FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 14, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ALLEN WOLFSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 07-4205
v. (D.C. No. 2:05-CV-796-TC)
(D. Utah)
CHRISTOPHER BRUNO,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Allen Wolfson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, asserts a
civil rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The district court
dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 1 We review de novo a dismissal under
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining Petitioner’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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“[T]he court shall dismiss [an in forma pauperis] case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which
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that section. Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).
“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only
where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and
it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Id. “In determining
whether dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as
true and we must construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that
might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.
For Petitioner’s complaint to state a claim under §1985(3), he must allege
that Defendant (1) conspired, (2) to deprive Petitioner of equal protection or equal
privileges and immunities under the law, (3) acted in furtherance of this objective,
and (4) injured Petitioner or deprived him of any right or privilege as a result.
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971). The intent behind the
conspiracy must be based on some invidious discriminatory animus, such as racial
or otherwise class-based animus. Id. at 102. “The conspiracy . . . must aim at a
deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.” Id.
“[Section] 1985(3) applies to private conspiracies only in the event that the right
aimed at by the conspiracy is one protected against both public and private
interference.” Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993).
Petitioner argues on appeal that the district court should have allowed him
1
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relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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to amend his complaint. However, the deficiencies in Petitioner’s argument were
so glaring that, even when viewed liberally, they could neither support his cause
of action nor justify giving him an opportunity to amend. Petitioner also argues
on appeal that he should have been given ten days to amend his complaint before
it was dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Petitioner’s complaint was not
dismissed under that rule; therefore, this argument necessarily fails. Finally,
Petitioner also contends on appeal that, had he been given the opportunity to
amend his complaint, he would have amended his claim to arise under 28 U.S.C. §
1332 instead of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Petitioner confuses the question of
improper jurisdiction with his civil rights claim and does not explain why
amending his jurisdictional argument would affect his original claim.
For substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s memorandum
decision and order, we conclude Petitioner failed to allege facts that would allow
him to prevail on his claim for relief. Moreover, we hold it would be futile to
give Petitioner the opportunity to amend. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. We GRANT Petitioner’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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