F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 17, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-3244
v. (D. Kansas)
DW AYN GRANT also know n as CJ, (D.C. No. 04-CR-20001-KHV)
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
A jury found Dwayn Grant guilty of one count of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Grant appeals from
his conviction, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
lesser included offense of simple possession and in admitting evidence of
uncharged drugs in his possession at the time of his arrest. W e AFFIRM .
Background
On October 17, 2003, Officer Brian Hill, a police officer with the City of
Olathe, Kansas, was conducting a routine patrol. As he patrolled the parking area
of an apartment complex, he noticed a car backed into a space on the far, dark end
of the lot. Because it was parked in an isolated location away from the entrance
to the complex, Officer Hill thought it “looked out of place” and shined his
spotlight on the car. (R. Vol. III at 41.) Hill saw the top of a woman’s head in the
passenger seat, but could not see anyone in the driver’s seat. As he approached
the passenger side of the parked car, the passenger, M elva Kennedy, sat up in the
passenger’s seat and began moving from side to side, like “someone sitting in a
chair and kicking a ball.” (Vol. III at 43.) W hen Hill reached the passenger side
window he observed another person, Dwayn Grant, in the reclined driver’s seat.
W hen he shined his flashlight into the car, Hill saw a small glass pipe on the side
of Kennedy’s foot. It appeared to be a crack pipe.
Hill took the car keys and called for backup. Approximately five minutes
later, Officer Holly Barrow arrived. Hill then instructed Grant to get out of the
car. Grant acted surprised at the presence of the pipe, denied there were drugs in
the car and gave Hill permission to search his person. In Grant’s left rear pocket,
Hill found a plastic baggie with thirty-three individually wrapped packets of a
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white substance. Some of the packages contained cocaine rocks while others
contained cocaine powder. 1 The substance field-tested positive for cocaine.
W hile searching the car, Hill also found a notebook above the visor on the
driver’s side. The notebook contained calculations Hill believed were evidence of
money transactions for drugs. In addition, Hill found $802 in Grant’s w allet.
Grant and Kennedy were arrested.
Grant was indicted on one count of possession of more than five grams of
cocaine base (crack) with the intent to distribute. After testing determined there
were only 4.1 grams of cocaine base, the government filed a superseding
indictment removing the crack cocaine’s weight. 2 Several days before trial, Grant
filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the government from introducing
evidence of the additional 5.1 grams of powder cocaine contained in small
packets intermingled w ith the small packets of crack cocaine. The district court
denied the motion.
1
Andrew Guzman, the Johnson County Criminalistics Laboratory employee
who tested the substances found in Grant’s baggie, explained: “C ocaine salt
[cocaine hydrochloride] is the common white powder that most people associate
with cocaine. Cocaine base is actually the rock cocaine that is comm only know
as crack cocaine.” (R. Vol. III at 158.) Federal agents identified 4.1 grams of
cocaine base (the charged drug quantity) and approximately 5 grams of cocaine
powder.
2
Possession with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of crack cocaine
carries a maximum sentence of forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(IV )(iii).
Less than 5 grams carries a maximum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(D).
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Kennedy testified for the government, saying Grant had given her a ride
home from work the evening of their arrests. On the way, she smoked some of
Grant’s crack cocaine. Kennedy could not remember whether Grant gave her the
crack cocaine or she found it in his car. In any event, she felt she owed Grant
some form of payment for the drugs. Kennedy knew Grant for five or six years
but had never seen him use drugs.
Ed D rake, a senior patrol officer with the Olathe Police D epartment, also
testified for the government. According to Drake, a normal user generally
purchases only the amount of crack cocaine he or she wants to smoke at the time
of purchase; a light user might ingest from .2 to .5 grams a day while a heavy user
smokes 1 to 1.5 grams a day; the presence of two types of cocaine indicated Grant
“was basically working two different types of drugs for different clientele.” (V ol.
III at 220.) Drake concluded “these drugs are being . . . possessed with the
intent to sell.” (Id.)
The government offered as evidence photographs of the baggie containing
both the crack and the powder cocaine packets confiscated from Grant. Both
drugs were admitted over Grant’s objection.
At the close of the government’s evidence, the government offered, by
stipulation, a letter written by Grant. In the letter Grant stated he had no problem
with pleading guilty to possession, but the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate his intent to distribute the drugs.
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Grant’s theory of defense was that he possessed the drugs, but did not
intend to distribute them. His only evidence was the testimony of his mother,
Carolyn Grant. She explained how Grant would often accompany her and her
husband to the river boat casinos to gamble. A day or two before Grant’s arrest
she gave him approximately $600 to $650 in large bills to hold so she would not
“play[] back” the money. (R. Vol. III at 267.) On the night of the arrest, she and
her husband were waiting for Grant to bring the money to their house so they
could go to the casinos that evening.
Grant requested an instruction on simple possession, suggesting it was a
lesser included offense of the charged offense. He claimed the jury could
rationally find possession of cocaine base without an intent to distribute. Grant’s
request generated the following colloquy at the preliminary instruction
conference:
The Court: Do you have any authority which says I’m
required to do that over the Government’s
opposition?
[Defense Counsel]: I do not. And, in fact, I think the case law is over
the Government’s opposition you are not required.
The Court: Right.
[Defense Counsel]: But I do want to make very clear, I am requesting
this instruction consistent with what prior counsel
did and submitted to the Court. I don’t want you
to think that I’ve abandoned that instruction. I
have not. I adopt this, I propose this, I request
that it be given.
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(Id. at 295-96.) The judge then asked the government its position. It objected to
the instruction because there was no evidence suggesting Grant was merely a user
who possessed the cocaine for personal enjoyment. The requested instruction was
refused. The next day, at the final instruction conference, the judge addressed
Grant personally regarding the lesser included offense instruction stating: “M r.
Grant, your attorney explained to you that where the Government objects to
giving . . . an instruction as to a lesser included offense that the Court cannot give
that instruction?” (Id. at 304.) Grant answered “Yes.” (Id.) The judge
explained, “So that’s why I overruled that particular request.” (Id.)
The jury convicted. Thereafter, Grant filed a “Consolidated M otion for
Post-Trial Relief” arguing, inter alia, the evidence was insufficient and the trial
court’s erroneous admission of the powder cocaine required acquittal or a new
trial. The judge denied the motion and subsequently sentenced Grant to 63
months imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
Discussion
1. Instruction on Lesser Included O ffense
Grant again contends he was entitled to have the jury consider the lesser
included offense of simple possession (21 U.S.C. § 844), which carries a
significantly less severe penalty than possession with intent to distribute. W e
review de novo whether the offense on which the instruction is sought is a lesser
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included offense to the charged crime, but review the trial court’s determination
whether the evidence justifies the inclusion of the instruction for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1206 (10th Cir.2000)
(citing United States v. Duran, 127 F.3d 911, 914 (10th Cir.1997)). It is not a
"broad ranging discretion but is focused narrowly on whether there is any
evidence fairly tending to bear on the lesser included offense." Id. “[A]
defendant is entitled to an instruction concerning a lesser crime, pursuant to
[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 31(c), if the evidence justifies that
instruction.” 3 United States v. Bruce, 458 F.3d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 999 (2007). “[I]f there is evidence to
support a lesser included offense and defendant requests such a charge, the court
has no discretion to refuse to give the instruction.” Id. (quotations omitted). But
a lesser included offense instruction ought not be given to the jury merely to have
a convenient compromise if the decision becomes difficult or in sympathy for the
defendant. And, while possession is necessarily part of possession with intent to
distribute, it is not necessary to give a lesser included offence instruction for that
reason alone.
To determine whether the district court should have given a lesser included
offense instruction, we apply a four part test:
3
“A defendant may be found guilty of . . . an offense necessarily included
in the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c)(1).
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First, the defendant must properly request the instruction; second, the
elements of the lesser included offense must be a subset of the
elements of the charged offense; third, the element required for the
greater, charged offense that is not an element of the lesser offense
must be in dispute; and fourth, the evidence must be such that the
jury could rationally acquit the defendant on the greater offense and
convict on the lesser offense.
Humphrey, 208 F.3d at 1206 (citing Duran, 127 F.3d at 914-15). “If each of
these four elements can be satisfied, the district court must provide the
instruction.” United States v Abeyta, 27 F.3d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1994); see
United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 103 (10th Cir. 1980); Keeble v. United
States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).
Here, Grant met the first two parts of the four-part test. He requested the
instruction and “[p]ossession of a controlled substance, relative to the crime of
possession of such with intent to distribute, is a prototypal ‘lesser included
offense.’” Burns, 624 F.2d at 104. It is less clear whether he met the third part.
“Absent some evidence to counter the strong inference of [the charged offense]
. . . the issue is not elevated to a truly disputed one.” United States v. Joe, 831
F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079,
1084 (5th Cir.1974)); see United States v. Haar, 931 F.2d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir.
1991). Thus, the third part of the test is not met by the mere expedient of denial
and “putting the government to its proofs,” but requires a dispute in the evidence.
But, irrespective of the third part, Grant clearly failed to meet the fourth part and
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“Failure to meet any part of the test is fatal for the defendant.” Joe, 831 F.2d at
219.
Since controlled substances are hardly collector’s items, possession must be
for one of two purposes, personal use or distribution to others. In this case the
only issue was intent.
Resolution of the issue depends upon reasonable inferences a jury might
draw from the evidence. For three reasons the government suggests only one
inference was reasonable – an intent to distribute: (1) The amount of cocaine
Grant possessed was more than one person would quickly consume and it was
packaged for distribution, (2) Grant’s possession of two types of cocaine suggests
an intent to distribute and (3) the amount of cash in the denominations found in
Grant’s possession were indicative of drug dealing.
Grant sees it differently. As to the first point he refers to O fficer Drake’s
testimony regarding quantities of crack a heavy user might use 1 to 1.5 grams per
day and contends the amount of crack cocaine he possessed could be consumed by
a heavy user over a course of three to four days. Accordingly, he argues, the
amount does not necessarily imply an intent to distribute drugs. W ith respect to
the second point Grant acknowledges Drake’s testimony that it was not typical for
a person to use both types of cocaine (powder and crack) because a user usually
prefers one over the other. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that Drake did not say a
person will never possess two types of cocaine for personal use. Finally, he
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claims his evidence about the amount and denomination of the money in his
possession negates any inference with respect to the government’s third point.
In summary, Grant concedes the government could properly ask the jury to
draw inferences adverse to him, but it w ould not be obligated to do so. Burns,
624 F.2d at 104. From that, he concludes the lesser included offense should have
been given, allowing the jury to infer what it might and decide accordingly. 4
In response, the government claims Grant was not entitled to the lesser
included offense instruction because there was simply no evidence he used drugs.
Although Grant admitted he possessed drugs, he never admitted to using. In fact,
the only testimony on this subject was from Kennedy, who said she had known
Grant for five or six years and had never seen him use drugs.
The government’s second and third points (two kinds of drugs and
suspicious cash) permit an inference of intent to distribute, but they are equivocal
and a jury might not draw an allowable inference, even if it is reasonable. The
first point is another matter. There was no direct evidence G rant used drugs.
4
W e considered and rejected a similar argument in Haar where we quoted
the district courts findings: “[A] fter hearing all the evidence, I just didn't think
that there was any evidence elicited to establish that M r. Haar merely possessed
it and was not further involved, and I think it all is directed to manufacture and
the jury is either going to have to believe that he was involved in the m anufacture
or not.” 931 F.2d at 1372 (emphasis added). W e then said: “After reviewing the
record as a whole, w e agree with the trial court's determination that the elements
differentiating the two offenses were not in dispute. Therefore, we find no abuse
of discretion in the court's rejection of Defendant's requested lesser-included-
offense instruction for mere possession.” Id.
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Accordingly, his argument that the amount of drugs discovered in his possession
could have been consumed by a heavy user in three to four days is only
theoretical. The issue is, tellingly, not what a hypothetical heavy user might
consume, but what Grant might consume. Grant’s argument would require the
jury to merely speculate about his possible drug use, and heavy drug use at that.
And there was other evidence of Grant’s intent to distribute – possession of
thirty-three small packages of two different forms of cocaine and the presence of
a drug ledger in his vehicle.
Against an impressive array of evidence suggesting an intent to distribute is
the testimony of Grant’s mother, explaining his suspicious cash. And his
arguments, more hypothetical than rational. But he is required to prove nothing.
His defense may consist entirely of attempting to disparage the government’s
evidence, arguing it is insufficient as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
W hile he is presumed innocent and permissible arguments for an acquittal
are largely unbound, he is entitled to a lesser included offence instruction only if
the evidence is such that the jury could rationally acquit him of the greater
offense and convict of the lesser. W e could speculate as to whether a jury might
rationally acquit based upon the inferences discussed, but we need not rest our
decision on such esoteric grounds because his intent was made manifest.
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Kennedy testified to obtaining crack cocaine from Grant the night of his arrest 5
and her testimony went uncontradicted. Such evidence of distribution is
irrefutable evidence of an intent to distribute. The district court did not abuse its
limited discretion in refusing the requested lesser included offense instruction.
But even if the court erred in refusing the instruction, the error was
harmless. 6 See United States v. Trujillo, 390 F.3d 1267, 1275 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“[A] non-constitutional error is harmless unless the error had substantial
influence on the outcome of trial or if one is left in grave doubt as to its
influence.”). The evidence of Grant’s intent to distribute was overwhelming.
5
Kennedy testified she could not remember specifically if Grant handed
her the drugs or if she just helped herself. It matters not. Nothing suggests
Kennedy had her own crack. The only reasonable inference is that Grant knew
she was using his drugs w hen she loaded and lit the crack pipe while they were in
the extremely confines of the car. The jury was correctly instructed:
The third element of the crime charged requires the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to distribute
the mixture or substance containing cocaine base. The term “to
distribute,” as used in these instructions, means to deliver or transfer
possession or control of something from one person to another.
(R . Vol. I, Doc. 123 at 19 (emphasis added).)
6
The trial court erroneously stated “where the Government objects to
giving . . . an instruction as to a lesser included offense [] the Court cannot give
that instruction.” (R. Vol. III at 304.) The government claims the trial court’s
m istake w as the result of the representations of Grant’s counsel and therefore, w e
should not review this claim because Grant invited the error. “The invited-error
doctrine prevents a party who induces an erroneous ruling from being able to have
it set aside on appeal.” United States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir.
2005) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 113 (2006). Because we find
any error harmless, we need not decide the issue on this basis.
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2. Admission of Evidence
Grant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence he possessed
powder cocaine under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
government argues Rule 404(b) is inapplicable because it only applies to evidence
of acts extrinsic to the charged crime. According to the government this evidence
was properly admitted, not under Rule 404(b), but because it was so inextricably
intertwined with the charged offense that the witnesses’ testimony would have
been confusing and incomplete if it were excluded. W e agree.
“W e review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Portillo-Quezada, 469 F.3d 1345, 1353 (10th Cir.
2006). “Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of acts extrinsic to the charged
crime.” United States v. Lam bert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quotations omitted). 7 Because the evidence of Grant’s possession of powder
7
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as follow s:
(b) Other Crimes, W rongs, or A cts.--Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It m ay, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of m otive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce
at trial.
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cocaine is not extrinsic, but is intrinsic to the possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine charge, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable. Id. (“Other act evidence is
intrinsic when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime charged
are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or
the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.”) (quotations
omitted); see also United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1372 n.5 (10th Cir.
1989) (“An uncharged act may not be extrinsic if it was part of the scheme for
which a defendant is being prosecuted or if it was inextricably intertwined with
the charged crime such that a witness’ testimony would have been confusing and
incomplete without mention of the prior act.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
“Such intrinsic ‘other act’ evidence, although not excluded by 404(b), is
still subject to the requirement of Fed.R.Evid. 403 that its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Lam bert, 995 F.2d
at 1007-08. Here, the evidence of Grant’s possession of the powder cocaine was
relevant to whether his possession of the crack cocaine was w ith the intent to
distribute it. He fails to demonstrate this evidence was more prejudicial than
probative.
Grant concedes the evidence was relevant to his intent but nonetheless
argues the court failed to meet its “duty to excise evidence of other uncharged
wrongs if [it] can do so without destroying the relevancy of the evidence that
addresses itself to the charges.” United States v. Kelley, 635 F.2d 778, 782 (10th
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Cir. 1980). He claims evidence of his possession of the powder cocaine was “not
necessary to explain to the jury the government’s belief that he was engaged in
the distribution of crack cocaine” because the government’s experts did not so
testify. (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) Grant’s reliance on Kelley is misplaced. Kelley
involved extrinsic 404(b) evidence. But, more important, the premise of the
argument fails. As the government argued, just because the government’s experts
did not specifically rely on the presence of the powder cocaine in reaching their
conclusions does not mean the jury could not consider it a factor in determining
whether Grant intended to distribute the crack cocaine.
A FFIR ME D.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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