FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 5, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-2279
EMIGDIO TREJO-NOLASQUEZ, (D.C. No. CR-08-01692-WJ-1)
(D.N. Mex.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McWILLIAMS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Emigdio Trejo-Nolasquez pled guilty to illegally re-entering the
United States after having been deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and
(b). The district court sentenced him to 37 months’ imprisonment, a sentence
which was at the bottom of his advisory Sentencing Guideline range. On appeal,
Trejo-Nolasquez argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
the district court erred in applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when it denied
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
his request for a downward variance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We agree with the government’s argument that Trejo-Nolasquez has
waived his right to appeal, and dismiss this appeal. 1
I.
Trejo-Nolasquez pled guilty without entering into a plea agreement with the
government. Prior to sentencing he did, however, sign a waiver of his appeal
rights and any post-conviction challenges to his sentence in exchange for the
government agreeing to an additional one-point reduction in his Sentencing
Guideline offense level. The waiver stated in its entirety:
The Defendant, EMIDGDIO TREJO-NOLASQUEZ, is aware
that federal law affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence
imposed. Acknowledging that right, the Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed that is
within or below the Sentencing Guideline range that is applicable to
the Defendant.
In addition, the Defendant agrees to waive any other collateral
attack to the Defendant’s conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
except that the Defendant specifically reserves the right to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel through the district court, if the
Defendant elects to raise such a claim. No other issue is reserved.
In exchange for this waiver of appeal rights and post-
conviction challenges, the United States agrees that the total offense
level shall be reduced an additional one level.
I have read this waiver of appeal rights and have carefully
reviewed every aspect of it with my attorney in my native language.
I understand this waiver and I knowingly and voluntarily sign it in
the presence of the Court.
1
Although it is preferred that the government file a motion to enforce an
appeal waiver before briefing commences, failure to file such a motion “does not
preclude a party from raising the issue in a merits brief.” See Tenth Cir. R.
27.2(A)(1)(d), (2), (3).
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ROA, Vol. 1, Doc. 21 at 1. This agreement resulted in the lowering of Trejo-
Nolasquez’s applicable Guideline range from 41 to 51 months to 37 to 46 months.
At sentencing, where a Spanish speaking interpreter was in attendance, Trejo-
Nolasquez’s attorney presented this written agreement to the district court. While
the district court did engage in a brief conversation with defense counsel
regarding the waiver, it never directly addressed Trejo-Nolasquez about it. Trejo-
Nolasquez contends on appeal that the district court’s failure to engage him in a
colloquy regarding the appeal waiver, coupled with the fact that the waiver and
the sentencing hearing were in English and not his native tongue, render his
waiver unenforceable.
II.
In determining whether to enforce a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights
this court must determine: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope
of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the appellant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315,
1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
A. Scope of Waiver
When considering an appeal brought subsequent to a defendant executing
an agreement to waive his appellate rights, this court must first determine whether
the appeal in question falls within the scope of the waiver. Hahn, 359 F.3d at
3
1325. The waiver Trejo-Nolasquez signed explicitly stated that he waived his
right to appeal any sentence imposed within or below the applicable Sentencing
Guideline range. The district court sentenced Trejo-Nolasquez to a term within
his applicable Guideline range and thus his instant appeal, which challenges the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, is unquestionably within the
scope of the waiver that he signed.
B. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver
We next address whether the defendant’s waiver was knowing and
voluntary. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. The appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement.
Id. at 1329. In addressing this question, we examine whether the written waiver
contains language indicating that the defendant entered into the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 1325. As appeal waivers are usually obtained
as part of a plea agreement, we normally also consider the existence and adequacy
of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy in making this
determination. Id. Here, however, Trejo-Nolasquez pled guilty without the
benefit of a plea agreement and did not present his appellate waiver to the district
court until sentencing. We are left then with only the written appellate waiver
and the sentencing transcript when determining whether Trejo-Nolasquez’s waiver
of his appellate rights was knowing and voluntary.
The waiver signed by Trejo-Nolasquez explicitly states that he read and
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carefully reviewed every aspect of it with his attorney in his native language and
that he both knowingly and voluntarily signed it in the presence of the court and
knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights. At sentencing, the district
court did not, however, question Trejo-Nolasquez directly regarding the waiver.
Instead, the court merely affirmed that defense counsel had reviewed it with him.
Trejo-Nolasquez relies on this absence of a colloquy and on the fact that the
sentencing proceedings and the waiver were both in English—a language in which
he is not fluent—to support his position that his waiver was not made knowingly
and voluntarily.
Trejo-Nolasquez’s argument is unpersuasive. We have the unique
circumstance here that Trejo-Nolasquez entered his plea without the benefit of a
plea agreement and before the appellate waiver was executed. Given this
chronology of events, the Rule 11 provisions which require the court to engage
the defendant in a colloquy when taking a plea or accepting a plea agreement
were not triggered here when the appeal was presented to the court. Even given
that significant distinction, we find persuasive a case in which we addressed a
defendant’s argument that a language barrier resulted in an unknowing and
involuntary plea where Rule 11 did apply.
In United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1220-23 (10th Cir.
2008), the defendant was a Mexican citizen and spoke Spanish. 517 F.3d at 1223.
The district court conducted a Rule 11 plea colloquy in English, but used an
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interpreter. Id. at 1223. During the course of the colloquy, however, the
magistrate judge erroneously stated that the maximum penalty for the offense was
ten years when in fact that was the mandatory minimum penalty. Id. at 1220.
This was a clear violation of Rule 11(b)(1). Id. We noted, however, that the
defendant “failed to indicate during the district court proceedings—either at the
Rule 11 hearing, the sentencing hearing, or otherwise—that her inability to speak
or read English compromised her understanding of the plea agreement” and went
on to hold that “[b]ecause the parties had already entered into their Rule 11
agreement, the magistrate judge’s statement could not have created such
ambiguity as to undermine the ‘knowing and voluntariness’ of [the] Defendant’s
plea agreement.” Id. at 1223.
Similarly, Trejo-Nolasquez had the benefit of a translator at both his plea
and sentencing hearings, and though there was a brief miscommunication between
him and the court at his plea hearing, he failed to indicate at any time during
either hearing that his inability to speak or read English compromised his ability
to understand the proceedings or his waiver agreement. Further, in stark contrast
to the sentencing court in Ibarra-Coronel, the district court in the instant case
made no misleading statements and in fact accurately noted that Trejo-Nolasquez
had formally waived his right to appeal his sentence. This, coupled with the
explicit language of the waiver which stated that it had been reviewed with Trejo-
Nolasquez in his native language and the district court’s confirmation that counsel
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had reviewed it with him prior to sentencing, leads us to conclude that Trejo-
Nolasquez has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that his waiver was not
knowing and voluntary.
C. No Miscarriage of Justice to Enforce Waiver
Finally, in order for us to conclude that enforcing the waiver would not
result in a miscarriage of justice we must determine that none of the following
occurred: (1) that the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race;
(2) that ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the
waiver renders it invalid; (3) that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; or
(4) that the waiver is otherwise unlawful. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327. Three of these
possibilities can be summarily rejected. Trejo-Nolasquez concedes that his
sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum and he does not allege that the
district court relied upon any impermissible factors or that there was ineffective
assistance of counsel. Trejo-Nolasquez does, however, allege that because his
waiver was not knowing and voluntary, it is therefore unlawful. This argument is
unavailing because as discussed above, Trejo-Nolasquez has failed to satisfy his
burden in this regard. Thus, we conclude it is not a miscarriage of justice to
enforce Trejo-Nolasquez’s waiver of appellate rights.
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III.
Trejo-Nolasquez has executed an enforceable waiver of his appellate rights.
His appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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