F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 16, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-3249
(D.C. No. 02-CR-40131-JAR)
DA RRELL TRIPLETT, (D . Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, M cCO NNELL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
On September 22, 2003, defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms of a mixture containing cocaine
and one count of possession of five kilograms or more of a mixture containing
cocaine. Pursuant to a written plea agreement between defendant and the United
States, defendant “knowingly waive[d] any right to appeal a sentence imposed
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
which is within the guideline range determined appropriate by the court. . . . In
other w ords, the defendant waive[d] the right to appeal the sentence imposed in
this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from the
applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court.” Plea Agreement
at 12, ¶ 11.
At the sentencing hearing on June 21, 2004, the district court found that
defendant’s offense and relevant conduct amounted to 397.78 kilograms of
cocaine, that he possessed a firearm in connection with the offense, that he was a
manager or supervisor of five or more participants, and that he had obstructed
justice by committing perjury at his trial, which had ended in his guilty plea.
Based on these findings, the court determined that defendant’s adjusted offense
level was 43 and his criminal history level was II. Under the sentencing
guidelines, this produced a sentence of life on each count. Accordingly, the
district court sentenced defendant to concurrent life sentences.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging his sentences on June 29,
2004, which was docketed as appeal No. 04-3237. The United States, in turn,
filed a motion to enforce the waiver of appeal rights contained in the plea
agreement. W hile that appeal was pending the Supreme Court issued its decision
in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which significantly altered the
sentencing landscape. In light of the Booker decision, the United States
reconsidered its position on defendant’s appeal. It filed a motion confessing that
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the district court had committed both constitutional and non-constitutional Booker
error in sentencing defendant, that the errors were plain, that they affected
substantial rights, and that they ought to be noticed. Therefore, the government
withdrew its motion to enforce the appeal waiver and asked that the case be
remanded for resentencing. This court granted the motion and remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to vacate the sentence previously imposed
and resentence defendant in accordance with Booker.
The district court resentenced defendant on M ay 30, 2006. At the
resentencing hearing, the court determined that while the guidelines advised a life
sentence on each count, the court was not going to impose a life sentence.
Instead, taking into account the other sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553, the court determined that a more reasonable sentence on each count was
thirty years. Thus, the court imposed concurrent thirty-year sentences.
Defendant again filed a timely appeal of his sentence. His counsel filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding there
were no non-frivolous arguments for appeal, but advancing two arguments his
client would have him make. Counsel then moved to withdraw. Defendant was
given an opportunity to file a pro se response to his counsel’s Anders brief, which
he did. Rather than file a merits brief, the United States moved to enforce the
waiver of appeal rights contained in the plea agreement pursuant to United States
v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
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Defense counsel has responded to the government’s motion stating that it is
appellant’s position that the court did not determine the appropriate guidelines
range and thus did not impose a sentence within the appropriate guidelines range,
so this court should consider the merits of his appeal rather than deem it waived
under the plea agreement. Defendant also was given an opportunity to respond to
the government’s motion, which he did. In his pro se response, he argues that the
government forfeited its right to enforce the appeal waiver when it filed its
motion in appeal No. 04-3237 confessing error, withdrawing its motion to enforce
the appeal waiver, and seeking a remand. He also argues that the government’s
confession of plain error in the earlier appeal demonstrates that the plea
agreement itself was not sound and should not be enforced. Finally, he argues
that once this court remanded the case for resentencing it somehow vitiated the
plea agreement and the waiver of appeal rights contained in that agreement.
Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 359 F.3d at 1325. The
miscarriage-of-justice prong requires the defendant to show (a) his sentence relied
on an impermissible factor such as race; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the appeal waiver rendered the waiver invalid;
(c) his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; or (d) his appeal waiver is
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otherw ise unlawful. Id. at 1327. The government’s motion addresses these
considerations, explaining why none of them undermines defendant’s appeal
waiver.
W e have carefully reviewed the plea agreement, the transcripts of the plea
hearing and the resentencing hearing, counsel’s Anders brief, defendant’s pro se
brief, and the materials filed by the parties in connection with the current motion
to enforce the plea agreement. “U nder Hahn, we conclude that defendant has
waived his right to appeal and his contrary arguments are without merit.”
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s M otion for Enforcement of Plea
Agreement and DISM ISS the appeal. Defense counsel’s motion to withdraw is
GRANTED. Defendant’s Response and Objection to “Former” Counsel’s
Response to Appellee’s M otion for Enforcement of Plea Agreement and M otion to
Dismiss Counsel is DENIED as moot. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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