F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 31, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
NAOMI OLSEN; TOM OLSEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. Nos. 03-2230 & 03-2238
(D.C. No. CIV-01-762 PJK/DJS)
WILLIAM AEBERSOLD, individually (D. N.M.)
and doing business as Gable
Properties; MIKE MORGAN, doing
business as agent/employee/other for
William Aebersold; FARMERS
INSURANCE GROUP; ROBERT
BABCOCK, individually and as an
agent/employee/other and/or business
partner and/or associate of Ann Kantor
and/or Albert O. Engel; ANN
KANTOR, individually and as an
agent/employee/other and/or business
partner and/or associate of Robert
Babcock and/or Albert O. Engel;
ALBERT ENGEL, individually and as
an agent/employee/other and/or
business partner and/or associate of
Robert Babcock and/or Ann Kantor,
doing business as Triple A Machine
Shop, Inc., a California corporation,
Defendants,
and
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, ANDERSON , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs Naomi Olsen and Tom Olsen, proceeding pro se, challenge the
district court’s order granting the motion for attorney fees filed by Fire Insurance
Exchange, the sole appellee in this action. 1
The district court awarded
defendant-appellee $2,721.50 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We affirm.
Background
Plaintiffs have filed several lawsuits arising from the rental of a home in
California that was contaminated with mold and fungus. In this case, they sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated their civil rights.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
Even though plaintiffs filed two notices of appeal, resulting in two
appellate case numbers, their appeal is from only one district court judgment.
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The district court afforded plaintiff’s complaint a liberal construction, and
dismissed the case on the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a federal claim on
which relief may be granted. In a prior appeal, a panel of this court determined
that plaintiffs’ claims were too insubstantial to invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal court because plaintiffs “did not identify a federal right that defendants
invaded, nor did they allege facts showing that defendants acted under color of
state law.” Olsen v. Aebersold , 71 Fed. Appx. 7, 9 (10th Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, the case was remanded with directions for the district court to
dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 10. The
district court was also directed to reconsider the attorney-fee award on remand,
specifically, whether the dismissal on the merits for lack of jurisdiction divested
the federal district court of jurisdiction to award attorney fees to defendant. Id.
On remand, the district court determined that federal subject-matter
jurisdiction lies to award attorney fees under § 1988, even though jurisdiction
over the merits is lacking. The court then found plaintiffs’ claims meritless under
the applicable standard, and awarded attorney fees to defendant.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that they did not receive defendant’s motion for
attorney fees, and that the attorney-fee award should be vacated because they
were acting in good faith when they filed the underlying lawsuit.
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Motion to Dismiss
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The grounds for the
motion pertain to the merits of the appeal, rather than to appellate jurisdiction or
any ground listed in 10th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(1) (listing types of dispositive motions a
party may file). Consequently, the motion to dismiss is denied.
Jurisdiction
After the remand in this case and after the district court issued its
post-remand order awarding defendant its attorney fees, this court resolved the
jurisdictional issue presented here. In United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair,
Inc. , 389 F.3d 1038, 1056-58 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied , 125 S. Ct. 2964
(2005), this court held that a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a
request for attorney fees even in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction over
the underlying claim. Accordingly, we proceed to the merits.
Merits
“We review both the court’s decision to award attorney’s fees and the
reasonableness of the amount awarded for an abuse of discretion.” Houston v.
Norton , 215 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions, including the
interpretation of statutes, de novo. Id. In this case, however, plaintiffs have not
challenged the amount awarded, either in the district court or this court, so we
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review only the decision to award attorney fees. See Wilburn v. Mid-South Health
Dev., Inc. , 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating arguments not presented
to district court generally will not be considered on appeal); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating failure to raise
an issue in opening brief waives the issue).
A prevailing party in a civil rights suit may recover attorney fees. 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). “[A] prevailing defendant in a civil rights action may recover
attorney fees only if the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or
embarrass the defendant.” Mitchell v. City of Moore , 218 F.3d 1190, 1203 (10th
Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Although this is a demanding standard, id. , and
it is rare for attorney fees to be assessed against a pro se plaintiff in a § 1983
action, a district court has discretion to do so, see Houston , 215 F.3d at 1174.
“Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation
of judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations –
filing fees and attorney’s fees – that deter other litigants from filing frivolous
petitions.” In re Anderson , 511 U.S. 364, 365 (1994) (quoting In re Sindram , 498
U.S. 177, 179-80 (1991)). Attorney fees are not available against a pro se litigant
unless the action is “meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without
foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe , 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980).
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The district court held that the circumstances of this case met the
demanding standard for imposing attorney fees on a pro se civil rights plaintiff.
The court found that plaintiffs had filed several federal lawsuits, all of which
involved jurisdictional challenges. See R. doc. 48, at 6 & n.1. The court also
found that plaintiffs had failed to consider the necessary element of federal
jurisdiction in this case. Indeed, the court had previously identified deficiencies
in the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which requires a party to include in
his complaint a “statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction
depends.” Plaintiffs maintain that they acted in good faith, but they offer no
argument or authority to refute the district court’s findings. We see no error in
the district court’s determination that plaintiffs’ claims of federal jurisdiction
were sufficiently groundless or without foundation to be meritless under the
standards set forth above. Consequently, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant its attorney fees. 2
2
We decline to reverse the district court’s award of attorney fees on the
ground that plaintiffs now claim that they did not receive the motion for attorney
fees. Defendant filed its attorney-fee motion on the same date it filed a motion
for costs. R. docs. 40, 41, 42, & 43. Plaintiffs claim they received neither
motion, yet they admit they reviewed the costs motion. Moreover, they made no
attempt to rectify this alleged error in the district court.
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Defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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