FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 9, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE ARMANDO TREJO-MOLINA, No. 07-1126
AKA Jose Trejo-Molina, a/k/a Jose (D.C. No. 06-CV-00443-EWN)
Armando Molina, a/k/a Jose Armando, (D. Colo.)
a/k/a Jose Trejo, a/k/a Jose Molina,
a/k/a Jose Armando Trejo, a/k/a Jose
Armando Trego, a/k/a Fernando
Martinez, a/k/a Alejandro Pulido,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, Chief Judge, TYMKOVICH and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Jose Armando Trejo-Molina, a Colorado federal
prisoner appearing through counsel, was charged in a one-count indictment with
Illegal Reentry After Deportation Subsequent to an Aggravated Felony
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with F ED . R. A PP . P. 32.1 and 10th
C IR . R. 32.1. After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this matter. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a); 10th
C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The Presentence
Report (“PSR”) computed his sentencing range under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) to be 57 to 71
months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced him to 57 months. Mr.
Trejo-Molina challenges his conviction and sentence. Exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Trejo-Molina pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement with
the government, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to the one-count indictment in
exchange for the government’s agreement that (1) he should receive a two-point
reduction in the offense level for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and that (2) the government would move the court for an
additional one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1(b). The PSR stated that the base offense level was eight, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a), and that a 16-point upward adjustment would apply for
being a deported alien previously convicted of a crime of violence, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The district court found Mr. Trejo-Molina’s
criminal history category to be IV, which resulted in an advisory guideline range
of 57 to 71 months.
Neither party objected at sentencing to the PSR’s factual recitations or
sentencing computations. Mr. Trejo-Molina did request, however, a downward
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variance. As grounds, he argued that the prior crime-of-violence conviction was
old (i.e., seventeen years old) and that it produced allegedly illogical sentencing
effects because it was a California “Wobbler” offense. The felony or
misdemeanor status of such offenses apparently was dependent on the actual
sentence imposed and Mr. Trejo-Molina alleged that it was illogical that his
conviction, for which he was sentenced to probation, should be deemed a felony.
R., Vol. II, Tr. at 3-5 (Sentencing Hearing, dated Mar. 23, 2007). The district
court expressly acknowledged these arguments but determined, under the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), that it was appropriate to sentence Mr. Trejo-
Molina at the bottom of the Guidelines range.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Trejo-Molina’s counsel (who also represented him in the district court)
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and
seeks to withdraw. Anders teaches that “if counsel finds his case to be wholly
frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court
and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal.” Id. at 744. Mr. Trejo-Molina’s counsel concluded that this
appeal is frivolous in that no substantive grounds for appeal exist. Mr. Trejo-
Molina had the opportunity to file a brief in response to his counsel’s brief, but
did not do so.
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We have conducted an independent review of the record and agree with Mr.
Trejo-Molina’s counsel. There are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. Because
Mr. Trejo-Molina pleaded guilty and did not go to trial, we reach that conclusion
after examining his guilty plea and his sentencing. Given our assessment, it is
appropriate to permit Mr. Trejo-Molina’s counsel to withdraw.
A. The Guilty Plea
In order for a guilty plea to be valid, it must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. See, e.g., United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.
1998). Generally, district courts are required, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to specifically ensure that a defendant understands: the
nature of the charge; the maximum possible penalties, as well as any mandatory
minimum prison terms; the rights attendant to a jury trial, including the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and
to testify and present evidence on his own behalf; the right to be protected from
compelled self-incrimination; and, further, that his trial rights are waived if the
court accepts his guilty plea, and the court is obliged to calculate and consider the
applicable Guidelines sentencing range. F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1). A district
court is also required to personally address the defendant as to the voluntariness
of his plea and determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. F ED . R. C RIM .
P. 11(b)(2)-(3). From our careful review of the record, it is readily apparent that
the district court fully complied with all of Rule 11’s requirements and we are
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aware of no other grounds upon which to question the propriety of Mr. Trejo-
Molina’s plea proceeding. Accordingly, we uphold his conviction.
B. Sentencing
We recently outlined the standards that govern our review of sentences:
On appeal, we review sentences for reasonableness, which has
both procedural and substantive dimensions. That is, we
consider both the length of the sentence, as well as the method
by which the sentence was calculated. A sentence is
procedurally reasonable when the district court computes the
applicable Guidelines range, properly considers the § 3553(a)
factors, and affords the defendant his rights under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. A sentence is substantively
reasonable when the length of the sentence reflects the gravity
of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.
United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 898 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). “[A] within-Guidelines
sentence is entitled to a presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.
The defendant may rebut this presumption by showing that his sentence is
unreasonable in light of the sentencing factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, __F.3d__, No. 07-3327, 2008 WL 4866609,
*4 (10th Cir. Nov. 12, 2008) (citations omitted).
It is beyond peradventure that the district court did not commit procedural
or substantive error in sentencing Mr. Trejo-Molina. 1 Regarding the procedure,
1
Mr. Trejo-Molina did not object to the district court’s procedure in
calculating his sentence. “As a general rule, when a defendant fails to preserve
(continued...)
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with the explicit approval of Mr. Trejo-Molina, the district court relied upon the
PSR’s computations in determining the Guidelines sentencing range and no error
is apparent in those computations. The court then thoroughly considered the §
3553(a) factors in its assessment of “the kinds of sentences available and the
sentencing range established by the guidelines.” R., Vol. II, Tr. at 8. As for Mr.
Trejo-Molina’s request for a downward variance, the district court expressly
acknowledged the two bases for it—the age of Mr. Trejo-Molina’s conviction and
the allegedly “unusual” effects of California’s “Wobbler” statute—and
entertained arguments from Mr. Trejo-Molina in support of his request. Id. at 3-
6, 9. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that a sentence within the
Guidelines range was appropriate, noting that Mr. Trejo-Molina “has a serious
criminal history [including several prior felony convictions] and it is worth
imposing a guideline sentence to protect the public.” Id. at 9. In addition, in
light of Mr. Trejo-Molina’s recidivism, the court stressed the need to impose a
1
(...continued)
an objection to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, we review only for
plain error.” Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at 899 (citing United States v.
Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 319 (2007)).
However, we have no need to undertake a full plain error analysis because it is
patent that any procedural challenge by Mr. Trejo-Molina fails at the first step of
plain error—viz., there is no error. When a defendant’s challenge is to the length
of his sentence, he need not object before the district court to preserve the
challenge. See United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir.
2006). But we conclude on the substantive front, as well, that the district court
committed no sentencing error.
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significant prison term to deter him. Id. (“Maybe this time he will finally get it if
he serves a substantial prison term.”).
Our precedent clearly establishes that the district court’s sentencing
procedure was sound and free from error. See Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at
902-04; United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1289-90 n.18 (10th Cir. 2008).
Regarding any substantive challenge to the length of his sentence, Mr. Trejo-
Molina would need to be able to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that
attaches to his low-end, within-Guidelines sentence by reference to § 3553(a)
factors, and we discern no grounds that would allow him to do so. See United
States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we uphold
his sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Trejo-Molina’s conviction and
sentence and GRANT the motion of Mr. Trejo-Molina’s counsel to withdraw.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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