FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
February 28, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant,
v. Nos. 03-1515, 03-1522, 03-1523,
04-1000, 04-1538, 04-1540
MIKE LAVALLEE, ROD SCHULTZ,
and ROBERT VERBICKAS,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 00-CR-481-D)
Brian K. Holland, Holland & Pagliuca, P.C., Denver, Colorado, appearing for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Verbickas.
Richard A. Hostetler, Law Office of Richard A. Hostetler, Denver, Colorado,
appearing for Appellant/Cross-Appellee LaVallee.
Neil McFarlane, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Schultz.
Karl N. Gellert, Attorney (R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General,
Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Jessica Dunsay
Silver, Attorney, with him on the briefs), United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, appearing for Appellee/Cross-Appellant United States.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
This appeal relates to a three-year investigation of inmate abuse at the
United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“USP-Florence”), that resulted
in charges against ten former correctional officers for conspiracy and deprivation
of inmates’ constitutional rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
Following a jury trial, two correctional officers, Michael LaVallee and Rod
Schultz, were found guilty of both offenses, and Robert Verbickas was found
guilty of the substantive deprivation charge. All three men (collectively,
“Appellants”) appeal both their convictions and sentences. The Government
cross-appeals their sentences. Mr. Schultz also appeals the District Court’s denial
of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and the
Government’s suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. We
have consolidated all five cases for disposition on appeal. We take jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1997, the Government began investigating allegations of the
widespread abuse of prisoners and the falsification of records to cover up that
abuse at USP-Florence. As a result of the investigation, eight Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) correctional officers were indicted and two were charged by information.
Three officers—Dennis Britt, Charlotte Gutierrez, and Kenneth Mitchell—pleaded
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guilty and cooperated with the Government by providing testimony at trial.
The seven remaining defendants, including Appellants, were charged in a
ten-count superceding indictment on February 6, 2001. All seven were named in
Count I, which alleged a vast conspiracy of abuse and cover-up, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 241. The remaining nine counts charged certain defendants with
excessive force against individually named inmates in violation of the inmates’
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See 18
U.S.C. § 242.
At trial, the Government sought to establish a vast conspiracy to abuse
inmates. Throughout trial, the Government maintained a “green light” theory in
which it alleged that Captain Terry Hines had given the defendants the “green
light to take care of business” with certain inmates in the Special Housing Unit 1
(“SHU”) who were aggressive toward the prison staff. Several correctional
officers testified that they understood this to mean that they were to abuse
inmates to let them know that aggression against prison staff would not be
tolerated. Although not all supervisors were tolerant of the wrongful conduct,
some supervisors were.
Standard procedure at the SHU for any use of force required the officers to
document the incident through memoranda. Additionally, any time there was a
1
The SHU is the prison unit that prisoners were sent to if they had
disciplinary problems or were otherwise being punished through administrative
segregation.
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planned use of force, the incident was generally videotaped. The tapes were
designed to ensure that the officers acted in accordance with the BOP’s “Use of
Force Policy.”
Accordingly, in support of its conspiracy theory under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the
Government presented a case at trial that detailed the officers’ agreements to
provide false reports and fabricate injuries to themselves when they violated the
BOP’s Use of Force Policy by beating inmates unjustifiably. They presented
testimony that several officers created an atmosphere that not only tolerated abuse
of inmates, but encouraged it. The Government maintained that, in addition to
conspiring to do so, the officers in fact violated inmates’ civil rights through
beatings and assaults. The facts of the incidents giving rise to the Appellants’
assault convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 are as follows.
A. The Howard Lane Assault
Testimony at trial demonstrated that Howard Lane, a USP-Florence
prisoner, wrote several letters containing sexually explicit remarks to a female
USP-Florence officer. After the discovery of the letters, Mr. Verbickas escorted
Mr. Lane to Captain Hines’s office, where the Captain told Mr. Verbickas and Mr.
Britt to “take this piece of shit down to SHU and give him a treatment.” Mr.
Verbickas and Mr. Britt applied restraints to Mr. Lane’s wrists and took him to
the SHU. As he was led to the SHU, Mr. Lane threatened the officers and
struggled against the restraints. When the trio arrived at the SHU, Ms. Gutierrez
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opened a cell door as the other officers escorted Mr. Lane inside. Mr. Britt
returned to the officers’ station.
Ms. Gutierrez testified that she saw Mr. Verbickas punch Mr. Lane while
he was standing against the wall of the cell, his hands still restrained behind his
back. She further stated that Mr. Verbickas then placed him on the floor and that
she kicked him in the ribs so as to avoid leaving visible injuries and the
concomitant need to file an incident report. Mr. Verbickas then grabbed Mr. Lane
by his collar and the seat of his pants, lifted him waist high, and dropped him on
his face. Blood oozed from Mr. Lane’s lip. Finally, Mr. Verbickas threw Mr.
Lane up against the wall, leaving a blood stain.
Because Mr. Lane suffered visible facial injuries as a result of the beating,
the officers discussed how they would falsify their incident reports to avoid an
investigation. The reports ultimately filed with USP-Florence stated that Mr.
Lane kicked both Mr. Verbickas and Ms. Gutierrez, and Mr. Lane threw himself
up against the wall. To support this version of events, Ms. Gutierrez testified that
she inflicted an injury on herself.
B. The Pedro Castillo Assault
Pedro Castillo, another inmate in the SHU, was an orderly in that unit and
responsible for cleaning as directed by the officers. During an argument with Ms.
Gutierrez on the morning of April 5, 1996, Mr. Castillo threw a mop and bucket
of water onto the floor. Because of this, Mr. Castillo lost his job as an orderly as
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well as the freedom associated with the job; he was forced to return to 23-hour
lockdown.
The Government presented evidence at trial that later that day, several
officers met to discuss how they would further punish Mr. Castillo for his
behavior that morning. According to the Government, the officers resolved to
concoct a story that Mr. Castillo was cutting himself—he was a known self-
mutilator—which would require them to perform a forced-cell move. The officers
assigned roles to each other in the ensuing assault. Because a video camera was
perched outside Mr. Castillo’s cell, Mr. Schultz’s role in the assault was to knock
the camera over so that it would not record the officers entering the cell. After
doing so, several officers entered the cell, pulled Mr. Castillo off his top bunk,
put him on the floor, and restrained him with handcuffs. Additional testimony
demonstrated that the officers then took Mr. Castillo to a holding cell where Mr.
Schultz and Mr. LaVallee each struck him two or three times in the back with
their fists while Mr. Mitchell held Mr. Castillo against the wall. Mr. Mitchell
then released Mr. Castillo and walked back to the officers’ station approximately
twenty feet away; he could hear the sound of the blows as the officers continued
to beat Mr. Castillo. Ms. Gutierrez then entered the cell and Mr. LaVallee told
her to kick Mr. Castillo, which she did. After the assault, Mr. LaVallee told Ms.
Gutierrez that they had beaten Mr. Castillo on her behalf.
Following the incident, the officers again fabricated false reports to justify
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the forced-cell move. The officers reported that Mr. Castillo had been cutting
himself and that when the officers entered the cell to subdue him, Mr. Schultz
slipped and knocked down the camera. The reports also stated that once the
officers were inside the cell, Mr. Castillo punched one of them in the head. None
of the reports mentioned that Mr. Castillo was beaten.
Mr. Verbickas was charged with one count of conspiracy to violate
inmates’ civil rights and three substantive assault counts regarding individual
inmates. Mr. Schultz and Mr. LaVallee were also charged with conspiracy.
Additionally, Mr. Schultz was charged with three substantive assault counts and
Mr. LaVallee was charged with four. Following approximately eight weeks of
testimony and two weeks of jury deliberations, Mr. Verbickas was convicted on
one count of using excessive force against Mr. Lane and was sentenced to 30
months’ imprisonment. Both Mr. Schultz and Mr. LaVallee were convicted on
the conspiracy charge and the substantive assault charge involving Mr. Castillo.
The District Court sentenced them to 41 months’ imprisonment. This appeal
followed. 2
In Mr. Verbickas’s opening brief, he raises four issues that he claims
warrant reversal of his conviction. Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz incorporated
these claims by reference into their briefs on appeal. We will therefore address
2
The four remaining defendants—James Bond, Brent Gall, David Pruyne,
and Ken Shatto—were acquitted on all counts and, accordingly, are not parties to
these appeals.
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these issues first, as they apply to all the Appellants. We will then address Mr.
LaVallee’s and Mr. Schultz’s additional claims of error in their convictions.
Finally, we will address all sentencing issues including the Appellants’ claimed
errors under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) and the
Government’s cross-appeal contesting the District Court’s failure to apply an
enhancement for obstruction of justice and its discretionary decision to depart
downward from the applicable Guidelines range.
III. COMMON ISSUES
A. Bureau of Prisons Attorney on Prosecution Team
Jenifer Grundy served as a supervisory attorney for the BOP at USP-
Florence from November 1992 to April 2002. In that position, she was
responsible for providing legal services to the facility as well as to correctional
officers who were accused by inmates of constitutional violations in Bivens
actions. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (providing legal representation to federal
employees in actions arising out of performance of their official duties). When an
officer would make a request for representation, Ms. Grundy would take the
officer’s statement and then submit it to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). The
DOJ would determine whether representation was warranted.
Prior to trial, several of the defendants in this case had Bivens actions filed
against them. Relevant to this case, Mr. LaVallee, Mr. Schultz, and David Pruyne
were each named in several actions. According to the Appellants, some of the
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defendants contacted Ms. Grundy to obtain DOJ representation in the actions
against them.
Later, in connection with the instant case, Ms. Grundy contacted Mr.
Pruyne and another of the acquitted defendants, Brent Gall, and requested that
they speak with DOJ attorney Mark Blumberg—one of the Government’s
prosecutors in this case—and an FBI agent. She did not represent either Mr.
Pruyne or Mr. Gall at their interviews. During the interviews, Mr. Pruyne and
Mr. Gall were allegedly advised that they were the targets of an investigation
involving the abuse of inmates. 3
On April 21, 2003, ten days into trial, it became apparent to the defendants,
including Messrs. LaVallee, Schultz, and Verbickas, that Ms. Grundy was acting
with the Government as part of the prosecution against them. They filed a joint
motion to disqualify her, 4 alleging violations of Rules 1.9, 1.11 and 1.6(a) of the
3
For various reasons, the substance of these interviews later became the
subject of two motions to suppress. The District Court denied Mr. Pruyne’s
motion to suppress as moot after Mr. Pruyne’s counsel withdrew it. The District
Court denied Mr. Gall’s motion to suppress because, inter alia, there was no
evidence that Mr. Gall believed that he had established an attorney-client
relationship with Ms. Grundy.
4
If this motion was untimely, our review would be severely limited, and
subject only to plain error review. United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1195
n.5 (10th Cir. 2004). It is not clear, however, that the facts giving rise to the
motion to disqualify were known to the defendants before it was made. Thus, we
decline to apply plain error analysis to this claim.
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Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. 5 Counsel for the Government responded
that Ms. Grundy’s only role in the case was to “assist and manage witnesses and
just general management of the trial.” The Government further explained that she
had not been hired by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, nor was she acting as a special
assistant to the U.S. Attorney. The defendants presented evidence, however, that
Ms. Grundy was acting as a “Special AUSA” and was participating in witness
5
Rule 1.9 states: “A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.”
Rule 1.11(b), (e), which relate to successive government and private employment,
provide:
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having
information that the lawyer knows is confidential government
information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public
officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the
information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer
is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no
part of the fee therefrom.
...
(e) As used in this Rule, the Term "confidential government
information" means information which has been obtained under
governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the
government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has
a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available
to the public.
Under Rule 1.6(a), “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.”
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interviews. Before ruling on the motion for disqualification, the District Court
ordered the Government to submit a written response and then denied the motion
to disqualify as “utterly without merit.”
The Appellants claim that Ms. Grundy’s participation on the prosecution
team violated their constitutional right to a fair trial. Indeed, “[a] fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955). “The right to due process and a fair trial include the essential
element that there is no unfair advantage to the prosecution by reason of a prior
professional relationship between a member of its staff and a criminal defendant
concerning the same or closely related matter.” State v. Boyd, 560 S.W.2d 296,
298–99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (quotation omitted). “[D]ue process is violated
when an attorney represents a client and then participates in the prosecution of
that client with respect to the same matter.” United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d
559, 566 (4th Cir. 1985).
In order to determine whether disqualification of counsel is warranted
because of prior representation, we ordinarily undertake a three-part inquiry in
which we ask whether “(1) an actual attorney-client relationship existed between
the moving party and the opposing counsel; (2) the present litigation involves a
matter that is substantially related to the subject of the movant’s prior
representation; and (3) the interests of the opposing counsel’s present client are
materially adverse to the movant.” United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1196
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(10th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). If the moving party makes a
non-frivolous allegation that he has had an attorney-client relationship in a
substantially related matter, a district court must investigate the allegation further
through an evidentiary hearing before denying a motion to disqualify. Id. Failure
to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, the District Court concluded that the motion to disqualify Ms.
Grundy for violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct was
frivolous. Indeed, it explicitly stated that the motion was “utterly without merit.”
On appeal, Mssrs. LaVallee and Schultz proffer no argument to suggest that the
District Court erred in concluding that Ms. Grundy violated the rules with respect
to any former relationship she may have had with them. The only reference to a
relationship between the Appellants and Ms. Grundy is the following:
[S]o-called “Bivens” violations [were filed] against the Defendants
and other correctional officers. LaVallee, Schultz and Bond . . . were
named as Defendants in Turner. Pruyne was named as a defendant in
Bryant, Collins, and Verdecia. Pruyne and other Defendants sought
legal representation from the . . . DOJ . . . . Grundy represented
Pruyne and these Defendants regarding their requests for DOJ
representation. She entered into an attorney-client relationship with
Defendants and gathered relevant information regarding their
requests to be afforded DOJ legal representation in these civil
actions.
Based on this conclusory argument, we cannot conclude that District Court erred
in finding Mr. LaVallee’s and Mr. Schultz’s argument frivolous. In fact, neither
Appellant ever averred that he actually spoke with Ms. Grundy. At the District
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Court level, the factual basis for Mr. Schultz’s claim—which the District Court
rejected—amounted to an assertion that “[u]pon information and belief statements
were given to Ms. Grundy and or a representative of the U.S. Government.” We
therefore find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion on this
point.
Nonetheless, the Appellants argue that the court erred because it failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of Ms. Grundy’s attorney-
client relationship with Mr. Pruyne and Mr. Gall. Although the record shows that
the court had already determined that no attorney-client relationship existed with
respect to Mr. Gall, the same cannot be said with respect to Mr. Pruyne. Even so,
we need not decide whether the District Court erred in failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing. Both Mr. Gall and Mr. Pruyne were acquitted of the charges
against them and therefore are not parties to this appeal.
The remaining issue, then, is whether the three Appellants were denied a
fair trial because Ms. Grundy purportedly obtained privileged information through
her alleged prior representation of the Appellants’ codefendants Messrs. Gall and
Pruyne such that the prosecution had an unfair advantage in obtaining the
Appellants’ convictions. The Fourth Circuit confronted similar circumstances in
United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559.
Schell involved the indictment of thirty-nine individuals for numerous
crimes, including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21
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U.S.C. § 846. During the investigation of the crimes, three individuals under
investigation sought representation from an attorney, David Jividen. Id. at
562–63. Mr. Jividen represented them when they appeared before the third grand
jury in the matter. Id. at 562. Several months later, Mr. Jividen became
employed as an Assistant United States Attorney in the district in which the
appellants were later indicted. Id. at 562. In his role as a U.S. Attorney, he
appeared before the fourth grand jury leading up to the indictments. Id. at 563.
After the grand jury returned its indictment, Mr. Jividen no longer participated in
the prosecution of his former clients nor participated in any proceeding in which
his former clients were witnesses or potential witnesses. Id. at 564. All three of
his clients, along with thirty-five coconspirators, were convicted. Id.
On appeal, two of Mr. Jividen’s former clients and two of their
coconspirators appealed their convictions, arguing that Mr. Jividen’s appearance
before the fourth grand jury violated their due process rights and was per se
prejudicial. Id. at 564–65. The Fourth Circuit stated:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is a sacred one.
In that relationship, the client must be secure in the knowledge that
any information he reveals to counsel will remain confidential. The
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is severely
compromised, if not destroyed, when, after representing a client, a
lawyer joins in the criminal prosecution of that client with respect to
the identical matter about which the attorney originally counseled the
client. Such switching of sides is fundamentally unfair and
inherently prejudicial. Without question, the client’s right to a fair
trial, secured by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, is compromised under these circumstances.
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Id. at 565 (emphasis omitted). It therefore reversed the convictions of Mr.
Jividen’s former clients. Id. at 566. In so concluding, however, the court refused
to find constitutional error with respect to the appellants who had established no
attorney-client relationship with Mr. Jividen and who had not demonstrated that
Mr. Jividen’s former clients had imparted to him confidential information
regarding them. Id. at 566.
Similarly, in McFarlan v. District Court, the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that a prosecutor is not automatically disqualified from prosecuting an
accused because of a prior attorney-client relationship with a codefendant of the
accused. 718 P.2d 247, 250 (Colo. 1986) (listing cases). It identified two factors
to consider in determining whether to disqualify a prosecutor in such a case: (1)
whether the accused had an attorney-client relationship with the prosecutor; and
(2) whether there is any evidence that the prosecutor actually received
confidential information from or about the accused. Id.
Here, the Appellants make only conclusory allegations that they had an
attorney-client relationship with Ms. Grundy. There is no evidence that Mr.
Pruyne or any defendant imparted confidential information to Ms. Grundy
regarding the Appellants. Mr. Pruyne applied for and obtained DOJ
representation for the three Bivens actions filed against him prior to the
prosecution of the instant case. There is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Pruyne
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communicated confidential information to Ms. Grundy on any topic other than the
subject of those Bivens actions. The three inmates who filed those suits were not
victims of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment against the Appellants. In
other words, the Appellants have failed to establish that they were in any way
prejudiced by Ms. Grundy’s participation in their prosecution. We therefore hold
that the Appellants suffered no constitutional defect in their trials. 6
B. Jury Instructions
The Appellants raise several claims of error with respect to the instructions
given to the jury. First, they argue that the District Court erred in instructing the
jury on the elements of both the conspiracy and substantive offenses. We review
jury instructions in their entirety under a de novo standard of review. United
States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1994). “In so doing, we
analyze, in light of the record, whether the instructions state the governing law
and whether the jury was provided an intelligent, meaningful understanding of the
applicable issues and standards.” Id. We will reverse only if we have
“substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided.” United States v. Smith, 13
F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Where no objection was
6
To echo the words of United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 322 (10th Cir.
1990), “[w]e cannot fathom the obdurate persistence of the prosecution in keeping
[Ms. Grundy] on this case. The decision, in the face of objection . . . is, to say
the least, aberrant. The exercise of a modicum of prudence on the part of the
prosecutor would have made consideration of this issue on appeal completely
unnecessary.”
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made below, however, we review only for plain error. United States v. Ellzey,
936 F.2d 492, 500 (10th Cir. 1991).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 241: Conspiracy Against Rights
18 U.S.C. § 241 prohibits two or more people from conspiring “to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory,
Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having so exercised the same.” After reading the statute to the
jury, the District Court instructed it that there were four necessary elements to
prove conspiracy. Instruction No. 33 stated in part:
ONE: The defendant whose case you are considering entered
into a conspiracy with one or more persons to injure,
oppress, threaten or intimidate inmates.
TWO: The conspiracy was directed at the deprivation of a right
which is secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, here, the right not to be subjected
to cruel and unusual punishment.
THREE: The defendant acted willfully to deprive inmates of such
right.
FOUR: The defendant acted under color of law.
If you should find from your consideration of all the evidence as to
each defendant that any of these elements has not been proved . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not
guilty.
The District Court then elaborated on each element of the crime. Four
subsequent instructions expanded upon the first element and described what it
meant to be part of a conspiracy. In addition, Instruction No. 39 informed the
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jury that the words “injure,” “oppress,” “threaten,” or “intimidate,” “are not used
in any technical sense but may cover a variety of conduct intended to harm,
frighten, prevent, or punish the free action of other persons.”
Instruction No. 40 elaborated on the second element—that the conspiracy
must be directed at the deprivation of the constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. It provided that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” and whether the action taken by
the defendant amounts to such conduct “turns on whether the force was applied in
a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.” It further provided that “[f]actors to be
considered in making the determination include the extent of injury suffered by an
inmate, the need for the application of force, the relationship between that need
and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the person using
force on the inmate, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.”
Messrs. LaVallee and Schultz 7 argue that use of certain statutory language
in the above instructions is inconsistent with and dilutes the constitutional
standard for determining whether there has been a conspiracy to deprive an
inmate of his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, they argue that the words
7
Only Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz complain of the 18 U.S.C. § 241
instruction; Mr. Verbickas was not convicted on that charge.
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“injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate,” which appear in 18 U.S.C. § 241 and
Instructions Nos. 33 and 39, allowed a reasonable jury to infer that something less
than the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” is sufficient to convict,
which is inconsistent with Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). In other
words, their argument is that the language confused the jury and permitted it to
convict based on a finding that a defendant conspired to threaten or intimidate
inmates, not that he conspired to violate their Eighth Amendment rights. Cf.
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (reversing convictions because
instruction alleging conspiracy to deprive individuals of their Thirteenth
Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 allowed for conviction based upon psychological coercion which is not
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment or the statute enacted to enforce it).
After reviewing the jury instructions in their entirety, it is clear that a jury
could not convict on the conspiracy charge unless it found that the conspiracy was
directed at depriving the inmates of their Eighth Amendment right. Instruction
No. 33 provided that if the Government did not prove “any of these elements” it
must find the defendant under consideration not guilty. See United States v.
Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that the court presumes
“jurors attend closely to the language of instructions in a criminal case and follow
the instructions given to them”). The same instruction provided that the
conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate must be “directed at the
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deprivation of a right which is secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, here, the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.” Further, Instruction No. 40 correctly prescribed the scope of
protection under the Eighth Amendment, stating that “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at
5 (quotations, alteration, and citations omitted); see also Kozminski, 487 U.S. at
952–53 (holding that for purposes of prosecution under § 241 for subjecting an
individual to involuntary servitude, the jury must be instructed that involuntary
servitude is the compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of physical or
legal coercion). Instruction No. 39 merely elaborated on the first element—that
is, what it meant to be involved in a conspiracy. After reaching a conclusion on
that element of the crime, the jury also had to conclude that the object of the
conspiracy was to deprive an inmate of his Eighth Amendment right, as defined
by the instructions. That the individual instructions explaining the language
“injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate” did not explicitly reference the scope of
the constitutional right at issue did not confuse the jury as to their task. Rather,
as the District Court found, the approach was designed to minimize confusion.
The court stated, “What you’re really asking me to do is to put in every
instruction everything that’s in every other instruction so the instructions would
in effect be so confusing that no one would ever understand what they mean, and
I reject that.” We agree. The instructions were consistent with the legal standard
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for conspiracy to deprive a person of his Eight Amendment right.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 242: Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
18 U.S.C. § 242 prohibits a person acting “under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject[] any person in any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” After reading the statute to the jury, the District Court instructed
it that there were four necessary elements to prove the deprivation of rights under
§ 242. Instruction No. 47 stated:
ONE: The defendant whose case you are considering deprived
an inmate or inmates of a right which is secured or
protected by the Constitution of the United States;
namely the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment;
TWO: The defendant acted willfully to deprive the inmate of
such right;
THREE: The defendant acted under the color of law;
FOUR: The inmate suffered bodily injury as a result of the
defendant’s conduct.
The Appellants first complain that the District Court did not include a
cautionary instruction that the de minimis use of physical force does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Appellants did not raise this objection to the District Court, and accordingly
we review only for plain error.
In Hudson, the Supreme Court established that a de minimis use of force,
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unless it is of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” does not violate
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 503 U.S.
at 9–10 (quotation omitted). Though the jury instructions did not make this fact
clear, the Appellants have failed to establish plain error. First, Instruction No.
40, described above, helps to resolve any confusion regarding the proof needed to
establish a violation of § 242. It provided that “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” and that the jury
should consider the relationship between the amount of force used and the need
for such force. This instruction tends to exclude the possibility of a conviction
based on a de minimis use of force. Second, there was no dispute at trial about
whether the force used by the Appellants was de minimis. To the contrary, the
Government presented evidence that Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz punched Mr.
Castillo in the back numerous times while he was restrained and compliant; Mr.
Mitchell testified that the sound of the blows could be heard in another room
fifteen to twenty feet away. The Government also presented evidence that Mr.
Verbickas punched Mr. Lane while he was restrained and compliant, then picked
him up off the floor waist-high and dropped him on his face, causing blood to
spill from his lip. The Appellants never challenged this testimony on the basis
that the force applied was de minimis; rather, they argued that they did not
commit the acts at all. On this evidence, there was no occasion for the jury to
consider whether the force used was de minimis. Thus the District Court did not
-22-
plainly err in failing to give such an instruction sua sponte.
Next, the Appellants claim that the jury instructions permitted the jury to
convict if it found that the inmates suffered only de minimis injuries which, they
argue, is prohibited by the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” standard
set forth in Hudson. Section 242 makes “it criminal to act (1) ‘willfully’ and (2)
under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.” Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997).
If these elements are met, and if bodily injury (but not death) results from the
willful deprivation of the constitutional right, the defendant is subject to a
sentencing enhancement of up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 242. The Appellants
argue that the Eighth Amendment is not violated if the inmates only suffered de
minimis injuries. As such, they claim that Instruction No. 48, which defined
“bodily injury” for purposes of the sentencing enhancement as “(1) a cut,
abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement; (2) physical pain; (3) illness; (4)
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (5)
any other injury to the body no matter how temporary,” misled the jury and
allowed them to convict if they found merely de minimis injuries, such as a small
cut or exceedingly temporary injury. 8
8
The Appellants do not argue that “bodily injury” as defined in Instruction
No. 48 was a misstatement of the law as it applies to the sentencing enhancement.
Nor do they dispute that bodily injury resulted.
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Hudson explained that “the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is [but]
one factor that may suggest” whether the force applied was necessary or wanton,
id. at 7, and the Court explicitly rejected a requirement that inmates show a
“significant injury” to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id at 5. Several circuits have held, however, that there has been no
excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when an inmate suffers
only de minimis injuries. See, e.g., Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th
Cir. 1997); Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Those courts draw a negative inference from the statement in Hudson that “the
blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a
cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. The
extent of Hudson’s injuries thus provides no basis for dismissal of his § 1983
claim.” Norman, 25 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10). In other
words, they infer from this statement that merely “de minimis injury can serve as
conclusive evidence that de minimis force was used.” Id. We reject this view.
In Hudson, the Court explained:
In the excessive force context, . . . [w]hen prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary
standards of decency always are violated. This is true whether or not
significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment
would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or
inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such
a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth
Amendment as it is today.
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503 U.S. at 9 (internal citations omitted). It further explained that in determining
whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary,
it may also be proper to evaluate the need and the amount of force
used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’
and “any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response.” The
absence of a significant injury is therefore relevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.
Id. at 7 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Therefore, we agree with the Third Circuit that in Hudson, the Supreme
Court evidenced its “commit[ment] to an Eighth Amendment which protects
against cruel and unusual force, not merely cruel and unusual force that results in
sufficient injury.” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that
“[t]he Court today appropriately puts to rest a seriously misguided view that pain
inflicted by an excessive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amendment
only when coupled with ‘significant injury,’ e.g., injury that requires medical
attention or leaves permanent marks.”). A contrary holding would mean that “a
prisoner could constitutionally be attacked for the sole purpose of causing pain as
long as the blows were inflicted in a manner that resulted in visible (or palpable
or diagnosable) injuries that were de minimis.” Brooks, 204 F.3d 108. We
therefore hold that the government need not prove that an individual suffered a
certain level or type of injury to establish excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 242.
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In so holding, we recognize that the degree of injury may be highly relevant
to the determination of the unreasonableness of the force used. But we decline to
adopt a rule today, which we believe would be inconsistent with Hudson, that
permits an officer to beat an inmate so long as the resulting injuries are neither
permanent nor require medical attention. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury
instructions did not mislead the jury as to the applicable law.
3. Supplemental Instruction
After approximately eight weeks of testimony, the case was submitted to
the jury. The jury deliberated for ten days, at which point the district court judge
called the jury into the courtroom and reread Instruction No. 29, which provided
in relevant part:
A separate crime is alleged in each count of the indictment. Under
these instructions, you may find that [sic] one or more of the
defendants guilty or not guilty as charged. At any time during
deliberations, you may return into court with your verdict of guilty or
not guilty as to any defendant concerning whom you have
unanimously agreed.
The court went on to state:
What I’m ordering you to do is to the extent, consistent with
Instruction No. 29 and all of the other instructions that you have
received and presumably read, if you have reached a verdict of either
guilty or not guilty as to the defendant, I’m ordering you to put that
verdict, if you’ve reached it, into an envelope, and we will seal that
envelope and . . . write the words [“]this is the verdict for defendant
blank[”] and then each of you would then sign the envelope and . . .
return[] [it] to Mr. Keech [the courtroom deputy] for safekeeping. It
will not be returned to me because I don’t want to see it.
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And so that’s what I’m directing you to do. And I want to reiterate, I
want you to do that only if . . . you have reached a verdict of guilty
or not guilty as to any defendant concerning whom you have
unanimously agreed.
If you have not reached a unanimous agreement, then you don’t have
to do anything. And if you have reached a unanimous agreement,
then I’m instructing you to do what I just said.
The jury sealed five verdicts in envelopes that day, including the guilty verdict as
to Mr. Verbickas, and two more verdicts after several hours of deliberation the
following day, including the guilty verdicts as to Messrs. Schultz and LaVallee.
The Appellants argue that this instruction is error for two reasons. First,
they argue that it is an Allen charge 9 that impermissibly coerced the jury’s
verdicts. Second, they argue that the District Court abused its discretion by
instructing the jury to return partial verdicts as it improperly invaded the province
of the jury regarding how it conducted deliberations. We address each argument
in turn. 10
a. Allen Charge
An Allen charge is “a supplemental instruction given to the jury and
designed to encourage a divided jury to agree on a verdict.” United States v.
9
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
To the extent that the Appellants argue that the supplemental instruction
10
should not have been given at all, we find that the District Court, concerned about
the length of deliberations, did not abuse its discretion in so doing. See United
States v. McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928, 940 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that whether to
give an instruction at all is within the sound discretion of the trial court).
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Zabriskie, 415 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2005). When an Allen charge “imposes
such pressure on the jury such that the accuracy and integrity of their verdict
becomes uncertain,” it violates a defendant’s right to due process and Sixth
Amendment rights to an impartial jury trial and to a unanimous verdict. Id. at
1148.
The District Court’s instruction in this case is not a typical Allen charge.
Generally, such an instruction urges deadlocked jurors to “review and reconsider
the evidence in the light of the views expressed by other jurors” so as to avoid a
mistrial. Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless,
this Court must determine whether the supplemental charge improperly coerced a
jury verdict. Id.; McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 941. Factors to consider in determining
whether a supplemental instruction coerced a verdict include: “(1) the language of
the instruction, (2) whether the instruction is presented with other instructions, (3)
the timing of the instruction, and (4) the length of the jury’s subsequent
deliberations.” Darks, 327 F.3d at 1013 (quotations omitted).
In the first part of the inquiry, this Court asks whether the language of the
instruction is “coercive, or merely the proper exercise of [the district court
judge’s] common law right and duty to guide and assist the jury toward a fair and
impartial verdict.” United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quotations omitted). There is nothing inherently coercive about the language
used by the District Court. Although the instruction lacked protective language
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assuring jurors holding the minority position that they were not required to
relinquish firmly held convictions, it did not include any language asking jurors
to reconsider their views and to change them if they believed they were wrong; it
did not press hold-out jurors to yield to the majority position; and it did not
impose any time restrictions on the deliberations. See Darks, 327 F.3d at 1014;
see also Arney, 248 F.3d at 988 (an instruction directed at all jurors, rather than
only those holding the minority view, reduces the possibility of coercion).
Further, though the District Court “ordered” and “directed” the jury to seal any
unanimous decisions—guilty or not guilty—in a sealed envelope while they
continued to deliberate on the remaining defendants, it did not instruct them to
reach a unanimous verdict as to any remaining defendants or charges. In fact, the
District Court emphasized that they “don’t have to do anything” if the jurors had
not reached a unanimous decision.
The Appellants argue that the absence of cautionary language to ameliorate
the coercive effect of the supplemental instruction—such as reminding jurors that
they should not surrender their conscientiously held convictions and that the
burden of proof belongs to the Government—makes this instruction per se
coercive. To this end, they cite our opinion in United States v. McElhiney, in
which this Court stated that it “has never . . . approved of an Allen charge that
failed to incorporate an admonition regarding the juror’s conscientiously held
convictions.” 275 F.3d 928, 943 (10th Cir. 2001). Despite the Appellants’
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assertions to the contrary, however, McElhiney did not spell out a per se rule
regarding coercion. Instead, we found that the absence of cautionary language in
that case meant that the coercive effect of the instruction was “substantially
heightened.” See id. at 944. Here, however, we harken back to the language of
the particular instruction and find that it was not inherently coercive. 11
In the next two steps of the analysis, we consider the timing of the
instruction and whether it was presented with other instructions. While the
preferred practice is to give an Allen charge prior to jury deliberations and along
with other instructions, there is no per se rule against giving an Allen charge once
the jury has begun to deliberate. Arney, 248 F.3d at 988–89. In fact, this Court
has found on numerous occasions that Allen charges given during deliberations
were not unduly coercive. Id. at 989 (listing cases). Moreover, the District Court
called the jury in to give the instruction on the court’s own accord, before the jury
indicated that it was deadlocked, which makes this instruction less coercive.
See id.
Finally, we look at the subsequent length of jury deliberations once the
supplemental instruction has been given. There is a suggestion of coercion when
a jury returns a verdict soon after the supplemental instruction. Darks, 327 F.3d
11
We also note that since our decision in McElhiney, we have approved of
at least one Allen charge that did not contain the recommended cautionary
language. See Darks, 327 F.3d 1014 (jury not coerced in returning death
sentence).
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at 1016. In this case, the jury resumed deliberations after receiving the
instruction at 4:00 p.m. Within the hour, the jury had sealed five verdicts in
envelopes. The jury was then excused for the day and they reconvened the next
morning. After approximately five to six hours of deliberation that day, they
reached verdicts on the remaining counts. Because the verdict forms were dated,
the record is clear that the verdicts the jury put into envelopes shortly after the
instruction included complete acquittals for four of the defendants, and a guilty
verdict as to Mr. Verbickas on one count and acquittals on the remaining counts.
The verdicts returned the following day convicted Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz
of two counts each and acquitted them of the other counts. In this case, because
the jury had not indicated that it was deadlocked as to any of the defendants, it is
reasonable to conclude that the jury had already reached unanimous decisions as
to the five verdicts sealed on June 23, even before the instruction was
given—indeed, the jury had already deliberated for ten days at that point. In
addition, it was almost a full day later that the jury reached verdicts as to Messrs.
Schultz and LaVallee. See Darks, 327 F.3d at 1016 (upholding verdict returned
twenty minutes after the challenged instruction). After viewing the supplemental
instruction in light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that it was
not coercive and therefore did not deny the Appellants their rights to a fair trial,
an impartial jury, and a unanimous verdict.
b. Partial Verdict Instruction
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In trials with multiple defendants, Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(b) permits a jury to
return a verdict at any time during its deliberations as to any defendant about
whom it has unanimously agreed. The Appellants argue that the supplemental
instruction “ordering” the jurors to seal verdicts in envelopes improperly invaded
the province of the jury regarding how it conducted deliberations. We review
submission of supplemental jury instructions once the jury has retired for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 1070, 1075 (10th Cir.
1994).
The District Court, in giving its supplemental instruction, initially repeated
the language of Instruction No. 29, but it then altered that language by ordering
the jury to seal any unanimous verdicts it had already reached. In other words,
unlike Instruction No. 29, which afforded the jury discretion as to whether or not
to return any partial verdicts, the supplemental instruction effectively removed
that discretion by directing the jury to return any partial verdicts that had been
reached at that point. Thus, the supplemental instruction clearly had the potential
to infringe on the jury’s discretion to decide for itself what deliberative process to
utilize and undoubtedly infringed on the jury’s discretion to decide when, if at all,
to report a partial verdict. See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.
1981) (discussing right of jury to return partial verdict in multi-defendant trial).
We therefore hold that giving such an instruction was error. Nevertheless, we
need not remand if we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
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doubt. See Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1191 (potential error in verdict form did not
warrant remand when any error did not affect the outcome of the trial).
The Appellants argue that the partial verdict instruction had the same effect
as an Allen instruction, i.e., improperly coercing the jury to reach a verdict as to
the charges still being deliberated at the time the District Court gave the
supplemental instruction. We concluded above that this instruction did not coerce
the jury’s verdict. As such, we hold that the District Court’s error in giving the
supplemental instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Cumulative Error
The Appellants argue that they were denied their due process right to
fundamental fairness through the combined effect of three discovery errors and
thirteen errors in admitting testimony. A cumulative error analysis aggregates all
the errors that individually are harmless, and therefore not reversible, and
“analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that
collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v.
Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc). “Only actual errors are
considered in determining whether the defendant’s right to a fair trial was
violated.” United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 2002).
1. Discovery Rulings
Ms. Gutierrez was one of the Government’s principal witnesses for both the
conspiracy and assault charges. In March 2002, more than a year before trial
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commenced, Mr. Verbickas filed a motion for the production of Ms. Gutierrez’s
psychiatric records to be used during cross-examination as impeachment
evidence. The District Court denied the motion because the documents requested
were privileged and the defendants cited no relevant authority to suggest that
privileged documents were subject to discovery for purposes of cross-
examination. 12 The Appellants argue that this ruling violated their Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against them. See Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1985) (per curium) (stating that the right to confront a
witness includes the right to conduct cross-examination).
The Appellants have failed to provide this Court with any relevant authority
suggesting that the Confrontation Clause permits them to discover the privileged
medical records of an adverse witness. Even so, we undertook our own review of
the case law and find that the Appellants’s Sixth Amendment rights were not
implicated by the District Court’s order.
The Confrontation Clause is not a “constitutionally compelled rule of
pretrial discovery.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 408 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). In rejecting
the defendant’s claim that the trial court’s refusal to permit discovery of
12
The District Court also denied the motion because the motion was
improperly filed under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c), rather than the general discovery
statute, Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
214, 219 (1951) (stating that Rule 17(c) is not intended to provide a means of
discovery for criminal cases).
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privileged communications by his accuser to be used during cross-examination
violated his right to confront witnesses against him, the Court in Ritchie stated:
[T]he right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent
improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel
may ask during cross-examination. The ability to question adverse
witnesses, however, does not include the power to require the pretrial
disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in
contradicting unfavorable testimony. Normally the right to confront
one's accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at
trial to question witnesses. In short, the Confrontation Clause only
guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.
Id. (citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). There is no indication in
this case that the Appellants did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Ms.
Gutierrez effectively. Indeed, the District Court did not appear to limit the scope
of questions that the defendants could ask Ms. Gutierrez on cross-examination.
Thus, there has been no Sixth Amendment violation.
The Appellants’ next claim of error in discovery relates to alleged promises
made by the Government to Ms. Gutierrez in exchange for her testimony at trial.
Specifically, the Appellants point out that Ms. Gutierrez pleaded guilty to
violating 18 U.S.C. § 242, which the District Court considered to be a “crime of
violence.” Nevertheless, she was released pending sentencing, which is only
permitted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) when the court “finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any
other person or the community” and either “there is a substantial likelihood that a
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motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted[,] or an attorney for the
Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on
the person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)
(including crimes of violence in subsection (A)). According to the Appellants, an
off-the-record colloquy took place between Ms. Gutierrez and her counsel, the
magistrate judge, and the Government. The Appellants claim that the District
Court made a discovery ruling prohibiting them from discovering the substance of
this conversation and that such ruling violated their due process rights under
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
We decline to review this claim of error. In addition to failing to supply
relevant legal authority, 13 the Appellants fail to cite to references in this ninety-
volume, ten-thousand-page transcript where this issue was raised and ruled upon
below. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2) and (3); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d
993, 1014–1015 (10th Cir. 2001). Due to these failures, this court cannot even
attempt to assess the merits of this argument.
Appellants next argue that the District Court erred in refusing to permit
them to discover the substance of an interview by the Government of Mr. Britt.
Mr. Britt was twice interviewed by the Government prior to giving testimony in
13
The Government correctly points out that the cases upon which the
Appellants rely, United States v. Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio, 405 U.S.
150, relate to the Government’s suppression of evidence, not a district court’s
erroneous evidentiary rulings.
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this case. One interview was reduced to writing; the other was not. After direct
and cross-examination of Mr. Britt, counsel for Mr. Verbickas sought permission
from the District Court to put Mr. Britt back on the witness stand to determine
whether a second statement was in fact recorded. The District Court asked the
Government whether there were any other written statements, to which Mr.
Blumberg said no. The court then instructed the defendants to file a written
motion to recall Mr. Britt to the stand. There is nothing in the record indicating
that any of the defendants filed such motion. Therefore, any error appears to be
that of the Appellants.
Finally, the Appellants argue that the District Court erred in refusing to
allow Mr. Verbickas’s counsel to cross-examine Mr. Britt as to whether he knew
of Mr. Lane’s history of violence. Mr. Britt testified on direct that Mr.
Verbickas’s use of force against Mr. Lane was excessive and contravened the
BOP “Use of Force” policy. Counsel for Mr. Verbickas cross-examined Mr. Britt
and asked him detailed questions about his knowledge of Mr. Lane’s history of
violence. After a while, the Government objected on the grounds that Mr.
Verbickas’s counsel was, in effect, testifying about Mr. Lane’s violent
background. The District Court sustained the objection in part, permitting
counsel to “ask the witness if he has any knowledge about why Lane was at [a
medical facility], without your question revealing why he was there.” The court
further stated, “I’m not foreclosing this evidence, but I’m foreclosing it through a
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witness that doesn’t know anything about it.” The Appellants argue that this
prohibited the jury from evaluating the basis of Mr. Britt’s testimony that Mr.
Verbickas’s use of force was excessive. We conclude that this argument has no
merit. The District Court did not prevent the Appellants from asking about Mr.
Britt’s foundation for his testimony.
2. Evidentiary Rulings
The Appellants make several additional objections on appeal that relate to
Ms. Gutierrez’s testimony. First, they argue that the Government improperly
asked her two leading questions. Only one of these questions was objected to,
however, and the District Court sustained the objection before Ms. Gutierrez
could answer the question. In addition, the Appellants argue that the District
Court erred in prohibiting testimony regarding a purported prior inconsistent
statement made by Ms. Gutierrez. Specifically, the Appellants argue that after
Ms. Gutierrez testified about inmate abuse at USP-Florence, the court should have
permitted them to call Lieutenant Mark Mooneyham to testify that Ms. Gutierrez
had, in fact, previously told him that she had no knowledge of inmate abuse at
USP-Florence and that Mr. Blumberg threatened that she might lose custody of
her children if she did not cooperate with the Government’s investigation. During
her testimony, however, Ms. Gutierrez admitted that she had previously made that
statement to Mr. Mooneyham. The District Court ruled that Ms. Gutierrez’s
testimony was consistent with what Mr. Mooneyham would testify to and
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therefore Fed. R. Evid. 613(b) did not apply. We find no error in any of these
rulings. 14
Next, the Appellants argue that the Government improperly elicited
testimony that they had reputations for violent behavior. They complain of the
following colloquy between Mr. Blumberg and Raymond Holt, the warden at
USP-Florence:
Q: Did you obtain information—excuse me. Did you learn the
reputation of individuals or the character of being unnecessarily
violent relating to certain correctional officers at Florence?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you learn that reputation for a correctional officer named Rod
Schultz?
A: Yes.
[Mr. Schultz’s counsel objected and the objection was overruled.]
Q: Did you learn that reputation for a correctional officer named
Mike LaVallee?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you learn that reputation for a correctional officer named Ken
Shatto?
A: Yes.
The Appellants also object to a question asked by Mr. Blumberg on re-
14
direct examination as to whether Ms. Gutierrez had ever met Mr. LaVallee’s
attorney in the presence of the defendants. We discuss this question infra in
section IV and conclude that permitting the question did not constitute error.
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Q: Did you learn that information related to a correctional officer
named David Pruyne?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you learn that information regarding a correctional officer
named Robert Verbickas?
A: Yes.
....
Q: What was that reputation for those people that you learned prior
to coming to Florence?
The defendants objected to the last question and the jury was excused while
the court determined whether it would permit Mr. Holt to answer. Ultimately, the
District Court barred admission of the reputation testimony pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 403.
Appellants argue that Mr. Holt’s affirmative responses to the prosecutor’s
initial questions is reputation testimony that violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule
404(b), however, relates to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. In other
words, it applies to specific instances of conduct. The challenged questions, on
the other hand, refer to defendants’ reputations for violent behavior, not to any
specific instances of conduct, and therefore Rule 404(b) is not implicated. We
also question whether this testimony is reputation testimony at all. Mr. Holt
merely testified that he had information about whether each Appellant had a
reputation for unnecessarily violent behavior; he did not testify as to what that
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reputation was, i.e., that any Appellant had a violent or nonviolent reputation.
This question was necessary to establish foundation for the follow-up question.
Indeed, the court sustained the Appellants’ objection as to that question, and the
jury never heard Mr. Holt’s answer. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in
the admission of such testimony. 15
The Appellants raise nine other alleged errors in admitting testimony. For
these claimed errors, they either fail to identify the statements which they contend
were wrongly admitted, fail to meet this court’s modest requirement that an
appellant provide citations to the record where these statements might be found,
or fail to provide argument or legal authority for these alleged errors. Due to
these failures, we decline to assess the merits of these arguments. United States
v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 825–26 (10th Cir. 2000).
In sum, we have found no error in any of the District Court’s discovery and
evidentiary rulings. We therefore conclude the Appellants’s assertion that the
cumulative impact of errors deprived them of a fair trial is without merit.
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY MR. LAVALLEE
Mr. LaVallee argues that Mr. Blumberg engaged in several instances of
prosecutorial misconduct that fatally infected his trial. During trial, Mr.
15
The Appellants also argue that this testimony was hearsay that violated
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. This argument is without merit, as
it is clear that the testimony was not hearsay.
-41-
Blumberg made several references to Mr. LaVallee’s attorney, Thomas
Hammond. Mr. LaVallee argues that these references permitted the jury to draw
an adverse inference from the fact he exercised his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and that therefore his conviction should be reversed. See United States v.
Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 442–445 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are mixed questions of law and
fact which we review de novo. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 988 (10th Cir.
2002). When the defendant makes a timely motion for a mistrial based on
prosecutorial misconduct, we review the district court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001).
We will not reverse a conviction on the basis of a prosecutor’s improper
statement to the jury unless there is reason to believe that it influenced the jury’s
verdict. Meienberg, 263 F.3d at 1180. In assessing whether the misconduct had
such an impact, we look to the curative acts of the district court, the extent of the
misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within the case as a whole. Id.
Mr. Blumberg first made reference to Mr. Hammond during redirect
examination of Ms. Gutierrez. During the exchange, Mr. Blumberg elicited
testimony from her that she had previously met Mr. Hammond at a meeting in the
company of the other defendants. Mr. Hammond objected, and the judge held a
sidebar conference. During the conference, Mr. Blumberg proffered that Ms.
Gutierrez would testify that after the meeting, certain defendants had a discussion
-42-
about not telling their attorneys the truth about the beatings. 16 The District Court
excused the jury, and Mr. Blumberg questioned Ms. Gutierrez on the issue. After
her testimony, the District Court found that Mr. Blumberg’s proffer at the sidebar
was contrary to what Ms. Gutierrez had just testified. The court therefore
disallowed the testimony to be relayed to the jury and sanctioned the Government
by prohibiting it from eliciting evidence about a conversation that Ms. Gutierrez
had with Mr. Schultz in which he told her not to tell her lawyer the truth about
what went on in the prison. The court, however, denied Mr. Hammond’s motion
for a mistrial based on the testimony Mr. Blumberg had succeeded in eliciting in
front of the jury—namely, that there had been a meeting among some defendants
and Mr. Hammond—because it found that testimony admissible since six of the
seven defense attorneys had asked Ms. Gutierrez on cross-examination whether
she had ever met with them before. Even so, when redirect examination resumed,
the District Court gave the jury a cautionary instruction to disregard any
testimony it had heard about that meeting. We conclude that because the jury
only heard unobjectionable testimony and was, in any event, instructed not to
consider it, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
Hammond’s motion for a mistrial.
Mr. Blumberg reasoned that such testimony was relevant to whether the
16
defendants had willfully deprived the inmates of a constitutional right under 18
U.S.C. § 242.
-43-
Mr. Blumberg again made reference to Mr. Hammond during cross-
examination of Mr. LaVallee. Mr. Blumberg asked whether Mr. LaVallee knew
that several murders took place at USP-Florence while he worked there, to which
Mr. LaVallee responded that he had no personal knowledge of such murders. Mr.
Blumberg asked, “Was that because you didn’t prepare for that [question] with
Mr. Hammond?” Mr. Hammond objected, arguing that the question was
improper, but he did not move for a mistrial. The District Court overruled the
objection. Mr. Blumberg later commented that defense counsel were “peddling”
defenses. Two attorneys objected to the question based on its characterization
and that it was argumentative. No defendant moved for a mistrial. 17
We need not tarry on whether these remarks constituted prosecutorial
misconduct because we are satisfied that they did not affect the trial’s outcome.
These two flippant remarks must be evaluated in the context of an eight-week
trial. This conduct, even if improper, was not “flagrant enough to influence the
jury to convict on grounds other than the evidence presented.” See Meienberg,
263 F.3d at 1180 (quotations omitted). As such, we conclude that any misconduct
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
17
Mr. Blumberg also asked whether it was Mr. LaVallee’s belief that Ms.
Gutierrez’s lawyer had coordinated witness’s testimony. This reference to Ms.
Gutierrez’s attorney did not involve any adverse inference drawn from Mr.
LaVallee’s invocation of his right to counsel and we therefore do not address it
here.
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V. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY MR. SCHULTZ
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Schultz argues that the Government lacked sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for deprivation of rights under color of law because the
testimony of Ms. Gutierrez and Mr. Mitchell was contradictory in several
respects. 18 Claims of insufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo. United
States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004). “Evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917,
921 (10th Cir. 2002).
Mr. Schultz does not dispute that the witnesses, despite their disparate
recollection of non-material details, provided testimony which, if believed,
satisfied each element of the crimes for which he was convicted. Essentially,
then, Mr. Schultz’s argument amounts to an attack on Ms. Gutierrez’s and Mr.
Mitchell’s credibility. This argument must be rejected. “To the extent that the
evidence conflicts, we accept the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d
18
For instance, the witnesses had differing recollections about what the
abused inmate was wearing at the time of the abuse and the relative positions of
the other correctional officers in the cell.
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1118, 1126 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted); see also United States v.
Washita Constr. Co., 789 F.2d 809, 816–17 (10th Cir. 1986) (rejecting sufficiency
of the evidence argument based on inconsistencies in testimony of government
witnesses).
B. Motion for a New Trial
1. Violations Under Brady v. Maryland and California v. Trombetta
Bureau of Prisons policy requires correctional officers routinely to
videotape any calculated use of force on an inmate. The warden reviews the
videotapes to ensure that the officers follow the appropriate procedures during the
use of force. The tapes are retained for up to two years and then destroyed in the
ordinary course of business. If an incident is serious and has been referred for
possible criminal investigation, the tape might be retained, placed into evidence,
and controlled more closely.
Beginning in July 2001, the defendants made several requests for the tapes
created on April 5 and 6, 1996 during forced-cell moves of Pedro Castillo, the
inmate whom Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz were convicted of abusing. After
each request, the BOP responded that the tapes no longer existed. Mr. Schultz
made one last request for the tapes shortly before his sentencing. This time, the
Government responded to the request by producing the tape created on April 6,
1996, the day after the incident giving rise to Mr. Schultz’s and Mr. LaVallee’s
convictions.
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The tape shows Mr. Castillo slashing at his chest and legs, attempting to
draw blood. Mr. Schultz approaches the cell and instructs Mr. Castillo to put his
hands through the food gate so that he can be handcuffed. Mr. Castillo complies
and Mr. Schultz enters the cell to fasten a chain around Mr. Castillo’s waist. Mr.
Schultz then escorts Mr. Castillo to the x-ray room without incident. Mr. Schultz
moved for a new trial, arguing that the Government suppressed favorable and
material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
When the Government withholds evidence on demand of a defendant
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him, it violates the due process
rights of that defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Government’s good faith is
not relevant. Id. While we ordinarily review a district court’s denial of a motion
for a new trial for an abuse of discretion, when the motion is based on an alleged
Brady violation, we review the district court’s decision de novo. See United
States v. Combs, 267 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001). To establish a Brady
violation, “a defendant must demonstrate (1) the prosecution suppressed
evidence,[ 19] (2) the evidence was favorable to defendant, and (3) the evidence
was material.” United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir.
19
The “prosecution” for Brady purposes encompasses not only the
prosecutors handling the case, but also extends to law enforcement personnel and
governmental entities involved in investigative aspects of a particular criminal
venture. Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dept. of Corrs., 50 F.3d 801, 824 (10th Cir.
1995).
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1999). There is no dispute in this case that the prosecution suppressed evidence
within the meaning of Brady. We therefore concentrate our analysis on the
remaining two factors.
Evidence is favorable to the defendant if it constitutes either exculpatory or
impeachment evidence. Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dept. of Corrs., 50 F.3d 801, 825
(10th Cir. 1995). Mr. Schultz argues that the evidence is favorable to him
because it shows Mr. Castillo cutting at his chest and legs to draw blood.
According to Mr. Schultz, this casts doubt on the Government’s theory of the
case—that the defendants fabricated a reason to move Mr. Castillo from his cell
to beat him—and supports his defense that Mr. Castillo was in fact trying to
injure himself the previous day. He also argues that it is favorable because it
shows Mr. Schultz and Mr. Castillo interacting without incident. The
Government counters that this tape does not rebut their theory of the
case—inmate Castillo was a known self-mutilator and the Government’s theory
was that the defendants falsely claimed that he had been cutting himself on April
5 precisely because it was a plausible explanation for entering his cell. In this
regard, the tape is consistent with the Government’s evidence. We need not
conclusively resolve whether this evidence was favorable to Mr. Schultz,
however, because we find that it was not material to his guilt.
Evidence is material to the defendant if it creates a “reasonable probability
that, ‘had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
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would have been different.’” Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir.
2002) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “A
‘reasonable probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
Mr. Schultz argues that there is a reasonable probability that had the videotape
been disclosed he would have been acquitted because it defies common sense to
believe that Mr. Castillo would cooperate with Mr. Schultz if Mr. Schultz had
abused him the previous day.
To the contrary, the District Court found, and we agree, that the videotape
is consistent with the fact that Mr. Castillo was beaten the previous day and does
not cast sufficient doubt on the fact that Mr. Schultz participated in that abuse.
The Government presented evidence at trial that on April 5 Mr. Castillo was
beaten in the kidney area. The video shows Mr. Castillo’s abdomen wrapped in
bandages consistent with the area of beating. Further, the video shows Mr.
Castillo moving somewhat gingerly, which is also consistent with testimony that
he was abused the previous day. That the video shows Mr. Schultz and Mr.
Castillo interacting without incident does not undermine our confidence in the
outcome of the trial. As the District Court noted, “[i]t is a fact of life that in a
prison setting, prisoners are forced to interact on a daily basis with the
correctional officers, even those officers that may have mistreated or abused the
prisoners.” The tape merely shows Mr. Castillo cooperating with the officers the
-49-
day after the assault and as such, it has little bearing on what occurred the
previous day. Cf. Engberg v. Wyoming, 265 F.3d 1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2001)
(evidence that creates a mere “possibility” of a different result does not meet the
standard for “reasonable probability”). We therefore hold that the evidence was
not material and, as such, Mr. Schultz’s due process rights were not violated.
Mr. Schultz also argues that the Government’s destruction of the April 5,
1996 videotape violated his due process rights and warrants a new trial under
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Mr. Schultz did not raise this issue
to the District Court. Accordingly, we review the District Court’s failure sua
sponte to realize that the destruction warranted a new trial only for plain error.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10th
Cir. 1991).
For the government’s destruction of evidence “to rise to the level of
affecting a defendant’s due process rights under California v. Trombetta, the
evidence ‘must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of a nature that the defendant would be unable to
obtain it by other reasonably available means.’” United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d
1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489)). In addition,
the defendant must show that the government acted in bad faith. Id. (citing
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).
Even if Mr. Schultz could show that the exculpatory value of the video was
-50-
apparent before the video was destroyed, he fails to show that the tape was
destroyed in bad faith. He argues that the failure of the Government to preserve
the tape undermines the only reason the tape was created in the first place and it
was therefore done in bad faith. To the contrary, there is unrebutted testimony
that these tapes, used to ensure that the correctional officers used the proper
procedures during forced-cell moves, were routinely destroyed in the ordinary
course of business approximately two years after their creation. Mr. Schultz
notes that the Government first became aware that Mr. Castillo was beaten when
it spoke with Ms. Gutierrez in February 2000, nearly four years after the incident.
When the defendants made their first request for the video in 2001, it had already
been destroyed. Therefore, Mr. Schultz has failed to establish the District Court
plainly erred in not granting a new trial on its own initiative due to the
Government’s bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence.
2. Newly discovered evidence
During the investigation that led to Mr. Schultz’s indictment, FBI
investigators questioned Mr. Castillo. Mr. Castillo told the investigators that he
was beaten by several correctional officers around the first of April 1996.
Though he could not recall all of the officers’ names who participated in the
abuse, he did state that all the officers who took part in the forced-cell move
committed the abuse. He did not identify Mr. Schultz by name. Since Mr.
Schultz was on duty that night, however, the Government began investigating
-51-
him. Several of Mr. Schultz’s coconspirators identified him as a participant. In
February 2001, the Government filed a superceding indictment against Mr.
Schultz for the abuse of Mr. Castillo. He was tried and convicted over two years
later in June 2003.
Mr. Castillo was incarcerated until May 2002. During this time, Mr.
Schultz never attempted to interview Mr. Castillo about his allegations of abuse.
Nor did Mr. Schultz attempt to locate Mr. Castillo after his release but prior to
trial. Mr. Castillo was not a witness at trial. After Mr. Schultz was sentenced to
41 months’ imprisonment in November 2003, however, he employed a private
investigator to locate Mr. Castillo; the investigator found Mr. Castillo within six
weeks. After finding him, the investigator showed Mr. Castillo a photo of Mr.
Schultz and asked whether Mr. Schultz ever beat him. Mr. Castillo responded
that Mr. Schultz had not done so and that, in fact, Mr. Schultz had treated him
with dignity and respect. 20 Mr. Schultz filed a motion for a new trial, which the
District Court denied.
20
We note, however, that Mr. Castillo’s testimony is hardly conclusive of
the issue. Mr. Castillo provided several inconsistent statements regarding Mr.
Schultz’s participation in the abuse. For example, he stated he believed Mr.
Schultz did not participate in the beating because Mr. Castillo “was sure [Mr.
Schultz] had not been on duty or present” that night. After being presented with
information that Mr. Schultz admitted not only to being present, but also to
participating in the forced-cell move, Mr. Castillo acknowledged that his memory
of the events seven years earlier was vague and that he could not positively state
whether Mr. Schultz took part in the abuse.
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 authorizes a district court to grant a
new trial if the interests of justice require one. United States v. Quintanilla, 193
F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999). We review rulings on a motion under Rule 33
for an abuse of discretion. Id. We apply a five-part test to determine whether
newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial. Id. at 1147. The defendant must
show:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure to learn of
the evidence was not caused by [his] own lack of diligence, (3) the
new evidence is not merely impeaching, (4) the new evidence is
material to the principal issues involved, and (5) the new evidence is
of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an
acquittal.
Id.
The District Court denied Mr. Schultz’s motion for several reasons. First,
the court found that Mr. Schultz did not use due diligence in attempting to locate
Mr. Castillo before trial. Second, the court determined that Mr. Castillo’s
statements constituted only impeachment evidence because previous statements he
had made to the FBI were inconsistent with his current statements. Last, the
District Court concluded that there was not a reasonable probability that the
evidence would result in an acquittal if Mr. Schultz was to be given a new trial.
Because we agree that Mr. Schultz failed to exercise due diligence in discovering
the evidence before trial, we need not address whether Mr. Castillo’s testimony is
merely impeaching or whether there is a reasonable probability that it would
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result in an acquittal.
Due diligence does not require that a defendant exercise the highest degree
of diligence possible to locate evidence prior to trial; only “reasonable diligence”
is required. United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir. 1977). This
requirement prevents defendants from keeping “an evidentiary trump card in the
event of a conviction.” Quintanilla, 193 F.3d at 1147. Mr. Schultz does not
dispute that he made no attempt to interview Mr. Castillo before trial. Nor can he
argue that he was unable to interview Mr. Castillo before trial, as Mr. Castillo
was incarcerated for a full fifteen months after the Government filed the
superceding indictment against Mr. Schultz. Rather, he contends that the standard
for diligence should be lowered because the Government produced misleading
reports that indicated Mr. Castillo had identified him as one of the abusers. As
support for this proposition he cites our decision in United States v. Sinclair, 109
F.3d 1527, 1532 (10th Cir. 1997) in which we refused to apply the Seventh
Circuit’s lower standard for evaluating the fifth prong of the test—that is, when
newly discovered evidence would likely produce an acquittal after a subsequent
trial. We stated:
[W]e are unwilling to apply the Larrison possibility standard when,
as here, the allegedly false testimony is merely impeaching. We
recognize that the possibility standard applied in Larrison and
subsequent cases might be appropriate when the government has
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently offered false testimony.
However, Mr. Sinclair has not alleged, nor does the record show, that
the government knowingly, recklessly, or negligently used Dallas
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Woods’s testimony about his school attendance. We therefore
conclude that the Larrison possibility standard should not be applied
under the circumstances in this case.
Id. at 1532 (citing Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928)).
Mr. Schultz argues that the Government knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently offered misleading documents and that such conduct should lessen his
due diligence requirement. We decline to adopt such an approach. The
requirement of “reasonable diligence” adequately accounts for any misconduct by
the Government. Moreover, the reports from the interviews of Mr. Castillo do not
falsely claim that Mr. Castillo identified Mr. Schultz personally. They merely
state that Mr. Castillo alleged that he was beaten by all the officers who
participated in the forced-cell move—and Mr. Schultz admits that he participated
in that process. We therefore find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
District Court in denying Mr. Schultz’s motion for a new trial.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Last, Mr. Schultz argues that the prosecution, knowing that the April 5,
1996 videotape of Mr. Castillo’s forced-cell move was destroyed in the ordinary
course of business, misrepresented to the jury that the defendants destroyed the
tape as part of their conspiracy to deprive Mr. Castillo of his constitutional
rights. 21
21
We note that Mr. Schultz’s argument on this basis cuts against his
(continued...)
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It does appear that part of the Government’s pre-trial theory of the case was
that the conspirators destroyed the tape to cover up any evidence of abuse. At
trial, however, the only statement that Mr. Schultz complains of with respect to
the defendants’ alleged destruction of the tape came in closing argument when
Mr. Blumberg said that “the removal of the video camera was a fake.” (emphasis
added). This statement in no way indicates that Mr. Schultz destroyed the tape
inside the camera. Rather, it references Mr. Schultz’s role in the conspiracy—his
job was to knock over the video camera so that it would not record the ensuing
abuse. Because Mr. Blumberg did not argue before the jury that the defendants
destroyed this evidence to cover up their crime, Mr. Schultz’s argument is simply
without merit.
VI. SENTENCING
We now turn to issues concerning the Appellants’ sentences. Mr.
Verbickas was found guilty of a single count of deprivation of civil rights in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The base offense level for a conviction under § 242
is governed by U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1, “Offenses Involving Individual Rights,” which
directs the court to apply the greatest offense level of:
(1) the offense level from the offense guidelines applicable to any
underlying offense;
(...continued)
21
argument that the Government destroyed the tape in bad faith in violation of his
due process rights under Trombetta.
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(2) 12, if the offense involved two or more participants;
(3) 10, if the offense involved
(A) the use of threat of force against a person or
(B) damages or the threat of property damages; or
(4) 6, otherwise.
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a). The District Court calculated Mr. Verbickas’s base offense
level at 12 because it concluded that the offense involved two or more
participants. See U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(2). It then imposed a six-level
enhancement because the offense was committed under color of law, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2H1.1(b)(1); a two-level enhancement because Mr. Lane was a vulnerable
victim, see U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1); and a two-level enhancement because Mr.
Lane was restrained during the assault, see U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3. The resulting base
offense level was 22. The District Court then departed downward two levels
because it determined that Mr. Verbickas was especially susceptible to abuse in
prison. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (permitting downward departures for circumstances
not adequately taken into consideration by the Guidelines). The court further
departed another two levels because it found both that the assault was aberrant
behavior, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20, and that Mr. Lane’s misconduct substantially
contributed to provoking the assault, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. The resulting
offense level was 18, and Mr. Verbickas had a criminal history score of I, which
subjected him to a sentence of 27–33 months’ imprisonment. The District Court
sentenced him to 30 months. Mr. Verbickas challenges each of the sentencing
enhancements except for the under color of law enhancement under United States
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v. Booker, arguing that his offense level before the court’s downward departure
should only have been 16, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2H1.1(a)(3) and (b)(1), with a
resulting sentencing range of only 21–27 months.
Messrs. LaVallee and Schultz were found guilty both of conspiracy under
18 U.S.C. § 241 as well as a substantive offense under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for the
assault of Mr. Castillo. Because both offenses were committed by two or more
people, the District Court determined the base level for both men to be 12. See
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(2). As it had with Mr. Verbickas, the District Court applied
a six-level enhancement for acting under color of law, see U.S.S.G.
§ 2H1.1(b)(1); a two-level enhancement for a vulnerable victim, see U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.(b)(1); and a two-level enhancement for committing the offense while the
victim was restrained, see U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3. Because the Guidelines prohibit the
grouping of conspiracy and substantive offenses when the conspiracy has another
object besides the substantive offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. 4, the District
Court added another two levels under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a) (requiring the addition
of two levels for offenses constituting two equally serious groups). The court
then granted a two-level departure for susceptibility to abuse in prison. See
U.S.S.G § 5K2.0. With a resulting offense level of 22 and a criminal history
score of I, the applicable Guidelines range was 41–51 months’ incarceration.
Messrs. LaVallee and Schultz were both sentenced to 41 months. Both contend
that the District Court committed error under Booker which resulted in the
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imposition of a higher sentence than that warranted by facts found by the jury.
A. Booker Error
In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that
“[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of
guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. As a remedy, the Court
severed the statutory section requiring district courts to sentence within the
Guidelines range. Id. at 756–57. We recognize two types of Booker errors:
constitutional and non-constitutional. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d
727, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). A constitutional Booker error occurs when a court
“[relies] upon judge-found facts, other than those of prior convictions, to enhance
a defendant’s sentence mandatorily.” Id. A non-constitutional error arises when
a sentencing court “appl[ies] the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, as opposed to
a discretionary fashion, even though the resulting sentence was calculated solely
upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found by the jury, or based upon
the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 731–32. These appeals allege constitutional
Booker error.
Because all three Appellants challenge such error for the first time on
appeal, we review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
F.3d at 732. To establish plain error, the Appellants “must demonstrate that (1)
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the District Court committed error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the
plain error affected [their] substantial rights. United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d
1147, 1174 (10th Cir. 2005). If each condition is met, “a court reviewing the
error may exercise discretion to correct it if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. When
reviewing a potential constitutional error, we conduct this analysis less rigidly.
Id. “By now, it is axiomatic under plain error review that a court commits error
that is plain when it enhances a defendant’s sentence based on judicially-found
facts.” United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1155 (10th Cir. 2005). We will
therefore limit our review to the third and fourth prongs of the plain error test.
To satisfy their burden on the third prong of plain error, the Appellants
must establish that their substantial rights were affected—that is, they must show
to a “reasonable probability” that the error in sentencing affected the outcome of
the proceedings. Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175. We have identified at least two ways
a defendant can make this showing in the case of constitutional Booker error:
First, if the defendant shows a reasonable probability that a jury
applying a reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same
material facts that a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence,
then the defendant successfully demonstrates that the error below
affected his substantial rights. . . . Second, a defendant may show
that the district court’s error affected his substantial rights by
demonstrating a reasonable probability that, under the specific facts
of his case as analyzed under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) the district court judge would reasonably impose a sentence
outside the Guidelines range.
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Id. (footnote omitted).
If the Appellants satisfy the first three prongs of plain error review, they
must then persuade this Court that the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We have stated that a
defendant can meet this burden by presenting evidence that:
(a) a sentence increased substantially based on a Booker error; (b) a
showing that the district court would likely impose a significantly
lighter sentence on remand; (c) a substantial lack of evidence to
support the entire sentence the Guidelines required the district court
to impose; (d) a showing that objective consideration of the §
3553(a) factors warrants a departure from the sentence suggested by
the Guidelines; or (e) other evidence peculiar to the defendant that
demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing process.
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 919 (10th Cir. 2005).
1. Mr. Verbickas’s Sentence
Mr. Verbickas has failed to satisfy the third prong of establishing plain
error. First, he has failed to show that a jury applying a reasonable doubt
standard would not have found the same material facts. Indeed, Mr. Verbickas
did not challenge the factual basis of any of the enhancements at the District
Court (and does not do so here). Rather, with respect to the enhancements based
on the condition of the victim (restrained and vulnerable), Mr. Verbickas’s
contentions were legal claims. 22 Cf. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876
22
For example, Mr. Verbickas argued that if the District Court imposed one
of the enhancements, it should not impose the other because it would constitute
(continued...)
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(10th Cir. 2005) (in harmless error analysis, stating that defendant’s decision not
to contest the facts supporting an enhancement indicates that constitutional
Booker error did not affect substantial rights). Moreover, the record is replete
with testimony that Mr. Lane was in fact restrained and that he was in fact
“vulnerable” within the meaning of the Guideline provision. See U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.1; United States v. Lambright, 320 F.3d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 2003) (inmate
who was completely dependent on correctional officers for care, was locked in
cell, and was unable to protect himself from assault was vulnerable victim);
United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1504–06 (2d Cir. 1992) (inmate
beaten while surrounded by correctional officers was vulnerable victim). With
respect to the enhancement based on the offense involving two or more
participants, the record shows that Ms. Gutierrez pleaded guilty to abusing Mr.
Lane. Finally, it is clear from the jury’s verdict that it found Mr. Verbickas was
acting under color of law. Indeed, a finding that the defendant acted under color
of law in depriving an inmate of a constitutional right was explicitly listed as an
element of § 242 in the jury instructions. Accordingly, Mr. Verbickas has in no
way demonstrated that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would not
have found the same facts as the District Court which gave rise to the
enhancements.
(...continued)
22
impermissible “double counting,” which he does not raise here.
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Second, Mr. Verbickas has failed to show that the District Court, applying
the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), might have imposed a sentence outside the
Guidelines range. The judge did not express any dissatisfaction with the length of
the sentence or indicate that he felt that it was inappropriate in light of all the
circumstances. See Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175. Further, the District Court imposed
a sentence in the middle of the applicable Guidelines range, even though it was
within the court’s power to impose a shorter sentence under the pre-Booker
scheme. That it was not inclined to do so suggests that the judge would not
exercise “his now greater [post-Booker] discretion to reduce the sentence.”
United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th Cir. 2005).
We are aware that this Court recently found that constitutional Booker error
affected a defendant’s substantial rights even though the district court had granted
a five-level downward departure that took into consideration several of the
sentencing factors recommended by § 3553(a)(1). See Serrata, 425 F.3d at 918.
Though the District Court in this case took several of the § 3553(a)(1) sentencing
factors into account in granting Mr. Verbickas a two-level downward departure,
we think that Serrata is distinguishable for several reasons. First, in Serrata we
found that “the most telling evidence” that the defendant’s substantial rights were
violated was that the district court “repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with
the guidelines” and stated that it would sentence each defendant to probation if
the Guidelines so permitted. Id. at 919. Second, the district court sentenced each
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defendant to the lowest possible sentence in the applicable Guidelines range. Id.
Third, this Court found that the district court abused its discretion in departing
downward—we acknowledged that although departure was not warranted under
the Guidelines, post-Booker, the same factors may warrant departure pursuant to
§ 3553(a)(1). 23 Id.; cf. United States v. Ollson, 413 F.3d 1119, 1121 (10th Cir.
2005) (finding that defendant’s substantial rights not violated when district court
properly exercised discretion to depart downward and could have departed further
if it determined further departure was warranted). None of these circumstances
are present in this case. We therefore conclude that Mr. Verbickas has failed to
establish that but for the improper judicial fact-finding, the result of his
proceeding would have been different.
2. Mr. LaVallee’s and Mr. Schultz’s Sentences
As noted above, the enhancement for acting under color of law, see
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1), is fully reflected in the jury’s verdict. The same can be
said of the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(2) (offense committed by two
or more people) because both Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz were convicted of
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which requires “two or more persons” as an
23
We also note that because the court in Serrata held that the district court
abused its discretion in imposing a five-level downward departure thus requiring
remand, the court’s discussion of Booker error is dicta. See United States v. Sims,
428 F.3d 945, 966 (10th Cir. 2005) (declining to address Booker issues when
district court abused its discretion in departing downward).
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element of the offense. Accordingly, these enhancements do not constitute
constitutional Booker error.
In addition, the facts giving rise to the two-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a), which is predicated on a finding that the substantive offense
was not “the sole object of the conspiracy,” see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 cmt. 4, are also
implicit in the jury’s verdict. The jury instructions provided that the jury must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government proved “that the single
overall conspiracy alleged in Count I of the superceding indictment existed.” The
superceding indictment alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to (1)
unjustifiably strike, kick, assault, injure, and physically punish inmates; (2)
falsely justify uses of force against inmates by falsifying records and fabricating
injuries; (3) threaten officers to secure their silence; and (4) perpetuate an
environment within the prison allowing unlawful beatings and assaults against
inmates to continue indefinitely and with impunity. Clearly, then, the jury’s
guilty verdict against Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz on the conspiracy charge
reflects the fact that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
beating of Mr. Castillo was not the sole object of the conspiracy. Therefore, this
enhancement is also not constitutional Booker error.
Accordingly, only the other two enhancements—one two-level
enhancement for a vulnerable victim and another two-level enhancement for a
restrained victim—potentially violate Booker. Without these enhancements, the
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sentencing range supported by the jury’s findings was 33–41 months’
imprisonment, based on an offense level of 20 rather than 24. The District Court
exercised its discretion to depart downward two levels from 24 to 22, however,
and thus calculated the applicable sentencing range to be 41–51 months; the court
ultimately sentenced both Mr. LaVallee and Mr. Schultz to 41 months. We stated
in United States v. Yazzie that:
Booker made clear that it is the actual sentence, not the sentencing
range, that must not be increased based upon judge-found facts in
order to violate the Sixth Amendment: “Accordingly, we reaffirm our
holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which
is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
407 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756).
Because the District Court’s judicial fact-finding did not increase the sentence
beyond that authorized by the jury’s verdict, there was no constitutional error.
Id.; see also United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1188 (10th Cir. 2005).
Nevertheless, it is clear on appeal that the District Court’s mandatory
application of the Guidelines still constitutes non-constitutional Booker error that
is plain. We need not decide whether Messrs. LaVallee’s and Schultz’s
substantial rights were affected, however, because they have failed to satisfy their
burden on the fourth prong of plain error analysis. See Yazzie, 407 F.3d at 1146
(declining to conduct a substantial-rights analysis because defendant could not
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satisfy the fourth prong of plain-error review). We will not notice non-
constitutional error “unless it is both particularly egregious and our failure to
notice the error would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. The Appellants
have made no such showing here.
B. Cross-Appeal
It its cross-appeal, the Government raises three arguments. First, it argues
that the District Court erred in failing to impose an enhancement to each
Appellant’s sentence for obstruction of justice. Second, it argues that the District
Court erred in granting the Appellants a two-level downward departure due to
their susceptibility to abuse in prison. Third, it argues that the District Court
erred in granting Mr. Verbickas an additional two-level downward departure due
to the inmate’s provocation of the offense behavior and Mr. Verbickas’s aberrant
behavior.
Post-Booker, district courts, though not bound by the Guidelines, must
consult the Guidelines and consider them in sentencing. See Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738, 767 (2005). This consultation requirement normally obliges the district
court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.
See United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir.2005); United
States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). In considering
the district court’s application of the Guidelines, we review its factual findings
for clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. Serrata, 425 F.3d at 906.
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“We give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the
facts.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Government first argues that the District Court erred in failing to apply
an obstruction of justice enhancement to each of their sentences pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. As an initial matter, we recognize that if the District Court had
applied the obstruction of justice enhancement to increase the Appellants’
sentences mandatorily, it would have committed constitutional Booker error. See
United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 821 (10th Cir. 2005). Booker made its
remedial interpretation of the Guidelines applicable to all cases on direct review,
however, and we therefore must still consider the merits of the Government’s
cross-appeal. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769; United States v. Lynch, 397 F.3d
1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2005).
With respect to this claimed error, the Government suffers the same fate as
the Appellants in their claim of error related to the discovery of alleged promises
made to Ms. Gutierrez in exchange for her testimony. The District Court’s ruling
on this issue is conspicuously missing from the transcript and the Government has
otherwise failed to point to the place in the record where this discussion is found.
Because we must be informed by the District Court’s findings of fact and its
application of the Guidelines to the facts, the Government’s failure to ensure that
the record has been supplemented with the relevant transcripts is fatal to its claim.
See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2), (3); United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993,
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1014–1015 (10th Cir. 2001).
Next, the Government argues that the District Court erred in granting each
Appellant a two-level downward departure based on their susceptibility to abuse
in prison under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. We review downward departures under a
unitary abuse of discretion “which includes review to determine that the
discretion of the district court was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”
United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation and
alteration omitted). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion
this Court must evaluate: (1) whether the factual circumstances supporting a
departure are permissible departure factors; (2) whether the departure factors
relied upon by the district court remove the defendant from the applicable
Guideline heartland thus warranting a departure, (3) whether the record
sufficiently supports the factual basis underlying the departure, and (4) whether
the degree of departure is reasonable. Id. Here, the Government claims only that
the District Court erred in finding that the Appellants’ susceptibility to abuse in
prison removed them from the heartland of cases thus warranting departure.
The fact that police officers are susceptible to abuse in prison does not,
alone, warrant a downward departure. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81,
112 (1996). Indeed, in many instances, committing a crime while acting under
color of law will result in a higher sentence—as it did in this case—rather than a
lower sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1) (permitting enhancement when
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offense is committed under color of law). However, when a district court
determines that the defendants’ susceptibility to abuse is compounded by
“widespread publicity and emotional outrage . . . [this] is just the sort of
determination that must be accorded deference by the appellate courts.” Koon,
518 U.S. at 112.
Relying on Koon, the District Court found that this case was outside the
heartland of the Guidelines because it was part of a vast investigation, spanning
several years, that involved not only the abuse of inmates by correctional officers,
but also the conspiracy to abuse inmates. In addition to evidence of the size and
scope of the investigation, the District Court was presented with other evidence
that this case was outside the heartland of cases. For example, there was evidence
that the investigation was reported on in a publication distributed among federal
inmates; that because of the Appellants’ notoriety they were on 23-hour
lockdown; and that other inmates threatened the Appellants’ lives and described
the types of sexual acts they would commit upon their bodies once they were
dead. Based on these circumstances, the District Court felt that a two-level
downward departure was warranted. We find no abuse of discretion in that
determination.
Finally, we address the Government’s argument that the District Court
abused its discretion in granting Mr. Verbickas a two-level downward departure
based on the combined reasons of Mr. Verbickas’s aberrant behavior, see
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U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20, and the victim’s misconduct that substantially contributed to
provoking the offense behavior, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10.
Section 5K2.10 provides that:
If the victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the
offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline
range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. We first note that victim provocation is an “encouraged
departure factor.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 94 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10). Further, the
provoking conduct need not immediately precede the offense behavior. Id. at
104; see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10(3) (instructing courts to consider the danger
perceived by the defendant and the victim’s reputation for violence). In this case,
there was testimony that Mr. Lane made sexually explicit remarks to a female
officer, threatened Mr. Verbickas immediately before the assault, and made an
aggressive move toward him. Indeed, the District Court noted Mr. Lane’s “surly”
behavior in granting the departure.
The aberrant behavior exception may apply in an exceptional case when
“the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal
transaction that (1) was committed without significant planning; (2) was of
limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an
otherwise law-abiding life.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20(a), (b). The conduct for which
Mr. Verbickas was convicted meets the three requirements of § 5K2.20(b), and
there is substantial evidence in the record that this was also an exceptional case,
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thus warranting a departure. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Appellants’ convictions and
sentences.
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No. 03-1515, United States v. Verbickas
No. 03-1522, United States v. LaVallee
No. 03-1523, United States v. Schultz
No. 04-1000, United States v. Verbickas
No. 04-1540, United States v. Schultz
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the judgment but write separately to address the issue of
Grundy’s disqualification, as it relates to LaVallee and Schultz, in greater detail.
I.
Grundy’s relationship with the defendants was first brought to the attention
of the district court in July 2001, when defendant Gall, who was later acquitted,
filed a motion to suppress statements he gave to FBI agents and prosecutors
during the pre-indictment investigation. 1 In support of his motion, Gall argued
that he was confused and/or misled by Grundy regarding his right to legal
representation at the time he gave the statements to the FBI agents and
prosecutors. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Gall’s motion on
September 25, 2001. ROA, Vol. X. Upon being called by Gall’s defense counsel,
Grundy first testified generally about her duties at USP-Florence in 1999.
According to Grundy, in early 1999 she “was the supervisory attorney with
Defendant Pruyne filed a similar motion, but ultimately withdrew it.
1
ROA, Vol. X, at 142.
responsibilities for providing legal services to” employees “of the facilities at
Florence” “[i]n connection with their jobs . . . .” Id. at 93. With respect to
correctional officers who were sued by inmates alleging abuse, Grundy testified
that she would “assist the staff member, if they request[ed] representation by the
Department of Justice, in obtaining representation or making the request itself . . .
.” Id. In doing so, she would “ask them” for their version of “what happened.”
Id. Then, “[i]f representation [wa]s granted,” she would “assist the United States
attorney’s office . . . in providing the defense to the civil suit of that particular
employee.” Id. Grundy then testified about her dealings with defendant Gall. In
1997, Grundy was contacted by either the FBI or an attorney from the DOJ’s
Civil Rights Division staff and informed that they “would be looking to interview
certain correctional officer witnesses . . . .” Id. at 126. Grundy was further
informed that, other than being criminal in nature, she could not be told the nature
of the investigation being conducted. Id. at 128. In March 1999, and again in
July 1999, Grundy was asked by investigators to arrange interviews for them with
defendant Gall. Id. at 129. In arranging those interviews, Grundy informed Gall
that DOJ lawyers and FBI agents were interested in speaking with him, id., and
that he was free to speak or not speak with them. Id. at 130. Grundy further
informed Gall that she “could not help him with” the interviews and that she
“wasn’t going in there.” Id. at 131. According to Grundy, Gall did not ask her to
arrange legal or union representation for him. Id. at 131-32. The district court
-2-
ultimately denied Gall’s motion. Id. at 236.
Approximately nineteen months later, on April 21, 2003 (the tenth day of
trial), all of the defendants filed a joint motion to disqualify Grundy for violating
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6(a), 1.9, and 1.11(b) and (e). ROA,
Vol. V, Doc. 1080. In their motion, defendants alleged that Grundy, who by that
time was working as an assistant general counsel for the BOP nationally, provided
prior representation to them in several respects. In particular, defendants alleged
that while they were employed as correctional officers at USP-Florence, various
civil actions were filed against them by inmates, and that Grundy acted as their
legal counsel in connection with these actions. Id. at 2-3. One such civil action
was filed by inmate William Turner and concerned the same alleged conduct that
was listed as one of the overt acts in Count I of the superseding indictment, and
that formed the basis for Count VIII of the superseding indictment (the jury
acquitted defendants LaVallee, Schultz, and Bond on this latter count). In turn,
defendants alleged that Grundy played two roles in the prosecution of the case
against them. First, defendants alleged that Grundy “provided ‘liaison’
coordination between the BOP and the United States Attorney’s Office
prosecuting this action until sometime prior to April 1, 2002 as a BOP employee.”
Id. Second, defendants alleged that “Grundy became a contract attorney for the
United States Attorney prosecuting th[e] matter before the commencement of
th[e] trial.” Id. “In that role,” defendants alleged, “Grundy participated in
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witness interviews with the witnesses to be called by the prosecution . . . .” Id.
Based upon these allegations, defendants alleged that “a conflict of interest
exist[ed] and [that],” pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct
cited in their motion, “Grundy’s representation of the United States in this matter
require[d] her disqualification.” Id.
Upon receiving the motion, the district court asked the lead prosecutor to
explain Grundy’s “role in th[e] case.” ROA, Vol. LVI, at 2195. The lead
prosecutor explained that Grundy
ha[d] been assigned by the [BOP] to assist and manage witnesses and
just general management of the trial and act as liaison to the
prosecution team in order to make sure we get people in and out at
the right times and assist with travel and documents and basically
logistics for the most part. She is not hired by the U.S. Attorney’s
office. She is not a special assistant U.S. attorney.
Id. at 2195-96. In addition, the lead prosecutor stated that Grundy “was a general
counsel or assistant general counsel for the [BOP]” and “d[id]n’t represent the
defendants.” Id. at 2196. The district court stated it was “tempted to summarily
deny th[e motion] as late,” but would instead first give the government a chance
to respond in writing. Id.
On April 28, 2003, the government filed its written response to defendants’
motion to disqualify Grundy. Id., Vol. V, Doc. 1120. Therein, the government
asserted that Grundy “[wa]s not a contract attorney for the United States Attorney
prosecuting the case at bar,” but rather was “Counsel for the [BOP] and ha[d]
-4-
been facilitating the appearance of [BOP] staff at th[e] trial.” Id. at 1. “As such,”
the government argued, Grundy’s “presence in the court c[ould not] be equated
with the representation of the United States in the prosecution of th[e] case.” Id.
Further, the government argued that “[i]n her role as Counsel for the [BOP],”
Grundy “represented the [BOP] and not the employees of her agency.” Id. at 2.
Although the government acknowledged that Grundy acted as “a conduit through
which [prison] employees obtained representation from the U.S. Department of
Justice and United States Attorney’s Office for civil suits filed against them in
their official capacities,” it asserted that such actions were “insufficient to create
an attorney-client relationship” with the individual prison employees she assisted.
Id. Relatedly, the government asserted that defense counsel were “already aware
that civil attorneys from the U.S. Department of Justice and/or the United States
Attorney’s Office represented their clients in the various suits filed against them
by inmates as they ha[d] already moved for notes and statements provided to
these attorneys by their clients.” Id. at 3. Lastly, the government asserted that
“Grundy [wa]s not going to be called as a witness for the government” at trial.
Id.
On April 28, 2003 (the same day the government filed its written response),
the district court orally denied defendants’ motion to disqualify Ms. Grundy.
ROA, Vol. LX, at 3212. In doing so, the district court simply stated: “I find it to
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be utterly without merit.” 2 Id.
II.
In their opening appellate briefs, LaVallee and Schultz contend that the
inclusion of Jenifer Grundy on the prosecution team was a clear conflict of
interest. (LaVallee’s Br. at 2, issue 3; and Schultz’s Br. at 42, issue 5.) Both
LaVallee and Schultz have incorporated by reference the discussion of the Grundy
issue contained in Verbickas’ opening appellate brief. Verbickas’ brief, in turn,
repeatedly emphasizes that each of the defendants, including LaVallee and
Schultz, had an attorney-client relationship with Grundy. In particular,
Verbickas’ brief states:
• “The [district] court was made aware of the conflict presented by
Grundy’s representation of Pruyne, LaVallee, Schultz and Bond at
the hearing held on July 11, 2001.” Verbickas’ Br. at 28 (emphasis
added).
• “Grundy had an attorney-client relationship with the Defendants
because of her position as legal counsel to the USP Florence
employees. During the investigation of this case, all Defendants
worked as correctional officers at USP Florence. As a result of their
employment, numerous civil actions were filed by inmates alleging
some of the Defendants violated their civil rights, including: Turner
v. Schultz, et al., 99-WM-2232 . . . . These civil actions alleged so-
called ‘Bivens’ violations against the Defendants and other
correctional officers. LaVallee, Schultz and Bond, three co-
defendants in this trial, were named as Defendants in Turner." Id. at
31 (emphasis added).
• “Grundy represented Pruyne and these Defendants regarding their
2
The government, in its appellate brief, asserts the district court denied the
motion as untimely. That assertion, however, is not supported by the record.
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requests for DOJ representation. She entered into an attorney-client
relationship with Defendants and gathered relevant information
regarding their requests to be afforded DOJ legal representation in
these civil actions.” Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
• “Grundy’s relationship with the Defendants proved there were
attorney-client relationships that subjected her to the ethical
obligation of preserving confidential communications.” Id. at 38
(emphasis added).
• “The Defendants looked to Grundy as their lawyer.” Id. at 38
(emphasis added).
• “Grundy advised Defendants.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
• “Grundy’s prior relationship with the Defendants constitutes actual
impropriety under Colorado law.” Id. at 42.
In sum, the allegations in Verbickas’ brief are sufficiently detailed to suggest the
district court erred in denying LaVallee’s and Schultz’s motion to disqualify
Grundy.
II.
We “review a district court’s decision on a motion to disqualify counsel for
abuse of discretion.” Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 839 (10th Cir. 2005);
see United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 321 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). “The
merits of [a] disqualification motion depend on whether a substantial relationship
exists between the pending suit and the matter in which the challenged attorney
previously represented the client.” Bolton, 905 F.2d at 321 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In reviewing the district court’s ruling, the threshold question is whether an
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attorney-client relationship existed between Grundy and either LaVallee or
Schultz. According to defendants’ motion, a USP-Florence inmate named
William Turner filed a federal civil action against LaVallee and Schultz (as well
as defendant Bond) asserting they violated his constitutional rights by physically
abusing him. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that
LaVallee and Schultz sought and received representation from the Department of
Justice with respect to this civil action and, in doing so, worked at least initially
with Grundy. Based upon the testimony Grundy gave during the evidentiary
hearing on defendant Gall’s motion, it appears that she would have interviewed
LaVallee and Schultz in order to obtain their version of events and, in turn, would
have assisted them in obtaining representation from other DOJ attorneys. As the
supervisory attorney at USP-Florence, Grundy followed this general procedure
when a USP-Florence employee sought DOJ representation after being sued by an
inmate. Assuming these facts are true (the government has never seriously
disputed these facts), it appears that an attorney-client relationship did, in fact,
exist between Grundy and these two defendants. According to 28 C.F.R. §
50.15(a)(3), “[a]ttorneys employed by any component of the Department of
Justice who participate in any process utilized for the purpose of determining
whether the [DOJ] should provide representation to a federal employee,
undertake a full and traditional attorney-client relationship with the employee
with respect to application of the attorney-client privilege.” This provision would
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clearly encompass Grundy, since she allegedly “participate[d] in [the] process
utilized” by the DOJ for determining whether it would provide representation to
USP-Florence employees.
Assuming, then, that Grundy had an attorney-client relationship with
LaVallee and Schultz regarding the William Turner lawsuit, the question then
becomes whether, pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct cited
by defendants in their original motion, that relationship barred Grundy from
acting as a “liaison” to the DOJ attorneys prosecuting the defendants.
Defendants first cited to Rule 1.6(a), entitled Confidentiality of
Information, which states:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
Applying that rule to the circumstances here, there is no evidence, and no express
assertion by defendants, that Grundy revealed to the prosecution team any
information that was provided to her by LaVallee or Schultz in connection with
the civil suit filed against them by inmate Turner. Nor does it appear to be a
reasonable assumption that, by simply coordinating BOP witnesses for the
prosecution team, Grundy necessarily would have disclosed any such information.
Thus, there is no basis for concluding that Grundy’s role as “liaison” to the
prosecution team resulted in a violation of Rule 1.6(a).
-9-
The second rule cited by defendants was Rule 1.9(a), entitled Conflict of
Interest: Former Client, which states:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse
to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents
after consultation.
Applying that rule to the circumstances present here, it appears, for the reasons
already discussed, that Grundy likely had an attorney-client relationship with
LaVallee and Schultz in connection with the civil lawsuit filed by inmate Turner.
Further, as noted, that civil lawsuit was apparently based upon some of the same
allegations of abuse as set forth in the superseding indictment. Thus, Rule 1.9(a)
would have prohibited Grundy from representing any interests that were adverse
to defendants LaVallee and Schultz. Based upon the information contained in the
government’s response to defendants’ motion to disqualify Grundy, however,
there is no indication that she ever acted as government counsel in these criminal
proceedings. In other words, although defendants have characterized Grundy as a
“member of the prosecution team,” it appears that she, in fact, simply helped to
coordinate BOP witnesses for the DOJ attorneys who represented the government
in this case, and otherwise played no role in the investigation or prosecution of
the charges against defendants. Thus, Rule 1.9(a) was not violated. 3
3
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Grundy could have been
considered a member of the prosecution team, any resulting violation of Rule
(continued...)
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Finally, defendants cited Rule 1.11, entitled Successive Government and
Private Employment, which states, in pertinent part:
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having
information that the lawyer knows is confidential government
information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public
officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the
information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake
or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified
lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.
***
(e) As used in this Rule, the term “confidential government
information” means information which has been obtained under
governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the
government is prohibited from disclosing to the public or has a legal
privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the
public.
Clearly, this rule has no application here, since Grundy has continuously worked
for the BOP and has never worked in private practice representing a private
client.
In sum, I conclude there was no merit to defendants’ motion to disqualify
Grundy, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that
(...continued)
3
1.9(a) was harmless. In particular, the jury acquitted defendants LaVallee and
Schultz of the substantive charge that alleged the beating of inmate William
Turner. Further, LaVallee’s and Schultz’s conspiracy convictions rested upon
their role in beating inmate Pedro Castillo and then concealing evidence of that
beating.
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motion.
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