F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 16, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-7099
ED D IE K A Y CO PEM A N ,
Defendant - Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E EASTERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A *
(D .C . N O. C R-03-09-01-W H )
Eddie Kay Copeman, pro se.
Gordon B. Cecil, Assistant United States Attorney, (Sheldon J. Sperling, United
States A ttorney, and Ryan M . Roberts, Assistant United States A ttorney, with him
on the brief), M uskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, HA RTZ and TYM KOVICH, Circuit
Judges.
HA RTZ, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Eddie Kay Copeman w as convicted in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma on seven counts of an indictment, all involving
drug and firearms offenses. His convictions have been upheld on appeal. See
United States v. Copeman, Nos. 04-7003 & 04-7004, 2006 W L 1793258 (10th
Cir., June 30, 2006). In this related appeal he challenges the district court’s
denial of his postconviction motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) 1 for return of
certain property seized by Oklahoma law-enforcement officers during the
investigation that led to the federal charges against him. W e have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Rule 41(g) provides:
(g) M otion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of
property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be
filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must
receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.
If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the
movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to
the property and its use in later proceedings.
“Rule 41([g]) is an equitable remedy, . . . available to [the movant] only if he can
show irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law.” Clymore v. United
States, 164 F.3d 569, 571 (10th Cir. 1999).
1
Rule 41 was amended in 2002 as part of the general restyling of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. W hat was formerly Rule 41(e) is now Rule
41(g), with only stylistic changes.
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As conceded by M r. Copeman, the property in question was seized by state
law-enforcement officers. Nevertheless,
there are some limited circumstances under which Rule 41([g]) can
be used as a vehicle to petition for the return of property seized by
state authorities. Those circumstances include actual federal
possession of the property forfeited by the state, constructive federal
possession where the property was considered evidence in the federal
prosecution, or instances w here property was seized by state officials
acting at the direction of federal authorities in an agency capacity.
Id.
It is not contested that the property at issue has been continuously in the
physical custody of the state and most, if not all, of it was the subject of state
judicial-forfeiture proceedings when M r. Copeman filed his Rule 41(g) motion. 2
(Nothing in the record indicates the present status of those proceedings.) Nor
does M r. Copeman suggest that any of the property he seeks was ever considered
potential evidence for his federal prosecution. He argued below, however, that
the U nited States is in “constructive possession” of the property “because
D efendant’s case w as clearly prosecuted by the United States, and there are ‘N O ’
state charges failed [sic] against D efendant.” Supp. R. Doc. 139 at 1.
The district court dismissed the motion with prejudice, ruling that “1) the
United States is not currently in actual or constructive possession of said
property, and 2) the defendant has an adequate remedy at law in the courts of the
2
M r. Copeman suggests that some seized property has not been the subject
of state judicial-forfeiture proceedings, but he fails to identify specifically even
one item.
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State of Oklahoma.” Id. Doc. 156 at 2. “Generally, we review a district court’s
denial of a Rule 41([g]) motion for an abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Aguirre, 414 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2005). W e agree with both
grounds of the district court’s decision, and hold that it did not abuse its
discretion. A lthough either ground would suffice for denial of the motion, we
will address both.
First, as we said in Clymore, property seized and held by state law-
enforcement officers is not in the constructive possession of the United States for
Rule 41(g) purposes unless it is being held for potential use as evidence in a
federal prosecution. 164 F.3d at 571; see also United States v. Solis, 108 F.3d
722, 723 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Nor does the record affirmatively establish that the
vehicle was ever considered evidence in the federal prosecution; therefore, even if
we were to accept the concept of constructive possession, . . . there would be no
basis for relief.”). A bsent such potential use, the United States has no interest in
the property.
M r. Copeman cites two district-court opinions to support his claim that a
state’s decision to defer prosecution to the United States confers constructive
possession of all property seized during the investigation. In United States v.
Story, 170 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865 (D. M inn. 2001), the property in question was
seized and held by state authorities, but the investigation led to a guilty plea in
federal court. Citing Clymore, the court said that Rule 41(g) “can be used to
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force the federal government to return items seized by state officials” when “the
United States actually possesses the property or constructively possesses the
property by: (1) using the property as evidence in the federal prosecution; or (2)
where the federal government directed state officials to seize the property in the
first place.” Id. at 866. Yet then, without explanation, the court went beyond
Clymore in concluding that, “because these items were seized as part of an
investigation that resulted in Story’s federal prosecution, the United States has
constructive possession over the items.” Id. at 867. To the extent that Story
holds that federal prosecution alone confers on the federal government
constructive possession of each item of property seized by a state during an
investigation, regardless of whether the item is being held for federal authorities
as potential evidence, it conflicts with Clymore and we reject it.
W e similarly limit our approval of the second case M r. Copeman cites,
United States v. Fabela-Garcia, 753 F. Supp. 326 (D. Utah 1989), an opinion that
predates Clymore. In Fabela-Garcia the property in question was seized by the
state and remained in state possession. But the court ruled that it had jurisdiction
on the ground that the federal government had “constructive possession of the
property” because the state had “deferred to the United States in all aspects of the
prosecution.” Id. at 328. As an alternative ground for jurisdiction, the court
noted its prior ruling that property had been seized illegally, and said that a court
must be able “to vindicate and enforce the consequences of its own order.” Id. at
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329. Of course, our later decision in Clymore deprives the ruling on the first
ground of any authority in this circuit to the extent that Fabela-Garcia was basing
constructive possession on federal prosecution alone, even when the state’s
holding of the property had not been for the benefit of that prosecution. W e
express no view on the court’s alternative holding. (Although the district court
had ruled before M r. Copeman’s trial that some items may have been improperly
seized, M r. Copeman did not raise this as a basis for his motion seeking return of
the property.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded by M r. Copeman’s reliance on
Fabela-G arcia.
W e can also readily affirm the district court’s ruling that M r. Copeman has
an adequate remedy in state court. W hen “state avenues of relief [are] open to
[the movant], he cannot show an inadequate remedy at law.” Clymore, 164 F.3d
at 571. See id. (Rule 41(g) is not available to challenge state judicial-forfeiture
proceedings because they provide an adequate remedy); cf. United States v. Akers,
215 F.3d 1089, 1106 (10th Cir. 2000) (“This court has held that a forfeiture
proceeding provides a defendant with an adequate remedy at law for resolving a
claim to seized property.”); Frazee v. IRS, 947 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1991) (Rule
41(g) motion properly dismissed when federal judicial-forfeiture proceeding had
been commenced). M r. Copeman contends that the state proceedings do not
provide an adequate remedy because the state courts lack jurisdiction. But his
only apparent argument why the state lacks jurisdiction is that the federal
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government has constructive possession of the property, an argument we have
already rejected. Also, to the extent that M r. Copeman contends that state
judicial-forfeiture proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy because he has
a greater burden of persuasion in those proceedings, we do not think that such a
difference, even assuming that it truly exists, renders the state remedy inadequate.
A remedy may still be adequate, even if imperfect. See, e.g., Women’s Equity
Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751 (D .C. Cir. 1990) (Ginsburg, R. B.,
J.) (“[S]ituation-specific litigation affords an adequate, even if imperfect,
remedy.”); Superintendent of Ins. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d
209, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]hat does not mean its remedy is legally inadequate,
simply that it is imperfect.”).
W e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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