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d at 427. This concern is clearly regarding a risk of
the use of intentional force.
Therefore, Delgado-Enriquez was not weakened by Chapa-Garza, as both
cases consistently apply the following test for the application of §16(b): Is there
a substantial risk that the defendant will intentionally use force in the commission
of the crime? This is the same test that we utilized in Lucio-Lucio, 2003 WL
22436260, at *2-3. We agree with the Fifth Circuit in Delgado-Enriquez that
there is a substantial risk that a defendant will intentionally use physical force in
completing the crime of criminal trespass in a dwelling, whether the defendant
entered the dwelling unlawfully or remained there unlawfully.
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Even a case cited by Defendant supports this analysis. In Sareang Ye, 214
F.3d at 1134, although the Ninth Circuit found that vehicle burglary was not a
“crime of violence,” it explicitly distinguished its case from one that involved
residential burglary: “[T]he interiors of vehicles are generally visible from the
outside, and there is little risk that a thief will stumble upon an unexpected
occupant[.]” Although a residential burglary conviction clearly requires specific
intent while residential trespass does not, we do not find substantially lessened
risk of force inherent in a residential trespass. A defendant will often encounter
resistance either from occupants or structural barriers in “entering or remaining”
in someone’s dwelling unlawfully, regardless of the defendant’s intent in being
there. Therefore, there is still a substantial risk that a defendant will need to use
force against people or property to either gain entry or remain in a dwelling
unlawfully.
In conclusion, Defendant’s prior Colorado residential trespass conviction is
a “crime of violence” under § 16(b), and thus an “aggravated felony” under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s
sentencing decision.
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