FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 5, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-2211
v. (D. New Mexico)
JUAN EDUARDO MARQUEZ, (D.C. No. CR-06-563-JC)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant Juan Eduardo Marquez pled guilty to reentry of a
deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2) and (b)(2). He was sentenced to forty-six months’
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release. He appeals his
sentence, which we reverse and remand for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
Marquez was arrested by United States Border Patrol agents on January 4,
2006. He admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico, and that he had no
authorization to reside in the United States. Immigration records established that
he had previously been deported in 1997 and 1999, and that he was convicted in
Texas in 1987 of attempted burglary of a habitation, which resulted in a sentence
of ten years probation. As indicated, Marquez then pled guilty to reentry by a
deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony. As we explain
further below, however, Marquez’s prior conviction for attempted burglary was
not, in fact, an aggravated felony.
In preparation for his sentencing, the United States Probation Office
prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR recommended that Marquez
receive a sixteen-level enhancement to his base offense level under the United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2005), based upon
his prior conviction for attempted burglary of a habitation which, under USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), qualified as a “crime of violence.” The PSR then calculated a
total offense level of twenty-one which, with a criminal history category of III,
resulted in an advisory sentencing range under the USSG of forty-six to fifty-
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seven months. Because Marquez’s prior conviction for attempted burglary was
erroneously characterized as an aggravated felony, the PSR also stated,
erroneously, that the applicable statutory prison term was up to twenty years.
Marquez filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a variance from the
advisory Guideline range on the basis of the sentencing factors contained in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). He essentially argued that his prior crime, attempted burglary
of a habitation, was non-violent and occurred twenty years before, and he lacked
any other criminal history. Marquez also argued that he had “resigned himself to
the fact” that he would have to return to Mexico and never be permitted to legally
return to the United States. Sentencing Mem. at 3, R. Vol. I. He did not,
however, argue that his prior conviction had been erroneously classified as an
aggravated felony which exposed him to a twenty-year statutory term of
imprisonment.
At his sentencing hearing, Marquez’s counsel reiterated his request for a
lower sentence than that provided by the advisory Guidelines. In response to
Marquez’s request that the court “consider the [sentencing] memorandum and the
requests made therein,” the court responded, “I have considered it, and nothing
about the sentence I’m going to give him causes me any problems.” Tr. of
Sentencing Hr’g at 2-3, R. Vol. III. The district court then stated:
The Court has reviewed the Presentence Report factual findings and
has considered the sentencing guideline applications and the factors
set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1) through (7). The offense level
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is 21. The criminal history category is III. The guideline
imprisonment range is 46 to 57 months. The Court notes the
defendant illegally reentered the United States subsequent to an
aggravated felony conviction.
Id. at 3. When government counsel inquired, “Was there a departure requested
and [the court] did not depart?” the court responded, “Well, there was a departure
requested. I did not depart.” Id. at 4. When government counsel stated she “just
wanted the record to be clear as to your reasons why,” the court responded,
“Didn’t I say I thought the sentence was fitting?” Id. Marquez was accordingly
sentenced to forty-six months’ imprisonment. Marquez timely appealed his
sentence.
Marquez’s trial counsel filed an Anders brief, requesting permission to
withdraw from representation of Marquez on appeal because counsel concluded
that an appeal would be frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Our court rejected the Anders brief and appointed new counsel. Marquez’s new
counsel filed a brief arguing four issues: (1) the district court erred in classifying
his prior conviction for attempted burglary of a habitation as a conviction for an
aggravated felony; (2) the district court erred in increasing his offense level by
sixteen because such an increase is “capricious and unreasonable under the
§ 3553(a) objectives”; (3) the district court erred in presuming that the Guidelines
sentence was the correct sentence; and (4) this court should “revisit” its decision
in United States v. Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005), in which
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we cited approvingly to United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir.
2003), which held that, under USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a “‘crime of violence’
need[] only . . . be a ‘felony’ as defined in the application notes [to the
Guidelines]—and not an ‘aggravated felony’ as statutorily defined—to qualify for
a 16-level enhancement.” Id. at 963.
DISCUSSION
“[W]e review sentencing decisions for reasonableness, which has both
procedural and substantive components.” United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d
1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). “In setting a procedurally reasonable sentence, a
district court must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines range and apply the
factors set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. “A substantively reasonable sentence
ultimately reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to
the case.” Id. Further, while we review the ultimate sentence for reasonableness,
“we continue to review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo,
and we review any factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Townley,
472 F.3d 1267, 1275-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3069 (2007). Finally,
“[w]here the district court correctly applies the Guidelines and imposes a sentence
within the applicable Guidelines range, that sentence is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.” Id. at 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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As indicated, Marquez pled guilty to being in the United States unlawfully
after having been previously deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). “The
penalties for reentering the country after deportation vary widely depending upon
an alien’s criminal history.” Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d at 1092. “Where the
defendant has no prior criminal history, § 1326(a) provides for a maximum two-
year sentence.” Id. A defendant with a prior felony conviction, however, “is
subject to a maximum ten-year sentence.” Finally, “if the defendant’s prior
felony is an ‘aggravated felony,’ he is subject to a maximum twenty-year
sentence.” Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b).
It is undisputed that all parties involved, both government and defense
counsel, the United States Probation Office, and, most importantly, the district
court, erroneously believed that Marquez’s prior conviction for attempted
burglary of a habitation was a conviction for an aggravated felony, thereby
exposing Marquez to a maximum statutory sentence of twenty years. It was error
to treat that conviction as an aggravated felony conviction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2) because the prior conviction resulted only in probation. Gonzalez-
Coronado, 419 F.3d at 1091. 1
1
“To define ‘aggravated felony’ under § 1326(b)(2), this court looks to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).” Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d at 1092-93.
Section 1101(a)(43), in turn, defines an aggravated felony as including “a crime
of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year” and “a
theft offense . . . or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G). Since Marquez’s prior
(continued...)
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Marquez failed to object, however, to this characterization of his prior
conviction. “[W]here a defendant raises no contemporaneous objection to the
court’s explanation of the procedure by which his sentence was determined, ‘we
may reverse the district court’s judgment only in the presence of plain error.’”
United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007)). “We find
plain error only when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects
substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (further quotation omitted). Applying
plain error analysis, we conclude that the district court’s misunderstanding as to
the nature of Marquez’s prior conviction was plain error, which did affect
Marquez’s substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of the sentencing
procedure.
First, as our discussion above indicates and as the government concedes on
appeal (Appellee’s Br. at 3), it was plainly erroneous to treat Marquez’s prior
conviction for attempted burglary as an aggravated felony conviction. 2 Thus,
1
(...continued)
burglary conviction resulted in a sentence of probation, it was not an aggravated
felony under § 1326(b)(2). Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d at 1093.
2
We agree with Marquez that it does not matter that he pled guilty to an
information specifically alleging that he violated 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (a)(2)
and (b)(2) by reentering the United States following his conviction for an
aggravated felony. The government does not dispute this point by trying to argue
(continued...)
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there was error, which was plain. “Satisfying the third prong of plain-error
review—that the error affects substantial rights—‘usually means that the error
must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” United States
v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632 (2002)). Marquez, as the appellant, bears the
burden to make that showing. Id. at 733. We conclude that Marquez has met that
burden.
We initially observe that the district court specifically emphasized that
Marquez “illegally reentered the United States subsequent to an aggravated felony
conviction.” Tr. of Sentencing at 3, R. Vol. III. Thus, the “fact” that Marquez
had a prior aggravated felony conviction was front and center in the district
court’s thought process in imposing a sentence. That erroneously characterized
aggravated felony conviction exposed Marquez to a statutory maximum of twenty
years’ imprisonment, instead of the ten years he faced under the proper
characterization of his prior conviction as simply a felony. Thus, we agree with
Marquez that it is highly likely the district court was less inclined to sentence him
below the advisory Guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months, because
the court believed that Marquez was exposed to a twenty-year statutory sentence.
2
(...continued)
that Marquez somehow waived his right to object to the erroneous
characterization of his prior conviction because he pled guilty to reentry
following a conviction for an aggravated felony.
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The government argues that any error is harmless, or had no effect on the
district court’s sentence, because Marquez’s sentence was properly calculated
under the Guidelines and, as Marquez even concedes, his prior conviction was
clearly a “crime of violence” under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), which yielded an
advisory Guideline sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. In so
arguing, the government relies upon Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F.3d at 1094, where
we held that the district court’s erroneous treatment of the defendant’s prior
conviction as an aggravated felony, rather than a simple felony, was “harmless.”
Id. We so held because “a defendant like Gonzalez who has had a prior felony
conviction, other than an aggravated felony, still faces a maximum ten-year
sentence, which is more than sufficient to support [defendant’s] thirty-seven
month sentence.” Id.
We believe that the particular facts surrounding Marquez’s sentencing
proceeding suffice to distinguish this case from Gonzalez-Coronado. In this case,
Marquez argued to the district court that he deserved a lower sentence than that
provided by the advisory Guidelines, largely because his prior conviction was a
long time ago, committed when he was twenty years younger, and that he had
essentially no other criminal history, and no violent criminal history, since that
long-ago event. In that situation, the misperception that Marquez had committed
an aggravated felony may well have done more to undermine Marquez’s reasons
for seeking a variance from the Guidelines sentence.
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Furthermore, while we have stated repeatedly that a district court
sentencing a defendant to a sentence within a properly-calculated Guideline range
need not provide much explanation for its sentencing calculation, we note that the
sentencing proceeding here was extremely terse and conclusory, lasting a mere
four minutes from start to finish. The district court simply stated it rejected
Marquez’s request for a downward departure, without further elaboration.
Indeed, one of the few statements the district court made was its specific
observation that Marquez had a prior aggravated felony conviction.
Finally, this is one of those cases where a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines reinforces our concern that the district court might have sentenced
differently if it was proceeding from the proper premise concerning Marquez’s
criminal history. Thus, in these unique circumstances, we conclude that Marquez
has met his burden of showing that the error, shared by all present, affected the
outcome of his sentencing proceeding. We therefore reverse and remand for
resentencing with the awareness that Marquez’s prior conviction was not for an
aggravated felony. This conclusion means we need not address Marquez’s
remaining three arguments.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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