F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 10 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
OLEG SVIRIDOV,
Petitioner,
v. No. 02-9574
JOHN ASHCROFT,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(BIA No. A75 710 013)
Beverly W. Oserow, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner.
Donald E. Keener, Deputy Director, Office of Immigration Litigation (Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director; and
Susan K. Houser, Attorney, on the brief), Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Oleg Sviridov is a native and citizen of Russia. He seeks review
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Sviridov entered the United States on June 20, 1997, on a visitor visa with
authorization to stay until June 19, 1998. He successfully sought an extension of
his departure date to December 19, 1998. Sviridov filed an application for asylum
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, on
June 29, 2000. He was placed into immigration proceedings in August 2000 and
charged with being subject to removal under INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the United States beyond the date authorized
without receiving permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”). 1 He renewed his application for asylum, and also sought withholding of
1
The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003, and its functions were
transferred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) within
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.
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removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. 2
After conducting a hearing, the IJ denied Sviridov’s application for asylum
because it was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), (D) (requiring an asylum
petitioner to file within one year of arrival in the United States, absent a showing
of changed circumstances “which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for
asylum” or extraordinary circumstances excusing the delay). The IJ denied his
application for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) because Sviridov had
failed to show that “there is a clear probability of persecution due to his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S. 407, 413, 430 (1984)). The IJ also denied relief under the
Convention Against Torture because he found Sviridov failed to establish that “it
is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to [Russia].” 8
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Sviridov appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which
issued a summary affirmance without an opinion, in accordance with 8 C.F.R.
2
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, was
implemented in the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-
821 (1998). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(1), .17. It permits withholding of removal
for an alien who establishes that “it is more likely than not that he or she would
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Id. § 208.16(c)(2).
-3-
§ 3.1(e)(4) (now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2003)). Sviridov seeks
review of that decision.
Sviridov was born on October 24, 1958, and grew up in Poland and Russia.
His father was Russian and his mother is ethnically Jewish, although she is
registered as Russian. Sviridov trained to become a marine navigator and worked
as a captain’s assistant on a ship from 1979 until 1985. He alleges that the FSB
(formerly the KGB) questioned him in 1985 about sailors under his command who
had jumped ship while his ship was in port in the United States and warned him
not to allow such conduct again. He further avers that he also lost his job in 1985
when he refused to join the Communist Party. Sviridov thereafter moved to
Krasnodar, Russia, where he worked in construction for two years.
He was able to obtain another seafaring job in 1987, on a ship which
conducted geological expeditions. He avers that in late 1995, he was again
questioned by the FSB after several crew members jumped ship and defected to
the United States. 3
He asserts that the FSB knew about their prior contact with
him in 1985, and they allegedly threatened him if he allowed any crew members
to jump ship again. Sviridov testified that, following this questioning, he used his
accumulated vacation days to take a long leave of absence in the city of
He stated in his affidavit that this questioning occurred in October 1995.
3
He testified at his hearing before the IJ that the interrogation occurred in 1994.
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Novorosisk, not far from Krasnodar, and when he returned, he was told that he
would be fired unless he voluntarily quit his job. He avers that the company told
him he was being dismissed for his political beliefs.
Sviridov claims he then traveled to Moscow and filed a request for job
reinstatement with the Geological Ministry, the entity which oversaw Sviridov’s
former company. He alleges that nobody at the Ministry would listen to him. He
then returned home to Novorosisk, where he and other current and former
employees of the geological company formed a group to protest the company’s
dismissal of people based upon their political beliefs or ethnic background. He
avers the group was “an informal and unregistered group that did not have an
official name.” Sviridov Aff. at 2, Admin. R. at 189. He further avers the group
also opposed the candidacy of the company’s president, Mikhail Gromov, for a
seat in the Duma, the Russian parliament. Sviridov testified that the group
published flyers, spoke to people, and held meetings in the city of Gelendzhik,
some twenty miles from Novorosisk, to protest the administration in the
Krasnodar region, which the group claimed persecuted minorities.
Sviridov claims that in 1997, based upon his association with this group, he
was detained in the street and taken to a police station, where he was warned to
stop his protest activities and leave the city. He asserts that on May 1, 1997, he
and the group held a meeting in front of the geological company, during which
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Sviridov gave a speech accusing Gromov of being a Communist and being
corrupt. He admitted in his testimony before the IJ that the group was required to
obtain a permit before holding a demonstration, but that they had not obtained a
permit prior to the May 1 demonstration. He states that the police broke up the
meeting, arrested him and other group members, and detained him for twenty
days, during which time he asserts he was beaten on two or three occasions. 4
He
says the police interrogated him and told him he had been warned to leave the city
and that they knew of his dealings with the FSB. He avers he was placed in a cell
with others whom the police knew would beat him. He claims that, following his
release, he went to a hospital and received treatment for a concussion and other
injuries. He claims that he then returned home to Novorosisk.
Sviridov testified that, following his detention by the police, he and his
second wife decided to leave Russia and go to the United States. 5
He testified
that when he first came to the United States, he intended to seek asylum. Id. at
102. However, in his asylum application, he explained his failure to file his
application within one year of arrival by stating that he “did not plan to remain
USA.” Id. at 251. He claims he cannot return safely to Russia because Gromov
4
Sviridov testified at his hearing that he was beaten three times. Admin. R.
at 111. In his affidavit, he stated that he was beaten twice. Id. at 191.
5
Sviridov left Russia with his second wife, from whom he is now apparently
divorced.
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holds a position in the Duma, had held a position on the Geological Ministry
committee, and is a personal friend of Konstatin Kondratenko, the governor of the
Krasnodar region. He avers that “Gromov has power that extends throughout
Russia and Mr. Sviridov is afraid that Gromov could pursue and cause harm to
him no matter where he would move in Russia.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 16. He
further claims that he would be unable to register to live somewhere else in
Russia without first cancelling his current registration, which would necessitate
contacting the local authorities whom, he claims, would harm him. He believes
that he would be unable to obtain employment in his field because of Gromov’s
influence over the Geological Ministry committee and the industry in general.
Sviridov claims that after he left Russia, his first wife, who lives in
Krasnodar, began receiving phone calls from the police asking for Sviridov’s
whereabouts, and he avers that his brother sent to him several summons from the
police ordering him (Sviridov) to report to police headquarters. He further states
that his mother, who remains in Russia, has told him over the phone not to return
to Russia.
When asked why he filed his asylum application more than one year after
entering the United States, he testified that he was not initially aware of the one-
year deadline. Furthermore, he testified that when he began the process of
seeking asylum in November 1998, he gave someone $1000 to file his application,
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but that person never did so. He then contacted a woman in Los Angeles in
February 1999, who required $4000 to file his application. He avers it took him
some length of time to amass the $4000 fee. The woman finally filed his
application in June 2000.
Sviridov argues (1) the BIA improperly issued a decision without opinion
by a single Board member, in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) and (e)(4); (2) the
BIA violated Sviridov’s due process rights by issuing a decision without opinion
which failed to explain its reasons for upholding the IJ’s decision; (3) the IJ made
clearly erroneous factual findings concerning Sviridov’s testimony; (4) the IJ
erred in finding Sviridov was not credible; (5) the IJ erred in finding Sviridov had
“shown no basis why he would be targeted for harm by the authorities”; and (6)
the IJ erred as a matter of fact and law in finding that Sviridov had failed to
establish eligibility for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and
relief under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. Pet’r’s Opening
Br. at 40. At oral argument, Sviridov’s counsel argued for the first time that,
based upon her interpretation of a recent First Circuit decision, Haoud v.
Ashcroft , 350 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003), we should remand this case to the BIA for
clarification of the reasons why it affirmed the IJ’s decision. Sviridov has also
filed, subsequent to oral argument, a motion for a stay of voluntary departure
-8-
pending disposition of this appeal. We deny his petition and affirm the BIA’s
decision. We also deny his motion for a stay of voluntary departure.
DISCUSSION
I. BIA Decision
Sviridov first argues the BIA failed to comply with its own regulations in
issuing the decision without an opinion by a single Board member. INS (now
USCIS) regulations provide that cases on appeal from IJ decisions are initially
screened under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e). Each case is assigned to a single member of the
BIA unless, pursuant to § 3.1(e)(6), the case meets the criteria for assignment to a
three-member panel of the BIA.
If assigned to a single Board member, that member affirms the IJ’s decision
without issuing an opinion “if the Board member determines that the result
reached in the decision under review was correct[,] that any errors in the decision
under review were harmless or nonmaterial,” and that either existing precedent
controls the decision, or the issues involved “are not so substantial that the case
warrants the issuance of a written opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4)(i) (now codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)). The regulation further states that the IJ’s decision
becomes the “final agency determination,” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4)(ii), and that the
Board member’s summary affirmance “shall not include further explanation or
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reasoning” and only “approves the result reached in the decision below.” Id. The
BIA in this case invoked this regulation in summarily affirming without an
opinion the IJ’s decision.
Sviridov argues the Board member erred in employing § 3.1(e)(4) because
“the result reached in the IJ’s decision was not correct, the errors in the decision
were not harmless and nonmaterial, and the factual and legal questions raised on
appeal are not so insubstantial that three-member review was not warranted.”
Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 21. 6
As explained more fully below in our review of the
IJ’s decision, we disagree with Sviridov’s argument, and hold that the Board
member properly affirmed the IJ’s decision under § 3.1(e)(4).
II. Due Process
Sviridov argues the use of § 3.1(e)(4) to affirm the IJ’s decision violates
his due process rights. We have recently rejected this challenge to the summary
affirmance procedure contained in § 3.1(a)(7), which is identical to § 3.1(e)(4).
See Yuk v. Ashcroft , No. 02-9546, 2004 WL 79095, at *9 (10th Cir. Jan. 20,
2004); see also Batalova v. Ashcroft , No. 02-9588, 2004 WL 103555, at *6 (10th
6
Sviridov argues that the BIA failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7),
which contains language identical to § 3.1(e)(4). It is clear from the BIA’s
decision in this case that the Board member invoked § 3.1(e)(4).
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Cir. Jan. 23, 2004) (rejecting a due process challenge to summary affirmance
under § 3.1(e)(5)). Sviridov’s due process argument therefore fails.
III. IJ’s Decision
By summarily affirming the IJ’s decision without an opinion, pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4), the BIA made the IJ’s decision the final agency determination
for purposes of appellate review. Sviridov argues the IJ made various factual and
legal errors in denying his application.
“The [IJ’s] findings of fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates
that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
Yuk , 2004 WL 79095, at *10 (further quotation omitted); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Put another way, we review the IJ’s decision under the
substantial evidence standard. We therefore uphold it if “‘supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.’” INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a)(4)). We do not “weigh the evidence or . . . evaluate the witnesses’
credibility.” Woldemeskel v. INS , 257 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001) (further
quotation omitted). However, the credibility determinations must be
“substantially reasonable.” Id. at 1192. Because an alien’s testimony alone may
support an application for withholding of removal or asylum, 8 C.F.R.
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§ 208.13(a), the IJ must give “specific, cogent reasons” for disbelieving it. See
Secaida-Rosales v. INS , 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (further quotation
omitted).
A. Testimony and documents
Sviridov argues the IJ made various clearly erroneous factual
determinations concerning Sviridov’s testimony and the documents he submitted
in support of his application. In support of his claim that he was severely beaten
by the police when he was detained for twenty days in May 1997, Sviridov
submitted a medical certificate which stated that Sviridov had been diagnosed
with a “brain concussion of the II degree, numerous injuries, bleeding.” Admin.
R. at 264. He also presented copies of the two summonses he claims he
eventually received, which directed him to appear before the “militsia
department.” Id. at 233-35. The IJ found as follows concerning those documents:
[T]he medical certificate and the summonses . . . seem unreliable to
this Court. Those documents were not authenticated as permitted
under 8 C.F.R. § 287.6. The Court has no way of knowing whether
these documents are authentic. There are no recognizable indicia of
authenticity on those documents, which the Court can point to.
The respondent indicated that the medical certificate had been
issued in order to cover all three incidences in which he had been
arrested, this seems very unlikely. The summonses were addressed to
the respondent’s ex-wife. The respondent was divorced in 1983 and
the summonses were issued more than 15 years after that date. It
seems extremely unlikely that they would have been issued and
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addressed to the respondent at an address which apparently he had
not lived at for 15 years.
The respondent claims that his “propiska” still shows him
residing at the same address with his ex-wife. However, I would
note that the respondent was involved in a maritime business. He
received authorization and passports from the government relating to
his status as a seaman. It would seem that his identity and
whereabouts could be easily discerned by any interested authorities.
The fact that the authorities would not make a reasonable
effort to find out his actual whereabouts, points out the lack of
interest which the authorities would have in the actual locating of the
respondent. The Court finds that the documents not only are
unreliable, but in and of themselves, they don’t support the grant of
relief which the respondent requests.
Oral Decision of the IJ at 11-12, Admin. R. at 52-53.
Given our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the IJ’s
determination that the records in question were not reliable and did not support
Sviridov’s claims is supported by substantial evidence and is substantially
reasonable. 7
Sviridov also argues the IJ mischaracterized his testimony concerning the
group to which he belonged. The IJ stated he “is concerned that the respondent
indicated that this organization has no name and when questioned about its
7
Aside from lacking clear indicia of authentication, one copy of the medical
certificate translation contained in the administrative record contains the date
“October 20, 1997,” some five months after the alleged beatings took place. The
month “October” is crossed out and “May” is handwritten over it, with the
additional handwritten note, “translator error.” Admin. R. at 264. Another copy
of the certificate at another place in the administrative record contains the date
“October 20, 1997” without any additional notation. Id. at 228.
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political theories, the respondent gave only a general description of its goals and
its philosophies.” Id. at 51. The IJ accurately described Sviridov’s testimony on
this point. Sviridov testified that the purpose of the group was to “speak against
[Gromov],” and against “Governor Konstantin [Kondratenko] which was against
our beliefs.” Id. at 123. When asked what his beliefs were, Sviridov responded
that he was simply against the “actions of” Kondratenko and Gromov, because
Gromov “constantly lied” and “cheated,” because he “promised the employees of
the company to pay their salaries at times and promised to give everybody
employment,” and because “many people, minorities, such as Armenians and Jews
who worked for the company, were fired.” Id. at 123-24. The IJ’s factual
findings have substantial support in the record.
B. Credibility determinations
The IJ found Sviridov’s testimony not credible on various points. We will
not disturb those factual findings provided they are substantially reasonable and
supported by specific, cogent reasons. The IJ found Sviridov’s claim that he was
completely unaware of the existence of labor unions, and that there were no such
unions in Russia, “incredible” in view of information in the State Department
Country Report for Russia indicating the existence of labor unions. The IJ drew
the inference from Sviridov’s unawareness that he “has not made even a minimal
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effort to research the available resources for opposing the alleged oppression of
his company.” Oral Decision at 10, Admin. R. at 51. Thus, the IJ reasonably
concluded that Sviridov’s claim that he organized and directed a worker’s protest
group which voiced concerns about his former company’s general personnel
policies, as opposed to simply complaints about having been fired, was not
credible.
The IJ also found that Sviridov:
apparently had no political activity prior to the age of 38 years old.
Although it is possible for him to generate political opinions at that
age, it does seem unlikely that they would spring full blown the way
the respondent claimed they have, and it also seems very unlikely
that the respondent would have had the ability to generate the
attendance that he claims at a demonstration, which he claims was
based on political ideas.
Id. at 51-52. That is an adequate explanation of why the IJ doubted Sviridov’s
claim that his creation and participation in the group was motivated by political
beliefs rather than a simple labor dispute with his former company.
C. Adequacy of Sviridov’s showing of future harm
Sviridov argues the IJ erred in finding that he had shown no basis why he
would be targeted for harm. Sviridov repeats here his claim that he had
adequately demonstrated that he held “political opinions” which put him at odds
with Gromov, who would persecute him should he return to Russia. As explained
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above, when asked about his political views and those of the group to which he
belonged, Sviridov could only respond in vague generalities, which were equally
indicative of mere disgruntlement with having been fired from his job. We cannot
say that the IJ’s conclusion that Sviridov failed to show that he was in danger
because of his political views is “contrary to what a reasonable factfinder would
have been compelled to conclude.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft , No. 02-9573, 2003 WL
23098615, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003).
D. Eligibility for withholding of removal and
relief under the Convention Against Torture
An applicant seeking withholding of removal bears the burden of showing
“a clear probability of persecution attributable to race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Tsevegmid , 336
F.3d at 1235 (further quotation omitted). Relief under the Convention Against
Torture requires a showing that it is more likely than not that Sviridov would be
tortured if returned to Russia. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Sviridov failed to
show a clear probability of persecution based upon his political views and
activities. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s decision denying Sviridov
relief under the Convention Against Torture.
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IV. Haoud Decision
Sviridov has belatedly raised an argument concerning his asylum claim
based upon the recent First Circuit decision in Haoud . Sviridov’s application for
asylum was untimely. The IJ rejected his claim for asylum because of that
untimeliness and because Sviridov failed to show “extraordinary circumstances”
excusing the untimely application, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). We and
numerous other circuits have held that, although we generally have jurisdiction to
review the denial of an asylum request, we lack jurisdiction to review a
determination on the timeliness of an asylum application:
Section 1158(a)(3) expressly provides that the courts do not have
“jurisdiction to review any determination” on whether the alien filed
his application within a year of entry or whether “changed
circumstances” exist “which materially affect the applicant’s
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the
delay in filing an application.”
Tsevegmid , 336 F.3d at 1235 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)).
Sivirdov argues, citing Haoud , that because the BIA member summarily
affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion or explanation of its reasons, we
cannot tell whether the BIA affirmed on an unreviewable basis (untimeliness) or
on a reviewable basis (the merits of his asylum application). If in fact the BIA
affirmed on a reviewable basis, Sviridov would be deprived of that review if we
conclude that the existence of an additional, unreviewable basis deprives us of
jurisdiction.
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In Haoud , the applicant filed an untimely petition for asylum. The IJ
denied his application, finding that the applicant “failed to establish changed
circumstances to excuse that untimeliness.” Haoud , 350 F.3d at 203. The IJ also,
however, held in the alternative that “Haoud’s application failed to demonstrate
either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a
reasonable possibility that he would suffer harm in Algeria.” Id. Shortly after the
IJ rendered his decision denying Haoud’s asylum application, the BIA decided
another case, In re Amine Touarsi , A78-161-736 (BIA Dec. 28, 2000), involving a
man in essentially the identical situation as Haoud. “Although the IJ denied
Touarsi’s asylum application, the Board on appeal reversed upon concluding that
Touarsi had ‘a well-founded fear of persecution in Algeria based on imputed
political opinion.’” Haoud , 350 F.3d at 204.
The First Circuit first observed that the affirmance without opinion of the
IJ decision in that situation “gives us no guidance as to whether the Board
affirmed the IJ’s decision on a non-reviewable basis, i.e. untimeliness, or a
reviewable basis, i.e. the merits of Haoud’s asylum claim.” Id. at 206. After
noting that when the BIA affirms without opinion or explanation, “‘a Court of
Appeals must then review the decision of the IJ,’” id. at 207 (quoting Albathani v.
INS , 318 F.3d 365, 373 (1st Cir. 2003)), the court went on to state that that
“approach is inapposite here because the IJ never had the opportunity to consider
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Touarsi , which was rendered following the IJ’s decision.” Id. Thus, the court
concluded that “[a]s Touarsi bears strongly on Haoud’s asylum application, an
AWO affirming an IJ’s decision that never considered Touarsi fails to meet th[e]
mandate [that the Board give a reasoned administrative decision].” Id. at 208.
Our case is distinguishable from Haoud . First, the IJ in this case did not
rule in the alternative on the merits of Sviridov’s asylum claim. Rather, the IJ
clearly denied the asylum application because it was untimely and Sviridov failed
to show extraordinary circumstances excusing that untimeliness. The IJ plainly
did not reach the merits of the asylum application. Second, as the First Circuit
acknowledged, when the Board affirms without an opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(e)(4), as it did here, the IJ’s decision becomes the final agency decision and
that is what we review. See Yuk , 2004 WL 79095, at **7-8. There is no reason
in this case, as there may have been in Haoud , that such review is “inapposite.”
Accordingly, looking directly at the IJ’s decision, the IJ clearly denied
Sviridov’s asylum application on the exclusive ground of untimeliness. We have
no jurisdiction to review that decision. We do not hold that there could never be
a situation where a summary affirmance might leave us in doubt as to whether the
agency’s decision was on a reviewable or an unreviewable basis. That is not the
situation, however, on the particular facts of this case.
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V. Stay of Voluntary Departure
Finally, Sviridov has moved for a stay of voluntary departure. When the
BIA, on October 17, 2002, affirmed the IJ’s decision denying Sviridov’s
application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
Against Torture, the Board granted Sviridov permission to voluntarily depart the
United States “within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond
that time as may be granted by the district director [of the INS].” Order, Admin.
R. at 2. No extension was granted. The period of time for Sviridov to voluntarily
depart has, therefore, long ago expired.
Sviridov moves for “a stay of voluntary departure nunc pro tunc to the date
of this motion, which stay shall not expire until the issuance of the final mandate
in this petition for review.” Pet’r’s Mot. for Nunc Pro Tunc Stay of Voluntary
Departure at 1. We decline to do so. He gives no explanation for failing to file
his motion earlier, and cites no binding authority permitting a nunc pro tunc order
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in these circumstances. 8
We are not aware of any such authority. As we have
stated:
The Latin phrase [ nunc pro tunc ] is merely descriptive of the
inherent power of the court to make its records speak the truth—to
record that which was actually done, but omitted to be recorded. It is
no warrant for the entry of an order to record that which was omitted
to be done. There was no authority for a nunc pro tunc order to show
the timely filing of a claim which was not in fact timely.
W.F. Sebel Co. v. Hessee (In re Fractman) , 214 F.2d 459, 462 (10th Cir. 1954)
(citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review and affirm the
BIA and IJ’s decision denying Sviridov withholding of removal and relief under
the Convention Against Torture. We deny his motion for a stay of voluntary
removal.
8
He relies on two recent cases from other circuits, El Himri v. Ashcroft,
344 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2003), and Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325 (6th Cir.
2003) to argue we have the equitable power to grant such a stay. In both those
cases, the applicant filed a motion for a stay of voluntary departure before the
period for voluntary departure had expired. See El Himri, 344 F.3d at 1263 n.2;
Nwakanma, 352 F.3d at 327. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated it did
“not decide the issue of whether this court may stay the voluntary departure time
period if the motion for stay of voluntary departure is filed after expiration of the
voluntary departure time period.” El Himri, 344 F.3d at 1263 n.2.
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