F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 26, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-8025
JOEL PEREZ-AGUIRRE, (D.C. Civil No. 03-CV-215-B)
(D.C. Crim. No. 01-CR-038-B)
Defendant-Appellant. (D.Wyo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Joel Perez-Aguirre, appearing pro se, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm. **
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
**
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
(continued...)
Perez-Aguirre was charged by criminal complaint with, and subsequently
indicted for, illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Perez-Aguirre pled guilty to the charged offense and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of seventy-eight months. Following the completion of a direct
appeal unsuccessfully challenging his sentence, Perez-Aguirre, appearing pro se,
filed a § 2255 motion asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district
court denied Perez-Aguirre’s motion, but granted Perez-Aguirre a certificate of
appealability.
“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of
fact and law, which we review de novo.” United States v. Holder, 410 F.3d 651,
654 (10th Cir. 2005). Any underlying factual findings made by the district court
are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Blackwell, 127 F.3d 947, 955 (10th
Cir. 1997). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
petitioner must show that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that he was prejudiced thereby.” Holder, 410 F.3d at 654
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
The basis for Perez-Aguirre’s claim of ineffective assistance is that his
counsel failed to inform the district court that Perez-Aguirre wished to withdraw
his guilty plea. In support of that claim, Perez-Aguirre alleged that during his
**
(...continued)
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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sentencing hearing he attempted, through his interpreter, to inform the district
court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. However, Perez-Aguirre
alleged, his interpreter was not able to finish translating his request before being
interrupted by the district court, and his trial counsel failed to inform the district
court of this fact.
In addressing Perez-Aguirre’s claim, the district court made several
relevant factual findings. First, the district court found that Perez-Aguirre “gave
no indication to the Court or to his counsel that he desired to abort the sentencing
proceedings and withdraw his plea,” and that Perez-Aguirre indeed “expressed a
desire to proceed with the guilty plea and sentencing.” ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 8, at 8.
The district court further found “that the sentencing proceeding went on for
several minutes after [the district court] interrupted the interpreter,” yet Perez-
Aguirre failed to tell his trial counsel “that something was wrong.” Id. Lastly,
the district court found no evidence that Perez-Aguirre “ever told his attorney that
he did not want to go through with the sentencing, even after its conclusion.” Id.
Thus, the district court concluded there was no basis for finding that Perez-
Aguirre’s counsel “was even aware that anything was amiss.” Id. Based upon
these findings, the district court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was
not deficient.
After carefully examining the record on appeal, we agree with the district
court’s findings and conclusions. As outlined by the district court, there is simply
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no evidence to support Perez-Aguirre’s assertion that he attempted to withdraw
his guilty plea, nor is there any evidence that Perez-Aguirre’s counsel knew or
should have known that Perez-Aguirre was interested in withdrawing his plea. In
turn, there is no basis for concluding that trial counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Perez-Aguirre’s motion
to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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