FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DARLENE R. QUINN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-6176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D.C. No. CIV-03-192-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Darlene Quinn, appearing pro se, appeals from a district court order
striking her request for post-judgment relief. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
On February 13, 2003, Quinn, appearing pro se, filed suit against the
United States. According to her complaint, Quinn informed the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in 1994 that her Social Security number was being used without her
authorization by other persons, and that those persons “were allowed to receive
tax refunds under [her] Ssn [sic].” ROA, Doc. 1 at 3. Quinn further alleged that
although the IRS informed her in 1996 that the problem had been “cleared up,”
she subsequently discovered that “[a]s of 1999 they were still using [her] Ssn
[sic].” Id.
The government moved to dismiss Quinn’s complaint, arguing that it was
“devoid of any allegations, that the [district court] lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the purported suit, and that the . . . complaint fail[ed] to state a
claim upon which relief c[ould] be granted.” Id., Doc. 6 at 1. Quinn, in her
response to the government’s motion, cited a host of federal statutes and
regulations, including the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a), that
purportedly supported her claims.
On July 10, 2003, the district court issued an order granting the
government’s motion and dismissing Quinn’s complaint “without prejudice to
refiling.” ROA, Doc. 10 at 13. In its order, the district court noted that “[o]f all
the statutes cited by” Quinn, “the only one which potentially confer[red] a private
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right of action, and offer[ed] a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, [wa]s the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights,” but that Quinn’s complaint “fail[ed] to state a claim for
relief under that statute.” Id. Although Quinn filed an amended complaint on
July 29, 2003, the district court dismissed it on November 6, 2003, on essentially
the same grounds as the original complaint.
Quinn appealed the district court’s order dismissing her amended
complaint. On April 5, 2004, this court affirmed the district court’s decision.
Quinn v. United States, No. 03-6518 (Apr. 5, 2004). Although Quinn filed a
petition for rehearing, that petition was denied on May 27, 2004.
In late August and early September of 2004, Quinn filed a series of
pleadings with the district court entitled “Motion for Newly Discovered
Evidence,” “Petition for Rehearing,” and “Motion for Sua Sponte Summary
Judgment Now.” On September 17, 2004, the district court issued an order
denying Quinn’s motions. The district court emphasized in doing so, as it had in
its earlier orders, that Quinn “ha[d] not alleged or offered evidence of any acts
which would support a claim of reckless or intentional disregard of the Tax Code
by Internal Revenue Service employees in the course of collecting taxes,” and
thus she “ha[d] failed to state a claim under the federal Taxpayer Bill of Rights . .
. .” ROA, Doc. 32 at 1. The district court further noted that Quinn “ha[d]
likewise failed to establish an alternative basis for the waiver of the
Government’s sovereign immunity . . . .” Id.
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On May 20, 2005, Quinn filed a pleading entitled “Motion for New
Evidence - Evidence Withheld from the Court and Plaintiff Sua Sponte.” On June
16, 2005, the district court issued an order denying Quinn’s motion. The court
noted in its order that the motion failed to “identify or offer any new evidence in
support of [Quinn’s] claims.” Id., Doc. 34 at 1. The court further reiterated that
Quinn “ha[d] failed to state a claim under the federal Taxpayer Bill of Rights,”
“ha[d] failed to establish an alternative basis for the waiver of the Government’s
sovereign immunity,” and “ha[d] not shown that she [wa]s entitled to relief from
the Court’s judgment under Rule 60(b), or to a new trial under Rule 59(b), or to
summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. Pro.” Id. at 2.
On July 8, 2008, Quinn filed with the district court a series of
miscellaneous documents, including copies of correspondence that she had
previously sent to the IRS and members of Congress regarding the unauthorized
use of her Social Security number. On July 29, 2008, the district court issued an
order stating: “Pleading No. 35 [the series of miscellaneous documents] filed in
this case is stricken because this is a closed case and because the pleading is
nonsensical.” Id., Doc. 36 at 1. On August 12, 2008, Quinn filed a notice of
appeal from the district court’s order.
II.
Because Quinn is proceeding pro se, we construe her pleadings and filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Doing so, we
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construe the series of miscellaneous documents that she filed with the district
court as a request for post-judgment relief. In turn, we construe the district
court’s striking of those documents as a denial of post-judgment relief.
After carefully reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. See Servants of Paraclete v. Does,
204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying abuse of discretion standard to
district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) motion). As the district court noted, the
documents filed by Quinn are, whether viewed individually or as a group,
nonsensical. Moreover, as the district court also noted, the issues asserted by
Quinn in her original and amended complaints have been fully and repeatedly
addressed by the district court and this court. Thus, we see no basis upon which
Quinn could successfully obtain post-judgment relief.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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