F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 26, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-4179
JORGE M ARTINEZ, a/k/a A NTONIO
ZA M O RA-PER EZ, a/k/a JO RGE
M ARTINEZ-CERV ANTES,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D .C . NO. 04-CR-34-02-PGC)
G. Fred M etos, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, for D efendant-Appellant.
W ayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M . W arner, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before H E N RY, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.
Jorge M artinez appeals his conviction and sentence for possessing
methamphetamine w ith the intent to distribute. M artinez claims the district court
should have granted a mistrial based on the government’s failure to disclose the
substance of M artinez’s pretrial statements to a government agent. He also
claims the district court improperly sentenced him under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. W e conclude that the district court did not err in denying the request
for a mistrial and that M artinez’s sentence was reasonable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
W e therefore AFFIRM .
I. Background
Utah Highway Patrol officers arrested Alejandro Cervantes and Jorge
M artinez in Juab County, Utah, after discovering three pounds of
methamphetamine in the spare tire of their car. W ith Cervantes driving, the pair
claimed they were on a road trip from Phoenix, Arizona, to Ogden, Utah.
Following their arrest, Cervantes and M artinez were interviewed by DEA
Agent Jeffrey Clark and Agent Craig Hicken of the Utah Department of Public
Safety. Cervantes, interviewed first, told the agents the car was his but that he
did not know drugs were in the spare tire until they had been stopped near
Flagstaff, Arizona. At that time M artinez warned him to drive more carefully
because there were drugs in the car. Cervantes further stated that the drugs were
to be delivered to a person known as “El Grande” in Ogden, Utah.
The agents then interviewed M artinez. He reversed the finger-pointing,
stating that (1) Cervantes owned the drugs and (2) Cervantes informed him of the
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drugs in the car only after they had been stopped for a traffic violation in
Flagstaff.
Cervantes was then interview ed again. W hen told of the seriousness of his
case, Cervantes begged the officers to bring M artinez into the room to give them
El Grande’s phone number. The officers brought M artinez back, and Cervantes
continued to beg him to give the agents El Grande’s number. Prompted by
Cervantes’ pleading, M artinez wrote down a number, which later proved to be
false.
After the interview s, Agent Hicken prepared a report of what had been said
during them. M artinez received this report before trial, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A ). Agent Clark did not prepare a separate report.
At trial, the government discussed these interviews in several contexts.
First, during his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury they would hear
that M artinez “admitted that he had known El Grande and had contacts w ith him
in the past in a similar type of situation.” Vol. IV, Pg. 32–33. Second, the
government called the interviewing agents as witnesses. Agent Clark took the
stand and testified that M artinez admitted several incriminating points: (1) the
drugs belonged to M artinez, (2) he had previously transported drugs for El
Grande, (3) he described El Grande’s physical appearance, and (4) he detailed the
procedure for delivering the drugs to U tah. On cross examination, Agent Clark
admitted that none of this information was contained in Agent Hicken’s report.
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M artinez, however, lodged no objection to Agent Clark’s testimony on the basis
of surprise or nondisclosure under Rule 16.
Agent Hicken testified after Agent Clark. None of A gent Hicken’s
testimony is in dispute, and M artinez did not cross-examine Agent Hicken about
the information revealed in Agent Clark’s testimony.
Follow ing Agent Hicken’s testimony, the prosecution rested. The defense
also rested without calling any witnesses but immediately moved for a mistrial
based on the testimony of Agent Clark, arguing it showed the government had
failed to disclose the substance of M artinez’s admissions to Agent Clark during
discovery, as required by Rule 16(a)(1)(A). The court denied the motion, ruling
that the substance of the testimony had been provided by Agent Hicken’s report,
which summarized his and Agent Clark’s interviews with M artinez and Cervantes
at the jail. The court further held that a mistrial was inappropriate because
M artinez could have objected as early as the opening statement but chose not to.
The jury returned a guilty verdict.
By the time of sentencing, the Supreme Court had issued its landmark
ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the federal sentencing scheme under the Sixth Amendment. A
decision was pending in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which
the Supreme Court would ultimately apply Blakely to hold that mandatory
application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines also violated the Sixth
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Amendment. Presciently, the district court concluded the G uidelines were
inconsistent with Blakely and that it was not bound by them in sentencing
M artinez. Accordingly, it imposed a discretionary sentence of 210 months. It
also imposed an identical alternative sentence that would take effect in the event
the court was required to follow the G uidelines.
II. Analysis
M artinez raises two issues for us to consider. First he claims the district
court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because the government’s
report did not contain all the statements he made in the interview. Second, he
claims the district court improperly failed to consider the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing sentence. We reject both claims.
A. Rule 16 M istrial M otion
M artinez argues that the use of his admissions at trial violated Rule 16 and
that the only adequate remedy was a mistrial. “W e review a district court’s
refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion,” which means w e will reverse
only if the decision “was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an
erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” United
States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005). “In determining whether
to grant a mistrial, a district judge must first determine whether an error has
occurred and, if so, whether that error impaired the ‘defendant’s right to a fair and
impartial trial.’” Id. Here, we find no abuse of discretion.
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Rule 16(a)(1)(A) requires the government to “disclose to the defendant the
substance of any relevant oral statement made by the defendant . . . in response to
interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government agent if the
government intends to use the statement at trial.” 1 This rule “is designed to
provide the defendant with sufficient information to make an informed decision
about a plea, to allow the court to rule on admissibility motions before trial, to
minimize prejudicial surprise at trial, and to generally increase the efficiency of
litigation.” United States v. Hernandez-M uniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir.
1999).
Should the government fail to comply with this rule, Rule 16(d)(2) provides
a number of options for the court: “(A) order that party to permit the discovery or
inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and
conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the
undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the
circumstances.” Depending on the circumstances, even a mistrial could be
appropriate under Rule 16(d)(2)(D). See, e.g., United States v. Crouthers, 669
F.2d 635, 641 (10th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that defendant could have moved for a
mistrial).
1
Rule 16(a)(1)(A ), by its terms, applies only where the defendant requests
disclosure. Here, however, the government was proceeding under an open file
policy and acknowledges the rule applied in this case.
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W e have identified several considerations a district court should make in
determining which sanction is appropriate for failure to comply with Rule 16: (1)
the reasons the government delayed producing the requested materials, including
whether or not the government acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with
the discovery order; (2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the
government’s delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a
continuance. United States v. M uessig, 427 F.3d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999)); United States
v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1988). Applying these factors, the
district court should impose “the least severe sanction that will accomplish
prompt . . . and full compliance with the court’s discovery orders.” 2 Wicker, 848
F.2d at 1061.
In arguing for a mistrial under Rule 16, M artinez claimed that Agent
Hicken’s report “was essentially an exculpatory statement” that said nothing
about any dealings with El Grande. He argued that statements about M artinez
working with El Grande were “well beyond what was in the discovery [he] was
2
A mistrial is a drastic sanction, and any “motion for a mistrial should be
made promptly.” United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir.
1993) (citing Saville v. United States, 400 F.2d 397, 400 (1st Cir. 1968)
(concluding that motion for mistrial was untimely where defendant failed to act at
the earliest possible opportunity)). This doctrine is particularly relevant in the
context of a Rule 16 violation, for w hich less severe remedies are preferred. A
defendant should not wait to object until the only meaningful remedy would be a
mistrial. Rather, a defendant should object at the first reasonable opportunity to
allow the court to explore less drastic remedies.
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provided.” In response, the court first concluded that the government had
“substantially complied” with its disclosure obligations by providing the
“substance” of the disclosure prior to trial. Vol. V, Pg. 235. In addition, the
district court found that M artinez knew from the government’s opening statement
the basis of the proposed testimony but failed to timely object:
[The prosecutor], I remember in his opening argument, laid out all this
stuff that was coming in. If for some reason you thought that was a
surprise, we could have discussed it then and so forth. I think
everybody knows that there were incriminating statem ents that were
made, so I’m going to deny the motion for a mistrial.
Id.
W e recognize that disclosure of a defendant’s statements should certainly
be made prior to trial. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) contemplates pretrial disclosure, and
ordinarily the process followed by the government here— production of a written
report— would suffice. Unfortunately, in this appeal we are hampered in our
assessment of whether the disclosure obligation was fully satisfied because
neither party has provided the written report.
The district court, however, was justified in denying the request for a
mistrial based on Rule 16 because it was not timely. First of all, as early as the
government’s opening statement, M artinez knew the basis of A gent Clark’s
testimony and was on notice that the testimony could broadly include disclosures
that may not have been contained in the report. M artinez had a second
opportunity to object to the testimony when Agent Clark took the stand but again
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lodged no objection. At that time, under Rule 16 and our case law, M artinez
could have allowed the court to cure the nondisclosure, either to strike the
testimony or continue trial based on the violation. Either remedy would have
satisfied Rule 16 and would not have required the drastic remedy of mistrial. See
Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1061 (stating that a court should impose the “least severe
sanction”). Rule 16 and our cases specifically mention continuance or exclusion
of the evidence as preferred remedies. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)(B), (C); United
States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1281 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming decision to admit
evidence offered in violation of Rule 16 after giving defendant time to review it);
United States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 1988) (affirming decision
to suppress evidence based on a Rule 16 violation); United States v. Crouthers,
669 F.2d 635, 640–41 (10th Cir. 1982) (affirming decision to suppress evidence
offered in violation of Rule 16 but denying defendant’s motion for mistrial);
United States v. M itchell, 613 F.2d 779, 781 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that
defendant could have requested a cautionary instruction).
The other considerations relevant to a Rule 16 violation also suggest such a
drastic remedy was not appropriate in this case. M artinez does not claim the
government acted in bad faith. Nor has he shown any prejudice by the
government’s delay in disclosing the statements; the record reflects that he was
able to cross-examine Agent Clark effectively.
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At oral argument, M artinez’s counsel suggested that the late revelation of
this evidence undermined the entire theory of his defense and that had he seen the
evidence sooner, he might not have taken the case to trial. W hile it is true Rule
16 was “designed to provide the defendant with sufficient information to make an
informed decision about a plea,” Hernandez-M uniz, 170 F.3d at 1010, any error in
this regard could have been remedied without a mistrial. 3 In light of these
circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in declining
to grant a mistrial.
B. Sentencing
M artinez also claims the district court erred by issuing a discretionary
sentence that did not specifically consider the factors described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Since United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we review
sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th
Cir. 2006). In Kristl we explained that sentences must be both substantively and
procedurally reasonable. Id. (“[T]he reasonableness standard of review set forth
in Booker necessarily encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the
sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated.”).
M artinez raises a procedural challenge, arguing that the court erred by not
addressing each aspect of § 3553(a).
3
For example, M artinez could have asked for a short continuance to
evaluate his case in light of the new information. Based on this information, the
district court could have allowed him to change his plea without any penalty.
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This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104 (10th
Cir. 2005), in which we concluded the sentencing court does not abuse its
discretion by failing to mention each of the § 3553(a) factors:
It is true that the district court did not march through § 3553(a)’s
sentencing factors, but w e have never imposed such a requirem ent. . . .
It is quite clear that the sentencing court is not required to consider
individually each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence.
M oreover, we do not demand that the district court recite any magic
words to show that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the
factors that Congress has instructed it to consider. Here, the district
court stated that it “look[ed] at the record in its entirety,” and after its
review it concluded that 70 months was an appropriate sentence. The
court heard several different arguments regarding the appropriate
sentencing range and was obviously familiar with the facts of the case.
W e will not make the useless gesture of remanding for reconsideration
when Defendant was aw are at sentencing that all relevant factors w ould
be considered by the district court.
Id. at 1107 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the district court sentenced M artinez prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Booker, which made the sentencing guidelines advisory. The court,
however, did not apply the guidelines in a mandatory fashion. Instead,
anticipating the holding in Booker, the district court stated that it was “going to
sentence as an advisory— sentence under the preexisting law. However, in doing
that, I will take a look at the guidelines as instructive on the point.” Vol. VI, Pg.
4 (emphasis added). The court further stated, “I think I should have to make a
determination of the appropriate sentence in looking at everything.” Id. at 6–7.
Based on this review of the case, the court concluded: “[P]roceeding as a
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discretionary matter, the defendant will be sentenced to 210 months, slightly
down from the 235 months under the guidelines. If I w ere under the guidelines, I
would grant [the] motion for a downward departure . . . and sentence him to 210
months under the guidelines, so either way I would reach the same sentence of
210 months.” Id. at 16.
As in Rines, the district court heard multiple arguments regarding the
appropriate sentencing range and was familiar with all the relevant facts of the
case. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err when sentencing
M artinez and that his sentence is reasonable under § 3553(a).
III. Conclusion
Because the district court did not err in denying a mistrial, and because the
district court properly considered the entire record in applying the Guidelines in
an advisory fashion, we AFFIRM .
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