FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 3, 2009
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ADAM FLETCHER YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-6271
JOEL DAVIS, Agent/FBI and/or DEA;
RANDALL R. RIEGER, Agent, ICE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WESTERN OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 5:07-CV-00761-D)
Submitted on the brief: *
Adam Fletcher Young, Pro Se.
Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Adam Fletcher Young, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se,
appeals the dismissal of his claim for false arrest/false imprisonment brought
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court determined that Mr. Young’s claim was
time-barred. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the
dismissal of his claim.
I. Background
On July 9, 2007, Mr. Young filed his complaint, alleging that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by federal agents Joel Davis and Randall Reiger.
He asserted that, on January 26, 2005, defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned
him at Enid Municipal Airport in Enid, Oklahoma, and then forced him to submit
to continuing arrest and imprisonment by local Enid police officers. Mr. Young
alleged also that Defendant Davis gave false and misleading testimony at his
preliminary hearing in the ensuing criminal case, which caused him to be bound
over for trial on July 18, 2005.
A magistrate judge screened Mr. Young’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and issued a report recommending that the complaint be dismissed as
time-barred. In his report, the magistrate judge explained that the public docket
sheet for the criminal case resulting from Mr. Young’s arrest, which is a matter of
public record, showed that Mr. Young’s first appearance before a magistrate
occurred on January 28, 2005, at which time bond was set at $500,000. The
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magistrate judge used this date as the accrual date for Mr. Young’s claim.
Mr. Young acknowledged in his objections that he received a bail hearing on
January 28 during which he was informed of the charges against him and his bond
amount was set. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that this was
the point at which “legal process was initiated against [Mr. Young],” and the
statute of limitations began to run from that date. R. Doc. 13 at 4. The district
court concluded that Mr. Young’s claim was time-barred because he had not filed
it within two years from January 28, 2005, the date that he appeared before a
judicial officer and was lawfully detained. The district court dismissed
Mr. Young’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Mr. Young appeals from that
decision.
II. Standard of Review
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a legal question we review de novo.
McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). “We must accept all the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d
1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “We review the complaint for
plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” KT & G Corp. v. Att’y Gen.,
535 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citation omitted).
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III. Discussion
“A Bivens action is subject to the limitation period for an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that limitation period is set by the personal injury statute in
the state where the cause of action accrues.” Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236,
1238 (10th Cir. 2007). In Oklahoma, the limitations period for a personal injury
action is two years. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).
Mr. Young argues that his claim did not accrue until July 18, 2005, when
he was bound over for trial, relying on Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389
(2007). In Wallace, the Supreme Court held that a claim for false arrest/false
imprisonment accrues when the victim becomes held pursuant to legal process,
“for example, [when] he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.”
See id. at 389-90. Mr. Young argues alternatively that the accrual date should be
tolled until July 18, 2005, because he did not have access to a law library or other
legal resources during the time period from his arrest on January 26 to the hearing
on July 18.
In Wallace, the Court explained that the tort of false arrest/false
imprisonment arises out of detention without legal process, whereas the tort of
malicious prosecution arises out of detention after the wrongful institution of
legal process. Id. The district court concluded that Mr. Young’s allegation
regarding Defendant Davis’s false testimony at the July 18 hearing, which caused
him to be bound over for trial, did not support his claim for false arrest but,
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instead, would be attributable to a claim for wrongful institution of legal process.
The district court noted, however, that Mr. Young made clear in his objections to
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that he was not raising a claim
based on any torts other than false arrest/false imprisonment. Mr. Young has not
raised any issue on appeal with respect to the district court’s conclusion on this
matter.
A. Claim Accrual Date
The district court correctly decided that Mr. Young became held pursuant
to legal process on January 28, 2005. Mr. Young was arrested without a warrant.
In a warrantless arrest situation, “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975). The public
docket sheet from Mr. Young’s criminal case, which he attached to his objections
to the magistrate judge’s report, shows that on January 28, the same day he
received his bond hearing, a judge made a finding of probable cause to further
detain him. Although a probable cause determination by a judicial officer was not
given as one of the examples of legal process in Wallace, the Court was not
providing a complete list of situations that could constitute the initiation of legal
process. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389.
In Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008), this court
identified another example of the institution of legal process–an arrest warrant.
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An arrest warrant and the probable cause determination by a judicial officer after
a warrantless arrest are essentially the same legal process, except that one occurs
prior to arrest and the other occurs after. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 (holding
that states must provide a probable cause determination “for any significant
pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial
officer either before or promptly after arrest.”); cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 143 (1979) (“Since an adversary hearing is not required, and since the
probable cause standard for pretrial detention is the same as that for arrest, a
person arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of
probable-cause is not constitutionally entitled to a separate judicial determination
that there is probable cause to detain him pending trial.”). Because there was a
judicial determination of probable cause on January 28, 2005, Mr. Young became
lawfully detained pursuant to legal process at that point, and the statute of
limitations began to run on his false arrest/false imprisonment claim.
Mr. Young’s complaint was not filed until July 9, 2007, more than two years after
his cause of action accrued. Accordingly, the district court was correct in
dismissing his claim as being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
B. Equitable Tolling
The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Young did not present any
factual circumstances that would justify equitable tolling. “[S]tate law governs
the application of tolling in a [federal] civil rights action.” Alexander v.
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Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004). “In general, Oklahoma permits
the tolling of a statute of limitations in two circumstances.” Id. The first
circumstance is the existence of a legal disability, which has been applied in cases
where a plaintiff’s competency is impaired or where the plaintiff has not yet
reached the age of majority. Id. The second circumstance is when “defendants
engage in false, fraudulent or misleading conduct calculated to lull plaintiffs into
sitting on their rights.” Id. (quotation omitted). This court noted also that “[i]n
the appropriate case, exceptional circumstances may justify tolling a statute of
limitations.” Id. at 1219. Mr. Young’s allegations do not fit within any of these
circumstances.
Mr. Young argues on appeal that he did not know either the elements of the
crime with which he was charged or the requirements for a warrantless arrest until
July 18, and, therefore, his cause of action for false arrest/false imprisonment
could not accrue until that date. Mr. Young’s insufficient knowledge of these
issues has no bearing on the accrual date for his claim. See id. at 1219 n.6.
Mr. Young’s cause of action accrued at the earliest when he was arrested, see
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, and at the latest when legal process was initiated
against him two days later, see id. at 389-90. There is nothing about these factual
circumstances that would trigger tolling under Oklahoma law–no legal disability,
no fraudulent concealment, and no exceptional circumstances.
Mr. Young argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled for the
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period that he did not have access to a law library from January 26, 2005, until
July 18, 2005. As this court explained in Alexander, “the Oklahoma discovery
rule tolls the statute of limitations until an injured party knows of, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of or discovered the injury,
and resulting cause of action.” 382 F.3d at 1217 (quotation omitted). Mr. Young
fails to explain how his lack of access to a law library during this six-month
period prevented him from timely filing his complaint eighteen months later,
before the statute of limitations expired on January 28, 2007. He has not shown
that he pursued his claims with reasonable diligence and therefore is not entitled
to equitable tolling.
In the federal habeas context, as with the Oklahoma discovery rule, this
court has concluded that the statute of limitations may be tolled for extraordinary
circumstances, but tolling is only appropriate when an inmate diligently pursues
his claim. Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). In Miller, the
petitioner argued that he could not timely file his claim because he lacked access
to federal statutes and Colorado case law during the two-year period of time that
he was housed in a private correctional facility in Minnesota. This court noted
that “this did not explain Mr. Miller’s lack of pursuit of his federal claims before
the transfer from Colorado to Minnesota, from October 4, 1993 until January 20,
1995.” Id. This court affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Miller’s complaint as
untimely because Mr. Miller had not provided any “specificity regarding the
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alleged lack of access and the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal
claims.” Id. As in Miller, Mr. Young has not provided sufficient specificity
about the alleged lack of access and his attempts to diligently pursue his claims.
Mr. Young’s alleged lack of law library access during six months of the two-year
statute of limitations period does not present circumstances establishing eligibility
for equitable tolling.
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Young’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Mr. Young is reminded that he must
continue making partial payments until the filing fee is paid in full.
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