Hoiles v. Alioto

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
September 5, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

TIM OTH Y C. HOILES,

Plaintiff-Counterlaim-
Defendant-Appellee,
No. 05-1376
v.

JO SEPH M . A LIO TO ,

Defendant-Counterclaim-
Plaintiff-A ppellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 04-CV-00438 PSF-O ES)

Ronald S. Rauchberg, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, New York (Norman
Brow nstein, Timothy R. Beyer, Richard P. Barkley, Josephine Sandler,
Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C., Denver, Colorado, Ian L. Saffer and Chad King,
Townsend & Townsend & Crew , LLP, Denver, Colorado, Scott L. Levin, Fisher,
Sweetbaum & Levin, P.C., Denver, Colorado, Elise A. Yablonski, Proskauer Rose
LLP, New York, New York, Daniel Rees Shulman, Gray Plaint, M ooty, M otty &
Bennett, P.A., M inneapolis, M innesota, M axw ell M . Blecher, John E. Andrews,
Blecher & Collins, P.C., Los Angeles, California, with him on the briefs), for
Defendant-Counterclaim-Plaintiff-Appellant.

E. Glen Johnson, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Fort W orth, Texas (Bart A. Rue,
Frank P. Greenhaw IV, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Fort W orth, Texas, Kenneth
B. Siegel, Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief),
for Plaintiff-Counterclaim-Defendant-Appellee.
Before M U RPH Y, B AL DOC K , and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.

M U RPH Y, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

This appeal arises out of a contingent fee agreement (the “Fee Agreement”)

entered into by Plaintiff-Appellee Timothy Hoiles, a resident of Colorado, and

Defendant-Appellant Joseph Alioto, an attorney licensed to practice law in

California. Hoiles hired Alioto to assist him in selling stock he owned in a

private, family-owned media company, Freedom Communications, Inc.

(“Freedom”). Approximately two years after the parties entered into the Fee

Agreement, Freedom was recapitalized, enabling Hoiles to exchange his shares in

the company for cash. Hoiles subsequently filed suit seeking a declaratory

judgment that Alioto was not entitled to a contingent fee based on the selling

price of the stock. Alioto counterclaimed, asserting breach of contract, unjust

enrichment, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The United States District

Court for the District of Colorado determined Colorado law governed all issues in

the case and that the Fee Agreement was unenforceable under Colorado law. The

district court also dismissed Alioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation

claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found in favor of Alioto on his

unjust enrichment claim. Alioto challenges several of the district court’s rulings

-2-
on appeal. W e assert jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the

district court erred in applying Colorado law to determine the validity of the Fee

Agreement, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Alioto’s breach of

contract claim. W e remand with instructions for the district court to determine

whether the Fee Agreement is enforceable under California law. W e also reverse

the district court’s dismissal of Alioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation

claims.

II. Background

In 2001, Freedom w as a closely-held media conglomerate owning various

newspapers, magazines, and broadcast television stations throughout the country.

Timothy Hoiles, the grandson of Freedom’s founder, owned 511,221 shares in the

company. Hoiles’ ex-wife and two daughters (the “Davidson Defendants”) owned

a total of 155,740.5 shares. Hoiles’ and the Davidson Defendants’ shares

represented approximately 8.6% of the outstanding shares of Freedom; the

remaining shares were owned by other descendants of Hoiles’ grandfather.

Hoiles believed mismanagement of the company and family shareholder disputes

were damaging the value of Freedom’s stock. Therefore, he hired a consultant,

Joseph Barletta, to develop a plan to improve Freedom’s operations so Hoiles

could sell his shares at a fair price and exit the company. Hoiles’ relatives,

however, were unwilling to pay what Hoiles considered a fair price and outside

buyers were reluctant to purchase a minority interest in a family-owned company.

-3-
 At Hoiles’ direction, Barletta contacted Joseph Alioto, an attorney licensed

to practice law in California, about the possibility of providing legal

representation on a contingent fee basis. Hoiles subsequently traveled from his

home in Colorado to meet with Alioto in California. The parties dispute the

substance of their conversation. According to Hoiles, the parties discussed

pursuing a lawsuit against Freedom shareholders to force the purchase of H oiles’

stock. Alioto claims Hoiles wanted him to take any action that was necessary,

including but not limited to filing a lawsuit, to force the purchase of Hoiles’ and

the Davidson Defendants’ interest in Freedom. At the end of the meeting, the

parties reached an oral agreement whereby Alioto would represent Hoiles on a

contingent fee basis. Hoiles paid a $500,000 retainer and advanced Alioto

$100,000 for expenses and costs.

Several weeks after the meeting, Alioto faxed a letter to Hoiles in

Colorado, memorializing the terms of the legal representation. The letter

indicated Alioto’s firm would represent Hoiles in the “Freedom Communications

matter.” It provided Alioto was to receive “[f]ifteen percent (15% ) of anything

recovered before the filing of a complaint; 20% of anything recovered after the

filing of a complaint but before the commencement of the trial; and 25% of

anything recovered after the commencement of the trial.” If Hoiles withdrew

from or dismissed the case, or refused to settle against Alioto’s recommendation,

he was obligated to pay a reasonable hourly rate of $1000 for Alioto’s time and

-4-
$500 for co-counsel’s time. The Fee Agreement also required Hoiles to pay all

out-of-pocket and litigation expenses. Hoiles signed the Fee Agreement in

Colorado approximately six months after receiving it.

Two years later, Freedom entered into a recapitalization agreement with

Blackstone/Providence M erger Corp. The cause of the recapitalization is

disputed. Alioto contends the recapitalization of Freedom w as instigated by the

following actions on his part: (1) his drafting of, and threatening to file, a

com plaint against Freedom shareholders; and (2) his hiring of Christopher Shaw ,

an English newspaper broker, to generate market interest in the sale of Freedom.

Hoiles, on the other hand, claims Alioto’s contribution to the recapitalization was

minimal. Instead, he contends the recapitalization was the result of an

independent effort by shareholders to restructure the ownership of Freedom.

W hatever its cause, the recapitalization enabled all Freedom shareholders to

exchange their shares for cash or shares in a newly-formed corporation. Hoiles

and the Davidson Defendants elected the cash option and received $212.71 per

share, a total of $141,869,380.67.

After the recapitalization, Hoiles asked Alioto to submit a billing statement

for his services at $1000 per hour in accordance with the Fee Agreement. Alioto

responded by demanding a $28.4 million contingent fee. Hoiles subsequently

filed suit in Colorado state court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Alioto was

not entitled to a contingent fee. Alioto removed the case to federal district court

-5-
in Colorado based on diversity, and then filed his own suit against Hoiles and the

Davidson Defendants in California state court. Alioto’s complaint asserted claims

for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.

Hoiles removed Alioto’s C alifornia state court action to federal district court in

California. The parties then filed dueling motions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, Alioto in the Colorado case and Hoiles in the California case. Each

motion alternatively asked that the venue be transferred to the other federal

district court. The Colorado federal district court denied Alioto’s motion, and the

C alifornia federal district court transferred Alioto’s suit to Colorado. The two

cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado.

Alioto subsequently filed counterclaims in Colorado federal district court

that mirrored his claims in his original California state court action. Specifically,

he alleged Hoiles and the Davidson Defendants breached the Fee Agreement by

failing to pay him fifteen percent of the amount they received from the sale of

their Freedom shares. In the event the Fee Agreement was deemed unenforceable,

Alioto asserted Hoiles and the Davidson Defendants had been unjustly enriched

by his efforts. Finally, if it was determined Hoiles lacked authority to represent

the Davidson Defendants’ shares, Alioto claimed Hoiles misrepresented this fact

and was therefore obligated to pay Alioto’s contingent fee with respect to the

Davidson D efendants’ shares.

-6-
 The district court dismissed all of Alioto’s claims against the Davidson

Defendants, and Alioto does not appeal this ruling. The district court also

dismissed Alioto’s breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation

claims against Hoiles. Applying Colorado’s conflict of law rules, the district

court determined Colorado law governed all issues in the case. The district court

further determined, as a matter of law, that the Fee Agreement did not

substantially comply with Colorado’s rules governing contingent fee agreements.

See Colo. R. Governing Contingent Fees ch. 23.3. Thus, the Fee Agreement was

deemed unenforceable, and Alioto’s breach of contract claim was dismissed. The

district court also dismissed Alioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims

stating, “[t]his is not going to be a tort case.” The case proceeded to trial on the

issue of whether Alioto was entitled to quantum meruit. 1 The jury returned a

verdict in favor of Alioto for $1,150,000, which the district court reduced by the

$500,000 retainer Hoiles had previously paid.

III. Discussion

A. Choice of Law for Determining the Validity of the Fee Agreement

Alioto argues the district court erred in applying Colorado law to determine

whether the Fee Agreement was enforceable; he contends California law should

1
Hoiles’ claim for reimbursement of excessive and unreasonable expenses
paid to A lioto was also tried. The district court, however, granted judgement as a
matter of law for Alioto on this claim at the close of all the evidence.

-7-
govern the issue. W e review choice of law determinations de novo. Doering ex

rel. Barrett v. Copper M ountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001). The

underlying factual determinations of the district court, however, are reviewed for

clear error. Id.

Because the Fee Agreement does not contain a choice of law provision, the

district court was required to apply the choice of law principles of the state in

which it sits, i.e., Colorado. 2 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. M eraj Int’l Inv.

Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1281 (10th Cir. 2003). Colorado has adopted the “most

significant relationship” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

Laws (“Restatement”) for resolving conflict of laws questions in contract cases.

Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369, 1372

(Colo. 1979). This approach requires courts to apply the law of the state which,

with respect to the particular issue in dispute, has the most significant relationship

to the transaction and the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §

188(1) (1971). The state with the most significant relationship is determined by

considering the following factors:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

2
Neither party challenges the district court’s decision to apply Colorado’s
choice of law principles in determining which state’s substantive law governs the
parties’ claims. Cf. Doering ex rel. Barrett v. Copper M ountain, Inc., 259 F.3d
1202, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting, “w hen a district court transfers a case to
another forum, the transferee court must follow the choice of law rules of the
transferor court” unless the transferor court lacks personal jurisdiction).

-8-
 (b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.

Id. §§ 6(2), 188(1). In evaluating these factors courts take into account the place

of contracting; the place of negotiation of the contract; the place of performance;

the location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile, residence,

nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. Id. §

188(2).

The first factor— the needs of the interstate and international

systems— seeks “to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate

comm ercial intercourse between them.” Id. § 6 cmt. d. This factor favors the

application of California law in this case. Alioto did not solicit business in

Colorado. Instead, Hoiles traveled to California to retain a law yer licensed to

practice law in California. The majority of the legal services rendered pursuant to

the Fee Agreement were performed in California. Strategy meetings and

telephone conferences took place or were arranged from California. Part of

Alioto’s representation entailed consideration of a possible lawsuit against

Freedom shareholders. Although suit was never filed, Alioto drafted a complaint

to be filed in California state court that alleged violations of a California antitrust

-9-
statute. The majority of shareholders named in the complaint were California

residents.

Hoiles nevertheless contends a significant portion of services were also

performed in Colorado. He argues Alioto’s representation strategy required

everything to come out of Hoiles’ office in Colorado to ensure the interface was

between Hoiles and Freedom, not Hoiles’ attorneys and Freedom. To this end,

Alioto regularly dictated letters to Hoiles’ staff in Colorado for them to prepare

and mail. Hoiles notes he also performed substantial background research and

gathered documents in Colorado. Although Hoiles and his staff did substantial

work in Colorado, the Fee Agreement at issue here was a contract for the

rendition of Alioto’s legal services. Therefore, performance of the Fee

Agreement occurred largely in California w here Alioto dictated the letters to

Hoiles’ staff and provided other legal advice. Legal services w ere rendered in

Colorado on only one occasion: a member of Alioto’s legal team traveled to

Hoiles’ office in Colorado for one day to review documents. Alioto himself never

went to Colorado. Thus, significant services were not performed in Colorado. 3

3
Although the majority of services were performed in California, the Fee
Agreement did not explicitly require services to be performed in California. W e
therefore decline to rely on § 196 of the Restatement to resolve this dispute.
Section 196 applies to contracts for the rendition of services; it creates a
rebuttable presumption requiring application of the law of the state where the
contract requires the services to be rendered unless some other state has a more
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 196 (1971). The presumption only applies, however, when

-10-
 Applying Colorado law under these circumstances would likely impede the

interstate practice of law thereby creating discordant relations between states. A n

attorney who is licensed to practice law only in California, does not travel outside

California to solicit business, and performs legal services mainly in California is

not likely to enter into attorney-client relationships with citizens from other states

if he is required to conform to each state’s unique contingent fee agreement

requirements merely because his client is a resident of another state. The needs

of the interstate system therefore favor the application of California law here.

The second and third factors consider and compare the policies of states

having an interest in the dispute. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6

cmts. e, f. Here, both Colorado and California have some interest in the validity

of the Fee Agreement because the agreement was negotiated in California and

executed in Colorado by citizens of each state. 4 Hoiles contends Colorado’s

the contract expressly states where services are to be performed or the place of
performance can be inferred from the contract’s terms, the nature of the services
involved, or other circumstances. Id. § 196 cmt. a. The Fee Agreement does not
indicate where Alioto’s services w ere to be rendered. M oreover, the district court
did not determine whether the anticipated place of performance could be inferred
from the contract’s terms or other circumstances. Because it is not necessary for
us to decide this question of fact in the first instance to resolve this case, we
decline to do so.
4
The terms of the Fee Agreement were negotiated in California during
Hoiles’ and Alioto’s initial meeting. At this meeting, the parties reached an oral
agreement that Alioto subsequently reduced to writing. Because the written
agreement was executed by Hoiles in Colorado, the place of contracting for
purposes of applying the Restatement is Colorado. See Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 188 cmt. e (indicating the place of contracting is the place

-11-
interest is more compelling than California’s because of Colorado’s need to

protect its citizens who enter into contingent fee agreements. Colorado’s interest

in protecting its citizens is attenuated in this case, however, because Hoiles

traveled outside of Colorado to solicit representation by an attorney who resides

in, and is licensed to practice law in, California. Colorado’s interest is further

diluted because California also has enacted statutes to protect clients, regardless

of their state of residence, who enter into contingent fee agreements w ith

attorneys licensed to practice law in California. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6147;

see also Alderman v. Hamilton, 252 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).

M oreover, California has an interest in enforcing these rules against attorneys

licensed to practice law in California. California’s interest is especially

compelling where, as here, the attorney does not leave the state to solicit business

and performs the majority of the services required by the agreement in California.

Colorado, on the other hand, has no significant interest in enforcing its rules

regulating contingent fee agreements against attorneys w ho are not licensed to

practice law in Colorado, do not solicit business in Colorado, and do not perform

legal services in Colorado. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792

(1975) (noting “States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions

within their boundaries” (emphasis added)); Int’l Tele-M arine Corp. v. M alone &

where, under the forum’s rules of offer and acceptance, the last act necessary to
give the contract binding effect occurred).

-12-
Assocs., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1427, 1431 (D. Colo. 1994) (concluding Colorado’s

interest in regulating attorneys licensed and practicing in Colorado is greater than

Florida’s interest when no legal services were performed in Florida). Because

California’s interests are more deeply affected by this dispute, factors two and

three also favor the application of California law.

The fourth factor seeks to protect the parties’ justified expectations.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law s § 6(2)(d). Although the parties here

contest the meaning of the Fee Agreement, neither party disputes that they

intended to enter into a contingent fee agreement. Hoiles traveled to California

specifically to locate an attorney willing to represent him on a contingent fee

basis. The parties subsequently entered into an agreement that explicitly provided

for a fee based on a percentage of “anything recovered.” Protecting the parties’

expectations therefore requires application of whichever state’s law will uphold

the validity of the Fee Agreement. Alioto concedes the Fee Agreement is not

enforceable under Colorado law . The parties contest the agreement’s validity

under California law. Therefore, only the application of California law will

preserve the possibility of protecting the parties’ justified expectation that they

executed a valid contingent fee agreement. See id. § 6 cmt. g.

The fifth factor requires consideration of w hich state’s law “will best

achieve the basic policy, or policies, underlying the particular field of law

involved” in the dispute. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. h.

-13-
The parties disagree as to the particular field of law at issue here. Hoiles claims

the appropriate field of law is attorney-client contingent fee agreements. He

contends the policies underlying this field of law include protection of the client

by full, written disclosure; assumption by the attorney of the risk of no recovery;

and compensation for the attorney only upon the occurrence of an agreed-upon

contingency. Alioto contends the appropriate field of law is contracts. He urges

us to achieve the fundamental goal of contract law— giving effect to the intent of

the parties— by applying California law to uphold the validity of the Fee

Agreement. The law of contingent fee agreements is merely a subset of contract

law. The Fee Agreement is both a contract and, more specifically, a contingent

fee agreement. Therefore, the policies underlying both fields of law are relevant

in determining the validity of the Fee Agreement.

The law governing contingent fee agreements in Colorado and California is

similar. Both states require contingent fee agreements to be in writing and

contain specific information to ensure full disclosure to the client. Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 6147; Colo. R. Governing Contingent Fees ch. 23.3. Once a

contingent fee agreement is deemed valid, both states interpret the agreement by

looking to its express language to ascertain the intent of the parties. Cal. Civ.

Code § 1638; East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co.,

109 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2005). Both Colorado and California also construe any

ambiguous language in the agreement in favor of the client. Lane v. Wilkins, 40

-14-
Cal. Rptr. 309, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964); Elliott v. Joyce, 889 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo.

1994). Nevertheless, the description of information that must be disclosed in a

contingent fee agreement under Colorado law is more exacting than that which

must be disclosed under California law. Colorado law therefore arguably better

ensures full disclosure of all pertinent information to the client. As a result, the

policies underlying the law of contingent fee agreements arguably favor the

application of Colorado law. W e need not definitively decide this issue, however,

because the policies underlying the law of contracts favor the application of

California law in this case. Contract law strives to “[protect] the justified

expectations of the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188

cmt. b. As discussed above, the application of California law might fulfill the

parties’ expectation that they executed a valid contingent fee agreement whereas

the application of Colorado law will clearly defeat the parties’ expectation. Thus,

even if the policies underlying the law of contingent fee agreements favor the

application of Colorado law, this fifth factor does not favor the application of

Colorado law because the policies underlying the law of contracts, which are

equally relevant, favor California law. At most, this factor is neutral.

The sixth factor— certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result— favors

the application of California law. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §

6(2)(f). In this case, a citizen traveled from his residence in Colorado to

California to solicit representation from an attorney licensed to practice law only

-15-
in California. The majority of legal services performed pursuant to the contingent

fee agreement the parties subsequently entered into were performed in California.

Under these circumstances, it is predictable that California law would govern the

Fee A greement. Application of Colorado law, on the other hand, is less

predictable. The relevant contacts w ith Colorado are limited. Although Hoiles is

a Colorado resident and the Fee Agreement was signed by Hoiles in Colorado,

these two contacts do not make the application of Colorado law predictable when

compared to the numerous contacts with California present in this case. 5 See id. §

188(2) (listing contacts to be taken into account in determining state with most

significant relationship).

5
Hoiles contends other relevant contacts with Colorado include the
following: Hoiles paid all expenses incurred by Alioto under the Fee Agreement
from Colorado; if Hoiles breached the Fee Agreement by not paying the
contingent fee, the breach occurred in Colorado; and the subject matter of the Fee
Agreement, Hoiles’ Freedom shares, were located in Colorado. These contacts
are not persuasive. First, the origin of payments under a contract and the location
of the breach are not relevant contacts under § 188 of the Restatement. Second,
although the location of the subject matter of the contract is relevant, it does not
carry great weight in this case. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
188(2) (noting “contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue” in dispute). Alioto and Hoiles entered into a
contingent fee agreement whereby Alioto would perform legal services with the
aim of enabling Hoiles to sell his Freedom shares. The majority of the legal
services rendered pursuant to the Fee Agreement w ere performed in California.
Freedom, the company whose stock Hoiles owned, is incorporated in California
and has its principle place of business in California. Under these circumstances,
the fact that Hoiles’ stock certificates were located in Colorado is of limited
relevance.

-16-
 The application of California law in this case would also create certainty

and uniformity of result. A lioto is licensed to practice law only in California. H e

did not leave California to solicit business in another state. The legal services he

rendered pursuant to the Fee Agreement were performed largely in California. In

particular, he drafted a complaint asserting claims under a California antitrust

statute for filing in California state court. Alioto is entitled, under these

circumstances, to anticipate that California law will govern and draft his

contingent fee agreement accordingly. Requiring an attorney to conform to the

law of whichever state a client happens to reside in when the attorney is not

licensed to practice in that state, does not solicit business in that state, and does

not perform legal services in that state would create unnecessary uncertainty.

The seventh and final factor does not favor the application of either

Colorado or California law. This factor evaluates the ease in determining and

applying each interested state’s law. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §

6(2)(g). Both Colorado and California have statutes explicitly enumerating the

requirements for a valid and enforceable contingent fee agreement. Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 6147; Colo. R. Governing Contingent Fees ch. 23.3. Therefore,

neither state’s law would be difficult to determine or apply in assessing the

validity of the Fee Agreement.

Five of the seven factors for ascertaining the state with the most significant

relationship under § 6 of the Restatement weigh in favor of applying California

-17-
law in this case. The remaining two factors are neutral. Accordingly, California

has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties, and its law

should have been applied in determining the validity of the Fee Agreement.

Alioto argues, if this court determines the district court’s choice of law

ruling was erroneous, we should proceed to determine whether the Fee Agreement

is enforceable under California law. He contends the Fee Agreement is

enforceable and obligates Hoiles to pay him fifteen percent of the amount Hoiles

and the D avidson D efendants received from the sale of their Freedom shares. H e

therefore urges this court to remand the case to the district court with instructions

to award Alioto $21,293,121.84. Hoiles, however, contests the validity of the Fee

Agreement even under California law. He claims the Fee Agreement fails to

comply with California’s statutory requirements because it does not sufficiently

describe the contingent fee rate or discuss related matters not covered by the Fee

Agreement. Alternatively, if the Fee Agreement is enforceable under California

law, Hoiles argues the contingency contemplated by the agreement never

occurred, and thus, Alioto is only entitled to quantum meruit. The district court

has not assessed whether the Fee Agreement is enforceable under California law

or evaluated the parties’ competing interpretations of the agreement. Because

these are issues best resolved in district court in the first instance, we decline to

address them here. See United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1061 n.6

(10th Cir. 2006). W e therefore reverse the district court’s determination that the

-18-
Fee Agreement is unenforceable, and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

B . M isrepresentation C laim s

Alioto also contends the district court erred in dismissing his fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims. In his breach of contract and unjust

enrichment claims, Alioto alleged he was entitled to a contingent fee based on the

sale of both Hoiles’ and the Davidson Defendants’ stock— a total of 666,961.5

shares. Alioto claimed Hoiles executed the Fee Agreement with actual or

apparent authority to act on behalf of the Davidson Defendants and that the

agreement contemplated a contingent fee based on amounts recovered from the

sale of approximately 667,000 shares. In the event it was found Hoiles lacked

authority to act on behalf of the Davidson Defendants, Alioto pled alternative

theories of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Alioto claimed,

before the parties entered into the [Fee] Agreement, and throughout
the course of [A lioto’s] engagement for over two years, [Hoiles]
repeatedly represented to [Alioto] that [Hoiles] had authority to
represent and act on behalf of the interests of all approximately
667,000 Hoiles Shares, including the shares of [the Davidson
Defendants].

Alioto alleged he reasonably relied on these intentionally, knowingly, or

negligently false representations to his detriment in entering into the Fee

Agreement and continuing to perform services pursuant to the agreement. Alioto

sought both actual and punitive damages.

-19-
 Hoiles filed a motion seeking summary judgement on, inter alia, Alioto’s

fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. In a ruling from the bench, the

district court denied Hoiles’ motion. The district court noted there were “rampant

disputed facts on issues of causation and other issues, including the [Fee

Agreement].” A fter indicating it was denying Hoiles’ motion for summary

judgment, the district court nevertheless proceeded to dismiss Alioto’s fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims with prejudice. The court stated,

I will allow [Alioto] to seek a contingent fee based on the 667,000
shares as opposed to [Hoiles’] 511,210 shares, on the basis that it
was represented to him, or there was at least some factual issues
regarding the scope of the full number of shares that were the subject
of [the Fee Agreement].

I w ill toss the fraud and negligent misrepresentation . . .
claims. This is not going to be a tort case, and there is not going to
be any punitive damage claim in this case. 6

The district court therefore explicitly stated there were disputed issues of material

fact regarding Hoiles’ representations as to the number of shares contemplated by

the Fee Agreement. Hoiles does not contest this determination on appeal.

Instead, he argues the district court’s dismissal of Alioto’s fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims should be affirmed on other grounds. In particular,

Hoiles asserts (1) Alioto’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was

unreasonable as a matter of law ; (2) A lioto did not suffer any damages as a result

6
The district court subsequently concluded the Fee Agreement was invalid
under Colorado law and limited Alioto’s recovery to quantum meruit.

-20-
of the alleged misrepresentations; and (3) any error in dismissing the fraud and

negligent misrepresentation claims w as harmless because Alioto’s quantum meruit

recovery encompassed services rendered with respect to both Hoiles’ and the

Davidson D efendants’ shares.

Hoiles’ first proposed ground for affirming the district court’s

decision— that Alioto’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was

unreasonable as a matter of law— is premised on Fasing v. LaFond, 944 P.2d 608

(Colo. Ct. App. 1997). In Fasing, an attorney orally agreed to represent a client

on a contingent fee basis. Id. at 610. The attorney drafted a contingent fee

agreement, but the client never signed it. Id. W hen the underlying case settled,

the client filed suit, seeking a declaration that no valid contingent fee agreement

existed. Id. The attorney asserted various counterclaims, including fraudulent

misrepresentation. Id. at 611. Specifically, the attorney alleged the client had

intentionally misrepresented to him that they had a valid and enforceable

contingent fee agreement. Id. The trial court dismissed the fraudulent

misrepresentation claim, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 611–12. Citing

Colorado’s rules governing contingent fee agreements, the appellate court

observed Colorado places “the burden to ensure the validity of a contingent fee

agreement . . . squarely and solely upon the attorney.” Id.; see also Colo. R.

Governing Contingent Fees ch. 23.3. Accordingly, the court determined it was

-21-
unreasonable as a matter of law for an attorney to rely on a client’s

representations regarding the validity of a contingent fee agreement. Id. at 612.

It is unclear whether Colorado courts would apply the reasoning of Fasing,

which specifically relied on Colorado’s rules and policies governing contingent

fee agreements, to the present case in which California law governs the validity of

the Fee Agreement. Hoiles did not raise Fasing below, and the parties’ appellate

briefs do not discuss whether California’s rules and policies governing contingent

fee agreements support the conclusion reached in Fasing. Because this issue is

best addressed by the district court in the first instance after sufficient briefing by

the parties, we decline to affirm the dismissal of Alioto’s fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims on this ground. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433

F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (10th Cir. 2006) (indicating “we have discretion to affirm on

any ground adequately supported by the record, so long as the parties have had a

fair opportunity to address that ground” (alteration, quotation, and citation

omitted)).

Hoiles’ second and third proposed grounds for affirming the dismissal of

Alioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are related. Hoiles argues a

plaintiff claiming fraud and negligent misrepresentation can only recover out-of-

pocket expenses and consequential damages under Colorado law. He contends

Alioto did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses because Hoiles was required to

advance or reimburse all of Alioto’s out-of-pocket expenses under the terms of

-22-
the Fee Agreement. Hoiles further asserts Alioto was compensated for any

consequential damages he suffered by the quantum meruit award, which included

compensation for services rendered by Alioto with respect to the Davidson

Defendants’ shares.

Hoiles’ argument is based on a misstatement of Colorado law. Although

Colorado only permits recovery of out-of-pocket expenses and consequential

damages for a negligent misrepresentation claim, it allows benefit-of-the-bargain

damages in an action for fraud. 7 Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 672, 677

(Colo. 1994); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(2) (discussing

benefit-of-the-bargain damages as “damages sufficient to give [the recipient of a

fraudulent misrepresentation] the benefit of his contract w ith the maker”).

Neither Hoiles’ payment of Alioto’s out-of-pocket expenses nor Alioto’s quantum

meruit recovery are sufficient to give Alioto the benefit of the bargain he

allegedly struck in the Fee Agreement, i.e., payment on a contingent fee basis.

Therefore, Hoiles’ claim that Alioto did not suffer any damages to support his

fraud claim fails.

7
Alioto does not contest on appeal the district court’s application of
Colorado law to his tort claims. See United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd., 946 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D. Colo. 1996) (indicating “[c]hoice of
law in a given case is not made once for all issues”). Nevertheless, we note
California law also permits recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain damages for fraud.
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004).

-23-
 Hoiles also cannot demonstrate that the quantum meruit award renders any

error in dismissing Alioto’s negligent misrepresentation claim harmless. If Alioto

is successful on his negligent misrepresentation claim, he can recover a

reasonable hourly rate for the services he rendered with respect to the Davidson

Defendants’ shares. See W. Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller, 849 P.2d 44, 49

(Colo. 1993) (en banc). Although the jury was allowed to consider Alioto’s

efforts in selling the Davidson Defendants’ shares in calculating the quantum

meruit aw ard, it was not required to indicate the amount of the award attributable

to work performed on behalf of the D avidson Defendants’ shares. It is therefore

impossible to determine whether any portion of the quantum meruit award was

intended to compensate Alioto for services rendered on behalf of the Davidson

Defendants’ shares. Because the quantum meruit aw ard does not necessarily

compensate Alioto for consequential damages arising from any negligent

misrepresentation, any error in dismissing Alioto’s negligent misrepresentation

claim was not harmless. 8

In sum, Hoiles’ proposed alternative grounds for affirming the dismissal of

Alioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are unpersuasive.

8
Additionally, if the district court determines on remand that the Fee
Agreement is enforceable under California law, the quantum meruit award will be
vacated. Due to this possibility, we cannot use the quantum meruit award as a
basis for holding any error in the dismissal of Alioto’s negligent
misrepresentation claim harmless.

-24-
M oreover, Hoiles does not contest the district court’s determination that there are

disputed issues of material fact regarding Hoiles’ representations as to the number

of shares contemplated by the Fee Agreement. W e therefore accept the district

court’s determination that an issue of material fact exists. Because we can

discern no other justification for dismissing Alioto’s fraud and negligent

misrepresentation claims from the record before us, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of those claims.

C. Evidentiary R ulings

Alioto’s remaining claims of error concern the jury instructions on Alioto’s

unjust enrichment claim. As an initial matter, Alioto argues his unjust enrichment

claim is governed by California law. He nevertheless claims the jury instructions

were erroneous under both Colorado and California law. In particular, Alioto

challenges the district court’s instruction that the jury could not consider the

contingent fee percentage contained in the Fee Agreement or any other

percentage, or whether Alioto’s fee was fixed or contingent, in calculating a

reasonable quantum meruit aw ard. Additionally, Alioto claims the district court

erred in instructing the jury that its quantum meruit aw ard must be based on work

Alioto personally performed and could not account for work performed by

Alioto’s co-counsel.

Recovery in quantum meruit is permitted only in the absence of a valid,

express contract. Lemoge Elec. v. San M ateo County, 297 P.2d 638, 641 (Cal.

-25-
1956) (en banc); Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 444 (Colo.

2000) (en banc). Therefore, the jury trial during which the challenged

instructions were given was necessary only because the district court determined

the Fee A greement w as unenforceable. Because, as set out more fully above, w e

reverse the district court’s determination that the Fee Agreement is unenforceable

and remand for a determination of whether the agreement is valid under

California law, we need not address the propriety of the jury instructions at this

time. 9

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we REV ER SE the district court’s determination

that Colorado law governs the validity of the Fee Agreement and the district

court’s dismissal of Alioto’s breach of contract claim. W e REM AND with

instructions for the district court to determine whether the Fee Agreement is

enforceable under California law. W e also REV ER SE the district court’s

dismissal of A lioto’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. W e express

no opinion on Alioto’s claims of error with respect to the quantum meruit jury

instructions.

9
W e also decline to address whether Colorado or California law applies to
Alioto’s quantum meruit claim because the parties have not sufficiently briefed
the issue on appal. If necessary on remand, the district court should address this
issue in light of our choice of law determination regarding the validity of the Fee
Agreement. See supra pp. 7–19.

-26-