F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 4, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-2153
v. (D. New Mexico)
LUIS DAVID MACHUCA, (D.C. No. CR-04-1048-RB)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK , Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Luis David Machuca pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment,
followed by four years of supervised release. Mr. Machuca filed a timely Notice
of Appeal, and his counsel, Jose Coronado, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), moving to withdraw as counsel. For the reasons
set forth below, we agree with Mr. Coronado that the record in this case provides
no nonfrivolous basis for an appeal, and we therefore grant his motion to
withdraw and dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Machuca was arrested on February 7, 2004, after police officers who
had stopped a car in which he was a passenger discovered bags of a white
substance containing 5.3 grams of pure methamphetamine on his person and a
loaded firearm under the passenger seat. Mr. Machuca was then indicted by a
grand jury and pled guilty to the indictment without a plea agreement. The court
accepted Mr. Machuca’s plea after informing him of the constitutional rights he
would thereby waive and establishing the factual basis for the plea. Mr. Machuca
indicated at the plea hearing that he contested his possession of a firearm, and the
court indicated that that was not part of the indicted charge.
The United States Probation Office then prepared a presentence report
(“PSR”), which calculated an imprisonment range based on the United States
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Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (Nov. 2003). Using the
method of converting the actual methamphetamine amount to its marijuana
equivalent, the PSR set a base offense level of 26. The PSR suggested a two-
level enhancement pursuant to USSG §2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm,
and a two-level reduction pursuant to USSG §3E1.1(a) for acceptance of
responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 26.
In its calculation of a criminal history score, the PSR assessed four points
under USSG §4A1.1(b) based on two prior sentences of between sixty days and
thirteen months, six points under USSG §4A1.1(c) based on six other prior
sentences, two points under USSG §4A1.1(d) because the instant offense had
occurred while Mr. Machuca was on probation for a prior offense, and one point
under USSG §4A1.1(e) because the instant offense had occurred less than two
years after Mr. Machuca’s release from imprisonment. This yielded a total of
eleven points because a maximum of four points under USSG §4A1.1(c) are
allowed in the calculation. This established a criminal history category of V. The
resulting Guideline imprisonment range was 110 to 137 months.
Mr. Machuca objected to the §2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement for firearm
possession, submitting a letter from the driver of the vehicle in which the firearm
was found, in which the driver admitted owning the firearm. Mr. Machuca also
objected to the criminal history points assessed under §4A1.1(c), arguing that he
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was uncertain whether he had waived his right to counsel in those six cases, and
he further objected to the criminal history points assessed under §4A1.1(d) and
(e), arguing that these points double counted convictions for which he had already
been assessed points under §4A1.1(b) and (c). The government submitted a
response suggesting the §2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement may be unwarranted, and
indicating an additional one-level reduction in the offense level was warranted for
acceptance of responsibility.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated it would accept the
government’s concession regarding the §2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, and its
requested additional one-level reduction, without further argument. Documents
were then submitted indicating that Mr. Machuca had waived his right to counsel
in four of the six cases assessed points under §4A1.1(c). The court determined
that leaving the other two cases off the points calculation would have no effect on
criminal history category, since the maximum number of points assessable under
that subsection, as indicated above, was four. Based on a recalculated offense
level of 23, the Guideline imprisonment range was 84 to 105 months. After
hearing argument on other factors relevant to sentencing, the court sentenced
Mr. Machuca to 84 months, the low end of the Guideline range.
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DISCUSSION
Under Anders , “counsel [may] request permission to withdraw [from an
appeal] where counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that any
appeal would be wholly frivolous.” United States v. Calderon , 428 F.3d 928, 930
(10th Cir. 2005) (citing Anders , 386 U.S. at 744). This process requires counsel
to
submit a brief to the client and the appellate court indicating any
potential appealable issues based on the record. The client may then
choose to submit arguments to the court. The [c]ourt must then
conduct a full examination of the record to determine whether
defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous. If the court concludes after
such an examination that the appeal is frivolous, it may grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and may dismiss the appeal.
Id. (citing Anders , 386 U.S. at 744).
In this case, Mr. Machuca’s counsel filed his Anders brief in September
2005. Although six months have now passed, Mr. Machuca has not filed a
response. We therefore base our conclusions on counsel’s brief and our own
review of the record.
Mr. Machuca pled guilty without a plea agreement, and he did not file a
motion in district court to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing. In the
absence of a waiver of the right to appeal in a plea agreement, a plea may be set
aside on direct appeal if the court holds it was not knowing and voluntary. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e); United States v. Asch , 207 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir.
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2000). Having carefully reviewed the record, we see no basis for such a claim
here.
As recognized by counsel, the only other possible basis for an appeal must
relate to Mr. Machuca’s sentence. We agree with counsel that there is no
nonfrivolous issue related to the district court’s application of the Guidelines.
Counsel also indicates that, “[w]hile the court did not specifically address
whether there was a basis for disregarding the guidelines and exercis[ing] its
discretion, it is hard to imagine why the court would . . . sentence Mr. Machuca
outside the guideline range,” in light of his “somewhat extensive criminal
history.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. While we encourage district courts to refer
explicitly to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “[w]e will
‘not demand that the district court recite any magic words to show us that it
fulfilled its responsibility.’” United States v. Mares , 441 F.3d 1152, 1161 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Contreras- Martinez , 409 F.3d 1236, 1242
(10th Cir. 2005) (further quotation omitted)). We conclude from our review of
the record that there is no indication that the district court failed to consider the
appropriate factors, or that the presumption of reasonableness arising from the
imposition of a sentence within the Guideline range, see United States v. Kristl ,
437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), could be overcome based on
the facts of this case.
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Our review of the record reveals no other claims arguable on their merits,
and we accordingly conclude that Mr. Machuca’s appeal is wholly frivolous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and
this appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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