F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 19, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RICK Y DAVIS,
Petitioner - A ppellant, No. 07-3005
v. (D. Kansas)
DAVID M cKUNE, W arden, Lansing (D.C. No. 05-CV-3442-JAR)
Correctional Facility; PHILL KLINE,
Attorney General of the State of
Kansas,
Respondents - Appellees.
OR DER
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Proceeding pro se, Ricky Davis seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) from this court so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no
appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Davis has not “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a
COA and dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2). Davis’ motion to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal is granted.
Davis was convicted by a Kansas jury of two counts of rape and one count
of kidnaping. He was sentenced to 389 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the
Kansas Court of Appeals refused to consider Davis’ argument that his prosecution
violated the speedy trial provisions of the Kansas A greement on Detainers A ct,
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4401, because Davis failed to raise the issue before the trial
court. The appellate court then rejected Davis’ argument the trial court erred by
failing to give unanimity instructions on the rape and kidnaping charges,
concluding the jury did not have to be unanimous as to the means by which each
single offense was committed. The Kansas Supreme Court refused to review the
Court of Appeals’ decision.
Davis then filed a motion for a W rit of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60-1507, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, violation of his
speedy trial rights, and erroneous jury instructions. The state district court denied
relief and Davis appealed, abandoning all claims except the ineffective assistance
of counsel allegations. Davis v. Kansas, 113 P.3d 834, 834 (Kan. App. 2005)
(unpublished disposition). The Kansas Court of Appeals considered the
ineffective assistance claims but affirmed the denial of the habeas motion. Id.
Davis filed the instant federal § 2254 habeas petition on November 22,
2005, raising three general grounds for relief w hich he characterized as follow s:
(1) “K.S.A. 22-3402 and K.S.A. 22-4401, Unanimity Instructions on Force, Treat
[sic] or Deception or Force or Fear,” (2) “Effective Counsel, Chapter 60-1507
-2-
K.S.A. 22-3402 and 22-4401, Inspection / Brady M ateral [sic] 22-3212 / New
Trial,” and (3) “Sixth A mendment Rights, Failure to require hearing in open court
for good cause shown, Failure to parpare [sic] for trial.” Respondents moved to
dismiss Davis’ § 2254 petition, arguing he procedurally defaulted many of his
claims by failing to exhaust his state remedies and, alternatively, that all his
claims failed on the merits. Concluding many of D avis’ claims were
unexhausted, the district court declined to stay the petition and hold it in
abeyance, deciding instead to address all the claims on the merits. See Rhines v.
Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for
a w rit of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure
of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).
W ith respect to the claims Davis presented to the state court, the district court
applied the standard set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and concluded the state court’s adjudication of the claims was not contrary to,
nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an
unreasonable factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court reviewed the
remaining claims de novo and concluded Davis was not entitled to relief.
This court cannot grant Davis a COA unless he can demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
-3-
M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). In evaluating whether
Davis has carried his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though not
definitive, consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of his
claims. M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003). Davis is not required to
demonstrate that his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA. He must,
however, “prove something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of
mere good faith.” Id. (quotations omitted).
This court has reviewed Davis’ application for a COA and appellate brief,
the district court’s order, and the entire record on appeal pursuant to the
framework set out by the Supreme Court in M iller-El and concludes that Davis is
not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Davis’ claims is not
reasonably subject to debate and the claims are not adequate to deserve further
proceedings. Accordingly, Davis has not “made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right” and is not entitled to a COA. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).
This court denies Davis’ request for a COA and dismisses this appeal.
Entered for the Court
M ichael R. M urphy
Circuit Judge
-4-