FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 2, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
DANA L. PRICE-CORNELISON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-6140
v.
STEVE BROOKS, individually,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 5:04-CV-00241-W)
David W. Lee (Ambre C. Gooch, with him on the briefs), of Comingdeer, Lee &
Gooch, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Steve Brooks.
Valerie Williford, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee Dana L.
Price-Cornelison.
Before LUCERO, EBEL and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Steve Brooks, the Undersheriff of Garvin County,
Oklahoma, appeals the district court’s decision denying him qualified immunity
on Plaintiff-Appellee Dana L. Price-Cornelison’s two constitutional claims that
Brooks failed to enforce Price-Cornelison’s protective orders because she is a
lesbian victim of domestic violence. Price-Cornelison specifically alleged that, in
refusing to enforce her protective orders, Brooks 1) denied her equal protection of
the law; and 2) helped a private citizen unlawfully seize Price-Cornelison’s
property, contrary to the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that Brooks is entitled
to qualified immunity on the equal protection claim, to the extent that that claim
is based upon Brooks’ refusal to enforce Price-Cornelison’s emergency protective
order on October 16, 2003, and therefore we reverse the district court on that
portion of Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim. But we agree with the
district court that Brooks is not entitled to qualified immunity on the equal
protection claim, to the extent that claim is based upon Brooks’ refusal to enforce
Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order, on November 3, 2003. Nor is
Brooks entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.
Consequently we affirm these portions of the district court’s ruling.
I. BACKGROUND
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Price-Cornelison, see
Kirkland v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. No. Re-1J, 464 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.
2006), the record establishes the following: Price-Cornelison had been involved in
a homosexual relationship with Vickie Rogers since 1996. In 2003, the couple
was living together at Price-Cornelison’s farm, Lost Spring Farm (“the farm”),
located near Pauls Valley, Garvin County, Oklahoma. Price-Cornelison, who is
2
an anesthetist, worked an hour away, at a hospital in Muenster, Texas. She had
an apartment in Muenster where she stayed overnight when she was on call at the
hospital. Rogers stayed on the farm and took care of the couple’s horses.
Eventually Rogers grew tired of caring for the horses, so Price-Cornelison hired
several farmhands to live on the farm to take care of the horses.
Price-Cornelison’s and Roger’s relationship deteriorated. On October 16,
2003, Price-Cornelison sought an emergency protective order from a Garvin
County court, alleging that Rogers had threatened to shoot both Price-Cornelison
and then herself and that Rogers had fired a gun over the telephone while making
this threat. In her petition for the emergency protective order, Price-Cornelison
asked the court to order Rogers to leave the residence “on or before” the
following day, October 17, 2003. State Judge Tipton issued the emergency
protective order that same day, October 16. That order directed Rogers “to
immediately leave” her and Price-Cornelison’s residence “or before 10-17-03.”
After the state court issued the emergency protective order,
Price-Cornelison went to work at the hospital in Muenster, Texas. A Garvin
County sheriff’s deputy served the emergency protective order on Rogers that
same day, October 16. Rogers and some of her family and friends then began
removing property from the farm. During this time, Price-Cornelison’s farmhands
called her in Texas to report that Rogers was taking “everything” from the farm.
Price-Cornelison called the Garvin County sheriff’s office and spoke to
3
Undersheriff Brooks, who indicated that he had been assigned to handle her
situation. When Price-Cornelison asked Brooks to go out to the farm and stop
Rogers from removing Price-Cornelison’s property, Brooks informed
Price-Cornelison that Oklahoma is “a community property state and that [Rogers]
could take anything she want[ed].” 1 Price-Cornelison then asked Brooks to make
a police report about the incident, but he refused, telling her that this was a civil
matter. Price-Cornelison responded that she would have to leave work in Texas
and drive back home to the farm to stop Rogers from taking Price-Cornelison’s
property. But Brooks informed Price-Cornelison that if she went to the farm, she
would be arrested.
Price-Cornelison called the Garvin County sheriff’s office several more
times that day, to no avail. In addition, one of Price-Cornelison’s friends, Mary
Sanchez, called the sheriff’s office and she, too, spoke to Brooks. Brooks told
Sanchez the same thing he had told Price-Cornelison—Oklahoma was a
community property state; pursuant to the terms of the emergency protective
order, Rogers could remove whatever property she wanted up until the next day,
October 17, 2003; and, according to Brooks, Price-Cornelison could not be
present at her own home at this time. During this conversation, Brooks also
explained to Sanchez that Price-Cornelison had been “in one of those lesbian
1
Brooks testified at his deposition that he instead told Price-Cornelison that
Rogers had claimed that the property that she was taking from the farm belonged
to her and so Rogers could remove that property from the farm.
4
relationships. They have lived together for a long time, and they might as well
have been like they were married.”
Later that same day, Price-Cornelison called her attorney, whose office was
in Oklahoma City. The attorney in turn called the Garvin County sheriff’s office
and also spoke to Brooks. According to Brooks, the attorney suggested Brooks
get “off his doughnut-eating ass and do something.” This suggestion was not well
received; Brooks hung up on the attorney.
Brooks then went home, leaving instructions at the sheriff’s office that if
anyone called again about Price-Cornelison’s emergency protective order,
sheriff’s personnel were to have the caller contact Brooks the next morning.
According to Brooks, he left these instructions because he “did not want any of
[the other deputies] to be negotiators as to who owned the property.”
Heeding Brooks’ warning, Price-Cornelison did not return home to the farm
until she knew Rogers was no longer there. When Price-Cornelison did return
home, late at night on October 16, she found that Rogers had taken many things
belonging to Price-Cornelison, including appliances, furniture, electronics,
pictures off the wall, tools, horse trailers and equipment, farm implements, and
welding equipment, as well as all the horse and breeding records.
Two weeks later, on October 31, 2003, state Judge Blalock issued
Price-Cornelison a permanent protective order against Rogers. That order
required Rogers, among other things, “to remain away from” Price-Cornelison
5
and away from her residence. Despite this permanent protective order, on
November 3, 2003, Rogers returned to Lost Spring Farm with her sister, gaining
access to the farm by crawling under a fence. Although at the time
Price-Cornelison was in town buying supplies, one of her farmhands was at the
farm and tried unsuccessfully to stop Rogers from entering onto the property.
Rogers got into a verbal and physical confrontation with this farmhand. The
farmhand called Price-Cornelison to tell her Rogers was at the farm. Still in
town, Price-Cornelison called the Garvin County sheriff’s office twice to report
that Rogers was violating the protective order by being present at
Price-Cornelison’s farm. The woman who answered the phone at the sheriff’s
office, apparently Deputy Cricket Warren, told Price-Cornelison that “they” were
“busy” and were not going to send anyone out to her farm.
After calling the Sheriff’s office, Price-Cornelison drove back to her farm.
When Rogers saw Price-Cornelison’s car approaching, she and her sister left the
property. No one from the sheriff’s office ever came out to the farm in response
to Price-Cornelison’s calls about Rogers violating the protective order.
The next day, Price-Cornelison asked a local prosecutor how she could get
her protective order enforced. The prosecutor indicated that it should be enforced
and suggested that Price-Cornelison talk to Brooks. She did, that same day.
Brooks told Price-Cornelison that everyone in the courthouse was laughing at her
and that she should fire her attorney and obtain local counsel to represent her.
6
Price-Cornelison commenced this action in federal court in March 2004,
asserting federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and tort claims under
Oklahoma law against the Garvin County Board of County Commissioners (the
“County”) and Undersheriff Brooks. 2 The only two claims at issue in this appeal
are Price-Cornelison’s claims that Brooks, in his individual capacity, 1) deprived
Price-Cornelison of equal protection of the law when he refused to enforce her
protective orders because she is a lesbian victim of domestic violence; and
2) violated Price-Cornelison’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures of her property by threatening to arrest Price-Cornelison if
she returned to her home on October 16 and thus dissuading Price-Cornelison
from preventing Rogers from removing Price-Cornelison’s property from the
farm. The district court denied Brooks qualified immunity on these two claims.
He now appeals that decision.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Because qualified immunity provides, not simply a defense to liability, but
a right not to stand trial in the first place, a district court’s decision denying a
government official qualified immunity is an immediately appealable final
collateral order. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-27, 530 (1985). This
is true, however, only to the extent that the denial of immunity turns on an issue
2
Price-Cornelison also named Sheriff Bill Roady as a defendant, but he no
longer remains a party to this litigation.
7
of law. See id. at 530; Fishbein ex rel. Fishbein v. City of Glenwood Springs,
469 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 2006). “[T]his Court lacks jurisdiction over an
appeal from the denial of a defendant’s summary judgment order based on
qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial
record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1120 n.16 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Fishbein, 469 F.3d at 960.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court denied Brooks qualified immunity at the summary
judgment stage of this litigation.
Because of the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, we
review summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity questions
differently from other summary judgment decisions. When a defendant
asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff,
who must first establish that the defendant violated a constitutional
right. If no constitutional right would have been violated were the
allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity. If, on the other hand, a violation has
been shown, the plaintiff must then show that the constitutional right
was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation.
Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate if the
law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly
unlawful.
We have held that, for a right to be clearly established, there must
be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly
established weight of authority from other courts must have found the
law to be as the plaintiff maintains. The Supreme Court has explained
that officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
8
established law even in novel factual circumstances.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114-15 (citations, quotations, alterations omitted).
“Although at times it may be tempting for a court to address” the question
of whether a constitutional right is clearly established before addressing whether
the defendant violated such a constitutional right, “the Supreme Court directs that
a court consider these questions in order.” Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1188 (citing
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); see also Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct.
1769, 1774 n.4 (2007) (determining that it was unnecessary in that case to address
the wisdom of Saucier’s order of decision).
The district court’s denial of qualified immunity is a question of
law which we review de novo. We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Summary judgment is
appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) [subsequently amended].
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (citations, quotations, alterations omitted). At the
summary judgment stage, Price-Cornelison must go beyond her pleadings and
present some evidence in support of her claims. See Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of
Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 2006).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Price’s Equal Protection Claim.
1. Whether Price-Cornelison has asserted a constitutional
violation.
9
The threshold qualified immunity question presented is whether, “[t]aken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Scott, 127 S. Ct. at
1774 (reviewing qualified immunity decision made at summary judgment stage of
litigation). In this case, Price-Cornelison alleges Brooks deprived her of equal
protection of the law.
“The equal protection clause provides that ‘[n]o state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” Grace United
Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 659 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). “Equal protection ‘is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’” Id. (quoting
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
If the challenged government action implicates a fundamental right, or
classifies individuals using a suspect classification, such as race or national
origin, a court will review that challenged action applying strict scrutiny. See
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (addressing racial classification);
Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002)
(addressing classifications that “target a suspect class or involve a fundamental
right”). In such a case, “the government has the burden of proving that
[its] classifications are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
10
governmental interests.” Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (quotation omitted).
If, instead, the challenged government action classifies people according to
a quasi-suspect characteristic, such as gender or illegitimacy, then this court will
apply intermediate scrutiny. See Todd, 279 F.3d at 1210. In those cases, the test
would be whether the government can demonstrate that its classification serves
“important governmental objectives” and is “substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.” Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of
Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003).
Finally, where the challenged government action does not implicate either a
fundamental right or a protected class, this court will apply a rational basis test. 3
See Todd, 279 F.3d at 1210. In those cases, this court inquires whether the
government’s classification bears “a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Id.
at 1213 (quotation omitted).
Price-Cornelison alleges that Brooks deprived her of equal protection of the
law when he refused to enforce both her emergency and permanent protective
3
If a government classification is neutral, that is, if it does not on it face
implicate a protected class, heightened scrutiny might still apply if the application
of that neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a protected group. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976). In order to be
entitled to heightened scrutiny, however, the plaintiff challenging the facially
neutral governmental action must also establish that the government was acting
with a discriminatory intent. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65;
Washington, 426 U.S. at 239-42; see also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857
F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988).
11
orders to the same extent that he enforced protective orders obtained by
heterosexual victims of domestic violence. 4 And it is clear that, “[a]lthough there
is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not
discriminate in providing such protection.” Watson, 857 F.2d at 694.
Relying on Watson, Price-Cornelison alleged that the County has a policy
of providing less protection to lesbian victims of domestic violence than to
heterosexual domestic violence victims. The district court held that
Price-Cornelison had asserted sufficient evidence indicating that the County did
have such a policy to go to trial on that issue. Because we cannot review that
determination in the context of this appeal, see Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1120 n.16, we
assume here that the County has such a policy.
To support her claim against Brooks, in his individual capacity,
Price-Cornelison relies on the County’s policy, plus Brooks’ treatment of Amanda
Chandler, a heterosexual domestic violence victim who requested that Brooks
enforce her protective order against her former husband. 5 The evidence, viewed
4
Price-Cornelison specifically alleges discrimination against lesbian victims
of domestic violence rather than discrimination against lesbians generally. And
this is in keeping with Price-Cornelison’s evidence, indicating that Brooks’
actions favored Rogers, who is herself a lesbian.
5
During 2003, Brooks was only in charge of two cases involving domestic
protective orders, Chandler’s and Price-Cornelison’s. These cases, therefore,
provide the most relevant comparison of Brooks’ treatment of lesbian and
heterosexual domestic violence victims. While Brooks also assisted other
deputies in investigating the violation of protective orders on several occasions
(continued...)
12
in the light most favorable to Price-Cornelison, see Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115,
indicates the following: Amanda Chandler obtained a protective order requiring
her former husband, Johnny Chandler, to stay away from her. On September 29,
2003, Amanda Chandler called the Garvin County Sheriff’s office twice, reporting
that her former husband was following her as she drove on the highway, and that
he was trying to force her to pull over. Brooks advised Amanda Chandler to drive
immediately to the Sheriff’s office. Based upon Amanda Chandler’s report,
Brooks filed charges against Johnny Chandler for violating the protective order.
Price-Cornelison contrasts Brooks’ enforcement of Amanda Chandler’s
protective order with his refusal to enforce both Price-Cornelison’s emergency
and permanent protective orders. But Brooks’ refusal to enforce
Price-Cornelison’s emergency protective order, on October 16, 2003, by refusing
to go to her farm and prevent Rogers from removing any property, is not
sufficiently similar to Brooks’ enforcing Amanda Chandler’s protective order to
provide support for Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim. Amanda
Chandler’s protective order was valid and enforceable on the day that she called
seeking its enforcement. That was not the case with Price-Cornelison’s
emergency protective order. The express terms of the emergency protective order
5
(...continued)
during 2003, he was not the officer in charge of those other cases. These cases
where Brooks was not in charge do not offer a sufficient comparison of how
Brooks individually treated lesbian and heterosexual domestic violence victims
for our purposes here.
13
provided that Rogers did not have to vacate Price-Cornelison’s farm until October
17, which was the day after Price-Cornelison called soliciting Brooks’ help. The
record further indicates that Brooks, on October 16, did call the Garvin County
court to verify the dates that appeared on the emergency protective order and was
told that they were correct; the state judge had given Rogers a day to gather her
possessions together before leaving. See generally Fishbein, 469 F.3d at 960
(relying on undisputed evidence in reviewing interlocutory appeal from denial of
summary judgment based upon qualified immunity). Price-Cornelison has not
asserted any evidence suggesting that, contrary to his treatment of
Price-Cornelison, Brooks would have enforced a heterosexual domestic violence
victim’s protective order that was not yet effective under these same
circumstances.
Price-Cornelison, however, did have an enforceable permanent protective
order on November 3, 2003. We note here, at the outset of our discussion of
Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim alleging that Brooks refused to enforce
her permanent protective order, that the partial dissent takes issue with our
reading of the facts relevant to these allegations. We readily acknowledge that
there is evidence in the record that supports the dissent’s version of the facts.
Nevertheless, this case comes before us on an interlocutory appeal from the denial
of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of litigation. In that
context, we have to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
14
Price-Cornelison, as the non-moving party, and we may not weigh or decide
factual disputes. See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115. Nor may we consider, on
interlocutory appeal, whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of fact
sufficient to withstand summary judgment. See id. at 1120 n.16. If
Price-Cornelison has alleged a constitutional violation, and for the reasons
explained below we think she has, and if there is any evidence in the record to
support the version of events averred by Price-Cornelison, we simply must affirm.
See Serna, 455 F.3d at 1150-51. In our judgment, there is evidence in this record
to support her allegations and, thus, to require us to affirm the district court’s
decision denying Brooks’ qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. In
response to the concurrence/dissent’s recitation of facts, we have included in
footnotes 6, 7, and 8, infra, some of the specific evidence in the record that
supports Price-Cornelison’s version of the events.
Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order that was in effect on
November 3, 2003, required Rogers, among other things, to remain away from
Price-Cornelison’s residence. Both Price-Cornelison and her hired farmhand,
Tesh Morgan, called the sheriff’s office several times on that day, reporting that
Rogers had come onto Price-Cornelison’s property in violation of the permanent
protective order. 6 Brooks spoke with Morgan. It appears that he may also have
6
In his affidavit, Brooks asserts this incident occurred on October 31, 2003.
But in his deposition, Brooks instead indicates this incident may have occurred on
(continued...)
15
spoken to Price-Cornelison. 7 Another deputy with whom Price-Cornelison spoke
6
(...continued)
November 3, 2003.
Q. Did you receive some further calls on November 3rd from someone
at Ms. Cornelison’s residence stating that Vickie Rogers had returned
to the residence?
A. Was it November 3rd? You know, possibly. I don’t recall the date
on that. Are you referring to the Teshla Morgan phone conversation?
Q. Yes. Did you receive a call from Tesh Morgan around November
3rd?
A. Yes, I did.
And in his answers to interrogatories, Brooks indicates that Morgan called him
about this incident “[a] couple of days after the protective order had been
entered.” Because the permanent protective order had been entered on October
31, 2003, this lends further support to Brooks’ deposition testimony that his
conversation with Morgan occurred on November 3.
7
Deputy Brooks testified during his deposition as follows:
Q Did you speak to Dana Price-Cornelison on November 3rd?
A I believe I did.
Q What did Ms. Price-Cornelison say to you that evening.
A I don’t even really recall the conversation at this time. Like I said,
I believe I talked to her but I’m not positive I did or not. I don’t recall
at this time.
....
Q Okay. I’m handing you Exhibit 6. Is that a record of the call that
took place on November 3rd?
(continued...)
16
informed Price-Cornelison that “they weren’t sending” anybody to investigate
because “they were busy.”
The next day, Price-Cornelison and Morgan spoke to Brooks about getting
Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order enforced. They explained that they
were afraid of Rogers, in light of her previous use of firearms to accentuate her
threats to Price-Cornelison and Rogers’ later confrontation with Morgan, and they
were particularly concerned because two of Price-Cornelison’s other hired hands
lived on the farm with their child. Brooks responded by advising
Price-Cornelison that
it was all over the courthouse in town about everything that happened
between Vickie and [her] and that everybody was laughing, it was a big
joke, and that everybody really thought that [her] attorney was not
do[ing] a good job and that [the attorney] was—had really upset them
at the sheriff’s office, and they even said they were going to file a
complaint against [the attorney], and [Brooks] told [Price-Cornelison
that she] needed to get someone local to represent [her] if [she] w[as]
going to have any chance with the—anything go on here in town at the
courthouse.
(Id.) Despite these several reports that Rogers had violated the permanent
7
(...continued)
A I’m assuming, yes. 11-3-2003 at 17:53.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Price-Cornelison, this court
must assume, for purposes of this appeal, that Brooks spoke with her that night.
See Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1188. Further, Deputy Cricket Warren’s notes of a call
she received from Price-Cornelison’s attorney later that evening indicate that
Warren told the attorney that Price-Cornelison had called earlier that evening and
spoken to a deputy. This lends further support to Brooks’ deposition testimony
that he did speak to Price-Cornelison that evening.
17
protective order, Brooks declined to send any deputies to investigate, and no
charges were ever filed against Rogers, even though there was an eyewitness to
the violation. 8
Comparing Brooks’ refusal to enforce Price-Cornelison’s permanent
protective order with the level of enforcement he provided to Amanda Chandler,
and viewing this differing treatment in light of the County’s policy of providing
less police protection to lesbian victims of domestic violence than it provided to
heterosexual domestic violence victims, Price-Cornelison has asserted sufficient
evidence to show that Brooks himself treated Price-Cornelison less favorably than
he treated other domestic violence victims.
Price-Cornelison next asserts that Brooks intentionally treated her
differently because she is a lesbian and was a domestic violence victim. Because
we must assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the County has a policy of
8
The partial dissent points to Brooks’ deposition testimony that he did not
enforce the emergency protective order on October 16 because Price-Cornelison
was in Texas and Rogers was in Oklahoma and with that space and distance
between the two, Brooks was not worried about Price-Cornelison’s safety. The
dissent suggests that the same logic might apply on November 3. But the terms of
the protective order in effect on November 3 were different from the terms of the
earlier emergency protective order. The emergency protective order had directed
Rogers not to “visit with, assault, molest or otherwise interfere with the victim,”
Price-Cornelison. (Emphasis added.) But the permanent protective order, in
effect on November 3, directed Rogers, among other things, “to remain away
from the victim(s) and the residence of the victim(s).” (Emphasis added.) There
is evidence in the record, if believed, that establishes that Rogers clearly violated
the permanent protective order on November 3 and that Brooks was made aware
of that violation.
18
providing lesbian victims of domestic violence with less police protection than
other domestic violence victims, it is reasonable to infer, for purposes of Brooks’
motion for summary judgment, that, in refusing to enforce Price-Cornelison’s
permanent protective order, Brooks was acting pursuant to that policy. See Lauren
L. McFarlane, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When the
Police Will Not Respond?, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 929, 948 (1991) (noting that,
“once the existence of a municipal policy or custom has been shown, courts have
assumed that the injurious actions of the individual police officers were taken
pursuant to that policy, not merely on their own”). In addition, it is undisputed
that at the time Brooks refused to enforce Price-Cornelison’s permanent
protective order, Brooks was aware that she is a lesbian; he had previously
mentioned this fact to several people. Price-Cornelison has, therefore, presented
sufficient evidence to show that Brooks refused to enforce her permanent
protective order because she is a lesbian domestic violence victim.
Price-Cornelison has, therefore, adequately alleged Brooks deprived her of
equal protection of the law when he refused to enforce her permanent protective
order on November 3, 2003. Price-Cornelison’s claim, however, does not
implicate a fundamental right–“there is no general constitutional right to police
protection.” Watson, 857 F.2d at 694. Nor does it implicate a protected class,
19
which would warrant heightened scrutiny. 9 A government official can, therefore,
distinguish between its citizens on the basis of sexual orientation, if that
classification bears “a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Todd, 279 F.3d
at 1213 (quotation omitted). But Brooks has not asserted, and we cannot discern
on this record, a rational reason to provide less protection to lesbian victims of
domestic violence than to heterosexual domestic violence victims.
9
In the district court, Price-Cornelison also alleged lesbians comprise a
suspect class, warranting strict scrutiny. Price-Cornelison does not reassert that
claim now on appeal. In any event, this court, like many others, has previously
rejected the notion that homosexuality is a suspect classification. See Walmer v.
Dep’t of Defense, 52 F.3d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Scarbrough v.
Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting
homosexuality is not suspect classification in the Sixth Circuit); Citizens for
Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting Supreme Court
has never held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification for equal
protection purposes); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004)
(noting neither Supreme Court nor Fifth Circuit has recognized sexual orientation
as a suspect classification); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.,
358 F.3d 804, 818 & n.16 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that all circuits that
have addressed the issue have held that homosexuals are not a suspect class);
Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d
446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining to decide whether homosexuals are a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, but noting that, in military context, Seventh Circuit has
subjected discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to rational basis test
instead of applying strict scrutiny); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding military personnel who engage in, or have a propensity to
engage in, homosexual acts are not a suspect class); Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding homosexuality is neither a suspect
nor a quasi-suspect class); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101-04 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (same). See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996)
(discussing amendment precluding enactment of laws prohibiting discrimination
on basis of sexual orientation using rational basis test rather than applying strict
scrutiny).
20
Price-Cornelison, therefore, has sufficiently established that Brooks violated her
constitutional rights.
2. Whether this constitutional right was clearly established at
the time Brooks refused to enforce Price-Cornelison’s
permanent protective order.
The next qualified immunity question presented is whether the equal
protection right implicated here was clearly established at the time Brooks refused
to enforce Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order. We undertake this
inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114 (citations,
quotations, alterations omitted).
Brooks refused to enforce Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order on
November 3, 2003. It was much earlier, in 1988, that Watson clearly established
that, “[a]lthough there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the
state may not discriminate in providing such protection.” 857 F.2d at 694; see
also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196,
197 n.3 (1989) (noting that, although “the Due Process Clauses generally confer
no affirmative right to governmental aid,” “[t]he State may not, of course,
selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without
violating the Equal Protection Clause”). Watson reached this conclusion
21
specifically in the context of addressing police protection afforded to domestic
abuse victims. See 857 F.2d at 694. Watson, therefore, was sufficient to put
Brooks on notice that providing Price-Cornelison less police protection than other
domestic violence victims because she is a lesbian would deprive her of equal
protection of the law, at least in the absence of an articulated rational
governmental reason for such discrimination.
This is true even assuming that Brooks was acting according to a County
policy of affording less police protection to lesbian victims of domestic violence,
because Watson would have put Brooks on notice that applying such a policy
could result in a constitutional violation. See Lawrence v. Reed, 406 F.3d 1224,
1231-32 (10th Cir. 2005) (inquiring whether, “in spite of the existence of [County
policy], a reasonable officer should have known that his conduct was unlawful”);
see also Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251 (10th Cir. 2003)
(noting that, “[i]n considering the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the state
officer’s actions, one relevant factor is whether the defendant relied on a state
statute, regulation, or official policy that explicitly sanctioned the conduct in
question”) (emphasis added). See generally Watson, 857 F.2d at 697 (reversing
decision granting plaintiffs summary judgment on their claims asserted against
individual officers, in their individual capacity, for the district court to consider
officers’ qualified immunity defense, where this court held plaintiffs had
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims
22
alleging that the City had a policy that deprived them of equal protection). In any
event, Brooks does not argue here that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because he was following official policy, nor does he attempt to argue that there
is a rational basis for such a policy; instead, he denies that there is such a policy.
3. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision denying
Brooks qualified immunity on Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim, to the
extent that claim is based upon Brooks’ refusal, on October 16, 2003, to enforce
Price-Cornelison’s emergency protective order. But we affirm the district court’s
decision denying Brooks qualified immunity on Price-Cornelison’s equal
protection claim to the extent that it is based upon Brooks’ refusal to enforce
Price-Cornelison’s permanent protective order on November 3, 2003.
B. Price-Cornelison’s Fourth Amendment claim
1. Whether Price-Cornelison has sufficiently shown a Fourth
Amendment violation.
Price-Cornelison alleges that Brooks’ conduct on October 16,
2003—particularly his telling Price-Cornelison he would arrest her if she returned
to her residence that day while Rogers was still there—enabled Rogers to
unlawfully seize Price-Cornelison’s property in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth, provides in pertinent part that the “right of the people to be
23
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
A “seizure” of property . . . occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quotation, citation omitted).
Here, Price-Cornelison has sufficiently alleged a seizure of her property. That
seizure, however, was conducted by Rogers, a private citizen. Only government
action, and not the conduct of private parties, implicates the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments: “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment establishes an essential
dichotomy between governmental action, which is subject to scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and private conduct, which however discriminatory or
wrongful, is not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions.” Marcus v.
McCollum, 394 F.3d 813, 818 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).
Governmental defendants “normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when they have exercised coercive power or have
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. Mere approval of
or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to
justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)) (alterations
omitted). Here, however, Price-Cornelison has sufficiently alleged that Brooks
aided Rogers’ removal of the property from the farm to state a Fourth Amendment
claim against Brooks.
24
This court most recently addressed a police officer’s liability for a private
party’s seizure of property in Marcus. There, a private citizen, McCollum, was
attempting to repossess a car from Marcus. See id. at 816. McCollum made an
on-duty police officer, Wilson, who was parked across the street from the car to
be repossessed, aware of what McCollum was going to do. See id. The officer
remained across the street while McCollum, accompanied by a tow truck driver,
attempted to repossess the car from Marcus’ residential driveway. Id. Marcus
and her minor son came out of their residence and heatedly protested the
repossession, asserting McCollum was seizing the wrong car. Id. That turned out
to be true. Id. Officer Wilson eventually called for “back-up” and then drove
over and joined this discussion. Id. Three other officers soon arrived on the
scene. Id. The residents explained to Officer Wilson that McCollum had no legal
interest in the car he was trying to take. Id. The officers did not request any
documentation from McCollum that would support his claim to the car. Id. At
one point during this discussion, Officer Wilson poked the minor resident in the
chest with sufficient force to move him backwards. Id. Although the officers
told Marcus that “repossession was a civil matter in which the police could not be
involved, they also told Mrs. Marcus and [her son] to stop their interference,
advising ‘let them do what they’re going to do and take it up in small claims
court.’” Id. Marcus reported that the officers told her and her son that “if the
situation escalated, someone would be going to jail” and that Marcus and her son
25
“should keep our mouth[s] shut, go back in the house or we would indeed go to
jail that day.” Id. at 817 (quotation omitted). Yet under governing Oklahoma
law, all a citizen would have had to do to thwart such a repossession was to
protest in some minor way: “[t]he general rule is that a debtor’s request for the
financer to leave the car alone must be obeyed.” Id. at 820 (quotation omitted).
However, because Marcus and her son “took [the officer’s] statements as threats
directed toward them, they followed the officers’ instructions and allowed the car
to be towed away.” Id. at 817 (quotation omitted).
Under those circumstances, this court held that Marcus had alleged and
supported a Fourth Amendment violation sufficient to survive summary judgment.
See id. at 821-23. In reaching this conclusion, this court noted that “officers are
not state actors during a private repossession if they act only to keep the peace,
but they cross the line if they affirmatively intervene to aid the repossessor.” Id.
at 818; see also id. at 818-19.
It stands to reason that police should not weigh in on the side of the
repossessor and assist an illegal repossession. To diffuse a volatile
situation while ensuring a lack of state action, officers could direct both
parties to seek a judicial determination. A curbside courtroom, in
which officers decide who was entitled to possession, is precisely the
situation and deprivation of rights to be avoided.
Id. at 820 (quotations omitted).
Determining whether a police officer has actually aided a private party’s
seizure of property “is particularly fact-sensitive, so the circumstances must be
26
examined in their totality.” Id. at 819. In Marcus, this court recognized that, in
making this determination, other circuits have considered such facts as whether
the officer accompanied the private party onto the scene, told the debtor that the
seizure was legal, ordered the debtor to stop interfering or he would go to jail,
intervened at more than one step in the repossession process, failed to depart
before the repossession has been completed, stood in close proximity to the
creditor, and unreasonably recognized the documentation of one party over the
other to suggest the officer actually assisted in the seizure. Id. (discussing cases).
“[T]he overarching lesson of the case law is that officers may act to diffuse a
volatile situation, but may not aid the repossessor in such a way that the
repossession would not have occurred but for their assistance.” Id. In Marcus,
this court concluded Marcus’ and her son’s Fourth Amendment claim should
survive summary judgment because
under plaintiffs’ version of the facts a jury could find that the officers
did more than merely acquiesce or stand by in case of trouble. The
controlling question to be resolved by a factfinder is whether the
officers were simply keeping the peace, as they were entitled to do, or
aiding Mr. McCollum, as they were not.
Id. at 822.
In the case currently before this court, Brooks told Price-Cornelison that,
because the property was community property, Rogers was entitled to take
27
whatever property she wanted from the farm10 and, more importantly, he
affirmatively told Price-Cornelison that he would arrest her if she returned to her
own home in an effort to stop Rogers from taking Price-Cornelison’s property. 11
Drawing reasonable inferences from this evidence in Price-Cornelison’s favor,
Brooks’ threat to arrest Price-Cornelison dissuaded her from returning home until
Rogers had left the farm. 12 Cf. Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 806,
811 (7th Cir. 2005) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a Fourth Amendment
violation could not survive summary judgment where plaintiff failed to submit
evidence suggesting that police officer’s presence actually deterred neighbors
from calling police to report estranged husband was removing property from
10
Brooks denies saying this. But at this stage in the proceedings, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Price-Cornelison. See Kirkland,
464 F.3d at 1188.
11
While the emergency protective order required Rogers to leave the
residence she had shared with Price-Cornelison by October 17, that protective
order did not expressly limit Price-Cornelison’s right to be present in her own
home.
12
Brooks asserts that, by threatening to arrest Price-Cornelison, he was just
trying to keep the peace. In Marcus, however, this court cited authority from
other circuits indicating that an officer’s conduct could “give the repossession a
cachet of legality and have the effect of intimidating [the debtor] into not
exercising his right to resist, thus facilitating the repossession,” “[e]ven if
unintended,” and therefore would “constitute police intervention and aid
sufficient to establish state action.” 394 F.3d at 819 (quotations omitted;
emphasis added). In light of that authority, the relevant question in this case is
not what Brooks intended when he threatened to arrest Price-Cornelison, but the
effect his threat would have on an objectively reasonable person in
Price-Cornelison’s position.
28
wife’s residence). Price-Cornelison has thus shown facts sufficiently similar to
those in Marcus to state a Fourth Amendment violation. 13
2. Whether this Fourth Amendment right was clearly
established.
Because Price-Cornelison has sufficiently shown a Fourth Amendment
violation, the next step is to determine whether this
constitutional right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to
note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation. Summary judgment based on qualified immunity is
appropriate if the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct
would be clearly unlawful.
Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1114 (citations, quotations omitted). “Although
[Price-Cornelison] does not need to find a case with an identical factual situation,
[s]he still must show legal authority which makes it apparent that in the light of
pre-existing law a reasonable officer, in [Brooks’] position,” would have realized
that his actions were unlawful. Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted).
13
Brooks asserts that he cannot be liable because he himself did not
physically seize Price-Cornelison’s property. But the relevant case law does not
require that. In Marcus, for example, it was the private creditor, accompanied by
a private tow truck driver, who physically repossessed the car; the officers were
merely present during the repossession. 394 F.3d at 816. Likewise, in Soldal, it
was the private landlord and his private employees who physically removed a
tenant’s trailer home from a mobile home park, while police officers just stood
by. 506 U.S. at 57-59.
29
We conclude that this Fourth Amendment right was clearly established on
October 16, 2003, when Brooks told Price-Cornelison that Rogers could remove
whatever property she wanted from Price-Cornelison’s farm and threatened to
arrest Price-Cornelison if she returned to her home on that day. Although
Marcus was not decided until after the events at issue in this case occurred,
Marcus itself involved facts that happened before the incident at issue in this case
occurred. And this court, in Marcus, held that the law was clearly established, as
of the time that the events in that case occurred, that an officer’s assistance in a
private party’s seizure of property implicates Fourth Amendment protections. See
Marcus, 394 F.3d at 816, 823-24 (holding officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity for assisting private party’s repossession occurring in February 2002);
see also Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (relying in 1998 on
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), to hold that reasonable police officers
should know from established precedent “that their role is not to be participants in
property deprivations without notice and an opportunity to be heard”). Brooks
was thus on notice on October 16, 2003, that he could be liable for assisting a
private party’s unlawful seizure of property at the time he threatened to arrest
Price-Cornelison if she returned to her home to prevent Rogers from taking
Price-Cornelison’s property. See Moore, 438 F.3d at 1042.
3. Conclusion.
Price-Cornelison has sufficiently alleged that Brooks violated her Fourth
30
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures of her property. Further,
this law was clearly established at the time of Price-Cornelison’s and Rogers’
property dispute.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s decision denying
Brooks qualified immunity from Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim, to the
extent that claim was based upon his refusal to enforce Price-Cornelison’s
emergency protective order on October 16, 2003. But we AFFIRM the district
court’s decision denying Brooks qualified immunity to the extent her equal
protection claim was based upon Brooks’ refusal to enforce Price-Cornelison’s
protective order November 3, 2003, and on her Fourth Amendment claim. We
REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
31
05-6140, Price Cornelison v. Brooks
O’BRIEN J., Dissenting in part, concurring in part, concurring with the result in
part:
Faced with a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff “must first establish
that the defendant violated a constitutional right.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d
1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Price-Cornelison has failed to show
Brooks violated her right to equal protection with respect to her permanent
protective order on November 3, 2003. Thus, he is entitled to qualified immunity
on that claim and I dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion. I join the
decision with respect to the emergency protective order, dated October 16, 2003.
With respect to the seizure claim, I concur in the result.
A. Equal Protection Claim
Price-Cornelison alleges Brooks deprived her of equal protection of the law
on account of her status as a lesbian victim of domestic violence by refusing to
enforce her emergency and permanent protective orders to the same extent he
enforced protective orders obtained by heterosexual victims of domestic violence.
The district court found Garvin County had an unwritten custom or policy of
providing less protection to lesbian victims of domestic violence and, consistent
with this policy, Brooks himself provided less protection to Price-Cornelison.
The County has not appealed from the court’s finding and Brooks himself does
not challenge the finding so, improbable as it seems from this record, we must
presume the existence of an unwritten discriminatory policy for purposes of this
appeal. 1
In finding the County had an unwritten discriminatory policy, the district
court relied upon incident reports involving Amanda Lou Chandler, Mary Pelfrey,
Tera Lynn Wiggins, and Cindy Selman. The majority correctly disregards the
Pelfrey, Wiggins and Selman reports in considering the viability of the equal
protection claim against Brooks because he was not the officer in charge of those
cases. That leaves Chandler as the only comparator. The majority hangs its hat –
and Price-Cornelison’s equal protection claim – entirely on the contrast between
Brooks’ treatment of Price-Cornelison and his treatment of Chandler. There are
two problems with this. First, contrary to the majority’s assertion, Brooks had no
personal involvement with respect to the enforcement (or lack thereof) of Price-
1
The majority cites Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1120 n.16, for the proposition that
we lack jurisdiction to review a sufficiency of the evidence determination in the
context of a defendant’s appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. This proposition, which stems from Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995), may be a dead letter in light of Scott v. Harris, 127 S.
Ct. 1769 (2007). In Scott, an appeal from the denial of summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, the Court held the court of appeals erred in crediting
respondent’s version of the events (which was credited by the district court)
because it “is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could
have believed him.” Id. at 1776. Thus, it appears we would have jurisdiction to
review a district court’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to survive
summary judgment in the qualified immunity context, id. at 1774-75, if the issue
was properly raised.
2
Cornelison’s permanent protective order on November 3. 2 Second, Price-
Cornelison and Chandler were not similarly situated and their cases are not
comparable.
The majority says, “It appears that [Brooks] may . . . have spoken to Price-
Cornelison [on November 3].” (Majority Op. at 16-17.) The record does not
support this. Price-Cornelison testified she called the sheriff’s department on
November 3 and spoke to “a lady.” (R. Vol. II at 349.) She was asked: “Did you
talk to anyone else at the sheriff’s office?” and responded: “Just this lady. I
called a couple times . . . .” (Id.) A little while later, this exchange took place:
Q: Did you talk to anybody else at the sheriff’s office that night
[November 3]?
A: No. I made several calls, and the lady told me they weren’t
sending nobody out, that they were busy.
Q: So she’s the only one you talked to at the sheriff’s office?
A: Yes. I kept getting the same lady when I called.
(Id.)
2
As the majority notes, Brooks’ refusal to enforce Price-Cornelison’s
emergency protective order on October 16, 2003, cannot be compared to his
willingness to enforce Chandler’s protective order because Price-Cornelison’s
emergency protective order was not enforceable on October 16. Thus, we must
look only to Brooks’ actions on November 3, 2003, with respect to the permanent
protective order. Only acts or refusals to act on that date may be compared to his
actions in the Chandler matter.
3
Consistent with Price-Cornelison’s recollection, the records of the sheriff’s
office indicate Price-Cornelison spoke to Deputy Cricket Warren, a woman, not to
Brooks. Warren’s note of Price-Cornelison’s 5:53 p.m. call, prepared
contemporaneously, indicates Warren contacted “g4” who advised that if Price-
Cornelison called back, Warren was to “tell her to contact g2 in the mourning
[sic].” (R. Vol. I at 163.) Brooks testified (and no one disputes) that g4 refers to
Chad Hillis and g2 refers to him. Thus, it was Hillis, not Brooks, who advised the
dispatcher that if Price-Cornelison called again, she was to be told to contact
Brooks the next day.
The only evidence that could even possibly suggest Brooks spoke with
Price-Cornelison on November 3 is his testimony that he could not recall whether
he spoke to Price-Cornelison on November 3. 3 Direct testimony (Price-
Cornelison) as to a fact is not disputed simply because another witness (Brooks)
fails to recall the event. The Supreme Court recently explained: “At the summary
judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott, 127
S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “‘[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
3
Notably, the reference to “Exhibit 6” in footnote 7 of the majority
opinion is to the log of the 5:53 p.m. phone call between Price-Cornelison and
Deputy Warren. Thus, Brook’s testimony (that the exhibit is a record of the call
Price-Cornelison may have made to him on November 3) is clearly incorrect.
4
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986)). In Scott, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s version
of the facts (which the district court had credited), explaining: “When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Id.
Price-Cornelison’s version of the facts (as set forth in her appellate brief) is
contradicted by her own testimony and the record as a whole. Brooks certainly
had contact with Price-Cornelison prior to and after November 3, but the question
here is whether Brooks’ conduct (not some other officer’s conduct) with Price-
Cornelison (not one of her hired helpers) on November 3 (not some other date) is
sufficient to support an equal protection claim. It is not.
Even if Brooks had been aware on November 3 of Price-Cornelison’s
complaints regarding her permanent protective order, nothing suggests he treated
her differently than heterosexual victims of domestic violence. The only
comparator is Chandler and the record contains little information about her case.
According to the incident report, Chandler contacted the Garvin County Sheriff’s
Office on September 29, 2003, and advised dispatch her ex-husband was
following her and trying to get her to pull over. She called back approximately
5
ten minutes later and spoke to Brooks. She informed Brooks she was still being
followed by her ex-husband and was going to get off the highway. She also told
Brooks she had a protective order against her ex-husband. She asked Brooks
what she should do and he advised her to drive to the sheriff’s office. Brooks did
not send an officer to meet her; nor did he send an officer to her home. When she
arrived at the sheriff’s office, Brooks had her and the person with whom she had
been traveling complete affidavits. Charges were filed against Chandler’s ex-
husband for violation of the protective order.
In Jennings v. Stillwater, a class-of-one equal protection case, we held the
plaintiff “failed to make an adequate showing that similarly situated persons were
treated differently.” 383 F.3d 1199, 1213 (10th Cir. 2004). 4 While this is not a
class-of-one case, Jennings is still instructive on the plaintiff’s burden. We stated
in Jennings: “Inevitably, the degree to which others are viewed as similarly
situated depends substantially on the facts and context of the case.” Id. at 1214.
“When multiple variables are in play . . . the difference in treatment can be the
4
I recognize class-of-one equal protection claims are somewhat different
from traditional equal protection claims. See Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1213
(discussing the difference between “[t]raditional equal protection law” and class-
of-one equal protection law). But even in a traditional equal protection case,
“plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently
from others who were similarly situated to them.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d
1299, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998). In Barney, we held the female plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim failed because they could not “make the required threshold
showing that they were treated differently from male inmates who were similarly
situated . . . .” Id. at 1312-13.
6
product of a number of considerations, conscious or otherwise, many of them
legitimate.” Id. So it is here.
This case and Chandler’s case stand in stark contrast – the differences
involve the immediacy and object of the threat. In Chandler, the threat was to the
victim’s personal safety; here, the threat was only to property, as Price-
Cornelison was not present at her house when Rogers entered onto her land. In
Chandler, the threat was immediate; here, it was remote 5 as Rogers had already
departed the property when Price-Cornelison contacted the sheriff’s office on
November 3. The district court erroneously treated unlike circumstances as
comparable. 6 The majority does as well.
5
With respect to enforcement of Price-Cornelison’s emergency protective
order on October 16, Brooks testified it was the difference in the immediacy of
the threat that accounted for the differential treatment:
If [Ms.] Cornelison is not in any danger, she is not anywhere near the
house, I don’t see a need that I would have to go out there to protect
[Ms.] Cornelison. If she’s in Munster, Texas, . . . there’s enough
space and time there that I wouldn’t have to worry about her physical
well-being and that’s what the whole purpose of a victim’s protective
order is . . . .
(R. Vol. II at 366.) The same logic would apply to the November 3 incident had
Brooks known about it. While the permanent protective order directed Rogers to
remain away from Price-Cornelison and her residence, there is surely a qualitative
difference between a threat to a domestic violence victim (as in Chandler) and a
threat to a victim’s residence (as here).
6
Another variable impacting human interaction is tact. Although not
determinative, the conduct of Price-Cornelison’s counsel quite possibly fouled the
air. According to Brooks, on October 16, Price-Cornelison’s counsel spoke to
(continued...)
7
And that still leaves the problem of discriminatory intent – a problem not
adequately addressed by the majority. In Watson v. Kansas City, we held:
[T]o survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must go beyond her
pleadings and show that she has evidence of specific facts that
demonstrate that it is the policy or custom of the defendants to
provide less police protection to victims of domestic assault than to
other assault victims. She must also provide evidence that
discrimination was a motivating factor for the defendants and that
she was injured by operation of the policy or custom.
857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). There are two defendants
in this case – Garvin County and Brooks. To survive summary judgment, Price-
Cornelison had to present some evidence that Brooks himself was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. See id. She failed to make that showing.
The majority imputes discriminatory intent to Brooks based on the
presumed County policy and Brooks’ knowledge that Price-Cornelison was a
lesbian, but it cites no case law suggesting these factors are sufficient. 7 While
Brooks was certainly aware Price-Cornelison was a lesbian, no evidence suggests
he possessed any animus towards her in particular or lesbian domestic abuse
6
(...continued)
him regarding enforcement of the emergency protective order. She told him to
get off his “donut eating ass” and do something. (R. Vol. I at 29.) Price-
Cornelison’s counsel spoke to a different deputy on November 3, and complained
the sheriff’s office “won’t do shit.” (Id. at 162.) Brooks later told Price-
Cornelison her counsel had upset his deputies and advised her she needed to get a
different attorney.
7
The majority’s only citation is to a law review article from 1991. The
article is not persausive.
8
victims in general. The evidence in the record actually suggests otherwise. Mary
Sanchez, one of Price-Cornelison’s friends, reported: “Mr. Brooks informed me
that ‘Ms Rogers and Ms Cornelison had been in one of those “lesbian
relationship” [sic] for 7 years and that Oklahoma was a community property
state.’ He informed me it was not any different tha[n] a male and female married
relationship.” (R. Vol. II at 407.) This quotation does not reflect animosity
towards homosexuals – on the contrary, it reflects Brooks’ willingness to consider
cohabiting homosexuals as akin to married heterosexuals.
Sanchez also stated: “I asked [Brooks] if we ([Price-Cornelison] and I)
could go to the house. He said [Price-Cornelison] was not allowed to [go] there
as long as [Rogers] was there and she had until 12 midnight the 17th to be there.”
(Id.) Brooks was clearly mistaken, but that does not suggest discriminatory
intent. In fact, there is no evidence Brooks had a double standard. Self-serving
(but unrefuted) is Brooks’ statement: “During my employment with the Sheriff’s
Office, I have never discriminated against women, including the Plaintiff Dana
Price-Cornelison, with regard to the service and execution of protective orders, or
disputes over property.” 8 (R. Vol. I at 58.)
8
Similarly, sergeant and deputy sheriff Chad Hillis and reserve deputy
Mike Henderson each testified: “No one ever associated with the Sheriff’s Office
ever made any statements to me that was negative towards . . . Ms. Cornelison as
to her sexual orientation, or as to her status as a woman.” (R. Vol. I at 140, 155-
56.) Front office deputy Hellen Cavnar testified: “I never observed any
(continued...)
9
Without the majority’s tenuous inference that Brooks knew of and followed
the County’s unwritten discriminatory policy, Price-Cornelison has no case. In
Watson, we noted: “[T]here is no inherent inconsistency in allowing a suit
alleging an unconstitutional policy or custom to proceed against the city when the
individuals charged with executing the challenged policy to injure the plaintiff
have been relieved of individual liability.” Id. at 697. That is the result I would
reach here – Price-Cornelison can pursue her equal protection claim against the
County, but not against Brooks. In fact, her claim against the County continues
as the County did not appeal from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.
B. Seizure Claim
“A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interest in that property.” Winters v. Bd. of
County Comm’rs, 4 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotations
omitted). Here, it was Rogers, not Brooks, who interfered with Price-
Cornelison’s possessory interest in her property. In extending the rule the
8
(...continued)
discrimination toward women with regard to the way that complaints by women
were handled by the Garvin County Sheriff’s Office.” (Id. at 159.) Secretary-
bailiff Camille Frizell testified: “[I]n my opinion, there is no discrimination
against women by the Garvin County Sheriff’s Office with regard to the service
or enforcement of protective orders. I also saw no discrimination against Dana
Price-Cornelison by any member of the Sheriff’s Office on the basis of her sexual
orientation.” (Id. at 160.)
10
majority looks to Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813 (10th Cir. 2004). In
Marcus, we cited Barrett v. Harwood, 189 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1999), for the
proposition: “[W]hen an officer begins to take a more active hand in the
repossession . . . a point may be reached at which police assistance at the scene
of a private repossession may cause the repossession to take on the character of
state action.” Marcus, 394 F.3d at 818 (emphasis added). Central to our decision
was this observation:
As is typical of these cases, a self-help repossessor in Oklahoma may
take possession of property without judicial process only if he or she
has a security interest in the targeted property and no breach of the
peace takes place. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-9-609. This rule
derives from the Uniform Commercial Code, which states “after
default, a secured party . . . may take possession of the collateral . . .
(1) pursuant to judicial process; or (2) without judicial process, if it
proceeds without breach of the peace.” U.C.C. § 9-609 (formerly
U.C.C. § 9-503) (emphasis added); see also Helfinstine v. Martin,
561 P.2d 951, 954 (Okla. 1977) (recognizing the current statutory
“right to peaceful self-help repossession of property . . . has roots
deep in the common law”).
Id. at 819-20.
At least two factors distinguish this case from Marcus. First, this was not a
repossession therefore the restriction on self-help repossession contained in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) (cannot disturb the peace) does not apply.
Second, Brooks was on the phone, not at the scene. Since Rogers was not privy
to the conversation between Brooks and Price-Cornelison, she could not have
taken anything Brooks said or did as tacit approval of her act of retrieving
11
property from the common dwelling.
In Marcus, there were four police officers present at the time the plaintiff’s
car was repossessed — the plaintiff testified there was a “circle of officers
standing in her front yard.” Id. at 822 n.11 (quotations omitted). One of the
officers “remained at the plaintiffs’ residence until the towing was completed, and
he may also have forcibly poked [the minor plaintiff].” Id. at 821. Here, by
contrast, Brooks was not present when Rogers took Price-Cornelison’s property.
Obviously he had no physical contact with Price-Cornelison or any of her
associates.
I have not discovered a single case where an officer’s long-distance,
telephonic assistance in a private repossession was held to satisfy the state action
requirement. The cases we relied upon in Marcus all involved officers being
physically present. See, e.g., Barrett, 189 F.3d at 302 (noting “no bright line has
been drawn delineating the exact point at which an officer’s presence and
activities at the scene of a repossession become state action” but “[w]hen an
officer begins to take a more active hand in the repossession, . . . a point may be
reached at which police assistance . . . may cause the repossession to take on the
character of state action”); Booker v. City of Atlanta, 776 F.2d 272, 274 (11th Cir.
1985) (concluding summary judgment was improper because a jury “could find
that [the officer’s] arrival with the repossessor gave the repossession a cachet of
legality and had the effect of intimidating [the plaintiff] into not exercising his
12
right to resist”).
Extending the majority’s analogy, a police officer assigned to “civil
standby” 9 in a domestic situation, like one called to a repossession, is expected to
keep the peace, but not take sides. Marcus, 394 F.3d at 819-20. To do so in an
emotionally charged environment where one party is required to take his (or her)
property and move out of the home might require Solomonic power. Not
surprisingly, property ownership is often at issue and the Marquis of Queensberry
rules are not universally respected. Consider this: one party removes an
expensive oil painting from the wall, claiming ownership. The other, also
claiming ownership, grabs it and a physical scuffle ensues. The officer steps in to
quell the disturbance but it is obvious, because the parties are intractable and
determined, that the physical altercation will resume unless the officer somehow
assigns temporary possession to one of the parties. How is that done without
“taking sides”?
In Marcus we said:
This area of the law is particularly fact-sensitive, so the
circumstances must be ‘examined in their totality.’ If the evidence
showed, for example, that an “officer came on the scene at the
request of the repossessor and said to the debtor, ‘don’t interfere with
this repossession,’ or ‘you know you’re not the rightful owner of [the
property],’” an officer might be liable.
...
9
Surely a prized assignment.
13
Other factors courts take into consideration include intervening at
more than one step; failing to depart before completion of the
repossession; standing in close proximity to the creditor; and
unreasonably recognizing the documentation of one party over
another. To repeat, the overarching lesson of the case law is that
officers may act to diffuse a volatile situation, but may not aid the
repossessor in such a way that the repossession would not have
occurred but for their assistance.
Id. at 819 (citations omitted). Certainly the caution about fact sensitivity and the
need for a global approach are well taken. But repossession cases are aided by
the U.C.C.’s protection of the status quo, which is not replicated in domestic
cases. That makes the calculus even more difficult. For those reasons I would
normally be loath to extend the Marcus holding to a domestic case. But on these
peculiar facts, I see no alternative.
I agree with the majority that Brooks crossed the line on October 16 if he
threatened to arrest Price-Cornelison if she returned to her house to prevent
Rogers from taking her property. 10 By this threat (if made), Brooks, like the
officers in Marcus, arguably aided Rogers’ seizure by precluding Price-
Cornelison from exercising self-help to prevent Rogers from either removing the
property or by observing and documenting the property removed. However, I
cannot reconcile myself to another of the majority’s observations.
10
Price-Cornelison claims Brooks told her he would arrest her if she went
to her property while Rogers was there. Brooks says he told her she could be
arrested if she went to the property and interfered with Rogers’ right to remove
her (Rogers’) property. In this appeal we must accept Price-Cornelison’s version
of events.
14
Had Brooks simply refused or failed to respond to Price-Cornelison’s
request for assistance in restraining Rogers’ activities, this seizure claim would
not lie. 11 With that in mind, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that
Brooks’ ill-considered advice (informing Price-Cornelison the property was
community property and Rogers was entitled to take what she wanted until the
emergency protective order went into effect) might be an actionable element of a
seizure claim. His statements, whether or not correct, do not constitute the type
of affirmative state action that can support a § 1983 seizure claim. It is not
coercive – Price-Cornelison could and should have rejected it as unsolicited and
unprofessional legal advice. Moreover, she had her own actively involved
attorney to turn to for such advice. And Rogers could not have taken
encouragement from the statements since she was not privy to the conversation.
In summary, I join the majority opinion with respect to the emergency
protective order (reversing the district court’s denial of qualified immunity), I
dissent from that part of the decision with respect to the permanent protective
order (affirming the district court’s denial of qualified immunity) and I concur in
the result with respect to the seizure claim.
11
Nor would a § 1983 complaint based upon procedural or substantive due
process. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005)
(procedural); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195, 202 (1989) (substantive).
15