F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
February 26, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-2323
BRIAN SANDO VA L,
Defendant - Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D .C . NO. CR-04-1636 M CA)
M ark D. Jarmie, M ark D. Jarmie, LLC, Albuquerque, New M exico, for
Defendant - Appellant.
David N. W illiams, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff -
Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, M cW ILLIAM S, and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
HA RTZ, Circuit Judge.
In accordance with a plea agreement with the United States Attorney for the
District of New M exico, Brian Sandoval pleaded guilty to an information
charging him with theft and unauthorized conversion of two government vehicles,
see 18 U.S.C. § 641. The district court’s sentence included special conditions of
supervised release that restricted his contact with children. On appeal
M r. Sandoval challenges these conditions as unrelated to the crime for which he
pleaded guilty and as an unnecessary restriction on his liberty. In response the
government has filed a motion to enforce the provision of the plea agreement
waiving M r. Sandoval’s right to appeal. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and grant the government’s motion.
I. B AC KGR OU N D
On M ay 25, 2004, M r. Sandoval, a patient receiving medical and
psychiatric treatment at Crownpoint Public H ealth Service Indian Hospital in
C row npoint, N ew M exico, managed to obtain sets of automobile keys for two
General Service Administration (GSA ) vehicles, located one of the vehicles, and
removed it from the hospital parking lot. Several days later he returned it (in
damaged condition) and removed a second GSA vehicle. He was not authorized
to drive either car.
Upon questioning by Crownpoint police officers M r. Sandoval admitted to
taking both vehicles and damaging the first. An information charged him with the
thefts, and he entered a guilty plea on August 23, 2004.
The presentence report prepared by the probation office reviewed
M r. Sandoval’s history of sexual misconduct and sex-offender treatment: In
1999, at age 17, he sexually assaulted a nine-year-old female cousin. In a federal
-2-
juvenile adjudication he was sentenced on M ay 21, 2001, to three years’ probation
for the offense. As a term of probation he was placed in various sex-offender
treatment programs, none of which he successfully completed. In the summer of
2003 the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal M edical Center assessed
M r. Sandoval as a high-risk candidate for recidivism for various reasons,
including the early onset of his behavior and his failure to participate fully in sex-
offender treatment.
On November 16, 2004, the district court sentenced M r. Sandoval to 12
months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release under a
number of specified conditions. Four of the special conditions of release
prohibited him from (1) having any contact with persons under the age of 18,
without prior written permission from his parole officer; (2) working in any
position that would give him access to children, without prior approval of his
parole officer; (3) loitering within 100 feet of schools, parks, playgrounds,
arcades, or other places used primarily by children under 18; and (4) volunteering
for activities in which he would supervise children or adults with mental or
physical disabilities. At sentencing he raised no objection relating to the
conditions of release.
II. D ISC USSIO N
M r. Sandoval contends on appeal that the supervised-release conditions
regarding contacts with children are invalid on two grounds: First, he argues that
-3-
they do not deter him from engaging in criminal conduct similar to that for which
he was convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653(b)(5) (occupation restrictions must bear
“a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense”); United
States v. Erwin, 299 F.3d 1230, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b)(5)). Second, he argues that they unnecessarily deprive him of his
liberty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3383(d)(2) (conditions of release should not restrict
liberty more than reasonably necessary). He also complains that he had no notice
of these special conditions before they were imposed. See United States v.
Bartsm a, 198 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (defendant was entitled to
notice of special condition of release that was not facially related to charged
offense), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Atencio, No. 05-2279,
2007 W L 102977, at *9 (10th Cir. Jan. 17, 2007). W e need not resolve the merits
of these contentions, however, because he waived his right to appeal.
In United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc),
we held that a waiver of appeal is enforceable so long as (1) the disputed issue
falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) enforcing the
waiver does not result in a miscarriage of justice. The government contends that
M r. Sandoval’s appellate waiver satisfies all three conditions.
M r. Sandoval disagrees. He first asserts that the supervised-release
conditions do not fall within the scope of his waiver. W e narrowly construe the
-4-
scope of M r. Sandoval’s waiver of appeal rights. See United States v.
Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003). But we do not hesitate to
“hold a defendant to the terms of a lawful plea agreement.” United States v.
Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998).
M r. Sandoval’s plea agreement precludes any appeal of his sentence other
than an upward departure. Paragraph 10 states:
The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence
imposed.
a. Acknowledging that, the defendant knowingly waives
the right to appeal any sentence within the guideline range applicable
to the statute of conviction as determined by the court after
resolution of any objections by either party to the presentence report
to be prepared in this case, and the defendant specifically agrees not
to appeal the determination of the court in resolving any contested
sentencing factor. In other w ords, the defendant waives the right to
appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any,
that the court may depart upwards from the applicable sentencing
guideline range as determined by the court.
R. Vol. I Doc. 14 at 5 (emphasis added). Supervised-release conditions are part
of the sentence; and the reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (the statutory basis for
sentence appeals) in ¶ 10 of the plea agreement makes clear that the waiver
encompasses all appellate challenges to the sentence other than those falling
within the explicit exception for challenges to upward departures. See United
States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (in construing scope of
appeal waiver in plea agreement, “[t]he word ‘sentence’ encompasses both prison
-5-
time and periods of supervised release”); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886,
892 n.7 (8th Cir. 2003) (similar); United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 798 (7th
Cir. 2002) (similar). M r. Sandoval has not contended either in his briefs or at
oral argument that his supervised-release conditions constitute a “depart[ure]
upwards” from the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Blue Coat, 340
F.3d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 2003) (“This waiver clearly limits M r. Blue C oat’s
appellate rights. The only appellate right he retained was the right to appeal a
‘departure up from the guideline range.’ Thus, his w aiver would prevent him
from appealing the conditions of his supervised release.”). W e therefore hold that
the first Hahn requirement was satisfied.
M oving to the second Hahn requirement, we look primarily to two factors
in determining whether M r. Sandoval knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights: (1) whether the language of the plea agreement states that he
entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and (2) w hether the record
reveals an adequate colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. See
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. M r. Sandoval bears the burden to demonstrate that his
waiver w as not knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d
867, 872–73 (10th Cir. 2003) (defendant “has the burden to present evidence from
the record establishing that he did not understand the w aiver”).
M r. Sandoval has not come close to satisfying this burden. His agreement
explicitly states that he waived his appeal rights “knowingly.” R. Vol. I. Doc. 14
-6-
at 5. And the Rule 11 colloquy was thorough. In particular, he was informed of
the maximum penalty and how his sentence would be determined. W hen he was
asked specifically about his w aiver of appeal, he stated that he had discussed it
with his attorney and understood what he was waiving.
M r. Sandoval argues that although he knew most of the consequences of his
waiver, he could not have knowingly waived his right to appeal the special
conditions of his sentence, because they are not specified in the plea agreement.
But “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently
aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would
likely apply in general in the circumstances— even though the defendant may not
know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” United States v. Ruiz,
536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). Thus, in the context of an appeal waiver we have
rejected the notion “that a defendant must know with specificity the result he
forfeits before his waiver is valid.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326–27 (defendant
contended that he could not have anticipated that district court would mistakenly
believe that it lacked discretion to impose concurrent, rather than consecutive,
sentence). Accordingly, the second Hahn requirement was satisfied.
As to the third Hahn requirement, M r. Sandoval argues that a w aiver of his
appellate rights would result in a miscarriage of justice. M iscarriage of justice,
however, has a narrow meaning in this context. W e have held that it would arise
only when
-7-
1) the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race; 2)
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation
of the waiver renders the waiver invalid; 3) the sentence exceeds the
statutory maximum; or 4) the waiver is otherw ise unlawful.
United States v. M aldonado, 410 F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. M r. Sandoval argues only
that the fourth circumstance is present here. For the waiver to be invalid on the
ground of unlawfulness, the unlawfulness must “seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant bears the burden
of persuasion on this point. See United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 959
(10th Cir. 2004).
M r. Sandoval first asserts that the appellate waiver w ith regard to his
supervised-release conditions is unlawful because those conditions are not
specifically mentioned in the plea agreement. But this is just another way of
contending that the agreement does not encompass challenges to conditions of
release, a contention that we have already rejected.
M r. Sandoval also asserts that the waiver is unlaw ful because it is
“unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).” Aplt.’s Resp. to M ot. for Enforcement
of Plea A greement at 7 (M ay 2, 2005). But § 3742(a)(1), which permits a
defendant to appeal a sentence “imposed in violation of law,” is simply a source
of the right to appeal that was w aived by the plea agreement. It does not purport
-8-
to state what is lawful or unlawful, or even when it may be waived.
M r. Sandoval’s assertion is based on a misunderstanding of what must be
“unlawful” for a waiver to result in a miscarriage of justice. Our inquiry is not
whether the sentence is unlawful, but whether the waiver itself is unlawful
because of some procedural error or because no waiver is possible. See United
States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The relevant question . .
. is not whether Porter’s sentence is unlawful . . . , but whether . . . his appeal
waiver itself [is] unenforceable.”). An appeal waiver is not “unlaw ful” merely
because the claimed error would, in the absence of waiver, be appealable. To so
hold would make a waiver an empty gesture. Cf. United States v. Nguyen, 235
F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Nguyen’s view , a waiver of appellate
rights would be essentially meaningless; the waiver would be valid if the claims
were meritless, but invalid if the claims were meritorious. The whole point of a
waiver, however, is the relinquishment of claims regardless of their merit.”).
In short, affirmance of M r. Sandoval’s sentence would not cause a
miscarriage of justice. Cf. Sines, 303 F.3d at 798–99 (appellate waiver barred
defendant convicted of fraud from challenging special condition of release
requiring participation in sex-offender treatment program.)
Because we hold that the plea agreement precludes M r. Sandoval’s claims
on appeal, we do not address his argument that the supervised-release conditions
imposed by the district court are improper.
-9-
IV . C ON CLU SIO N
The government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement is GRANTED and
this appeal is DISM ISSED.
-10-