FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 21, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-5088
(D.C. No. 4:89-CR-00091-HDC-5)
REGGIE LEROY, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Reggie Leroy, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
modify his sentence based on Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). We exercise jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
A jury convicted Mr. Leroy and several codefendants of conspiring to
knowingly and intentionally distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine). He was
sentenced to 320 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed
and his sentence was remanded for the district court to make the necessary
findings on the record. United States v. Leroy, 944 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1991).
On remand, the district court again sentenced Mr. Leroy to 320 months, which
was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Leroy, 984 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Leroy’s sentence was based on a drug quantity of four kilograms of
cocaine base. His Guidelines sentence was calculated using the 1988 version of
the Guidelines. 1 Under that version, his base offense level was 36. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(a)(3) (1988). With an increase of two levels for possession of a firearm
and other dangerous weapons, and two additional levels for managing the
conspiracy, the total offense level was 40, with a sentencing range of 292 to 365
months. Mr. Leroy’s 320-month sentence was within that range.
Mr. Leroy filed his motion for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) based
on Amendment 706 of the Guidelines. “The Guidelines, through Amendment
706, generally adjust downward by two levels the base offense level assigned to
1
The district court’s order indicates that the 1989 version was applied, but it
is the 1988 version that states the base offense level as 36 for Mr. Leroy’s drug
quantity. See R. Vol. III at 6 (presentence report showing base offense level
of 36).
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quantities of crack cocaine. Amendment 706 took effect November 1, 2007 and
was made retroactive as of March 3, 2008.” United States v. Sharkey,
No. 08-3115, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 4482893, at *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2008).
But the base offense level for four kilograms of cocaine base was increased after
Mr. Leroy was sentenced. For example, the 1989 Guidelines directed a base
offense level of 38 for four kilograms of cocaine base. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3)
(1989).
It is undisputed that under the 1988 Guidelines, Mr. Leroy’s base offense
level was 36. It is further undisputed that under Amendment 706, his base
offense level is also 36. Adding the enhancements, both adjusted Guideline levels
are 40. Because application of Amendment 706 results in no change to
Mr. Leroy’s Guidelines level, the district court denied his motion to reduce his
sentence.
Mr. Leroy appeals. He maintains that despite the fact that Amendment 706
did not lower his base offense level, the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to reduce his sentence. He also contends that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to consider his postconviction conduct. In addition, he
maintains that the district court’s refusal to reconsider his sentence ran afoul of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Kimbrough v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), because the district court merely re-imposed the original
sentence without recognizing that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory.
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Legal Standards and Analysis
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the
sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). “We review for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).”
Sharkey, 2008 WL 4482893, at *2. We construe liberally pleadings filed by
pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Amendment 706 lowered the base offense level for drug offenses involving
crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2007); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend.
706 (Nov. 1, 2007). When, as here, a “motion for sentence reduction is not a
direct appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the viability of [the]
motion depends entirely on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” Smartt, 129 F.3d at 540
(quotation and brackets omitted). As applicable to Mr. Leroy’s situation,
§ 3582(c) allows the court to modify a sentence only if the sentencing range is
subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission.
A reduction of a defendant’s sentence “is not consistent with [the
Sentencing Commission’s] policy statement and therefore is not authorized under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)” if the amended drug-quantity table “does not have the
effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2008). Amendment 706 has no effect on the Guideline
Mr. Leroy was sentenced under; accordingly, his motion for relief pursuant to
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§ 3582(c)(2) was properly denied. Cf. Sharkey, 2008 WL 4482893, at *2 (holding
a reduction in defendant’s sentence as a career offender was not authorized under
§ 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 706 did not lower his applicable Guideline
range under the career-offender Guidelines).
Turning to Mr. Leroy’s claim that the district court erred by not considering
his exemplary postconviction conduct, we first note that he did not raise this
claim in the district court. Consequently, we do not consider it. See United
States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 837 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding defendant waived
alleged factual inaccuracies in presentence report by failing to raise them in
district court). Moreover, because the district court did not resentence Mr. Leroy,
it had no occasion to consider his rehabilitation. Finally, although this claim
arguably may fall within § 3582(c)(1)(A), such a claim must be brought by the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, a requirement not met here. Smartt, 129 F.3d
at 541.
Mr. Leroy also asserts that the district court failed to recognize that the
Guidelines are not mandatory, in violation of the Booker line of cases, and
therefore the court abused its discretion by imposing the same Guidelines
sentence. This court has held that § 3582(c)(2) motions may not be used to
present Booker claims seeking resentencing simply because Booker rendered the
Guidelines advisory. See United States v. Price, 438 F.3d 1005, 1007 & n.2
(10th Cir. 2006). In addition, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 provides:
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In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the
defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
this policy statement is warranted, the court . . . shall substitute only
the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding
guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was
sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions
unaffected.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, § 3582(c)(2) permits
the court to consider only whether Mr. Leroy is entitled to a two-level offense
reduction under Amendment 706, not to reevaluate his sentence under the
Guidelines.
The district court’s order denying Mr. Leroy’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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