F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 14, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
H ERBER T D O U G LA S
M OSCO SO-M ORA LES,
Petitioner,
No. 05-9524
v. (No. A97-187-270)
(Petition for Review)
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, BR ISC OE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Herbert Douglas M oscoso-M orales petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ)
denial of his request for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ concluded
that petitioner was not eligible for asylum because he had not met his burden of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
establishing past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. This
conclusion was based on the IJ’s determination that petitioner was not credible
with regard to his fear of living in Colombia. The BIA adopted and affirmed the
IJ’s decision with some additional reasoning. W e have jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because w e conclude that the BIA’s
adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Colombia. He was raised in the
M ormon Church and spent most of his life in religious activity serving on various
committees and teaching. Petitioner married Nancy Elena Pineros-Sanchez in
2000. In January 2001, he was appointed a teacher at La M erced High School in
Ibague, which is about 100 miles west of the capitol. In Ibague, he became
interested in the political campaign of Juan Felipe Ortiz, who was also a church
member. M r. Ortiz was a member of the national liberal party and a member of
the local party called the Colombian Conservatives. Petitioner was quite active in
the campaign as the chief of debate and the advisor concerning television spots
for the candidate. He also did some campaigning in the northern parts of the city.
During this time, petitioner was also involved with an informal group called the
Veedors, which is translated as “auditors.” This group tried to root out corruption
in the local city government and bring it to the public’s attention.
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Petitioner testified that at the beginning of the school year in 2001, a man
approached him and told him that he should be instructing the students that they
should become a part of the People’s Army. This was a reference to FARC,
which is the principal revolutionary group in Colombia and has been responsible
for thousands of deaths in that country. Petitioner refused to cooperate with the
man and instead publicly denounced FA RC during class and in meetings with the
parents. He testified that on November 12, 2001, he was approached by two men
on motorcycles who blocked his path. They threw him to the ground and
threatened him and made him promise not to participate in any more political
activity. They told him he had no authorization from them to be involved in
political activity.
According to petitioner, after this incident, he received a telephone threat
that same day and then for the next few months he and his w ife received twelve to
fifteen calls that he described as threatening and vulgar. He testified that in many
of the calls the caller would describe what petitioner had been doing that day
which indicated to petitioner that he was being followed. Petitioner and his wife
finally stopped answ ering their phone and disconnected it. Although his affidavit
states that these were threats “against our lives” he testified that actually the
threats were against his wife’s life only.
Because of these telephone threats, petitioner and his wife decided to take a
trip to get aw ay from everything. They attended a M ormon celebration in
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Nauvoo, Illinois in June 2002 for a period of two weeks. They returned to
C olom bia, but decided to move to Bogota to live with petitioner’s mother. On
September 25, 2002, petitioner received a written death threat that was hand
delivered to his mother’s house. The letter stated “[w]e know of all your political
and informant activities for your M ormon cult” and it gave him twenty-four hours
to disappear or he would be “eliminated.” Admin. R. at 253. Petitioner bought
airline tickets to the United States and he and his wife left the next day. They
entered the United States on six-month visitor visas. W hile they were in the
United States, petitioner and his wife learned that Felix M artinez, another member
of their political organization, was assassinated. After hearing this new s,
petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal.
Scope of Review
The threshold question for consideration is “whether we review (1) the
BIA’s affirmance, (2) the IJ’s original analysis, or (3) both agency decisions.”
Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2006). In this case,
the BIA issued a single-member brief order. In such a case, the BIA’s decision is
the final order and “w e will not affirm on grounds raised in the IJ decision unless
they are relied upon by the BIA in its affirmance.” Id. W e can look to the IJ’s
decision, however, to provide a more complete explanation of the grounds relied
upon by the BIA . See id. “This is especially appropriate w here the B IA
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incorporates by reference the IJ’s rationale or repeats a condensed version of its
reasons while also relying on the IJ’s more complete discussion.” Id.
Standard of Review
“Although always deferential to agency fact-finding, we must ensure that
BIA conclusions are sufficiently supported by the available evidence.” Id. This
court reviews a BIA decision to determine w hether the factual findings “are
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the
record as a whole.” Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004).
Credibility determinations “are subject to the substantial evidence test.” Id.
“W here the B IA’s decision relies upon an IJ’s initial findings, we must ensure
that such determinations are substantially reasonable.” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at
1204 (quotation omitted). These credibility determinations will be upheld “so
long as the IJ provides specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving the w itness’
testimony. This standard of review is a deferential one, but we do not blindly
accept an IJ’s determination that an alien seeking asylum or restriction on
removal is not credible.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1152 (quotation and citation
omitted).
An adverse credibility determination may be based on inconsistencies in the
witness’ testimony, lack of sufficient detail, implausibility, or testimonial
demeanor. Id. at 1152-1153. “A n IJ’s finding that an applicant’s testimony is
implausible may not be based upon speculation, conjecture, or unsupported
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personal opinion.” Id. at 1153. This court is bound by the reasons given by the
agency, and may not affirm on other grounds. M ickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d
1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2003). This court may reverse and remand for further
proceedings when the IJ’s credibility determination is not adequately supported.
See Chaib v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005); Elzour, 378 F.3d at
1154.
Discussion
Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is a refugee, and
therefore eligible for asylum, by demonstrating that he suffered past persecution
or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Castaneda v. INS,
23 F.3d 1576, 1578 (10th Cir. 1994). Petitioner asserts that he has met his burden
of demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ
concluded, however, that petitioner had not met his burden because he had not
shown a genuine fear of living in Colombia. This determination was based in part
on petitioner’s decision to travel to the United States for two weeks in the
summer of 2002 and then return to Colombia even though he had been subjected
to threats before he took the trip. The IJ also doubted petitioner’s credibility
about the threats because there was an inconsistency in petitioner’s testimony
about w hether both his and his wife’s life had been threatened.
The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision in a brief order. The order
stated that it was providing some additions to the IJ’s decision and then it went on
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to state that the BIA agreed that the discrepancy in the testimony regarding who
received the threats and the petitioner’s actions with regard to returning
voluntarily to Colombia in 2002 supported the IJ’s decision. The BIA included
an additional paragraph giving further specific information about the
inconsistency in the testimony. Because the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s
decision, we can look to that decision to provide a more complete explanation for
the grounds provided by the BIA . See U anreroro, 443 F.3d at 1204.
W e conclude that the IJ did not sufficiently support his credibility findings
and that the BIA’s decision does not further clarify the credibility issue. This
court’s
review is confined to the reasoning given by the IJ [or the BIA], and
[the court] will not independently search the record for alternative
bases to affirm. If an agency decides a case on a ground believed by
an appellate court to be wrong, the case has to be remanded to the
agency.
Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150 (quotation and citation omitted).
Inconsistent Testimony
Both the IJ and the BIA found significant the inconsistency between
petitioner’s testimony about the telephone threats he and his wife received and the
statement in his affidavit about those threats. In the affidavit, petitioner stated
“[a]fter this day the telephone threats and offenses started at different hours of the
day, some listed where I had been during the day and with whom I had met,
others were only vulgar and others contained threats against our lives.”
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Admin. R. at 212. During the hearing, petitioner was questioned about these
telephone threats:
Q. . . . [T]hese telephone calls that you received after November
of [2001] and before you came to the United States the first
time, did they ever threaten you with death?
A. They threatened my wife and me.
Q. W ith death?
A. The death threats w ere directed to my wife. I think it was to
frighten me.
Q. But not against you?
A. No . . . .
Q. Because your statement stays that some of the threats were
vulgar and others were threats against our lives, but now
[you’re] saying it’s only against your wife, is that right?
A. Yes, we are one. I understand that if someone threatens my
wife, they threaten me.
Id. at 89. Petitioner’s testimony very ably explains w hy he stated in the affidavit
that the threats were against “our lives.”
Because petitioner testified that he did not receive any death threats against
his own life by phone, the BIA noted that this was inconsistent with a notarized
statement by someone known to petitioner, Carlos Guzman, which stated that
petitioner received death threats by phone between December of 2002 and the
start of 2003. The BIA’s ruling seems to confuse two periods of threats (the 2001
threats and the 2002-2003 threats) and fails to include a discussion of additional
relevant record evidence. The threats discussed in the testimony quoted above
occurred when petitioner and his w ife were still living in Ibague. The threats
referred to in M r. Guzman’s statement occurred after they left Colombia in 2002
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and were living in the United States. W hen he w as asked about M r. Guzman’s
statement later in the hearing, M r. M oscoso-M orales explained that threats
continued against him even after he left the country through calls made to the
high school where he had worked and to his political party’s headquarters. Id. at
90.
“Inconsistencies of less than substantial importance for which a plausible
explanation is offered cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility
finding.” Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation
omitted). This inconsistency identified by the BIA is of less than substantial
importance because regardless of whether or not petitioner received death threats
by phone, it is undisputed that he received a death threat in writing, which
prompted him immediately to flee from Colombia. This w ritten death threat is
not discussed by the B IA in its decision and goes to the heart of petitioner’s
asylum claim. M oreover, petitioner offered a plausible explanation for why he
stated in the affidavit that the telephone threats were against “our lives.”
Trip to the United States in 2002
Both the BIA and the IJ also found significant the fact that petitioner and
his wife decided voluntarily to return to Colombia after their two-week stay in the
United States in June 2002. The IJ stated that this demonstrated that petitioner
and his wife w ere not afraid to live in C olombia. Petitioner explained, however,
the reasons for his return after this initial visit to the United States. Before they
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left on their trip, petitioner had received one threat in person to stop his political
activity and had received threats over the telephone against his wife. Petitioner
testified that they did not consider staying in the United States at the time of that
trip because they “were under the illusion that [the telephone threats were] just
going to be something that would pass.” Admin R. at 93-94. Petitioner testified
that he did not apply for asylum on that trip because he “thought that everything
was going to be fine. [He thought] that the people that were protecting [him]
would be able to protect [him].” Id. at 90.
Although petitioner thought he could still live safely in Colombia, upon his
return from his trip to the United States, petitioner and his wife took the
precaution of moving from their town to the capitol city of Bogota. This move,
however, did not protect them. W ithin three months, petitioner received a letter
threatening his life if he did not leave within twenty-four hours. See id. at 77,
253. Petitioner and his wife took the threat seriously, fled immediately to the
United States, and ultimately sought asylum.
The IJ and BIA’s reliance on the fact that petitioner and his wife
voluntarily returned to Colombia in June 2002 does not consider all of the
relevant information. “W hen making a credibility determination, the IJ is
required to consider ‘the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors.’”
Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1210 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The IJ and
BIA’s reasoning is incomplete because it fails to consider petitioner’s actions
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after his return to Colombia: the move to Bogota, the receipt of the written death
threat, and the immediate departure for the United States. Although it was
appropriate for the BIA to consider petitioner’s voluntary return in 2002 as a
factor in its credibility determination, it alone does not “rise to the level of
‘substantial evidence’ to support an adverse decision on [petitioner’s] claims for
relief.” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1211.
Additional Reasons Provided by the IJ
The IJ stated two other reasons for its adverse credibility decision that were
not mentioned by the BIA. These additional reasons, however, do not provide
sufficient support for the adverse credibility determination. The IJ stated that he
believed that petitioner’s conduct showed that he was not afraid to return to his
native country. Specifically, he stated that he did not believe that petitioner was a
genuine asylum seeker because petitioner did not leave after the allegedly
threatening letter was handed to him. This statement is in direct contradiction to
record evidence. Petitioner testified that the same day he received the written
death threat letter, he purchased the plane tickets to come to the United States and
they left the next day. Admin. R. at 77-78.
Second, the IJ found it hard to believe that petitioner did not apply for
asylum immediately after coming to the United States, but instead waited until
someone in his organization was killed. This finding is improperly based on
unsupported personal opinion. See Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1153. The fact that
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petitioner waited to apply for asylum until he learned of Felix M artinez’s murder
does not undermine his claim that he has a fear of future persecution; instead, it
supports it. Petitioner testified in his affidavit and at the hearing that he did not
intend to file for asylum when he and his wife initially fled the country.
Admin. R. at 78; 213. He intended “[j]ust to leave the scene for a bit to calm
things down.” Id. at 78. But once another person from his political organization
was assassinated, it became clear that there could be no safety for them in
Colombia. Id. at 78-80. The written death threat combined with the actual
murder of one of their colleagues provided petitioner with a necessary piece of
objective evidence to support his claim for a w ell-founded fear of future
persecution. See Wiransane v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 2004)
(requiring showing of objective basis for fear of future persecution by “credible,
direct, and specific evidence”). The IJ failed to address this relevant evidence.
Conclusion
Because “[t]he reasons presented by the IJ and repeated in part by the B IA
neither individually nor collectively constitute substantial evidence to support
[the agency’s] final determination,” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1211, we REVERSE
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the BIA ’s final order and REM AND for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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