F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 20, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES T. FISHER,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 04-6400
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
(D.C. No. CIV-04-1647-L)
JOHN WHETSEL,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
James T. Fisher, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for
habeas corpus, and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). We deny his
request for a COA, deny his request to proceed IFP, and dismiss his appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Fisher was convicted of first-degree murder in Oklahoma County
District Court and sentenced to death in September 1983. In March 2002, we
granted Mr. Fisher habeas corpus relief because his trial counsel was so “grossly
inept” that his representation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d
1283, 1298 (10th Cir. 2002). We granted the writ of habeas corpus subject to the
condition that the State of Oklahoma retry Mr. Fisher within a reasonable time “or
be subject to further federal proceedings to consider his release.” Id. at 1311.
In January 2004, the State appointed Mr. Fisher new counsel. His second
trial was scheduled to begin on December 6, 2004. On December 3, 2004, Mr.
Fisher filed in the federal district court an Emergency Motion and Petition in
Support for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Emergency Stay of State
Court Proceedings. The basis for his motion and request for stay was that he was
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel in preparation for the retrial.
The district court dismissed the petition upon filing under the abstention
doctrine delineated by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). Mr. Fisher then filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) to alter or amend the judgment and sought a COA. The district court denied
the motion to alter or amend the judgment and denied a COA. Mr. Fisher now
seeks a COA so he may appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. §
2254 petition. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and deny his
requests for a COA and IFP status.
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II. DISCUSSION
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. “The COA determination under
§ 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Id. at 336. “This threshold inquiry does not require
full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.
In fact, the statute forbids it.” Id. While Mr. Fisher is not required to prove the
merits of his case in applying for a COA, he must nevertheless demonstrate
“something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith
on his or her part.” Id. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
With these principles in mind, we have carefully reviewed the record of
these proceedings. As the district court noted, it has long been the policy of the
federal courts not to interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions, except in
narrow circumstances where irreparable harm is demonstrated. See Younger, 401
U.S. at 43-44.
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In determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate, a court
considers whether: (1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate
forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the
state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which
traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately
articulated state policies.
Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215
(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d
1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999)). If these three conditions are met, Younger
abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district
court is required to abstain. See Seneca-Cayuga of Okla. v. Okla. ex. rel.
Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989).
We agree with the district court’s assessment of Mr. Fisher’s claim under
the Younger abstention doctrine. It is undisputed that when the district court
denied habeas relief and the emergency stay motion in December 2004, the
scheduled trial was an ongoing criminal prosecution. The record reflects no
reason to believe otherwise. Mr. Fisher states that he was convicted at retrial in
April 2005. Because he may present a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
in a direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, he has an adequate
state forum in which to adjudicate his federal claims. Oklahoma’s important
interest in enforcing its criminal laws through proceedings in its state courts
remains axiomatic. Finally, Mr. Fisher did not allege any exception to the
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Younger doctrine that would permit the federal court to intervene, such as bad
faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances. See Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982) (applying the
Younger doctrine when these three conditions are met “so long as there is no
showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that
would make abstention inappropriate”).
III. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Mr. Fisher’s brief, the record, and the applicable law, we
conclude Mr. Fisher has raised no issues that are debatable or adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. We therefore
DENY a COA, DENY as moot his request to proceed IFP, and DISMISS his
appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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