F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 9, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROYCE GILREATH,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-3132
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-2282-KHV)
L-M FU NDING LLC, A Kansas (D . Kan.)
Limited Liability Company;
ROXANNE M ITCHELL; DAVID
M ITCHELL; M A RG EE H A MILTON;
JIM M Y H A MILTO N ; EV ELY N
H A MILTO N ; SEB RIN G CA PITAL
CORPORATION, A Delaw are
C orporation; C LIFFO RD WILEY;
JO A N N BU TA U D ,
Defendants,
and
BANK ONE, National Association, as
Trustee,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before K ELLY, M cK AY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Royce Gilreath, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
determination that his complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
well as its denial of his motion to amend his complaint to add additional
defendants and new claims. M r. Gilreath originally filed a breach of contract and
Kansas C onsumer Protection Act claim in K ansas state court against L-M
Funding, LLC (“LM F”) after a failed land deal. The trial court awarded LM F
summary judgment, but the Kansas Court of Appeals found trial necessary to
resolve issues of fact, specifically whether M r. Gilreath knowingly authorized his
attorney, defendant Clifford W iley, to cancel the contract. 1 M r. Gilreath then
amended his state court complaint a third time to add, inter alia, defendant Bank
One. The trial court granted B ank One’s motion for sum mary judgment, as M r.
Gilreath had not alleged any claims against it. At a subsequent bench trial, M r.
1
Appellant believes, incorrectly, that the Kansas Court of Appeals
determined, as a matter of law , that “since Plaintiff did not know of the contents
of the letter that M r. W iley sent to L-M Funding, and Plaintiff did not informed
[sic] L-M Funding that M r W iley was his agent, thus was not authorized to cancel
plaintiff contract.” (Appellant Br. at 3, 3a.) Appellant is fundamentally mistaken
regarding the Kansas Court of Appeal’s decision. Rather, that court found that no
uncontroverted evidence supported LM F’s position.
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Gilreath presented no evidence, and the trial court ruled in favor of the remaining
defendants. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
Appellant then filed an action in federal district court asserting that the
Kansas state court decision violated his constitutional due process rights and
constitutional rights to contract. 2 A magistrate judge recommended that the
motion to amend be denied and the case dismissed for failure to meet even the
liberal pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Over Appellant’s objection,
the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
2
Appellant’s complaint lists the follow ing claims:
Plaintiff claim 1
That defendants Jimmy Hamilton, M argee Hamilton, Evelyn
Hamilton and Bank One have yet to show that plaintiff pleading in
his third amended petition required plaintiff to elect a remedy, thus
for the state courts to order plaintiff to elect was error.
Plaintiff claim 11
Plaintiff was denied his due process of finality of a Judgment or
decision of a competence court thus deprived plaintiff of his
U.S.C.A. 14; especially since the stateappeal court in Gilreath 1 had
made afinal decision in regards to the two attorney having authority
to write letters to cancel the contract.
Plaintiff count 111
Plaintiff paid #4,000,00 dollars earnest money after signing the
contract with Dave Landis, of L-M Funding, however the contract
fail but plaintiff have not receive his earnest money back which is
inconstant with what the contract state. Plaintiff contends that this
is another mean by the state courts of impairing the oblig- of a
contract, which violate provisions of the federal constitution.
(C ompl., A ppellee’s App. at 18 (errors in original).)
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The district court denied Appellant’s motion to amend on grounds of
futility. It determined that Appellant failed adequately to allege any
circumstances justifying the federal statutory discrimination claims against the
numerous additional defendants, all of whom were attorneys that represented
either Appellant or defendants in the state court action. The district court also
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
First, it found that complete diversity was absent where nine of eleven defendants
were residents of the same state as Appellant. Second, the district court
concluded that Appellant’s federal claims were, under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, an impermissible attempt to seek review of a fully adjudicated state
court judgment.
W e review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. See Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473
(10th Cir. 2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a jurisdictional limit
on federal courts, precluding “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (stating
that Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in state court . . . from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment in a
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United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights”).
Based on our careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal,
including Appellant’s complaint and proposed amendment thereto, we conclude
that the district court properly dismissed this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Appellant’s claims clearly
seek reversal of the state courts’ final resolution of this action. His attempt to
add to his federal action the lawyers who appeared in the state court proceedings
only reinforces our conclusion. Cf. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting that the “addition of new defendants in federal court . . . does not
change the nature of the underlying state court ruling”). Accordingly, the district
court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
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