F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 25, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LILA C. ANDERSEN, successor in
interest to HAROLD J. ANDERSEN,
Petitioner,
v. No. 05-9550
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
Respondent.
_______________________________
ENERGY FUELS MINING COMPANY
and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Intervenors.
APPEAL FROM THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD
(BRB No. 04-0612 BLA)
Stephen D. Harris of Merrill, Anderson, King & Harris, LLC, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Petitioner.
Barry H. Joyner, United States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor (Howard M.
Radzely, Solicitor of Labor; Allen H. Feldman, Assistant Solicitor; Christian P. Barber,
Counsel for Appellate Litigation, with him on the brief), for Respondent.
W.C. Blanton of Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for
Intervenors.
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Lila Andersen is the surviving spouse of Harold Andersen, a coal miner.
Mr. Andersen worked as a coal miner for 40 years and suffered from Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Prior to his passing, Mr. Andersen applied for benefits
under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, (BLBA).1 According to Mr.
Andersen, his COPD was a compensable form of pneumoconiosis arising out of his
employment as a coal miner. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his claim and
the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (Board) affirmed. Petitioner seeks
review from the Board’s decision. The overriding issue before us is whether the Board
erred in denying Mr. Andersen a statutory rebuttable presumption that his COPD arose
out of his coal-mine employment. The Board’s decision presents a question of law
involving statutory and regulatory interpretation we review de novo. See Mangus v.
Director, OWCP, 882 F.2d 1527, 1530 (10th Cir. 1989). In interpreting the BLBA,
however, we give “considerable weight” to the Department of Labor’s (DOL)
construction of the statute it is entrusted to administer, Davis v. Director, OWCP, 936
1
Harold Andersen passed away while this appeal was pending. His surviving
spouse remains eligible for Mr. Andersen’s benefits under 30 U.S.C. § 932(1). The panel
granted an unopposed motion to substitute Lila Andersen as Petitioner in this matter. See
Fed. R. App. P. 43(a).
2
F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991), and “substantial deference” to the agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own regulations. Lukman v. Director, OWCP, 896 F.2d 1248, 1251
(10th Cir. 1990). Our jurisdiction arises under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (as incorporated into
the BLBA by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Congress enacted the BLBA to compensate coal miners who have become totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal-mine employment. See 30 U.S.C.
§901. To recover benefits under the BLBA, a claimant must prove, among other things,
that he suffers from pneumoconiosis, and that his pneumoconiosis arose out of his coal-
mine employment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-204; Mangus, 882 F.2d at 1529. The
BLBA defines pneumoconiosis as “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae,
including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.”
30 U.S.C. § 902(b). Notably, the BLBA does not have a provision setting forth the
criteria to be used in determining whether a particular lung disease satisfies this
definition. Pursuant to Congress’ grant of authority to promulgate regulations to
implement the provisions of the BLBA, see id. § 936(a), DOL has, consistent with several
of our sister circuits, interpreted § 902(b)’s definition of pneumoconiosis to encompass
two distinct types of compensable lung diseases: those diseases considered clinical
pneumoconiosis and those diseases considered legal pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. §
3
718.201.2
According to the regulations, clinical pneumoconiosis consists of those lung
diseases the medical community refers to as pneumoconiosis–“the condition
characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the
lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust
exposure[.]” Id. § 718.201(a)(1). These include, for example, coal workers’
pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary
fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis. Id. In contrast, legal pneumoconiosis
encompasses a broader class of lung diseases that are not pneumoconiosis as the term is
used by the medical community. See Eastover Mining Co. v. Williams, 338 F.3d 501,
509 (6th Cir. 2003). Legal pneumoconiosis consists of “any chronic lung disease or
impairment and its sequelae” including “any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary
disease arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2) (emphasis
added). A chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arises out of coal-mine
employment if it is “significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposer
in coal mine employment.” Id. § 718.202(b).
2
In interpreting the BLBA’s definition of pneumoconiosis to encompass the two
forms of compensable lung diseases, the DOL in 2000 codified an interpretation of the
BLBA that many circuits had followed for a number of years. See also Gulf & Western
Industries v. Ling, 176 F.3d 226, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1999); Bradberry v. Director, OWCP,
117 F.3d 1361, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997); Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308,
315 (3rd Cir. 1995); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Hage, 908 F.2d 393, 395-96 (8th Cir.
1990); Campbell v. Consolidation Coal Co., 811 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1987); Peaboy
Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 268 n.4 (7th Cir. 1983).
4
The BLBA and its implementing regulations establish several presumptions
“intended to ease a claimant’s burden by allowing an element of the required proof to be
presumed from the existence of other rationally-related facts.” Bosco v. Twin Pines Coal
Co., 892 F.2d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1989). At play in this case is the following
presumption: “[i]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.” 30 U.S.C. §
921(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 718.203(b).
II.
Before addressing Petitioner’s argument that Mr. Andersen was entitled to a
presumption that his COPD arose out of his coal-mine employment, we must first
consider whether Mr. Andersen’s COPD constitutes pneumoconiosis as the DOL has
interpreted that term. No one disputes that COPD, an obstructive pulmonary disease, is
not “clinical pneumoconiosis” as defined under the regulations.3 Accordingly, Mr.
Andersen could only recover benefits under the BLBA if he proved, among other things,
that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis–i.e. “any chronic restrictive or obstructive
pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment.” Id. § 718.201(a)(2).
The Board denied Mr. Andersen’s claim for black lung benefits finding he failed to
3
COPD is a respiratory impairment characterized by chronic bronchitis or
emphysema and airflow obstruction. See The Merk Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy
568 (17th ed. 1999).
5
prove he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis because he did not prove his COPD arose
out of coal-mine employment. The Board rejected Mr. Andersen’s argument he was
entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his COPD was related to coal dust exposure
because he proved he worked in a mine for over ten years and was afflicted with COPD.
On appeal, Petitioner argues the Board erred in interpreting the definition of legal
pneumoconiosis to require a claimant to prove his coal-mine employment caused his lung
disease rather than treating the causation requirement as a separate element of proof
necessary to establish entitlement to benefits.4 According to Petitioner, the issue of
whether Mr. Andersen’s coal-mine employment caused his COPD is a separate element
of entitlement that can be met by invoking the rebuttable presumption, and not part of the
definition of legal pneumoconiosis. While Petitioner’s argument has some logistic
appeal, applying our standard of review we cannot say the Board’s interpretation of the
definition of legal pneumoconiosis was erroneous in light of the DOL’s interpretation of
the BLBA.
Under the plain language of 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2), proving that one suffers
from an “obstructive pulmonary disease” does not prove that one suffers from legal
pneumoconiosis unless one is able to show one’s obstructive pulmonary disease arose out
of coal-mine employment. See Bradberry v. Director, OWCP, 117 F.3d 1361, 1368 (11th
4
Petitioner does not challenge the Board’s determination that he failed to prove via
credible evidence that his coal-mine employment caused his COPD. Accordingly we do
not address this issue.
6
Cir. 1997); Richardson v. Director, OWCP, 94 F.3d 164, 166 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus,
Petitioner incorrectly insists COPD is legal pneumoconiosis. As noted, legal
pneumoconiosis consists of “any chronic lung disease[,]” including an “obstructive
pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2)
(emphasis added). Only after a claimant is able to prove that his obstructive pulmonary
disease is “significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal
mine employment” does a claimant prove he suffers from legal pneumoconiosis. See id.
§ 718.201(b); Doris Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 938 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1991)
(“Legal pneumoconiosis, however, is much broader and refers to all lung diseases which
meet the statutory or regulatory definition of being any lung disease which is significantly
related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment.”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Petitioner’s interpretation of the statute would
allow “everyone who develops COPD from smoking [to] have legal pneumoconiosis.”
Williams, 338 F.3d at 515. The DOL has made clear that “each miner bear[s] the burden
of proving that his obstructive lung disease did in fact arise out of his coal mine
employment, and not from another source.” 65 Fed. Reg. 79938; see also 64 Fed. Reg.
54978 (noting that if a miner fails to demonstrate the existence of clinical
pneumoconiosis “he must prove that his lung disease arose out of coal mine employment
in order to carry his burden and establish that he has pneumoconiosis”). Accordingly, the
Board did not err in interpreting the definition of legal pneumoconiosis to require a
claimant to prove his coal-mine employment caused his lung disease.
7
III.
We now turn to the issue of whether Mr. Andersen, as part of his case to establish
his entitlement to benefits, was entitled to a rebuttable presumption his COPD arose out
of coal-mine employment. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, we conclude the
rebuttable presumption does not extend to claims of legal pneumoconiosis, but rather only
to claims of clinical pneumoconiosis. When the BLBA was originally enacted, the BLBA
defined the term pneumoconiosis as “a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of
employment in a coal mine.” Pub L. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742, § 402(b), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 823, 880. Under this definition, only those diseases the medical
community considered pneumoconiosis were compensable under the BLBA. See, e.g.,
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976) (discussing coal worker’s
pneumoconiosis). Accordingly, the use of the term pneumoconiosis in the presumption
provision referred to pneumoconiosis in its medical sense (i.e. clinical pneumoconiosis).
In light of new medical evidence that pneumoconiosis was not the only breathing
disability miners were susceptible to as a result of their coal-mine employment, Congress
broadened the definition of pneumoconiosis to read as it does today. 30 U.S.C. § 902(b);
S. Rep. 92-743, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2314 (“The assumption that coal
worker’s pneumoconiosis per se is the only disease process related to coal mining is not
medically justified. Other conditions of the lung, in addition to pneumoconiosis, are
commonly encountered among coal miners.”). The presumption provision, however,
remained intact. Petitioner argues Congress must have intended the presumption
8
provision to apply to both claims of clinical pneumoconiosis and legal pneumoconiosis
when it amended the definition of pneumoconiosis to make both types of diseases
compensable under the BLBA.
Congress’ use of the generic term “pneumoconiosis” in the presumption provision
and the DOL’s lack of a position as to whether Congress meant legal pneumoconiosis,
clinical pneumoconiosis or both, is an obvious source of confusion for Petitioner and
others seeking benefits under the BLBA. While Petitioner’s argument has some appeal,
in light of the regulatory definition of legal pneumoconiosis and the historical evolution
of the BLBA, we think Congress used the term “pneumoconiosis” in the presumption
provision to refer to clinical pneumoconiosis only. To construe the term any other way
leads to an absurd result for a miner alleging he suffers legal pneumoconiosis: a miner
with over ten years of coal-mine employment who proved his obstructive lung disease
arose out of coal-mine employment, and thus proved he suffers from legal
pneumoconiosis, would receive a presumption his pneumoconiosis arose out of coal-mine
employment. When applying a statute, we are responsible for interpreting its provisions
in a manner that would not render any part of the statute meaningless, redundant, or
superfluous. See Bridger Coal Co./Pac. Minerals, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 927 F.2d
1150, 1153 (10th Cir.1991).
Congress’ use of the generic term “pneumoconiosis” in the presumption provision
can be harmonized with the statutory scheme if construed to refer only to clinical
pneumoconiosis. The presumption does not aid a claimant suffering from COPD prove
9
entitlement to benefits, but it does aid a claimant afflicted with clinical pneumoconiosis.
Unlike legal pneumoconiosis, under the regulations a claimant proves the existence of
clinical pneumoconiosis by merely establishing that he is afflicted with a disease
considered by the medical community as pneumoconiosis. See § 718.202. No proof of
causation is required to establish the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis. Once a
claimant proves the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis, he then must prove his
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal-mine employment either by credible evidence or by
invoking the presumption if the claimant has worked in a coal mine for over ten years.
See §§ 718.203(b), (c). While both clinical and legal pneumoconiosis must arise out of
coal mine employment, the link between the diseases categorized as clinical
pneumoconiosis and lengthy coal mine employment is so strong that Congress obviously
believed a rational basis exists for the presumption of causation in cases of clinical
pneumoconiosis. See Usery, 428 U.S. at 29-30. Unlike COPD, which is a disease of the
general population with an overwhelming majority of cases being caused by cigarette
smoking and other lung diseases that meet the definition of legal pneumoconiosis, lung
diseases the medical community refers to as pneumoconiosis are closely linked to dust
exposure. Id., at 28-29; see also The Merk Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 570 (17th
ed. 1999). In general, respiratory and pulmonary impairments are caused by factors other
than dust exposure, such as cigarette smoking and air pollution. Id. To require a claimant
to prove a causal link between the lung disease and the coal-mine employment in order to
establish the presence of legal pneumoconiosis, therefore, makes sense.
10
Because a claimant suffering from COPD must prove his COPD arose out of coal-
mine employment to prove he suffers from legal pneumoconiosis, the rebuttable
presumption does not extend to cases of COPD; therefore, we deny Petitioner’s petition
for review and affirm the Board’s decision.5
5
The panel grants Intervenors’ motion to strike from the record a medical article
attached to Petitioner’s Reply Brief as well as the discussion of the article in the brief.
11