F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
December 7, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-5193
v. (Case No. 04-CR-182-002-TCK)
JAM ES LEE W ATSON, (N .D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before K ELLY, M cK AY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Appellant James Lee W atson brings this direct criminal appeal following
his conviction for multiple counts of armed robbery and related firearms charges.
Appellant challenges certain district court evidentiary rulings as well as that
court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
First, Appellant argues that the district court incorrectly denied his motion
to suppress an incriminating statement made to police detectives. Appellant
asserts that the administration of morphine in conjunction with a medical
procedure the day before the interview placed him in a weakened condition, and
that subjecting him to a police interview therefore violated his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the
district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination. United States v.
Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir. 2006). W e conduct de novo review on the
ultimate issue of whether a statement was voluntary, “taking into account the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The Government bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that a confession is voluntary. M issouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,
608 n.1 (2004). “W aiver of one’s Fifth A mendment privilege against
self-incrimination requires that the individual ‘voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently’ waive his constitutional privilege.” United States v. M orris, 287
F.3d 985, 988 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting M iranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966)).
The district court conducted a suppression hearing, at which the
interviewing detective and Appellant testified, and reviewed a videotape of the
-2-
interview. The district court found that Appellant knowingly signed a M iranda
waiver after reading portions of the waiver out loud, that Appellant was alert and
understood the nature of the interview, and that Appellant ended the interview by
refusing to talk further and by requesting a lawyer. The district court concluded
that these facts show ed that Appellant waived his M iranda rights w ith “‘full
awareness both of the nature of the [rights] being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon [them].’” Order, Case No. 04-CR-182-
K, at 4 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 23, 2005) (quoting M orris, 287 F.3d at 989). Based on
the totality of the circumstances, we agree. See M orris, 287 F.3d at 989 (finding
no mental impairment where physician said medication would have no effect on
faculties and defendant’s actions demonstrated comprehension of his rights); see
also United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that defendant was lucid and aware of his rights after district court reviewed
videotape of interview and heard testimony from interview ing officer).
Second, Appellant contends that the district court permitted the jury to
view the surveillance video of one the armed robberies in clear contravention of
Fed. R. Evid. 403. “W e review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion.” Curtis, 344 F.3d at 1067. “As has been stated many times, Rule 403
does not protect a party from all prejudice, only unfair prejudice.” Deters v.
Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). The
district court determined that the videotapes were directly relevant to the crimes
-3-
alleged, were not unfairly prejudicial, and corroborated witness testimony. W e do
not believe the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the
video’s probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial impact.
Third, Appellant challenges the admission of and playing of audiotaped
telephone conversations in which Appellant attempted to fabricate a false alibi
with the coerced cooperation of third parties. Appellant argues that (1) the
government’s notice requesting admission of this evidence was filed after the
motion deadline, (2) Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1(f) prohibits admission following
Appellant’s w ithdrawal of his alibi defense, (3) the evidence was not relevant,
and (4) the evidence was unduly prejudicial.
Admission of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. M ares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). W e do
not reverse a district court’s ruling “if ‘it fall[s] within the bounds of permissible
choice in the circumstances’ and is not ‘arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419
(10th Cir. 1997)). Rule 404(b) governs the admission of “other crimes, wrongs,
or acts,” and a ruling on Rule 404(b) admissibility requires that we examine the
following four factors: “(1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose,
(2) its relevancy, (3) that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and (4) a limiting instruction is given if the
defendant so requests.” Id. (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,
-4-
691 (1988)).
The district court found that the government, after learning about these
conversations, promptly filed its motion to admit the evidence. Also, the district
court determined that Rule 12.1(f) did not bar admission of this evidence to prove
consciousness of guilt. The audiotapes w ere offered for the permissible purpose
of establishing consciousness of guilt and were not overly prejudicial compared to
the relevant probative purpose. The district court did, however, require redaction
of Appellant’s threats to kill the witnesses and/or their family members if they
failed to cooperate. In addition, the district court instructed the jury that it could
not consider this evidence as proof of the acts charged but rather only as proof of
Appellant’s state of mind. W e find the district court’s ruling entirely appropriate.
Finally, Appellant argues that the district court erroneously denied his
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically,
Appellant contends his rights were prejudiced by a violation of the rule of
sequestration. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 authorizes district courts to grant new trials “if
required in the interest of justice.” However, “motion[s] for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence [are] generally disfavored and ‘should be granted only
with great caution.’” United States v. Gwathney, No. 05-2165, 2006 W L
2734108, at *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 26, 2006) (quoting United States v. Combs, 267
F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001)). A district court’s denial of a motion for a new
trial is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id.
-5-
After hearing testimony on the nature of the sequestration violation, the
district court determined not only that “[a]ny hypertechnical violation of the Rule
of Sequestration was not prejudical,” but also that “[i]t was a waste of this
Court’s time to hear” the motion since the evidence was in no way material to the
principal issues involved and no harmful prejudice could have resulted from the
violation. (Hr’g Tr. at 52-53, Aug. 31, 2005.) After reviewing the nature of the
violation, we agree that the violation was, at best, “minor,” “hypertechnical,” and
“harmless.” (Id.)
AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court
M onroe G. M cKay
Circuit Judge
-6-