F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
July 7, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
GLEN N A . W RIGH T,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
v. No. 05-1383
FED ERAL B UR EA U O F PR ISONS
and JO E L. N O RWO O D ,
Respondents - Appellees.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 04-CV-2667-REB/BNB)
David Alan Lewis, Brooklyn, New York (Colleen B. Scissors, Offices of Colleen
B. Scissors, LLC, Grand Junction, Colorado, on the briefs), appearing for
Appellant.
Jerry N. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, (W illiam J. Leone, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the
District of C olorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Appellees.
M ary Price, Esq., General Counsel, Families Against M andatory M inimums,
Denver, Colorado, and Philip A. Cherner, Esq., Law Office Of Philip A. Cherner,
W ashington, DC, for Amicus Curiae for Families Against M andatory M inimums.
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge.
In 1996, Petitioner-A ppellant Glenn W right was convicted of interstate
transportation of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A and
sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment; he began serving his sentence on M ay
24, 1996. M r. W right will not be incarcerated for the entire 168 months,
however, and the question this appeal raises is how early he will be released.
Based on its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), the federal statute governing
the calculation of credit for good conduct in prison, the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) predicts that M r. W right will earn 635 days of good time credit. Under
M r. W right’s interpretation of the statute, he predicts that he will earn 729 days of
good time credit. In December 2004, he petitioned the District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to dispute BOP’s method of
calculation. The District Court denied his petition; we take jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a) and AFFIRM .
I.
This appeal presents a straightforward case of statutory interpretation. The
statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), allows a prisoner to earn credit toward the
service of his sentence for exemplary conduct in prison. The provision provides
in relevant part:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the
prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward the service of the
prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the
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end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at
the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the
Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed
exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. . . .
[C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of
imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks
of the sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (emphasis added). The BOP issued a regulation, after
notice and comment, see 5 U.S.C. § 553, interpreting the emphasized portion of
the statute. The regulation provides that the BOP will “award 54 days credit
toward service of sentence . . . for each year served.” 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(a)
(emphasis added). The BOP has also issued, as part of its Sentence Computation
M anual, Program Statement 5880.28, which provides a formula for calculating
good-time credit on sentences exceeding a year and a day. As the Seventh Circuit
has explained:
[The] formula is based on the premise that for every day a prisoner
serves on good behavior, he may receive a certain amount of credit
toward the service of his sentence, up to a total of fifty-four days for
each full year. Thus, under the Bureau’s formula, a prisoner earns
.148 days’ credit for each day served on good behavior (54 / 365 =
.148), and for ease of administration the credit is awarded only in
whole day amounts. Recognizing that most sentences will end in a
partial year, the Bureau’s formula provides that the maximum
available credit for that partial year must be such that the number of
days actually served will entitle the prisoner (on the .148-per-day
basis) to a credit that when added to the time served equals the time
remaining on the sentence.
White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004), cert denied, White v.
Hobart, --- U.S. ---, 125 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2005). In other words, the BOP reads
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the statute as mandating good time credits to be calculated based on the amount of
time served in prison.
M r. W right argues, however, that § 3624(b)(1) unambiguously requires
good time credit to be calculated based upon the sentence imposed, as opposed to
the time served. Therefore, according to M r. W right, he is entitled to fifty-four
days of good-time credit for each of the fourteen years to which he was
sentenced, minus any deductions for disciplinary violations.
II.
Because this case involves an administrative agency’s construction of a
statute, our analysis is governed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, we first determine “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If so,
our inquiry is at an end; “the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.’” Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). If,
on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, we will
determine whether the agency’s view is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
W e review issues of statutory construction de novo. Robbins v. Chronister,
435 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “‘[O]ur task is to interpret the
words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.’” Hain v.
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M ullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Dickerson v.
New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U .S. 103, 118 (1983)). Our starting point, as always,
is the language employed by Congress. Id. W e read the words of the statute “in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132-133; Hain, 436 F.3d at 1177.
Our focus in this case is directed at the meaning of “term of imprisonment.”
The phrase has inconsistent meanings throughout § 3624. For example, § 3624(a)
states that “[a] prisoner shall be released by the [BO P] on the date of the
expiration of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, less any time credited tow ard
the service of the prisoner’s sentence as provided in subsection (b).” Here, “term
of imprisonment” plainly refers to the “sentence imposed” since the BOP is
instructed to deduct time credited from the prisoner’s sentence. Perez-Olivo v.
Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2005). In § 3624(d), however, the same phrase
means “time served.” That section provides that “[u]pon the release of a prisoner
on the expiration of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, the [B OP] shall furnish
the prisoner with [suitable clothing, an amount of money not to exceed $500, and
transportation].” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(d). Indeed, “[i]t would make no sense to
provide [a prisoner] these amenities at a time when the prisoner’s original
imposed sentence had expired— a date that would obviously occur after the
prisoner had been released based on good time credits.” Perez-O livo, 394 F.3d at
49 (quoting Loeffler v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 04-4627, 2004 W L 2417805, at *3
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(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004)).
The phrase is also used three times in the first sentence of § 3624(b)(1).
The provision applies to a prisoner “serving a term of imprisonment of more than
1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner’s life.”
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (emphasis added). Here, the phrase means “sentence
imposed” since the statute only applies to prisoners w ho have been sentenced to
more than one year’s imprisonment and less than life. Yi v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 2005). The BOP must be able to determine,
on the first day the prisoner arrives in prison, if he will be eligible for good time
credits. If, on the other hand, the phrase meant “time served” then a prisoner
“who initially would be eligible for the credit because his sentence was, say, 366
days, would become ineligible once the credit was taken into account.” White,
390 F.3d at 1001.
But the specific use of the phrase at issue here describes not how to
determine whether a prisoner is eligible for good time credits, but how (and
w hen) to calculate them. A t the end of each year of imprisonment, if the BOP
determines that the prisoner’s behavior during that year was exemplary, then it
may award up to fifty-four days credit toward service of the prisoner’s sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). The statute contemplates retrospective annual assessment
of a prisoner’s behavior— that is, Congress intended that prisoners earn good time
credits by “display[ing] exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary
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regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). To interpret “term of imprisonment” to
mean “sentence imposed,” as M r. W right suggests, an inmate could receive credit
for time when he was not in prison at all. See White, 390 F.3d at 1002. For
example, M r. W right suggests that he is entitled to fifty-four days of credit for
each of the fourteen years to which he was sentenced (minus any deductions for
less-than-exemplary behavior), even though it is undisputed that M r. W right will
not serve any of his fourteenth year. Simply put, “[a]n inmate w ho is not in
prison cannot ‘earn’ credit for compliance with disciplinary regulations,” Yi, 412
F.3d at 532, and M r. W right’s reading of the statute w ould appear to frustrate
Congress’s intent, see Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
such a reading would “conflict with § 3624’s directive that good time be
calculated at the end of each year” based on the prisoner’s actual behavior during
that year).
M r. W right next argues that his reading is bolstered by the use of the w ord
“credit” in § 3624(b)(1). He suggests that “credit” means “deduction from an
amount otherwise due” and can only refer to the sentence imposed since it is
impossible to get “credit” for time served, because that time is no longer due. W e
agree with M r. W right that a prisoner receives “credit” toward his sentence
imposed. Indeed, the statute explicitly says as much: a prisoner “may receive
credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
W e disagree, however, with M r. W right’s conclusion that this renders the use of
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the phrase “term of imprisonment” to unambiguously mean “sentence imposed.”
Nor does legislative history resolve this dispute. See Anderson v. U.S.
Dept. of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2005) (ordinary tools of
statutory construction include consultation of legislative history). Although
earlier good time credit statutes revealed a clear Congressional intent to calculate
credits based on the sentence imposed, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (repealed
1984), the legislative history of the current statute does not indicate any
Congressional intent to calculate credits based on the sentence imposed as
opposed to the time served. Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 50. Nor do some
congresspersons’ general statements made shortly after the passage of the statute
evidence a clear congressional intent to calculate credits based on the sentence
imposed. See, e.g., 131 Cong. Rec. E37-02 (Jan 3, 1985) (Statement of Rep. Lee
Hamilton) (“Now sentences w ill be reduced only 15% for good behavior”); see
also Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 51 (stating that the general statements do not
resolve ambiguity in the phrase “term of imprisonment”).
Nevertheless, M r. W right argues that there is a presumption that identical
words appearing in different parts of the same statute have the same meaning and
that the presumption is strongest when a term is repeated in a single sentence.
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). The rule of consistency, as M r.
W right acknowledges, is only a presumption. “[T]he presumption is not rigid and
readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the
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words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
employed . . . with different intent.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 595 (2004). Indeed, as discussed above, the phrase means different
things in § 3624(a) (sentence imposed) and § 3624(d) (time served). As for the
issue at hand, we hold, in accordance with nearly every circuit court to consider
the issue, that “term of imprisonment” is ambiguous as it is susceptible to more
than one interpretation. See Bernitt v. M artinez, 432 F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir.
2005); Sash, 428 F.3d at 136; Petty v. Stine, 424 F.3d 509, 510 (6th Cir. 2005);
Brown v. M cFadden, 416 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005); Yi, 412 F.3d at
533; O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005); Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d
at 52; White, 390 F.3d at 1002–03; Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266,
1269–70 (9th Cir. 2001); but see Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d
180, 186 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 3624(b)(1) unambiguously directs good
time credits to be calculated at the end of each year of time served).
Before proceeding to the second step of our Chevron analysis, we briefly
digress to resolve an intermediate argument raised by M r. W right. M r. W right
contends that Chevron deference is inappropriate in this case because if a
sentencing statute is ambiguous, we must apply the rule of lenity to construe the
ambiguity in his favor. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (stating
that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity”). Indeed, the rule of lenity applies “not only to interpretations of
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the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they
impose.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). The principle of
lenity is founded on two firmly-rooted ideas in this country’s tradition: “First, a
fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. . . .
Second . . . legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.” Bass, 404
U.S. at 348 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
W e conclude that the rule of lenity does not apply here. Section 3624(b) is
neither a substantive criminal statute nor does it prescribe the punishment
imposed for a violation of such a statute. Sentencing credits are awarded to those
prisoners who behave in prison— they “are awarded to ensure administrative order
in prisons, not to further the punitive goals of the criminal law.” Sash, 428 F.3d
at 134–35. Further, neither of the rule’s underlying principles are implicated
here. As an administrative tool, rather than a punitive measure, the ambiguity of
§ 3624(b) “does not result in any lack of notice to potential violators of the law of
the scope of the punishment that awaits them.” Sash, 428 F.3d at 134. M oreover,
because § 3624(b) is not criminal in nature, neither the courts nor the BOP have
infringed upon the role of the legislature to define what constitutes criminal
activity and how it should be punished. Id. at 135.
Having concluded that the statute is ambiguous, and that the rule of lenity
does not apply, the next step in the Chevron analysis is to determine whether the
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BOP’s interpretation of the statute is a permissible one. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843. 1 As the preceding discussion shows, the BOP’s interpretation of
§ 3624(b)(1) is clearly a reasonable one. The statute directs that a prisoner “may
receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence . . . at the end of each
year.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). “This is a clear congressional directive that the
BOP look retroactively at a prisoner’s conduct over the prior year, which makes it
reasonable for the BOP only to award [good time credits] for time served.”
Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 53. Indeed, every circuit to consider the issue has also
concluded that such an interpretation is reasonable. See Bernitt, 432 F.3d at 869;
Sash, 428 F.3d at 136; Petty, 424 F.3d at 510; Brown, 416 F.3d at 1272–73; Yi,
412 F.3d at 534; O’Donald, 402 F.3d at 174; Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 53; White,
390 F.3d at 1003; Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, the D istrict Court’s order dismissing M r.
W right’s petition for a w rit of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.
1
Congress has implicitly delegated interpretative authority over this issue to
the BOP. Perez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 52; Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270.
Accordingly, the BOP’s interpretation of the statute is afforded full Chevron
deference and we “may not substitute [our] ow n construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391 F.3d
1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004)
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05-1383, Wright v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
O’BRIEN, J. concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. If the statutory language
were ambiguous, I would join in the majority’s reasoning and discussion
affording Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. But,
like the Fifth Circuit, I think the statute unambiguously specifies the method by
which good time is to be calculated. M oreland v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 431
F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2005). The Bureau of Prisons has been faithful to that
method.
W right’s term of imprisonment is 168 months; that is also 14 years or 5112
days. It commenced M ay 24, 1996. W right may legitimately ask, “W hen do I get
out?” A bsent good time credits the answer is quite simple. Each day W right
serves reduces the remaining days by one. It is (or can be) calculated and
credited daily. Provisions for good time credit add a wrinkle and prompt other
questions.
W ith respect to good time credit W right may ask, “How much good time
credit do I get, when is it to be credited and how is it to be credited?” The
statute answers each question with straight-forward language. 1
1
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) provides in relevant part:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1
year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the
(continued...)
First, the amount is unambiguous, because it is easy to calculate. It
depends upon the prisoner’s conduct but “cannot exceed 54 days per year.”
Second, when it is to be credited is also unambiguous and the calculations
are, again, simple. It is to be credited “at the end of each year of the prisoner’s
term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term,” the
sentence anniversary date. A term of imprisonment expressed in months must be
converted into years in order to determine anniversary dates; for a fourteen year
sentence with no good time credits, there are 13. 2 The credit is to be applied
annually on the anniversary date.
Finally, how the credit is to be applied seems to be equally clear and the
calculations equally simple. Good time credit is to applied “toward the service of
the prisoner’s sentence.” A prisoner serves his sentence day by day. He expects
to, and does, receive credit against the “term of imprisonment” for each day he
1
(...continued)
prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward the service of the
prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the
end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at
the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the
Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed
exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.. . .
[C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of
imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks
of the sentence.
2
All other things being equal, the 14 th anniversary would be the release
date.
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has served. Thus, to calculate the time remaining in a “term of imprisonment” the
imposed term must be converted to days. A 168 month sentence beginning M ay
24, 1996, ends M ay 23, 2010. That is 5112 days, including the extra days in leap
years. Each day served is deducted from the total days to be served. At the end
of the first year the prisoner has 4747 days remaining (5112-365 = 4747). If the
prisoner earned maximum good time during that year it must be credited on the
sentence anniversary date. Using the method for crediting time actually served
(deducting it from the time remaining) the prisoner would then have 4693 days
remaining in his “term of imprisonment” (4747-54 = 4693). The calculations
continue, granting daily credit for time actually served and annual credit for good
time earned, until the days remaining equal zero. Following is a spread sheet
example (faithful to statutory language) of a 14 year sentence with maximum
good time credits. It is intended for illustrative purposes only and does not
purport to be the Bureau of Prisons’ actual calculation here.
G oo d T im e C om pu tation — 1 4 year sen ten ce
B e g in D a te End D a te Ye ars M on th s Days
5 / 23 / 20 1
5 / 24 / 19 9 6 14 168 5 1 12
0
A nn ive rsary Ye a r Se rved Tim e G o o d T im e To tal C redit D a ys left a fter cred it Relea se D a te
5 / 24 / 19 9 6 0 5 1 12 5 / 23 / 20 1 0
5 / 24 / 19 9 7 1 365 54 419 4 6 93 3 / 30 / 20 1 0
5 / 24 / 19 9 8 2 365 54 419 4 2 74 2 / 4/ 2 01 0
5 / 24 / 19 9 9 3 365 54 419 3 8 55 1 2 /1 2 /2 0 09
5 / 24 / 20 0 0 4 366 54 420 3 4 35 1 0 /1 9 /2 0 09
5 / 24 / 20 0 1 5 365 54 419 3 0 16 8 / 26 / 20 0 9
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5 / 24 / 20 0 2 6 365 54 419 2 5 97 7 / 3/ 2 00 9
5 / 24 / 20 0 3 7 365 54 419 2 1 78 5 / 10 / 20 0 9
5 / 24 / 20 0 4 8 366 54 420 1 7 58 3 / 17 / 20 0 9
5 / 24 / 20 0 5 9 365 54 419 1 3 39 1 / 22 / 20 0 9
5 / 24 / 20 0 6 10 365 54 419 920 1 1 /2 9 /2 0 08
5 / 24 / 20 0 7 11 365 54 419 501 1 0 /6 / 20 0 8
5 / 24 / 20 0 8 12 366 54 420 81 8 / 13 / 20 0 8
7 / 31 / 20 0 8 12 68 12 80 1 8 / 1/ 2 00 8
8 / 1/ 2 00 8 R e le ase D ate 0
Serv ed a s o f 7 / 31 / 20 0 8 4 4 51
G T C red it (7 / 31 / 20 0 8) 660
T ota l C red it (7 / 31 / 20 0 8) 5 1 11
_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _
___
Su m m ary
Im p o se d S erv e d Go od T im e P e rc en tag e
5 1 12 4 4 52 8 7 .0 9 %
5 1 12 660 1 2 .9 1 %
W right proposes a method for crediting good time at odds with the
practices of the Bureau of Prisons. It is most clearly stated in the Brief of Amicus
Curiae, which W right explicitly adopted at oral argument:
Petitioner and Amicus, . . . read the statute literally to grant a
“credit,” that is a deduction, at the “end of each year” of the “term of
imprisonment” imposed, if “during that year,” the prisoner has been
well behaved. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Accordingly, after the prisoner
has served a year, the Bureau may apply a “credit,” by definition a
“deduction,” of up to 54 days from that year, if, “during that year,”
the prisoner was well behaved. This credit, applied to the prior year
of the term, establishes the day on which service of that year was
fully satisfied. If the prisoner is granted 54 days’ credit, he satisfied
service of the first year of the term of imprisonment on the 311th day
actually served. The 312th day served thus becomes the first day of
the second year of the term. After another year of the term has
passed, the B ureau must again look back and consider the prisoner’s
conduct during the preceding year and again make the appropriate
deduction, which establishes the date on which service of that year
was satisfied and the succeeding year begins, and so on. Honoring
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the exact wording of the statute, then, a prisoner will be eligible for
54 days for each year of the “term of imprisonment” imposed by the
sentencing court. The plain words of the statute are thus effectuated
without the need to read the phrase “term of imprisonment” to have
two different meanings – the “term imposed” and the “time served” –
in the single sentence in which it appears, as the Bureau of Prisons
does.
Amicus Br., Families Against M andatory M inimums, at 2-3.
A good lawyer can formulate an argument that makes a hash of almost any
statutory, regulatory or contractual language. 3 W e must look through the
argument. Our approach is practical and circumspect. “A s in all statutory
construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute.” Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). If the statutory language is not
ambiguous, and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,” further inquiry
is unneeded. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The plainness or ambiguity of
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
context in w hich that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.” Robinson v. Shell O il Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); see also U.S. Nat'l
3
Years ago Chief Justice Burger gave a speech lamenting the poor
courtroom competence of many lawyers. W ith tongue firmly in cheek, Art
Buchwald penned a retort as only he could, or would. Among other things he
said: “A competent, first class lawyer can tie a case up in knots not only for the
jury but for the judge as well. . . . It is the able lawyers [not the incompetent
ones] who should not be permitted in the courtroom since they are the ones who
are doing all the damage.” See, Art Buchwald, "Bad Lawyers Are Very Good for
the U.S. Justice System," 64 A.B.A. J. 328 (1978).
“An incompetent lawyer can delay a trial for months or years. A competent
lawyer can delay one even longer.” Evelle Younger.
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Bank of O r. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)
(“Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor, and, at a minimum, must account
for a statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure, and subject
matter.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
W right’s arguments present a possible, but implausible, gloss on
unambiguous statutory language. If we can fairly do so, we should avoid, not
beget, a construction of a statute making it ambiguous.
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