F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 26, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-7124
CLONNIE ALONZO LAYM AN, (D.C. No. CR-06-11-01-JH)
(E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TACH A, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges. **
A federal jury convicted Defendant Clonnie Alonzo Layman on one count of
conspiracy to manufacture with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846; two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); one count of attempt to manufacture
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count of felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); one count of possession of a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist
the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir.
R. 34.1(G ). This case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1); and one count of possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The district court sentenced Defendant to 720 months
imprisonment. Prior to trial, Defendant moved twice to suppress incriminating
evidence seized from his person, m obile home, and travel trailer. Defendant also
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on Double Jeopardy. The district
court denied the motions. Defendant now appeals. On appeal, Defendant argues (1)
the officers’ initial warrantless entry into his mobile home and travel trailer was
unreasonable; (2) the search warrant obtained by officers as a result of their initial
entry failed to describe with sufficient particularity the place to be searched; and (3)
previous state criminal charges coupled w ith a state in rem forfeiture action against
his property bar his subsequent federal criminal prosecution. W e exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I.
The relevant historical facts are taken from the transcript of the suppression
hearing and are consistent with the district court’s findings. The Cherokee County,
Oklahoma Sheriff’s Department received information from the Rogers County,
Oklahoma Sheriff’s Department that Bobby Dale Kelley had outstanding w arrants
for failure to appear on drug trafficking charges in Rogers C ounty. Rogers C ounty
indicated Kelley possibly was staying at a residence in Cherokee County located on
property owned by his father. On August 25, 2003, three Cherokee County officers
2
and three Cherokee Nation M arshal Service agents w ent to the specified location in
south Cherokee County to arrest Kelley. The property was located in a heavily
wooded area, and the officers could not see the residence from the road. They split
into tw o groups, with one group approaching the residence from a dirt road and the
other from a utility easement.
About thirty yards from the residence, the officers encountered an
overwhelming ammonia-type, chemical smell which they immediately associated
with the manufacture of methamphetamine. In a clearing, the officers came upon a
mobile home that appeared vacant, i.e. run down with broken windows, and a travel
trailer that appeared occupied. N ear the trailer, paths appeared in the grass
apparently caused by people and vehicles coming to and from the trailer. The
chemical smell grew stronger as the officers moved closer to the residence. They
could not determine if the overpowering smell originated from the mobile home or
travel trailer. They observed items outside the trailer and mobile home that indicated
the manufacture of methamphetamine, including several small burn piles often found
incident to a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory. According to the testimony
of Cherokee County Officer Brian Swim:
Q: Okay. As you approached the residence to serve this arrest
warrant, did you encounter anything you found unusual?
A: Yes.
3
Q: What w as that?
A: There was several items outside the residence that are related to
manufacturing [of methamphetamine], and then there w as also an
overw helm ing chem ical smell.
Based on the ammonia-type smell, the items outside the residence, and the officers’
experience and training, they suspected a meth lab was operating in the mobile home
or travel trailer.
Officer Sw im explained the officers conducted an initial search of the travel
trailer because they feared someone inside might have been overcome by the
chemical fumes. Furthermore, they knew the toxic and volatile chemicals involved
in operating a meth lab could explode, thereby endangering both the officers
themselves and anyone inside the trailer or mobile home. The officers first knocked
on the travel trailer door, but received no answered. They tried to open the door, but
it was locked. They pulled on the door causing the lock to open. Inside they found
only a vacant trailer.
Next, the officers knocked on the front door of the mobile home. W hen no one
answ ered, the officers tried the back door. On the back porch, the smell of ammonia
became even more overwhelming. At that point, the officers observed more items
associated with a meth lab. These items included a container with lithium strips
soaking in mineral spirit, a container with a cloudy liquid, and brass fittings on a
water cooler that appeared corroded by anhydrous ammonia. The officers entered
the m obile home through the back door and discovered a meth lab in plain view .
4
They did not find anyone inside. The officers secured the premises, and obtained a
search warrant from the District Court of Cherokee County. After obtaining
the search warrant, the officers searched the mobile hom e and travel trailer
thoroughly. In the mobile home, they found, in addition to the meth lab, containers
of anhydrous ammonia, lithium battery strips, pseudoephedrine packets, solvents, and
other chemicals necessary to manufacture m ethamphetamine. In the travel trailer,
the officers seized more incriminating evidence, namely, methamphetamine,
firearms, a “booby” trap, and drug paraphernalia, including scales and baggies. The
officers also found documents identifying and connecting Defendant to the travel
trailer.
D uring execution of the state court search warrant, Defendant drove onto the
property. Because night had fallen, large halogen lights illuminated the search area.
At this point, the officers had not come into contact with Kelley, and were unsure
who was in the car. The officers lined the pathway and met Defendant with guns
drawn. Sergeant Thompson of the Cherokee Nation M arshal Service ordered
Defendant out of his vehicle and asked him for identification. Defendant presented
his driver’s license, which linked him to the documents discovered in the travel
trailer. Sergeant Thompson performed a pat-down of Defendant. Defendant was
unarmed. The sergeant, however, located on D efendant a ball wrapped in blue shop
towels that proved to be approximately tw o ounces of methamphetamine. The
indictment followed.
5
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person,
mobile home, and travel trailer. 1 In his motion, D efendant argued, among other
things, the w arrantless searches of his travel trailer and mobile home w ere
unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district judge referred the
motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation (R& R). In a thorough
R& R, the magistrate judge concluded the officers’ initial warrantless entry into the
travel trailer and mobile home was lawful. The magistrate judge reasoned the strong
chemical smell and the officers’ observation of items outside the residence
comm only associated with a meth lab established exigent circumstances justifying
the officers’ warrantless entry to protect themselves and anyone inside. The district
court overruled Defendant’s objections to the R& R and adopted it in its entirety.
Defendant next filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on double
jeopardy. Defendant claimed the State of Oklahoma’s decision to dismiss state
criminal charges against him in exchange for his agreement to forfeit property in a
pending state in rem civil forfeiture proceeding barred his subsequent prosecution
in federal court. The district court concluded the Double Jeopardy Clause was not
implicated because in rem civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment. The district
court also concluded the doctrine of dual sovereignty precluded Defendant’s claim
1
Defendant also moved to suppress incriminating statements made at the
time of his arrest. The district court suppressed the statements. The Government
does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
6
that the federal indictment was barred based on the state court prosecution.
Accordingly, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of
double jeopardy.
Finally, Defendant filed a second motion to suppress evidence seized during
the search. This time, Defendant argued the search warrant relied upon by the
officers did not sufficiently describe the location of the property to be searched in
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The district court
concluded no reasonable probability existed that another premises would be
mistakenly searched because the warrant contained specific descriptions of the
property and the executing officers had personal knowledge of the location of the
property. Therefore, the district court denied Defendant’s second m otion to
suppress.
II.
Defendant first argues the district court erred in upholding the officers’ initial
warrantless entry by applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. W e review the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress by
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See U nited
States v. G regoire, 425 F.3d 872, 875 (10th Cir. 2005). W e accept the district
court’s findings of historical fact unless clearly erroneous, and review its ultimate
determination of reasonableness de novo. Id.
W arrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively
7
unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); see also G roh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004). Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject
to certain exceptions. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). W e
have previously recognized the exigent circumstances exception to a warrantless
entry “when the circumstances posed a significant risk to the safety of a police
officer or a third party.” United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 2006).
This exception applies if (1) the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to
believe an immediate need to enter existed to protect the safety of themselves or
others, and (2) the conduct of the entry was otherwise reasonable. See United States
v. W alker, 474 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). The Government has the burden
of proving both prongs of the two-part test. Id.
Under the first prong of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement, we evaluate whether the officers had reasonable grounds to believe an
immediate need to enter existed “guided by the realities of the situation presented by
the record from the viewpoint of prudent, cautious, and trained officers.” Najar, 451
F.3d at 718-719 (internal quotations omitted). This inquiry is one of reasonable
belief. See id. at 719. Defendant’s argument in this regard is two-fold. First,
D efendant argues the officers, “faced with only the smell of ammonia emanating
from another nearby structure,” had no reason to believe this smell presented an
immediate danger. W e need not decide whether the smell of ammonia alone can give
rise to exigent circumstances because the totality of the circumstances in this case
8
undoubtedly justified the officers’ initial warrantless entry into the mobile home and
trailer. See Najar, 451 F.3d at 720. The overwhelming chemical odor, coupled with
items outside the residence that indicated the manufacture of methamphetamine
provided sufficient evidence for the officers to reasonably believe a meth lab existed.
Based on the officers’ knowledge and training of the toxic chemicals involved, they
were justified in reasonably believing the meth lab could explode, thereby
endangering both themselves and others. See United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d
1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 2003) (dangers associated with suspected meth lab established
reasonable basis to justify officers’ w arrantless entry).
Second, Defendant argues the officers had no basis for reasonably believing
a person was actually inside the trailer in need of immediate aid. Defendant cites
Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1946, to support his argument. In that case, officers
responded to a 3 a.m. call about a loud party. Upon arriving at the house, they saw
four adults through a screen door and windows beating an endangered juvenile. Id.
Given this tumult, the Court held the officers’ warrantless entry was reasonable. Id.
at 1949. Brigham City is not dispositive. The exigent circumstances exception does
not require officers actually see someone inside in immediate danger, as long as they
have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone might be in danger,
including themselves. See Rhiger, 315 F.3d at 1289. Under the circumstances of
this case, the officers had enough evidence to reasonably believe that someone might
be inside and possibly overcome by fumes. The officers received information that
9
Kelley, a wanted felon, was staying at the residence and paths in the grass indicated
someone had been staying there and could be inside. The strength of the chemical
smell further indicated that if someone w as inside, they might be unconscious or
incapacitated. Therefore, the officers’ were justified in entering the trailer and
mobile home to protect the safety of themselves and anyone inside.
Having determined the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to enter,
the second prong of the test requires us to consider whether the manner and scope
of the search was reasonable. See Najar, 451 F.3d at 720. Upon discovering no one
inside the travel trailer, the officers exited without further investigation. They
entered the mobile home from the back door, saw the meth lab in plain view, and
made sure no one inside was overcome by fumes. Once they determined the meth
lab was not operating and secured the premises, the officers immediately proceeded
to get a search warrant without further intrusion. W e agree with the district court
that both the manner and scope of the officers’ warrantless entry into the trailer and
mobile home w as reasonable.
Defendant characterizes the officers’ initial warrantless entry into the trailer
and mobile home as a “protective sweep.” H e argues such initial sweep was illegal
because it was not incident to an arrest. W e agree that in this circuit a “protective
sweep” may take place only incident to an arrest. See W alker, 474 F.3d at 1254.
The “protective sweep” exception to the w arrant requirement, however, is not in play
here. This case deals only with the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
10
requirement. 2 As we just explained, this latter exception to the warrant requirement
justified the officers’ initial warrantless entry.
III.
Defendant next argues the search warrant did not describe the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity. W e review the district court’s ultimate
determination of sufficient particularity de novo, and accept its factual findings
unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.
1993). The search warrant described the location as follows:
The residence and travel trailer to be searched may be located by
beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 62 and State H ighway 82.
At this intersection travel south on State Highway 82 for approximately
fourteen and two-tenths (14.2) miles to the intersection of State
H ighw ay 82 and a paved country road also known as Blue Top road. At
this intersection turn left (east) onto Blue Top road and travel
approximately one and one-tenths (1.1) miles to the intersection of Blue
Top road and an unmarked private drive and travel approximately one-
tenth (0.1) miles to the residence and the travel trailer to be searched.
Defendant argues this description is ambiguous because State Highway 62 and U.S.
Highway 82 intersect at two junctions, one on the east and the other on the south side
of town. Therefore, one of the junctions does not lead to the place to be searched.
To determine if a search w arrant adequately describes the place to be searched,
the test is (1) whether the description is sufficient to enable the executing officer to
2
In the statement of facts section of the R& R, the magistrate judge
inartfully referred to the initial warrantless entry as a “protective search.”
Reading the R& R as a whole, the magistrate judge clearly meant this description
of the initial warrantless entry to apply in the exigent circumstances context.
11
locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and (2) whether any
reasonable probability exists that another premises might be mistakenly searched.
See Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1078 (10th Cir. 2006). The inquiry depends
heavily on the facts of each case, as determined by practical accuracy rather than
technical precision, and necessarily differs for rural and urban areas. United States
v. D orrough, 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991). Applying the appropriate test, w e
agree with the district court that the search warrant in this case described the location
of the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Defendant’s reliance on United States v. W illiamson, 1 F.3d 1134 (10th C ir.
1993), is misplaced. In W illiamson, we invalidated a search warrant, in which the
only physical description provided was a rural m ail box nine miles from the
premises. Id. at 1136. The description here w as much more specific. To begin, the
warrant identified the place to be searched as a “residence and travel trailer.” In
addition, the warrant accurately specifies “Blue Top road” first at its intersection
w ith State H ighway 82, and then at its intersection with an unmarked private
driveway leading to the “residence and travel trailer” to be searched. The district
court correctly relied on our recent decision of Harman to conclude the description
of the initial junction did not determine whether the location was sufficiently
described; rather, the search warrant must be evaluated as a whole. See Harman, 446
F.3d at 1078 (noting we have upheld warrants w here one part of the description is
inaccurate, but the description has other accurate information to identify the place
12
to be searched with particularity). Furthermore, additional factors supported the
warrant’s descriptive sufficiency including the executing officers’ personal
knowledge of the location and the continued presence of officers at the location
while the search warrant was obtained. See id. at 1079.
Simply put, no reasonable probability existed that another premises might be
mistakenly searched in this case because the warrant’s terms, when considered in
their entirety, could only lead to Defendant’s mobile home and travel trailer. See
Dorrough, 927 F.2d at 500-501 (warrant describing a red, white, and black mailbox
in the shape of a house at defendant’s home was a unique landmark that enabled
officers to locate the residence with reasonable effort). Even assuming the officers
started at the inappropriate junction of the two highways, they would not have
located “Blue Top road,” much less another “residence and travel trailer” matching
the rest of the warrant’s description. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
holding the search warrant was valid.
IV.
D efendant lastly argues the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss based on double jeopardy. A defendant has the burden of proving double
jeopardy. U nited States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998). W e
review the district court’s legal determination on a double jeopardy claim de novo.
Id. W e review the underlying factual findings for clear error. Id.
In September 2003, the State of Oklahoma charged Defendant in state district
13
court with trafficking illegal drugs and manufacturing a controlled dangerous
substance. On the same day, the State filed a Notice of Seizure and Forfeiture in
state district court alerting Defendant that the State intended to forfeit certain items
of his personal property pursuant to Oklahoma’s civil forfeiture provision, 63 Okla.
Stat. § 2-501. In M arch 2004, the State dismissed the drug charges against
Defendant. In M ay 2004, a Journal Entry of Judgment and Forfeiture dated M arch
2004 appears forfeiting the personal property listed in the forfeiture proceeding.
Defendant apparently agreed to forfeit his property in exchange for the dismissal of
the state charges.
Defendant asserts he is now being prosecuted and punished twice for the same
conduct in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Double Jeopardy Clause consists of three distinct constitutional protections:
successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal, successive prosecutions
for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal punishments for the
same offense. See M onge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-728 (1998). The third
protection, which is in issue here, “prohibits the Government from punishing twice,
or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense.” U nited
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996). A prior state prosecution does not bar
a subsequent federal prosecution for the same conduct. Abbate v. United States, 359
U .S. 187, 194 (1959). The premise of this dual sovereignty doctrine is “that the law s
of separate sovereigns are indeed separate and that one act m ay violate the laws of
14
each; accordingly, prosecution by each cannot be for the same offense and double
jeopardy concerns are not implicated.” United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031,
1037 (10th C ir. 1991). A possible, yet limited, exception may exist where one
sovereign is acting as “merely a tool” of the other to bring a second prosecution that
is a “sham and cover” for a prosecution that otherwise would be barred. Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-124 (1959); see also Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1350 (noting
this exception has been discussed, but never applied by the Tenth Circuit).
As the district court recognized, Defendant’s double jeopardy claim fails for
a number of reasons. First, in rem civil forfeitures do not implicate the Double
Jeopardy Clause because they do not constitute punishment. Ursery, 518 U.S. at
270-271. Therefore, Defendant’s punishment resulting from the federal prosecution
is permissible. Second, Defendant’s argum ent fails because the dual sovereignty
doctrine applies. See Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1037-1038. The crux of D efendant’s
argum ent is that because the Cherokee M arshal Service, a federal agency, assisted
in the investigation which resulted in Defendant’s state prosecution, the deal
Defendant made in state court precludes his federal prosecution. Defendant,
however, presents nothing to suggest the Cherokee M arshal Service manipulated the
investigation or the federal prosecution w as a “sham and a cover” for an otherwise
impermissible prosecution. Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1350. “W hen a defendant claims
that federal and state officials are not acting as dual sovereigns, he has a substantial
burden of proving one sovereign is so dominated by the actions of the other that the
15
former is not acting of its own volition.” Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1037. Defendant
simply has not met his burden of showing the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated
by his federal prosecution. See Trammell, 133 F.3d at 1350 (defendant does not
satisfy this burden by “merely showing the state has conducted the majority of the
investigation relied upon by the government in [his] federal prosecution”).
Furthermore, we have previously held the dual sovereignty doctrine controlled
in cases where the double jeopardy circumstances were far more compelling than
those in the present case. See United States v. Padilla, 589 F.2d 481, 484 (10th Cir.
1978) (dual sovereignty doctrine permitted subsequent federal prosecution following
state prosecution on the same conduct where the same attorney represented both the
state and the United States in the two prosecutions against defendant). Therefore,
Defendant’s federal prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy C lause.
The judgment of the district court is
A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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