FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 24, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
LER OY M . SM ITH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-3031
(D.C. No. 05-CV -2149-JW L)
JOHN E. PO TTER, Postmaster (D . Kan.)
General, United States Postal
Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, Circuit Judge, BROR BY, Senior Circuit Judge and
T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Leroy M . Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s orders
granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer, the United States
Postal Service (USPS). Through appointed counsel in the district court, he
brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the A ge D iscrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634, alleging race and age discrimination, harassment,
retaliation, a racially-hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. W e
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Background
M r. Smith was employed by the USPS at the Bulk M ail Center in Kansas
City, Kansas from 1992 until August 6, 2004, when he went on disability
retirement. He claims that his job difficulties began after he testified against the
U SPS at a union-grievance hearing in August 2001, concerning the request of tw o
postal employees for light-duty assignments during the time they were on
crutches. In October 2002, M r. Smith filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging that his supervisors discriminated against him and
harassed him on the basis of his race (African American) in retaliation for
testifying at the union-grievance hearing. The EEO complaint was terminated in
December 2002, and M r. Smith did not file a federal lawsuit based on those
claims.
M r. Smith alleges that his supervisors continued to intimidate and harass
him. He asserts that younger, female, and Caucasian employees were assigned
better and easier jobs than he, despite his more senior status, and that new
supervisors also harassed him based on what his former supervisors told them.
M r. Smith further asserts that less senior employees were assigned work that
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should have been assigned to him. In addition, he claims that his supervisor put
his finger in his face and yelled at him and that a different supervisor insisted that
he do a hazardous job for which he was not qualified, and then yelled and
threatened to discipline him for refusing to do it.
In October 2002, M r. Smith was absent from his work area without
permission on two occasions, so his supervisor issued him a Letter of W arning.
He filed a second EEO complaint in January 2003, claiming that his supervisors
discriminated against him on the basis of race (African American), age (over 40),
and in retaliation for testifying at the union-grievance hearing when they issued
the Letter of W arning. 1 After his second EEO complaint was terminated,
M r. Smith filed a timely law suit in federal district court.
The district court dismissed some of M r. Smith’s claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and determined that he had exhausted his
administrative remedies on his claims based the October 2002 Letter of W arning.
On the merits, the court held that M r. Smith had not adduced enough evidence to
survive summary judgment.
On appeal, M r. Smith challenges the district court’s summary-judgment
orders. He also argues that his court-appointed attorney made errors that affected
1
On November 5, 2002, within 45 days of the Letter of W arning, M r. Smith
requested pre-complaint counseling, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a).
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the outcome and that he was denied his right to a jury trial. In addition, he claims
that postal employees harassed him by interfering with the delivery of his mail.
II. Analysis
W e review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
M cGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 741 (10th Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before we address the merits of M r. Smith’s claims, we must determine the
scope of our jurisdiction. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction
to review Title VII and ADEA claims not exhausted administratively. Shikles v.
Sprint/United M gmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005). “[E]ach discrete
[retaliatory or discriminatory action] constitutes its own unlawful employment
practice for which administrative remedies must be exhausted.” M artinez v.
Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Of the discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts M r. Smith identified, one
had been the subject of the first EEO complaint, so the court had no jurisdiction
over it because M r. Smith had failed to file suit within 90 days after the EEO
proceedings were concluded. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing civil
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action may be brought within 90 days of notice of conclusion of EEO complaint).
Two more claims had not been raised in any EEO complaint, so they were
unexhausted and the court likewise lacked jurisdiction. See Shikles, 426 F.3d at
1317 (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies “is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit under Title VII” and ADEA). Issuance of the Letter of
W arning was the only discrete act for which M r. Smith exhausted his
administrative remedies. Accordingly, we review the claims based on it.
B. Race Discrimination
A plaintiff asserting a claim that he was terminated on the basis of race
must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that (1) “he w as a
member of a protected class,” (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily, and
(3) “he was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th Cir.
2004). If he does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination that is not facially prohibited by
Title VII.” Id. (quotation omitted). Once the defendant provides such a reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason is a “pretext
for racial discrimination.” Id.
The parties dispute only the final step— whether issuance of the Letter of
W arning was a pretext for racial discrimination. M r. Smith contends that he
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demonstrated pretext by showing that similarly-situated Caucasian coworkers
were treated more favorably than he.
Similarly situated employees are those who deal with the same
supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing
performance evaluation and discipline. In determining whether two
employees are similarly situated, a court should also compare the
relevant employment circumstances, such as work history and
company policies, applicable to the plaintiff and the intended
comparable employees. M oreover, even employees w ho are similarly
situated must have been disciplined for conduct of comparable
seriousness in order for their disparate treatment to be relevant.
M cGowan, 472 F.3d at 745 (citations and quotations omitted).
M r. Smith’s evidence does not demonstrate that the Caucasian employees
were situated similarly to him. He did not show that the Caucasian employees
violated the same w ork rule against leaving the work area without permission,
that the C aucasian employees’ supervisors knew that they had left their work
areas, or that the Caucasian employees had the same supervisor as he. In
addition, M r. Smith’s only evidence of racial animus was his statement that he
had heard from unidentified supervisors and African American employees that
one of his supervisors treated African Americans more harshly than Caucasians.
R. Doc. 84, Attach. G, Ex. 6, at 265. This brief, general reference to a rumor is
insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C.,
253 F.3d 552, 558 (10th Cir. 2001) (“To w ithstand summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts show ing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” (quotations omitted)). M oreover, the hearsay statements
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by coworkers are inadmissable hearsay that cannot be considered on summary
judgment. Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006).
Consequently, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to the USPS on this claim.
C. Retaliation
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “forbids an employer from
‘discriminat[ing] against’ an employee . . . because that individual ‘opposed any
practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in’ a Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2408 (2006) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). M r. Smith’s retaliation claim was based on his
testim ony at the A ugust 2001 union-grievance hearing regarding whether two
employees should be given light-duty assignments while they were on crutches. 2
The union-grievance hearing was not protected opposition to discrimination
and therefore not protected by Title VII. Cf. Jones v. U.P.S., Inc., ___ F.3d ___,
2007 W L 2677141, at *14 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (“Unless an employer know s
that an employee is engaging in protected activity, it cannot retaliate against the
employee because of the protected conduct, as required by statute.”).
Accordingly, summary judgment was correct on the retaliation claim because it
was not based on protected conduct.
2
M r. Smith did not allege retaliation based on his first EEO complaint.
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D. Racial Harassment and Hostile Environment
“W hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII
is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and
quotations omitted). M r. Smith testified at his deposition that he did not recall
any of his supervisors making a racially derogatory or inappropriate statement.
R. Doc. 84, Attach. G, Ex. 6, at 407-08. 3 As discussed above, M r. Smith relies on
a rumor that one supervisor treated African Americans more harshly than
Caucasians, but an unsubstantiated rumor is insufficient to resist summary
judgment. To the extent M r. Smith seeks to demonstrate a racially hostile
environment based on allegations that he was treated less favorably than
Caucasian employees, we again hold that he has failed to show that he was
situated similarly to them. W e uphold the summary judgment on this claim, as
well.
E. Constructive Discharge
“A constructive discharge occurs when an employer, through unlawful acts,
makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the
3
In his affidavit opposing summary judgment, M r. Smith claimed that in
August 2004, his supervisor called him “boy,” a remark that can be racially
derogatory. But this incident was not included in the EEO complaint;
accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider it. See Shikles,
426 F.3d at 1317.
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employee’s position would feel forced to resign.” Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,
389 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004). The court employs an objective standard
to determine “the voluntariness of an employee’s resignation.” Id.
M r. Smith did not allege that the Letter of W arning made his working
conditions intolerable and forced him to resign. Indeed, he continued at his job
for almost two more years. In addition, as discussed above, he had virtually no
evidence of racial harassment. See id. at 1136 n.8 (rejecting plaintiff’s
constructive discharge claim and noting that plaintiff had not “demonstrated any
particular instances of racial harassment or any circumstances demonstrating
racial hostility”). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the USPS was
appropriate on this claim.
F. Age Discrimination
The ADEA prohibits discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age,”
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), for those who are aged 40 or older, id. § 631(a). A prima
facie case of age discrimination “requires evidence adequate to create an
inference that an employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory
criterion,” such as age. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
312 (1996) (quotation and emphasis omitted). For a prima facie case of age
discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) he belongs to a class protected by the
ADEA, (2) he w as qualified for his position, (3) he “suffered an adverse
employment action,” and (4) he was “treated less favorably than others,” usually
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that he was replaced by a younger person. Exum, 389 F.3d at 1134; M iller v. Eby
Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005).
M r. Smith failed to show that the Letter of W arning was an “adverse
employment action” given that he worked for almost two years after he received
it, and he was never demoted, suspended, or terminated as the result of it.
M oreover, although M r. Smith alleged that the Letter of W arning caused him to
be scrutinized more closely and bypassed for favorable job assignments, he has
presented no evidence to support those claims. Summary judgment was therefore
appropriate on the age-discrimination claim.
G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Jury Trial, Interference with M ail
For the first time on appeal, M r. Smith asserts that his court-appointed
attorney provided ineffective assistance and that he w as denied his right to a jury
trial. He also now claims that the USPS interfered with his mail delivery. W e
decline to consider these claims because they were not presented to the district
court. See Wilburn v. M id-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280
(10th Cir. 2003) (“An issue is waived if it was not raised below in the district
court.”).
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III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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