F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 31, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
COPART, IN C.,
Petitioner,
v. No. 06-9535
AD M INISTRATIVE REVIEW
BO AR D, UN ITED STATES
DEPARTM ENT OF LABOR,
Respondent.
C HA RLES L. D A LTO N ,
Intervenor.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF AN O RDER O F THE ADM INISTRATIVE REVIEW
BO AR D O F TH E U NITED STA TES D EPA RTM EN T O F LA BO R
(Nos. ARB 04-027 & 04-138)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Steven A. Broussard, Hall, Estill, H ardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C.,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Petitioner.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Howard M . Radzely, Solicitor of Labor, Joseph M . W oodward, Associate
Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, M ichael P. Doyle, Counsel for
Appellate Litigation, Ronald Gottlieb, Attorney, United States Department of
Labor, W ashington, D.C., for Respondent.
Robt. S. Coffey, Robt. S. Coffey, Inc., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Intervenor.
Before BR ISC OE, M cKA Y, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
G O R SU CH, Circuit Judge.
The question presented in this case is w hether an order of this court simply
stating “Petitioner’s M otion for Attorney Fees is denied” decided, either
explicitly or by necessary implication, the issue of intervenor Charles D alton’s
entitlement to fees for his attorney’s work before this court from petitioner
Copart, Inc., under 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(3)(B), a provision of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (“STAA”). Because we determine our
order did not decide the issue, we hold that the law of the case doctrine did not
preclude the United States D epartment of Labor Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”) from subsequently awarding those fees. Copart’s petition for review is
therefore denied.
I
Copart processes and sells salvage vehicles. It petitions this court for
review of a Decision and Order on Attorney’s Fees from the ARB in favor of
M r. Dalton, a former driver for Copart. M r. Dalton filed a complaint with the
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Department of Labor asserting that he was fired by Copart for refusing to drive
his truck. He claimed that his firing violated a provision of the STAA that
prohibits a company from discharging an employee for refusing to operate a
vehicle if the employee “has a reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the
employee or the public because of the vehicle’s unsafe condition.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Following a ruling in November 2000 by an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) reinstating M r. Dalton with back pay, the ARB reversed and dismissed
M r. Dalton’s complaint. In February 2003 this court, in turn, reversed the A RB’s
decision, see Dalton v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 58 F. App’x 442 (10th Cir.
2003), and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ’s original
ruling was reinstated. 1
In June 2003, M r. Dalton filed a motion with this court seeking an award of
appellate attorney fees. Copart argued that the motion should be denied as
untimely, that there was no statutory authority for a fee aw ard, and that this court
should not exercise its inherent authority to award fees. In February 2004, this
court denied M r. Dalton’s motion in an order that merely held “Petitioner’s
1
On remand, Copart argued that the record should be reopened so that it
could present evidence showing that M r. Dalton would present a threat to Copart
employees if reinstated. The A RB refused to reopen the record and Copart’s
subsequent petition to this court for review of that decision was denied. See
Copart, Inc. v. ARB, 184 F. App’x 711, 715 (10th Cir. 2006).
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M otion for A ttorney Fees is denied.” Supp. Admin. R., Doc. 5, Attach. IV .
Subsequently, this court also denied M r. Dalton’s motion for reconsideration.
M eanwhile, in November 2003, the ALJ awarded M r. Dalton attorney fees
based on an application M r. Dalton filed in December of 2000, following the
ALJ’s original decision, seeking fees for w ork performed prior to that decision.
The ALJ invoked Section 31105(b)(3)(B) of the STAA which provides, in
pertinent part,
If the Secretary issues an order [providing redress for a violation of
§ 31105(a)] and the complainant requests, the Secretary may assess
against the person against w hom the order is issued the costs
(including attorney’s fees) reasonably incurred by the complainant in
bringing the complaint. The Secretary shall determine the costs that
reasonably were incurred.
Id. § 31105(b)(3)(B). In June 2005, the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s 2003 award and
also granted M r. Dalton thirty days to submit a petition for attorney fees and other
litigation expenses in regard to work performed after the ALJ’s original decision.
In July 2005, M r. Dalton submitted his request for additional fees. M any of the
fees sought were for the same w ork that was the subject of the motion for attorney
fees previously denied by this court.
On February 8, 2006, the ARB awarded M r. Dalton $142,740 for attorney
fees. In making its award, the ARB held that, despite this court’s prior denial of
some of the same fees, its award did not violate the law of the case doctrine
because of the general nature of this court’s denial and because it determined that
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this court had no authority to award attorney fees under the STAA. Copart has
now petitioned this court for review of this award.
II
Copart argues that, because this court’s February 2004 denial of M r.
Dalton’s motion for attorney fees became the law of the case as to those fees, the
ARB erred in making its 2006 fee award. Pet’r Opening Br. at 16-17 (citing
Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship (Huffman II), 262 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir.
2001), which reversed a district court’s grant of appellate attorney fees on remand
after this court had previously refused to grant those same fees). Contrary to
Copart’s contention, however, Huffman II is not controlling here.
In Huffman v. Saul Holdings Limited Partnership (Huffman I), 194 F.3d
1072, 1084 (10th Cir. 1999), this court reversed a grant of summary judgment,
remanded to the district court, and held “Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs is DENIED. The parties must bear their own costs and fees.” Following
remand, the district court found that it had jurisdiction to grant appellate attorney
fees and costs despite our previous denial.
On appeal after remand, we held that, although the district court had
adequate jurisdiction to make the award, our previous denial of fees and costs had
become the law of the case and that both that doctrine and an important corollary
to it known as the mandate rule limited the district court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction. Huffman II, 262 F.3d at 1132. Specifically, we recognized that
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[t]he law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a
rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues
in subsequent stages in the same case. The doctrine has particular
relevance following a remand order issued by an appellate court.
W hen a case is appealed and remanded, the decision of the appellate
court establishes the law of the case and ordinarily will be followed
by both the trial court on remand and the appellate court in any
subsequent appeal. The law of the case doctrine is intended to
prevent continued re-argument of issues already decided, and to
preserve scarce court resources-to avoid in short, Dickens’s Jarndyce
v. Jarndyce syndrome.
262 F.3d at 1132 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). W e
further recognized that “the mandate rule[] provides that a district court must
comply strictly with the mandate rendered by the reviewing court.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although Huffman II involved a district court’s aw ard
of previously denied attorney fees on remand, we have held that
[a]lthough primarily applicable between courts of different levels,
the doctrine [of law of the case] and the mandate rule apply to
judicial review of administrative decisions, and require the
administrative agency, on remand from a court, to conform its further
proceedings in the case to the principles set forth in the judicial
decision, unless there is a compelling reason to depart.
Grigsby v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks and bracket omitted).
The instant question, then, is whether our February 2004 denial of attorney
fees became the law of the case as to the merits of M r. Dalton’s fee claim. 2
2
Copart does not argue that the mandate rule required the ARB to deny
M r. Dalton’s request for appellate attorney fees, so we need not address that
argument. But we note that our mandate reversing the ARB’s prior reversal of the
(continued...)
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Cognizant though we are of the already protracted nature of this litigation and the
Dickensian Jarndyce v. Jarndyce worries that animated our reasoning and result
in Huffman II, we are compelled to agree with the Department of Labor that the
factual situation confronting this court in Huffman II is distinguishable from that
in the case at hand, and that Huffman II is therefore not controlling. In Huffman
I, this court had not only denied the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees, we had
also ordered the parties to bear their own costs and fees. In the instant case, we
simply held “Petitioner’s M otion for A ttorney Fees is denied.” Supp. Admin. R.,
Doc. 5, Attach. IV. The Department of Labor argues that it is impossible to tell
from the order whether this court reached the merits of M r. Dalton’s attorney fee
request under the STAA and thereby triggered application of the law of the case
doctrine.
W e have explained that “[t]he doctrine [of law of the case] applies to issues
previously decided either explicitly or by necessary implication.” Guidry,
10 F.3d at 705 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557,
2
(...continued)
ALJ’s original decision, and remanding the case for further proceedings, was
issued over two months prior to the filing of M r. Dalton’s motion for attorney
fees and that no further mandate from this court was issued regarding the denial
of the motion. See Guidry v. Sheet M etal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 9, 10
F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 1993) (“W hen further proceedings follow a general
remand, the lower court is free to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate
issued by the higher court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). W e also note
that Copart does not contest the ARB’s jurisdiction to award attorney fees for
work before this court.
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566 (2001) (“The law of the case doctrine presumes a hearing on the merits.”);
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979) (“The doctrine of law of the case
comes into play only with respect to issues previously determined.”). H ere, it is
clear that our order did not explicitly decide whether M r. Dalton was entitled to
attorney fees under the STAA. Thus, we must determine whether our general
denial of M r. Dalton’s motion implicitly decided the issue on the merits. In
Guidry, we held that there were
three grounds under the “law of the case” doctrine by which we
might conclude an issue was implicitly resolved in a prior appeal, as
follows: (1) resolution of the issue was a necessary step in resolving
the earlier appeal; (2) resolution of the issue would abrogate the prior
decision and so must have been considered in the prior appeal; and
(3) the issue is so closely related to the earlier appeal its resolution
involves no additional consideration and so might have been resolved
but unstated.
Id. at 707.
None of these three grounds are present in this case. As to the first, it is
not clear from this court’s general denial of attorney fees or the parties’
arguments regarding the fee application that this court necessarily found that
M r. Dalton was not entitled to attorney fees under the STAA. In fact, in opposing
M r. Dalton’s application, Copart argued, among other things, that the application
should be denied because it was untimely and because this court did not have the
jurisdiction to grant attorney fees under the STAA. See Supp. Admin. R., Doc. 5,
Attach. VIII at 2-4. As to the second, because there was no explicit order in this
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case (in contrast to the one in Huffman I) ordering the parties to bear their own
costs, the ARB’s subsequent grant of fees did not have the effect of abrogating
any order of this court. Finally, the third ground w ould clearly not apply because
it pertains to a situation where one issue has been explicitly or implicitly decided
and the court must determine whether another issue is so closely related to the
decided issue that it should also be considered the law of the case. This court’s
decision to deny attorney fees, by contrast, was not necessarily entwined with the
merits of its reversal and remand. Consequently, we hold that the ARB did not
violate the law of the case doctrine by awarding attorney fees for work before this
court. 3
III
Copart’s remaining points of error all claim that the ARB abused its
discretion by awarding M r. Dalton $142,740 for attorney fees. Copart argues the
abuse of discretion occurred because: some of the fees aw arded were for work
performed prior to the A LJ’s original decision (Point 2); some of the fees were
for work related to the Department of Labor’s enforcement action (Point 3); the
ARB improperly and retroactively increased the rate charged by M r. Dalton’s
attorney from $175 to $200 per hour (Point 4); some of the fees aw arded were
3
In light of the above, we need not address the ARB’s determination that our
ruling could not have reached the merits of the fee claim because under 49 U.S.C.
§ 31105(b)(3)(B) this court has no authority to aw ard attorney fees for work
before this court in STAA cases, and we express no opinion on that score.
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fees for work that was duplicative of prior work (Point 5); some of the fees were
for work concerning matters not before the ALJ, ARB, or this court (Point 6); and
some of the fees were for work on motions for extensions of time that were not
necessitated by Copart’s actions (Point 7). The ARB rejected these arguments in
awarding fees.
Under the APA , we must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be,” among other possible infirmities,
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A ); see BSP Trans, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor,
160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying § 706(2) in the context of the STAA).
“W hen we review an agency’s decision under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of
discretion standard, our review is narrow and deferential; we must uphold the
agency’s action if it has articulated a rational basis for the decision and has
considered relevant factors.” Slingluff v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 425 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted).
W e have examined the parties’ briefs, Copart’s supplemental appendix, and
the administrative record in regard to these points of error. W e substantially
agree with the ARB’s reasoning in denying these arguments and hold that it is
clear that the ARB considered all relevant factors and articulated rational bases
for its award of fees. W e therefore hold that the A RB’s aw ard was not arbitrary
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or capricious or an abuse of the ARB’s discretion. Copart’s remaining points of
error are denied.
* * *
In light of the above, Copart’s petition for review is denied. Charles
Dalton’s unopposed Combined M otion to Permit Filing of M otion to Intervene
Out of Time and M otion to Intervene is granted. The Clerk’s office shall accept
M r. Dalton’s response brief for filing.
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